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ABSTRACT 
The subject of this thesis is the emergence and development of crisis and peace processes in 
modern society. It examines two Greek-Turkish crises and several peace processes 
undertaken in their aftermath as well as what is described here as a system of co-operation 
that emerged after a devastating earthquake in Turkey. Mainstream theory of crisis and peace 
processes has adopted an instrumental approach to crisis and peace processes conceptualizing 
them as the means to achieve specific aims. Nevertheless, this approach recognizes the 
difficulty it has to integrate different levels of analysis and explain the dynamics of the 
complexity involved in these phenomena. 
This thesis employs Niklas Luhmann's theory of social autopoiesis as an analytical tool in the 
research and analysis of crisis and peace processes. Luhmann's theory is a radical 
constructivist approach, which focuses on multiple causality, complexity and contingency. 
The main argument of the thesis is that in modern society, which is functionally, not 
hierarchically, differentiated, crisis and peace processes are autopoietic that is self-reproduced 
social systems which are constituted through communication. The findings of this thesis 
demonstrate that crisis and peace processes involve not only segments of the society like 
leaders and elites but they are selections made by the whole of modern society in the course 
of its blind evolution which is based on the variation and selection of communication. Society 
consists of autonomous but interconnected function systems like politics, media, the military 
and civil society organizations, which operate guided by already established social structures 
such as expectations, values, social practices, institutions, roles and persons. Social systems 
increase complexity and contingency in society through their normal operations. Given the 
appropriate conditioning, increased complexity can enforce the emergence of crisis or peace 
processes as combined selectivity towards the direction of conflict or co-operation. 
This thesis demonstrates that in a self-organizing society crisis and peace processes cannot be 
reduced to a particular reason or rationale like the protection of national interests or the desire 
for peace. Their dynamics depend on the connectivity and selectivity of communication about 
crisis/conflict and peace/co-operation. Thus, these processes are neither necessary nor 
impossible; they are contingent. 
This thesis demonstrates that Luhmann's theory provides us with sophisticated tools to 
explore the processes and the mechanisms involved in the emergence and development of 
crisis and peace processes. The project is based on fieldwork conducted from 1999 to 2002 in 
both Turkey and Greece and which involved the collection of primary source material 
gathered from more than 80 interviews with Greek and Turkish politicians, diplomats, 
journalists, academics, civil society representatives and military officers. It also covers an 
extensive range of theoretical and empirical secondary source literature. 
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THE LIMITS OF CRISIS AND PEACE PROCESSES THEORY: THE 
DYNAMICS OF COMPLEXITY 
Crises can arise and escalate suddenly in interstate relations and their dynamics can 
unfold quickly within or outside a protracted conflict. They can be recurring in the 
relations between two states and they can spread in a crazy-quilt fashion, and 
culminate in violence or `wind down'. The road to peace on the other hand can be 
short and abrupt with unexpected turnings or it can be long and drag on for years with 
sticking points. Often crisis and peace processes alternate in the relations between two 
states in conflict. 
The crying need to deal with international conflict through peaceful means - 
especially during the nuclear era - and the potential of a crisis to lead to violence 
explains the increased interest in the research and analysis of these phenomena. More 
often than not, crisis and peace processes are examined separately. In this thesis, 
however, it is argued that by studying them in parallel we will be able to draw some 
conclusions about common traits in their emergence and development that will help 
us to improve our understanding of their nature. 
The first chapter, in particular, is divided into four main sections. The first two 
sections present a review of the theory of crisis and peace processes seeking to 
highlight the uses and limits of existing approaches. Furthermore, they define the 
problem that various theories of crisis and peace processes have to deal with, in 
relation to the dynamics of complexity of modem society. It is demonstrated that there 
are various theoretical approaches, which have explored certain aspects of the 
emergence and development of crisis and peace processes. Nevertheless, these 
sections demonstrate that it is impossible to create a comprehensive framework by 
amalgamating these different approaches. The third section concerns the analytical 
tools Greek and Turkish academics employ in order to explain the Greek-Turkish 
crises and peace processes. The fourth section revisits crisis and peace processes 
theories in general to discuss their `blind spots' that is problems in their method of 
research which, however, they cannot ̀ see' and consequently they cannot discuss the 
paradoxes their application generates. This discussion concludes by putting forth two 
correctives: First, crisis and peace processes involve society as a whole and thus their 
theories should not be confined in the description of crisis or peace processes as 
something out of society. Second, theories themselves should be considered an object 
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among the objects of their analysis because they too, make part of the dynamics of the 
complexity of modem society. 
This discussion will prepare the ground for the presentation of Luhmann's theory of 
social autopoiesis, which follows in the second chapter. 
1. Theories of Crisis Processes 
The standard definition of international crisis describes it as a situation, which 
includes three perceptions of the decision-makers of the states involved in the crisis: 
the perception of a threat to important interests, the perception of time pressure and 
the perception of high risk of war. ' Elements that some scholars add to this definition 
are the increase of stress, which impairs the quality of decision making, and - 
especially in systemic approaches - the increase of interactions. 
In what follows, the main theoretical approaches to crisis are outlined. It is 
demonstrated that each of them places the emphasis on different elements of this 
definition. Rational approaches see crisis as an instrument in a bargaining process 
where one state is looking to extract some advantage and the other perceives this as a 
threat and a challenge which it resists, even with the means of war. Psychological 
approaches look at how factors like stress and tension may affect crisis decision- 
making. Cognitive approaches to crisis explore the cognitive processes involved in the 
formation of the above three perceptions. Organizational models describe the way 
institutionalised patterns of behaviour incorporated in organizational practices may 
determine crisis decision-making. Systemic approaches explore parameters related to 
the broader environment, the international system, within which a crisis escalates. 
Finally, it is shown that the dynamics of a crisis emerge through the interaction among 
all these parameters. 
1.1. Bargaining Approaches to Crisis Processes 
Crises have been conceptualised as bargaining processes where one side tries to 
extract an advantage by the skilful use of techniques of coercion while the other 
resists it. It is considered to be one of the viable influential tactics that states have at 
their disposal. This approach is based on the conceptualisation of interstate relations 
as a struggle for power, a zero-sum game, with one loser and one winner. It further 
2 
assumes that "conflict is ubiquitous due either to the drive to dominate or the security 
dilemma of an anarchical society" 2 This approach is also known as the rational actor 
model, because the unit of analysis here is states/governments, which are taken to be 
unitary rational actors who pursue the maximisation of profits and the minimisation of 
costs. The most important assumptions of this perspective are encapsulated in 
strategic theories of deterrence. 
The basic idea of deterrence theories is that a status quo state should display its 
determination and capability against a potential aggressor. 3 The latter will attempt to 
test the first's resolve. So, "[I]f the status quo powers retreat, they will not only lose 
the specific value at stake but, more important in the long run, will encourage the 
aggressor to press harder". 4 Snyder and Diesing argue that bargaining power becomes 
"a function of perceived comparative resolve". 5 
Strategists like Schelling, define escalation as a form of brinkmanship that is "the 
deliberate creation of a recognisable risk of war, a risk that one does not completely 
control... It means harassing and intimidating an adversary by exposing him to a 
shared risk, or deterring him by showing that if he makes a contrary move he may 
disturb us so that we slip over the brink whether we want to or not, carrying him with 
us". 6 Kahn argues that crisis bargaining is "a competition in risk taking". 7 Bueno de 
Mesquita offers a sophisticated and more recent version of the rational model. Based 
on the assumption that decision-makers are rational, and therefore are expected to be 
utility maximising actors, he argues that escalation is the function of decision-makers' 
expected utility calculations. 8 
1 Hermann, Charles, Internaional Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research, New York: Free Press, 
London: Collier Macmillan, 1972, p. 48. 
2 Groom, A. J. R, "Approaches to Conflict and Co-operation in International Relations: Lessons from 
Theory for Practice", see website, 
http: //www. ukc. ac. uk/politics/publications/j oumals/kentpapers/grooml. html 
For the understanding of interstate relations from a strategist point of view see Schelling, Thomas, The 
Strategy ofConflict, New York: O. U. P., 1963, p. 3. 
3 Williams, Phil, "Crisis Manamegement", Baylis, John, Booth, Ken, Garnett, John & Williams Phil, 
Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Concepts, New York; London: Holmes & Meier, 1987, pp. 241- 
242. 
4 Jervis, Robert, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics, Princeton N. J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1976, p. 58. 
s Snyder, Glenn H. & Diesing, Paul, ConfictAmongNations: Bargaining, Decision Making and 
System Structure in International Crises, Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 190. 
6 Schelling, Thomas, The Strategy of Conflict, p. 200. 
7 Kahn, Herman, 1965, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios, New York; London: Praeger, 1965 
r16. 
Mesquita, Bueno de, "An expected Utility Explanation of Conflict Escalation: A Preliminary 
Analysis" in Zinnes, Dina, (ed. ), Conflict Processes and the Breakdown of International System, 
Snyder and Diesing applied strategic formal models of bargaining (the `Security 
Dilemma' and the `Chicken Game') to study crisis decision-making. They ranked the 
values of the participants according to a very simple scheme, leaving out the details so 
as to illuminate the basic structure of a crisis created by the participants' ordinal 
ranking of values: win, lose, compromise, breakdown (expected costs). Nevertheless, 
their conclusion is that in most crises, at least one of the parties had not correctly 
guessed the opponent' s value rankings. For example, in 1905, Germany assumed that 
Britain would not support France and further assumed that France would be 
`Chicken'. When England, however, "did join the fray, France turned out to be 
Prisoner's Dilemma. If they had not mis-predicted British behaviour, the Germans 
would not have challenged". 9 
This is only one out of many studies which demonstrate that the rational actor model 
employed as a guide of policy-making can create paradoxes like self-fulfilling 
prophesies. 1° This explains the many criticisms against the use of this approach as a 
framework of research and analysis. Indeed, the rational actor model has been 
characterised as descriptive and intuitive rather than analytical and explanatory 
because it fails to consider the complicated ways various factors and processes 
interact in the context of a crisis. Yet, despite the progress that might have been made 
in pointing to deficiencies in this perspective, admittedly, it seems that this is the most 
widespread approach among politicians, diplomats and journalists. " Therefore, from 
the point of view of research scholars who attempt to solve the puzzles of crisis 
should examine this parameter too - what were the assumptions leaders made during a 
crisis. That does not mean that decision-makers do not try to think rationally in 
matters of foreign policy and they do not calculate the pros and cons of their 
decisions. However, a great part of the literature raises two serious objections. First, it 
challenges the view that conflict can be the best or the only way for the protection and 
promotion of the interests of a state. Second, accumulated empirical evidence 
University of Denver, 1983. See also Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap, New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1981. 
9 Snyder, Glenn H. & Diesing, Paul, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and 
Sý stem Structure in International Crises, Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 218. 
Jervis, Robert, Perceptions and Mispercetions in International Politics, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1976, pp. 76-84. See also Vasquez, John A., The Power of Power Politics, Cambridge 
University Press, 1998, pp218-219, 
" Allison, Graham & Zelikow, Philip, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, New 
York; Harlow: Longman, 1999, p. 13 and Frei, Daniel, (ed. ), Managing International Crises, Sage 
Publications, 1982, p. 38. 
4 
emphasises that there are several constraints upon leaders' capacity to make rational 
decisions - e. g. limitations related to the quantity and quality of information gathered 
by various state organizations, domestic contingencies, their personal interests, etc. 
These constraints are the subject of the theories that will be examined below. 
1.2. Psychological and Cognitive Approaches to Crisis Processes 
While strategists seem to view crises as a rational and selective calculation, other 
scholars argue that crisis decision-making is not similar to decision-making in routine 
policy making. Several authors discuss the implications of the increase of tension and 
the resultant parameter of stress on the ability of leaders to decide during the crisis. 
Nicholson, in his study on rationality and in particular, when discussing crisis, 
maintains that "the psychological pressures under which decision makers operate, 
mean that there are strong tendencies for the decision making to move further and 
further away from any principles of rationality, however weak, and result in decisions 
which are based on emotion and prejudice". 12 Wilkenfeld, Hopple Rosa and Andriole, 
in their study of international crises found that the impact of psychological factors 
increases in crises situations as compared to routine situations. 13 Holsti in his study on 
the 1914 crisis examined the constraints imposed by time in connection to stress when 
the stakes are high. 14 Janis discussed the effects of stress in connection to the 
`groupthink' phenomenon and he described dysfunctional performances of individuals 
in groups-15 These studies try to link the individual and the broader decision making 
process drawing upon knowledge from the field of psychology. 
Robert Jervis provides us with another perspective to examine crisis decision-making, 
which emphasises the cognitive processes involved therein. His seminal study on 
misperceptions in international politics, breaks down the simplified assumption of 
rational cost/benefit calculations and challenges also the `over-psychologised' 
theories of decision-making making the point that we do not need to delve "too deeply 
into individuals' psyches" in order to understand and explain leaders' attitudes. 
16 He 
12 Nicholson, Michael, Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict, Cambridge 
University 
Press, 1992, p. 135. 
13 Wilkenfeld, Jonathan, Hopple, Gerald W., Rossa, Paul J. & Andriole, Stephen J., Foreign 
Policy 
Behavior: The Interstate Behavior Analysis Model, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1980. 
14 Holsti, Ole, R., "The 1914 Case", American Political Science Review, 59,1965, p. 
365. See also 
Holsti, Ole R., in Tetlock et al., (eds. ), Crisis Decision-Making in Behavior 
Society and Nuclear War, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 
15 Janis, Irving L., Stress, Attitudes and Decisions, New York, Praeger, 
1982. 
16 Jervis, Robert, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics, p. 
3. 
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argues that part of the immediate causes of leaders' behaviour is related to the 
perceptions leaders hold about their state and the world. To understand and explain 
crucial decisions, he says, we must explore the cognitive processes involved. His 
research and analysis demonstrates that decisions that escalate a crisis and lead to war 
often emerge through misperceptions. '? 
Jervis found that in times of crises leaders see what they expect to see because they 
usually avoid information contradictory to the image they have already acquired about 
the other side (selective perception) or diminish its importance and rely upon the 
knowledge they already have (selective recall). 18 This perspective satisfies the human 
need to keep what one knows, believes and considers consistent. Irrational 
consistency is another cognitive process that can have an effect on crisis decision- 
making. It means that people recall many reasons to support their view although there 
is not necessarily a link among the different reasons. 19 
Furthermore, Jervis argues that one of the perceptions leaders frequently follow is the 
power politics practices encapsulated in deterrence theories. His research reveals that 
leaders, who use deterrence theories as a guide of action, may consider a first strike 
and escalate a crisis by setting off spirals of fear on the other side. 20 Deterrence 
policies may set in motion arms races, which can get out of hand, driven by their own 
dynamics. Leng and Wheeler' s more recent research corroborates the view that 
bullying strategies tend to escalate disputes to war while reciprocating tactics can be 
the means to avoid war. 21 
Similar observations appear in many empirical studies on a number of crises. Ole 
Holsti, Robert North and Richard Brody in their study of the crisis of 191422 and 
Lebow in his study of 26 interstate crises, emphasise that cognitive closure can be a 
source of misperception, which can impair rational decision-making. 23 
Davis and Wolf developed a cognitive process model of decision-making where they 
discuss the role of cognitive processes in crisis de-escalation. 
"Jervis, Robert, "Hypotheses on Misperception", World Politics. 20 (April 1968), 454-479. 
18 Jervis, Robert, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics, p. 145. 
19 ibid., p. 128. 
20 ibid., pp. 58-62. 
21 Leng, Russel J. & Wheeler, H. G. "Influence Strategies, Success and War", Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. 23,4,1979, pp. 655-684. 
22 Holsti, Ole R., North, Robert & Brody, Richard, "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis", in 
Vasquez, John A., Classics of International Relations, N. J. Prentice Hall, 1990, p. 195. 
23 Lebow, Richard N., Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis, Baltimore; 
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, pp. 10-12. 
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[C]ognitive processes contribute to.... `the fog of termination'.. Negative feelings 
about opponents ... can result 
in dangerous misperceptions of opponent 
actions... Other common cognitive processes... can also seriously impede efforts to 
terminate... [and] [some] 'non-rational' cognitive processes... could cancel each 
other and others might favour successful termination. 24 
These considerations have stimulated further research and analysis of aspects of the 
cognitive processes involved in crisis decision-making. One important parameter in 
cognitive processes is communication. Communication is often equated with 
information. Brecher's concept of communication in crisis is defined for example as 
"the transmission of data about the operational environment by mass media, internal 
bureaucratic reports, face to face contact etc". 25 The gathering and processing of 
information is another focus of crisis research. 
Karl Deutsch examined crisis decision as an information processing problem, 
developing and applying two models: the channel approach and the information 
approach. 26 In the first approach, he pointed to practical difficulties that emerge 
during a crisis with increasing needs for information. Examining the relationship 
between increased information and the quality of decisions during a crisis, he found 
the following typical responses to an overload of information: delays in decision 
making, skipping items more or less randomly, error frequency, putting messages 
together according to pre-existing stereotypes, the assignment of priorities and 
inadequate feedback control. 27 The memory approach complements the examination 
of information processing from a hermeneutic perspective focusing on both the 
cognitive and psychological processes involved. Deutcsh's memory approach 
considered the language of the message, the source, the context, the intentions of the 
sender, the content and the effects of the message on the recipient such as e. g 
pleasant/unpleasant, ethical and the effects upon the self-image of the recipient. His 
24 Davis, Paul K. & Wolf, Barry, "Behavioural Factors in Nuclear Crisis De-escalation", in Joseph E. 
Nation (ed. ), The De-escalation of Nuclear Crises, New York: St. Martin' s Press, 1992, p. 100. 
25 Brecher, Michael, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy, London, Oxford University Press and New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974, p. 6. Meisel John writes "[C]ommunications, the transmission 
of information by speech, signals, writing or pictures, are affected by crises and other events and 
circumstances, and they in turn influence the way in which crises evolve". Meizel, John, 
"Communications and Crisis", in Frei, Daniel, (ed. ), Managing International Crises, Sage Publications, 
1982, p. 61. 
26 Deutsch, Karl W., "Crisis Decision Making - The Information Approach", in Frei, Daniel, (ed. ), 
Managing International Crises, Sage Publications, 1982, p. 15-29. Karl Deutsch was the first to give an 
account of the role of information in policy making in general. Deutsch, Karl W., The Nerves of 
Government: Models of Political Communication and Control, New York: Free Press, 1966 
27 Deutsch, Karl W., "Crisis Decision making-The Information Approach", pp. 21-22. 
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conclusion is that the larger and more pressing the problems of the political system 
and the smaller its capacities for information search and processing, the more inferior 
its crisis decisions will be in comparison to its needs for adaptation and survival. 28 
The problem of incomplete information and ambiguity of signals was discussed by 
Coral Bell too. Bell using the examples of the Cuban crisis and the Korean war, 
argues that the intentional or unintentional ambiguity of signals transmitted during a 
crisis may lead both to creative or disastrous results. 29 
To sum up this section, theories focusing on cognitive processes have made an 
important contribution to our understanding of crisis decision-making. This 
perspective deconstructs the rational actor model, which conceptualises decisions as 
natural and necessary steps resulting from linear cause-effect calculations. 
Nevertheless, although they do provide us with valuable insights to the key points of 
crises, they cannot account for the dynamics of societal and systemic variables. 
Cognitive and psychological approaches to crises focus on decision-makers and the 
advisory group involved in the decision-making process. This viewpoint assumes a 
hierarchical structure of society where governments have full control of the 
developments in the territorial borders of their state. Organizational approaches to 
international crises seriously challenge this assumption and draw our attention to 
processes of selection and interpretation of information within the framework of 
bureaucratic organizations. 
1.3. Organizational Approaches to Crisis Processes 
Graham Allison's study of the Cuban Missile Crisis, from an organizational 
perspective, made an important contribution not only to crisis theorising but also to 
foreign policy analysis in general. 30 Allison looked at the development of the Cuban 
crisis as the result of routine practices and established rules of operations of the 
organizations involved in decision-making. The unit of analysis in the organizational 
model is governmental action as organizational output. Allison cogently argued that 
the decision-making process demands the involvement of a number of organizations, 
which provide information. This information is often the trigger for particular 
28 ibid., p. 24. 
29 Bell, Coral, The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management, London: Oxford 
University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1971, pp. 74-75. 
30 Allison, Graham & Zelikow, Philip, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, New 
York; Harlow: Longman, 1999. 
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decisions or the means for the implementation of these decisions. He makes then the 
point that "each of the organizations frames the problem at hand according to its own 
objectives, special capacities, and culture", and also according to the already 
established standard operating procedures. Furthermore, different organizations 
involved in decision making are often in a different hierarchy, if not in conflict and 
they pursue different objectives. For the Cuban crisis, in particular, Allison found that 
"organizational routines defined the options and also implemented the decisions. "31 
This model requires the researcher to uncover the routines, the particular goals and the 
distinct cultures of the organizations. 
This perspective is close to the cognitive perspective in the sense that it focuses on 
cognitive processes, but it places the emphasis on the institutionalisation of the 
perceptions in organizational structures. 
Under the heading of organizational approaches to crisis, one can also place empirical 
studies of crises, which discuss the role of news media. Case studies demonstrate that 
pre-established routines of medias' operation as regards gathering, constructing and 
disseminating news and their working relationship with politicians, can be crucial 
factors in a crisis situation. Studies, which started appearing at the turn of the 1970s, 
based on empirical observation explore the ways media organizations may instigate 
and exacerbate an international crisis. 32 Fen Osler Hampson's study suggests that in 
June 1979 it was the American news media and mainly the television, which led to 
one more American-Soviet crisis. This crisis, in fact, also ended the SALT II 
discussions. 33 According to Hampson, the crisis broke out when Senator Frank 
Church, for reasons of personal political interest, revealed on TV the existence of a 
Soviet unit in Cuba. 4 Stan Taylor and Theodore Ralston agree with Fen Osler 
Hampson and they point to another similar incident that occurred in 1978, when the 
Soviet Union shipped MIG-23 fighter interceptors to Cuba. At that time, the Carter 
administration had undertaken the task of resolving the potential crisis through the 
31 ibid., p. 386. 
32 Arno, A. & Dissanayake, W., The News Media in National and International Conflict, London; 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1984. See also Scanlon, Joseph T., Lukko, Rudy & Morton, Gerald, "Media 
Coverage of Crises: Better than Reported, Worse than Necessary", Journalism Quarterly, 1978, 
Vol. 55, pp. 68-72. 
33 Hampson, Fen, Osler, "The Divided Decision Maker: American Domestic Politics and the Cuban 
Crises", in Kegley, Charles W. & Wittkopf Eugene R., The Domestic Sources ofAmerican Foreign 
Policy-Insights and Evidence, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988, p. 244. 
34 ibid., pp. 242-243. 
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diplomatic path. "Yet", Taylor and Ralston conclude, "leaks to Washington journalists 
nearly ruined the crisis containment efforts". 35 
This analysis attempts to explore the domestic aspects of international crisis by 
connecting public opinion, news media and different interests groups. Another 
extensive literature drawing mainly from communication theories looks at the role of 
news media in international crisis from the point of view of medias' routines and their 
particular attraction to conflict and crisis as 'news'. 36 Despite these attempts at 
theorizing and conceptualisation the multiple links between news media, decision- 
making process and public opinion have not been described within a comprehensive 
framework of analysis. 
The discussion of the parameter of time in the context of a crisis situation has so far 
been placed in the context of the discussion of psychological aspects of crisis. 
Nevertheless, there is an important aspect that brings it closer to organizational 
theory. As many scholars conclude, although the First World War was a war that 
nobody wanted "the timetables for mobilisation structured decision-making in such a 
manner as to preclude delays necessary for negotiations and possible mediation. , 37 
This observation directs attention to the social construction of time within the 
operation of institutions, which also might depend on technological advances. If 
placed in the context of organizational theory, the parameter of time acquires a 
different dimension. It draws attention to the autonomy of organizational structures 
and thus, the autonomy of the emergence of crisis. 
Studies on crises from the organizational perspective explore complexity and 
contingency, pointing to ways rigid organizational structures may constrain the 
rationality of decision-makers, mislead and confuse them. They are close to the 
cognitive approach as the argument here is that organizations in their operation follow 
certain paths that they already know and rules they have pre-established. 
Nevertheless, it seems that there is no comprehensive framework of analysis, which 
can incorporate decision-making organizations, media organizations and factors like 
time and technology. 
's Taylor, Stan A. & Ralston, Theodore J., "The Role of Intelligence in Crisis Management", in 
George, Alexander L., (ed. ), Avoiding War- Problems of Crisis Management, Westview Press, 1991, 
398. 
36 Ottosen, Rune, "Enemy Images and the Journalistic Process", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 32, 
No. 1,1995, pp. 97-112. 
" Holsti, Kalevi J., "Paths to Peace? Theories of Conflict Resolution and Realities of International 
Politics", in Thakur, Ramesh, (ed. ), International Conflict Resolution, Boulder: Westview, 1988, p. 110. 
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1.4. Systemic Approaches to Crisis Processes 
Systemic approaches to crisis, drawing on the literature of systems theory, focus on 
the broader international environment within which a crisis emerges. The system is 
perceived as a set of actors, usually nations and international organizations, which 
interact with one another according to established patterns and designated structures. 
This strand of literature argues that it examines international crisis through a process 
or an interaction-structure analysis aiming in that way to illustrate the dynamic 
aspects of the phenomenon of crisis and changes involved therein. 38 It seeks to discern 
recurring patterns of state behaviour and regularities that indicate the emergence of a 
crisis. 
The phenomenon of crisis in this literature is described as a `turning point', as a 
disturbance to the normal run of business conducted between state actors. The focus is 
on the external behaviour of the parties, represented by their leaders. Inter-unit 
phenomena, independent variables such as the number of major actors, their 
interactions, the distribution of power among them, alliances and military technology 
find their proper place in a systemic analysis. 39 Oran Young defines crises through a 
structure-interaction perspective as "a process of interaction occurring at higher levels 
of perceived intensity than the ordinary flow of events and characterised by... 
significant implications for the stability of some system or subsystem". 4° 
Power cycle theories and catastrophe theories are examples of systemic approaches to 
the phenomenon of crises. Power cycle theories attempt to explain world wars as the 
result of systems in crisis and the explanation is based on structural considerations. 
41 
The international system is perceived as being in constant change and "transformation 
occurs not as a discontinuity but as an "evolutionary novelty emerging from the 
continuum of long-term changes in systemic structure". 42 Catastrophe theories 
formulated in mathematical models have also been employed in an attempt to present 
38 Brecher, Michael, Crisis in World Politics: Theory and Reality, Oxford; New York: Pergamon Press, 
1993, p. 20. 
39 Snyder, Glenn H., "Crisis Bargaining", in Hermann, Charles, F., (ed. ), International Crises: Insights 
from Behavioural Research, New York: Free Press, 1972, p. 220. 
40 Young, Oran R., A Systemic Approach to International Politics, Princeton University Press, 1968, 
°p15. ý Doran, Charles F., Systems in Crisis, New Imperatives of High Politics, at Century's End, Cambridge 
University Press, 1991, p. l. 
42 ibid., p. 3. 
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a unified description of world wars. 43 Hot, Lob and Markus developed a catastrophe 
theory model postulating as independent variables the unsatisfiable systemic demand, 
coalition opportunities, violence potential, and relative response time. The dependent 
variable is the condition of the system on a peace-war continuum as 
Most of these attempts started from the aspiration to explain world wars based on the 
assumption that there are features in the international system that indicate the 
potential for a crisis. Their focus is basically the behaviour of major powers. 
Nevertheless, as Brecher and Yehuda argue they are not successful in the integration 
of "the key concepts - change in interaction, type of structure, degree of 
disequilibrium and instability". 45 Additionally, they mix unit and system-level 
variables and their efforts to bridge the distance between process and structure 
ultimately remains unsuccessful. 46 Finally, this analysis has neglected other 
parameters, which have been substantiated in decision -making studies as playing a 
crucial role in crisis escalation. 
1.5. The Dynamics of Complexity 
Scholars, who have developed and applied the above presented frameworks of 
analysis, admit that one cannot rely on the tools taken only from one perspective. 
Allison and Zelikow, in the latest edition of Allison's study on the Cuban crisis, argue 
that there is no model that can fully describe crises; rather "the models can be 
complements to each other" 47 . Thus, scholars agree that crises emerge through the 
interaction of various factors. What makes a crisis a distinct and dangerous instance in 
interstate relations is precisely its dynamics emanating from this complexity. 
Brecher and Wilkenfeld tried to bridge the gap between the approaches to crises 
presented above and to deal with complexity in the International Crisis Behaviour 
Project (ICBP). 48 They operationalized variables taken from all the above approaches, 
43 Holt, Robert T., Job, Brian L. & Markus, Lawrence, "Catastrophe Theory and the Study of War", 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 22, No. 2, June 1978, pp. 171-208. 
44 ibid., p. 191. 
45 Brecher, Michael, &Yehuda Ben Hemda, "System and Crisis" in Brecher, Michael & Wilkenfeld, 
Jonathan, Crisis, Conflict and Instability, p. 25. 
46 Brecher, Michael, Crisis in World Politics: Theory and Reality, p. 21. 
47 Allison, Graham & Zelikow, Philip, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
392. 
°p8 Brecher, Michael & Wilkenfeld, Jonathan, Crisis, Conflict and Stability, Pergamon Press, 1989. See 
also Brecher, Michael, Crisis in World Politics: Theory and Reality, Oxford; N. York: Pergamon Press, 
1993. 
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in order to compare 278 international and 627 foreign policy crises. 49 This was a 
laborious study built upon data gathered through a number of studies, covering crises 
from 1929 to 1985. 
The results produced through this study confirm, in a way, results of all the other 
studies, illustrating the multiple causality that is involved in crises situations. There 
are some trends stronger than others e. g. a crisis within the context of a protracted 
conflict may escalate to war easier than others, but still, this does not offer a 
prescription of the causes of crisis or definite paths through which a crisis may 
emerge and escalate. 5° 
Brecher and Wilkenfeld conclude that "[T]he process is not linear ... an international 
crisis is a four-phase dynamic process which unfolds through the perceptual 
interpretation by decision-makers of a salient system, actor, and crisis attributes, 
followed by coping, choice and behaviour... "51 Vasquez too argues that the factors 
that can escalate a crisis to war are not only bargaining tactics, but also issues, the 
nature of leadership, the domestic political context and factors that affect leaders' 
perceptions, like "the traditional realist advice that one must show firmness (and 
resolve) in the struggle for power"52 To add that "[I]t is not the dynamics of decision- 
making that produce war, but a set of foreign policy goals and a sequence of practices 
which create a political relationship and an atmosphere that is apt to result in war 
given the right set of triggers". 53 Similarly, Lebow's conclusion of his study of 26 
crises is that "[S]uccessful crisis management is therefore a function of cultural 
organizational and personal behavioural patterns established long before the onset of 
49 According to this typification, a crisis is defined as foreign when the researcher looks from the point 
of view of one state to the crisis. International when both countries are seen as part of a system and 
domestic when the researcher looks to a country involved in a crisis focusing on this country, Brecher, 
Michael, and Wilkenfeld, Jonathan, Crisis, conflict ..., p. 6. 
50 The recognition of complexity is reflected on the mission assigned to a number of institutions like 
NGOs, think-tanks and research institutes for crisis prevention that have appeared over the last years. 
Factors such as political and economic reasons, existing protracted conflicts, the social structures and 
the culture of a country are the focus of analytical reports written by experts of these organizations. The 
International Crisis Group, the Crisis Prevention and Peace Forum and the Center for International 
Peace Operations are only a few of the many organizations that seek a role in crisis prevention. For 
statements on their mission and their philosophy see, The International Crisis Group (ICG), 
http: //www. intl-crisis-group. org , 
Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum 
http: //www. ssrc. org/programstconflict, Center for International Peace Operations, http: //www. zif- 
berlin. org/index_en. asp. See also UNDP, http: //www. undp. org/erd/smallarms/undp. htm 
51 Brecher, Michael & Wilkenfeld, Jonathan, Crisis, Conflict and Stability, Pergamon Press, 1989, 
226. 
3Z John, Vasquez, The War Puzzle, p. 194. 
53 ibid., p. 195. 
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any crisis. These patterns and the expectations they create largely determine the 
performance of a system in crisis". 54 
We could also add here another point made by Allison and Zelikow. Their analysis of 
the Cuban crisis demonstrated that many "ifs" could have drawn the two powers to 
disaster but "[I]n several instances both Americans and Soviets were just plain 
lucky. "55 This latter observation underlines the `probabilistic' that is the contingent 
nature of the processes involved in crisis decision-making. 56 
More recent analyses have sought to explore the complexity involved in international 
crisis by increasing the level of abstraction. Rosenau's turbulence model and its 
subsequent elaboration by Rosenau and Durfee aims to deal precisely with the 
dynamics of crisis. This approach is based on abstract concepts taken from 
organization theories like turbulence and bifurcation. 57 Here crises emerge out of 
"complex streams of action - that may not have clear-cut terminations". 58 The units of 
analysis are "specifiable conditions" rather than "specifiable decisions". Furthermore, 
decisions are seen as "springing from prior societal or transnational processes and not 
necessarily bringing crises to climatic endings". 59 This perspective - the post- 
internationalist perspective, as its authors call it - points to multiple rather than linear 
causality, where various actors may interfere leading to sudden and uncontrollable 
developments. 
Similarly, Vivienne Jabri's study on violence also increases the level of abstraction, 
qualifying the outbreaking of violence as an existing choice in society, constituted 
through social discourses and social practices. As a matter of fact, she addresses the 
point Vasquez made about war being a social institution. She utilises Giddens's 
structuration theory in her attempt to bridge the gap between agency and structure. 60 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to apply her analysis to empirical research on crises, as it is 
not designed to explore processes of crisis constitution that may or may not lead to 
violence. 
54 Lebow, Richard, Ned, Between Peace and War, p. 335. 
55 ibid., p. 396. 
56 Jervis, Robert, Perceptions and Misperceptions...,, p. 31. 
57 Rosenau, James N., Turbulence in World Politics, A Theory of Change and Continuity, Princeton 
University Press, 1990 and Rosenau, James, N. & Durfee, Mary, Thinking Theory Thoroughly, 
Westview Press, 2000. 
58 ibid., p. 139. 
s' ibid., p. 139. 
60 Jabri, Vivienne, Discourses on Violence: Conflict Analysis Reconsidered, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1995, p. 3. 
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So, we might have different pieces of the crisis puzzle but we do not know how to 
bring them together. What is the constitutive process of crisis? Although writers 
recognise complexity they can only describe, not explain the processes involved in 
crisis escalation and de-escalation. The `spiral' metaphor, the discussion of the spill- 
over effects and the turbulence model are descriptive schemes which do not explore 
the mechanisms that enable the interconnection of various factors and the dynamics of 
crisis. They cannot explain the timing of the escalation of a conflict or the reason for 
which the step from non-war to war is taken at a specific time. 
2. Theories of Peace Processes 
The Charter of the United Nations, established in 1945, provided in article 33 that the 
means of peaceful conflict resolution are "negotiation, enquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful means" through the choice of the parties. 61 
Negotiation and mediation are the techniques most frequently employed by the parties 
in a conflict and third parties that intervene in order to help them to cope with the 
conflict. Their focus is on face-to-face interaction, while arbitration and judicial 
settlement involve a third party - i. e. the International Court of The Hague - appointed 
by the parties in the conflict to resolve their dispute. 
Over the last half century, since the establishment of the UN Charter, there has been a 
great deal of research on and analysis of the praxis of coping with conflicts, seeking 
ways to improve existing and develop new means to pave the way towards peace. 62 
New approaches to negotiation and mediation have emerged and other totally new 
processes have been institutionalised. Today, there are two more conceptualisations of 
peace processes, separate from the bargaining process involved in negotiation and 
mediation and the legal processes of the UN Charter. First, peace processes are 
conceptualised as Problem Solving processes and this approach is mainly reflected in 
the Problem Solving Conflict Resolution Workshop (PSW). Second, peace processes 
61 See Charter of the UN, article 33. 
62 Groom, A. J. R., "Old Ways New Insights: Conflict Resolution in International Conflict", in 
Czempiel, Ernst-Otto, Zadjan, Lipart, Kiv & Masopust, Zdenek, Non-Violence in International Crises: 
Proceedings of the First International Symposium on Non- Violent Solutions of International Crises and 
Regional Conflicts, Frankfurt am Main, February 1989, p. 16. For International Law as the basis of 
dispute settlement in general and the obligations of states in regard to legal means of settlement, see in 
the same Degan, Vladimir-Djuvo, "International Law and Settlement of Disputes". Furthermore, there 
is a vast literature on conventional and customary International Law and jurisprudence. See Brownlie, 
I., Principles of Public International Law, Oxford, 1990. 
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are conceptualised as broader social change that transforms the conflict through 
learning processes, through peace pedagogy, peace journalism, peace and business 
and elaborations of the PSW, based on different - compared to earlier attempts at 
theorizing - ontological assumptions. These developments reflect a modified view of 
conflict from something to be `won' to something to be `solved' to something that can 
be `transformed'. 63 
This section presents a review of this literature, tracing the development of the theory 
and praxis of peace processes. It should be emphasised that the distinction between 
conflict resolution and conflict transformation does not necessarily represent different 
schools of thought in conflict theory. The forerunners in conflict resolution 
established the basis for conflict transformation approaches. Burton for example, a 
pioneer in the development of PSW technique whose particular approach is discussed 
under the second category has contributed enormously to theories of conflict 
transformation. Still, this distinction is useful as it highlights the difference in 
perspective between the two in terms of the processes they examine. Furthermore, it 
helps us to discuss where and how theory meets the praxis of peace processes. More 
specifically, it will be demonstrated that mainstream conflict resolution approaches 
draw a moderate role for the conflict worker whereas conflict transformation theories 
allow for more radical and participatory perspectives to develop. 
2.1. Bargaining Approaches to Peace Processes 
Negotiation and mediation are old institutionalised practices in the search for peace. 
Negotiation processes are launched when the parties in a conflict, alone or with the 
facilitation of a third party, try to achieve an agreement upon the issues of the conflict 
through face-to-face bargaining. The aim of the parties is "to win as much as 
possible". 64 In other words, the aim is to alter the behaviour of the other, rather than to 
modify the other parties' goals and perceptions. The interaction is conceived as 
power-based, competitive and formal in accordance with a set of guidelines given to 
the representatives of the states engaged in negotiations. Thus, this process also 
reflects the assumptions of the rational actor model presented above. 
63 Azar, Edward E., The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases, University of 
Maryland, 1990, p. 21. 
64 Mitchell, C. R., The Structure of International Conflict, Macmillan, 1981, p. 198. 
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Studies on negotiations deal mostly with the bargaining process, that is the offers and 
counter-offers that attempt to build a mutually acceptable settlement. In practice, there 
are many obstacles at every step in the path towards achieving some form of 
agreement on the conflicting issues through negotiations. Often the parties do not 
agree upon the issues to be negotiated or how the issues should be dealt with, as it is 
the case with the Greek-Turkish conflict. Greece argues that the only issue to be dealt 
with is the demarcation of the continental shelf. On the other hand, Turkey claims that 
there should be a "package deal" including the demarcation of the territorial waters, 
the airspace, the Flight Information Region and the demilitarisation of certain Greek 
islands in the eastern Aegean Sea. 65 
A third party, which is not part of the conflict but is interested in bringing an end to 
the conflict, may intervene or assist in the settlement of the dispute in the role of 
mediator. Peter Carnevale and Dean Pruit see mediation as a "variation on 
negotiation"66 and Peter Colosi sees it as an extension of the process of negotiation, 
since mediators employ the same tools as negotiators. 67 The aim here is to settle the 
conflict by "bringing the parties together and working with them to find a solution 
acceptable to both/all sides". 68 The role of third party mediator has also been 
described as "empowerment of the weaker party", or putting pressure on both parties, 
indeed enforcing a settlement. 69 
The practice demonstrates that negotiation and mediation are the most often employed 
means to achieve peace. Nevertheless, reality seems to leave little space for optimism 
with regard to the potential of these methods to bring about sustainable peace. Recent 
efforts of negotiations and mediation in the conflict in Yugoslavia as well as in the 
Israel/Palestine conflict, for example, have further challenged the capacity of these 
techniques to bring about a positive change. 
65 For the Turkish view on this issue see Pazarci, Hüsseyin, The Status of Demilitarisation of the 
Islands in the Eastern Aegean Sea, Ankara University, 1986. The Greek answer to the Turkish 
arguments is presented in Ekonomides, C. P., The Legal Status of the Greek Islands in the Aegean, 
Gnosi, 1989. 
66 Carnevale, Peter J. & Pruit, Dean G., Negotiation and Mediation, p. 532. 
67 Colosi, Thomas, "A Model for Negotiation and Mediation", in Bendahname, Diane, & McDonald, 
John Jr., (eds. ), International Negotiation, Art, and Science, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 
Foreign Service Institute, U. S. Department of State, 1984, p. 25. 
68 Brand-Jacobsen, Kai, Frithjof & Jacobsen, Carl G., "Beyond Mediation: Towards More Holistic 
Approaches to Peacebuilding and Peace Actor Empowerment", in Galtung, Johan & Jacobsen Carl G., 
Searching for Peace: the Road to Transcend, London, Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press, 2000, p. 233. 
69 Groom, A. J. R., "Old Ways New Insights: Conflict Resolution in International Conflict", in 
Czempiel, Ernst-Otto, Zadjan, Lipart, Kiv & Masopust, Zdenek, Non- Violence in International Crises, 
p. 17. 
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A part of the literature has set out to answer the question why although states in 
conflict engage many times in negotiation and mediation efforts, they, still fail to 
reach an agreement. 70 Scholars attempt to resolve this problem by elaborating on the 
concept of `ripeness' of a conflict and `timing'. `Ripeness' refers to a stage of a 
conflict or a crisis that is most amenable to reaching a settlement. Haas identifies 
ripeness with context and more specifically, the presence or absence of certain 
conditions in which negotiation takes place. He identifies two types of conditions, 
intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic conditions refer to the substance of the matter of the 
agreement. Extrinsic conditions refer to the broader context, including decision 
makers' capacity to sustain the agreement. 7' Zartman argues that a mediator can 
intervene when "crisis and conflict are powerful enough" and he identifies conditions 
like a `hurting stalemate' or an `impending catastrophe' that could make a conflict 
conducive to an agreement. 72 Contingency models, postulating a conflict life cycle 
constituted of different stages, have been developed in order to map phases of conflict 
conducive to appropriate third party intervention. 73 
Nevertheless, these attempts do not escape the limitations the complexity of a conflict 
situation imposes, including the increase of complexity the third party brings. 
Drawing on empirical research on the Yugoslav conflict, Keith Webb et al., aptly 
illustrate that the complexity of the situation could not make possible the prescription 
of a particular type of mediation. 74 This is particularly the case when a conflict 
involves governmental authorities, IGOs, NGOs, factions of the fighting parties and a 
continuous change of their positions, which can defy any attempt to discern stages in 
the conflict. 75 
70 Haas, Richard N., "Ripeness, De-escalation, and Arms Control", in Kriesberg, Louis & Thorson, 
Stuart J., (eds. ), Timing the de-escalation of International Conflicts, New York: Syracuse University 
Press, 1991 p. 83. 
71 Haas, Richard, "Ripeness De-escalation and Control", pp. 83-4. 
72 Zartman, William I., "Attempts at Crisis Management", in Winham, Gilbert R., (ed. ), New Issues in 
International Crisis Management, Boulder: Westview Press, 1988. 
73 Keashly, Loraleigh & Fisher, Ronald J., "A Contingency Perspective on Conflict Interventions: 
Theoretical and Practical Considerations", in Bercovitch, Jacob, (ed. ), Resolving International 
Conflicts, the Theory and Practice of Mediation, Lynne Rienner, 1996, p. 235. 
74 Webb, Keith, Koutrakou, Vassiliki & Walters, Mike, "The Yugoslavian Conflict, European 
Mediation and the Contingency Model: A Critical Perspective", in Bercovitch, Jacob, (ed. ), Resolving 
International Conflicts, The theory and Practice of Mediation, Boulder London, 1996, p. 188. 
75 See also evaluation of past official negotiations between the two communities in Cyprus from 1968 
until 1992. Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis Maria & Trigeorgis Lenos argue that the rigid, formal and legalistic 
nature of the procedure of negotiations along with the constant change of parties' positions and 
publicity rituals doomed these efforts to failure. Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, Maria & Trigeorgis, Lenos, 
"Cyprus: An Evolutionary Approach to Conflict Resolution", Journal ofConfict Resolution, Vol-37, 
No. 2, June 1993, p. 340-360. 
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Levinger and Rubin argue that "few opportunities exist for effective intervention by 
third parties - except by the most powerful actors, those in a position to coerce 
agreements through threat or buy off agreements by lavishing rewards". 76 To 
negotiation and mediation with muscle we should add activities that fall under the 
category of peace making and involve the UN. 
Although these activities as well as processes of negotiation and mediation may 
sometimes be able to bring an end to violence, they cannot address the causes of the 
conflict. Furthermore, the most important criticism levelled against these processes of 
conflict settlement is that their outcomes are often short-lived because they reflect the 
relative power of the parties and rest on power relationships ignoring the complexity 
involved in the conflict. 77 
The dynamics of complexity contrast with static approaches of negotiation processes - 
including facilitated negotiation - which focus primarily on the interaction among the 
negotiating parties. Mitschell argues, to confine the process of negotiation only to the 
face-to-face interaction "within the chamber", would not be an accurate description as 
the preliminary bargaining and the implementation of the agreement are also part of 
the overall process. 78 To add that "[T]he problem still remains of integrating into a 
negotiation process those activities outside the negotiating chamber which affect 
either by accident or design the on-going process of negotiation". 79 These 
considerations have led to a search for other means, other processes complementary or 
independent from negotiations and third party intervention. 
2.1.2 Problem Solving Approaches to Peace Processes 
Alarmed by the failure of negotiation and facilitated negotiation, scholars like John 
Burton, Herbert Kelman and Leonard Doob developed a new pioneering technique of 
conflict resolution in the late 60s and early 70s, which has been increasingly 
employed over the last thirty years. This is the problem solving conflict resolution 
workshop (PSW). Developments in social sciences incorporated in the theory of PSW 
and conclusions drawn through its application over the last 10 years, have provided 
new conceptualisations and aims for the same technique. Here, I will examine PSW 
76 Levinger, George & Rubin, J. Z., "Bridges and Barriers to a More General Theory of Conflict", 
Negotiation Journal, July 1994, p. 209. 
77 Burton, John, Conflict Resolution and Provention, London: Macmillan, 1990, p. 191. 
78 ibid., p. 207. 
79 Mitchell, C. R., The Structure of International Conflict, Macmillan, 1981, p. 198. 
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practised as a process capable of resolving the conflict, while further down in this 
section I will refer to different approaches to PSW. 
PSW is described by Anthony de Reuck as follows: "representatives of the parties in 
dispute should meet in the presence of a small panel of disinterested consultants, 
professionally qualified in the social sciences, in order to analyse and possibly also to 
resolve their conflict, in conditions of total confidentiality". 80 
This technique, compared to negotiation and mediation, reflects a different 
philosophical approach to the problem of conflict in society. Departing from socio- 
psychological explanations, conflict is deemed here to be "endemic in human 
relationships". 81 As such it can be functional, a source of creativity, which can draw 
attention to existing problems and help to correct attitudes. 82 According to Burton, 
when basic needs like security and identity are not fulfilled, a perception of injustice 
emerges and in the lack of effective communication - which might be created by 
misperceptions - violence may arise. 83 The core idea behind most of the PSW 
approaches is that the parties to a conflict, when meeting face-to-face in an 
appropriate environment, can get to know each other and may change their mutual 
misperceptions and acknowledge each other's needs. 84 The aim of the PSW is to 
address the deep-rooted sources of conflict, and to generate an acceptable solution to 
the parties in the conflict, changing their values, goals, attitudes and behaviour. That 
is why the declared purpose of PSW is to resolve and not to settle the conflict. 
85 If the 
80 Reuck, Anthony de, "A Theory of Conflict Resolution by Problem Solving", in Burton, John & 
Dukes, Frank, (eds. ), Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution, Macmillan, 1990, p. 183. The 
first PSWs were organised in 1965 and 1966 for the Borneo and Cyprus conflicts respectively 
by John 
Burton the leader of London School and his colleagues. See Burton, John, W., Global Conflict, The 
Domestic Sources of International Crisis, Brighton: Wheatseaf, 1984, p. 160. 
81 Groom, A. J. R, "Old Ways New Insights: Conflict Resolution in International Conflict", p. 15. 
82 Coser makes the argument that conflict may be functional, may re-establish unity and cohesion 
among tehmemembers of a group or a community but may not as well. For the functions of conflict see 
Coser, Lewis A., The Functions of Conflict, London: Routlege & K. Paul, 1956. See also North, Robert 
C., Koch, Howard E. Jr. & Zinnes, Dina A., "The integrative Functions of Conflict", Conflict 
Resolution Journal, Vol. IV, No. 3, pp. 355-374. 
83 Burton, John W., Conflict and Communication, The Use of Controlled Communication in 
International Relations, London: Macmillan, 1969. See also Deviance, Terrorism and War, New York: 
St Martin's Pres, 1979. 
" Kelman, Herbert C., Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner, in Bercovitch, Jacob, (ed. ) 
Resolving Interational Conflict, The Theory and Practice of Mediation, London: Boulder, 1996, p. 
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cognitive processes known as `tunnel vision' and stereotyping can lead to escalation 
of crisis and violent confrontation, it is argued that PSWs can "break down the 
stereotypes". 86 Here, learning as the direct result of the interaction constitutes an 
important part of the process. 
This conceptualisation of PSW relies upon an assumption of an instrumental 
rationality. Burton has confidence in the rational human being and his ability to 
resolve conflicts through the analysis of the conflict situation. 87 The facilitator "is in 
an analytical, almost a teaching position, drawing attention to false assumptions, and 
opening up possibilities of arriving at potentially realistic ones". 88 In other words, the 
facilitator is assumed to have and apply knowledge about an objective reality, thus 
functioning in a therapeutic way in society. Furthermore, the participants are also 
conceived as cost-benefit oriented. A. J. R. Groom argues that "[T]his is an exercise in 
increasing the degree of rationality in decision-making and seeking to reduce thereby 
the scale of conflict". 89 Discussing Burton's approach to PSW, Tarja Vayrynen makes 
the argument that "[A]lthough Burton does not rely on the rational choice paradigm in 
a strict sense, by postulating the utility maximising actor, he, however, accepts 
implicitly many of the underlying assumptions of the paradigm". 90 
Scholars who have developed the theory and have applied this approach in praxis 
argue that if the parties generate some kind of resolution for the issues involved in the 
conflict, they can deliver the results of this exercise to decision-makers and they in 
turn will consider and materialise them. This explains why the theory postulates that 
participants of the workshops should ideally be "individuals who are close to the key 
decision-makers of a community or state and who can influence these individuals in a 
private and personal way, and yet are able to explore alternatives without fear of 
political repercussions". 91 Azar argues for a hierarchical relationship between 
negotiations and PSW, which are "a crucial first step ... designed to establish a pre- 
86 ibid., p. 21. 
87 Burton, John W., World Society, p. 162. 
88 Burton, John W., Conflict Resolution and Provention, p. 125. 
89 Groom, A. J. R., "Old Ways New Insights: Conflict Resolution in International Conflict", pp. 18-19. 
John Burton argues that "controlled communication is a means of increasing the state of knowledge 
and the probabilities of accurate prediction". Burton, John, The Use of Controlled Communication in 
International Relations, p. 209. 
90 Vayrynen, Tarja, Sharing Reality: An Insight from Phenomenology to John Burton's Problem- 
Solving Conflict Resolution Theory, PhD Thesis UKC, 1995, p. 130. 
91 Azar, Edward E., The Management of Protracted Social Conflict. - Theory and Cases, p. 34. 
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negotiation stage". 92 John McDonald, on the other hand, stresses the emphasis on the 
element of `complementarity' when he argues that "if the proponents of each track 
learn to build on the track below them, they will gradually develop an enormous 
power base themselves. The proponents collectively will be able to force first track 
bureaucrats to change their way of thinking into a more positive, problem solving 
mode". 93 
Nevertheless, the aim of the resolution seems to overload the workshop with tasks 
whose implementation is doubtful. More precisely, the problem with the above 
described conceptualisation of the PSW is that it cannot deal with the complexity of 
the process of communication within the PSW. Neither can it explore its linkage with 
its environment, that is, both decision-making processes and the societies wholly 
involved in the conflict. 
Participants in this kind of workshops are culturally and communicatively conditioned 
and even those assumed to be on the same side, may define conflict in completely 
different ways. Scholars stress the emphasis on how cultural differences construct 
behaviour in conflict and co-operation. Kevin Avruch and Peter Black develop a 
cultural perspective of PSW where "culture is seen to be a fundamental feature of 
human consciousness, the sine qua non of human being". 94 Cohen argues that 
different cultures have developed their own negotiation styles. 95 Galtung contributes 
to these considerations of the complexity within the workshop, observing that there 
are four layers that interact in every face-to-face interaction: role behaviour, personal 
outlook, personal baggage and deep culture. 96 Given this complexity, the pursuit of a 
resolution of conflict through the workshop does not automatically arise as the result 
of the process. 
If the complexity within the workshop challenges the assumption of an immediate 
change of attitudes and goals, the insertion of the workshop outcome into the society 
and the decision-making is another problem. Several scholars demonstrate that this is 
92 ibid., p. 3. 
93 McDonald, John, "Exploration of Track Two Diplomacy", in Kriesberg, Louis & Thorson, Stuart J., 
(eds. ), Timing the de-escalation.., p205. 
94 Avruch, Kevin & Black, Peter, "Conflict Resolution in Intercultural Settings: Problems and 
Prospects", in Sandole, Dennis J. & Hugo van der Merve, (eds. ), Conflict Resolution Theory and 
Practice: Integration and Application, Manchester: Manchester U. P., 1993, p. 32. 
95 Cohen, Raymond, Negotiating Across Cultures, Communication Obstacles in Inetrnational 
Diplomacy, Washington D. C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991. 
96 Galtung, Johan, "Crafting Peace on the Psychology of the TRANSCEND approach", p. 223 
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not a uni-linear process of transfer from the workshop to society. 97 Discussing the 
issue of the re-entry, Kelman argues that although participants in the workshop may 
change their perceptions they might not be able to affect existing `institutional' 
misperceptions. 98 The conceptualisation of PSWs as the means to resolve conflicts 
does not address the political and other contingencies that may interfere with the 
development of a peace process in a complex society. It presupposes a stable setting 
for the workshop and society, where changes can be engineered in a more or less 
mechanical and automatic way. 
One of the cases that raised the hopes for the effectiveness of this technique was the 
Oslo process between Israelis and Palestinians in 1993. About ten years later, it seems 
that there is some agreement about what went wrong. Scholars point to its inability to 
address the causes and the complexity of the conflict. The exclusion of hard-liners and 
the imposition of the stronger party - Israeli - upon the weaker - PLO - were 
conditions conducive to a problematic development of the process. Furthermore, the 
process was not supported by efforts at the grassroots level and finally, the defiance of 
these agreements by the Israeli side in the years that followed the Oslo process, 
doomed the agreement to failure. 99 
Taking into account these problems, modem theories seek to develop more holistic 
approaches to peace processes in modem society. New conceptualisations attempt 
both to redress the problem between the peace process and its broader environment 
and to mitigate the assumptions of uni-linearity, stability and control, emphasising 
complexity and difference in perspectives. 
Before we come to the discussion of these approaches it should be added that a part of 
the literature describes third party mediation as a kind of facilitation. Here third 
parties are not academics and their activities take place outside the milieu of the 
institutionalised PSW. Third states, interstate organizations, NGOs and individuals 
can facilitate the parties in their search for peace. They can facilitate the contact of the 
parties who want to negotiate, though after a stage of overt hostilities this might be 
97 Groom, A. J. R., "Old Ways New Insights: Conflict Resolution in International Conflict", in 
Czempiel, Ernst-Otto, Zadjan, Lipart, Kiv & Masopust, Zdenek, Non-Violence in International Crises.., 
24. 
8 Kelman, Herbert C., "The Problem Solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution", in Merritt, R. L., 
Communication in International Politics, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972, p. 54. 
99 Brand-Jacobsen, Kai, Frithjof & Jacobsen, Carl G., "Beyond Mediation: Towards More Holistic 
Approaches to Peacebuilding and Peace Actor Empowerment", in Galtung, Johan & Jacobsen Carl, G., 
Searching for Peace: the Road to Transcend, p. 23 8-240. 
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difficult. That was the case with Northern Ireland, where a religious community was 
involved in bringing together Sinn Fein and the Irish government. They can play an 
important role in "gaining the trust and confidence of the parties, setting agendas, 
clarifying issues and formulating agreements. "' 00 These tasks are closer to facilitation 
and problem solving than to enforcement and use of power for bargaining. The assets 
of third parties here are their reputation and their skills. 
2.2. Conflict Transformation Approaches to Peace Processes 
From 1991, when Raimo Vayrynen posed the question "To Settle or to Transform? " 
until 2000, accumulated theory and research seem to answer in favour of conflict 
transformation as opposed to conflict settlement or conflict resolution. Conflict 
transformation is considered a step beyond or a development of conflict resolution 
and differentiates from the latter in two important points: First, it stresses the 
emphasis on a holistic conceptualisation of peace processes arguing that peace 
processes should not involve only leaders and elites but the whole of society. '°1 
Second, it is distanced from instrumental rationality and moves towards the 
exploration of complexity and discursive rationality, which is defined as "an 
understanding of the possibility and fruitfulness of dialogue". 102 
The idea that changes in society may affect the peaceful resolution of conflicts is not 
new; it started well before the 1990s. There is a vast literature on processes of 
democratisation and the ways the establishment of democratic institutions can ensure 
a sustainable peace. 103 Change of world economic structures can be another viable 
path to peace, argued Kalevi Holsti towards the end of the Cold War. 104 Burton has 
also been one of the forerunners arguing for the need for fundamental social changes 
through the means of education and the role of common functions which will increase 
co-operative interactions between societies in conflict. Smoke and Harman built from 
where Burton had left the issue of education, to look for more profound and abstract 
100 Miall, Hugh, Ramsbotham, Oliver & Woodhouse, Tom, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Polity 
Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 224. 
101 ibid., p. 21. 
102 Vayrynen, Tarja, Sharing Reality: An Insight from Phenomenology to John Burton's Problem- 
Solving Conflict Resolution Theory, PhD Thesis UKC, 1995, p. 213. 
103 See for example Ray, James, Lee, Democracy and International Conflict. - An evaluation of the 
democratic peace proposition, Columbia, South Carolina : University of South Carolina P., 1995. 
104 Holsti, Kalevi J., "Paths to Peace? Theories of Conflict Resolution and Realities of International 
Politics", in Thakur, Ramesh, (ed. ), International Conflict Resolution, Boulder: Westview, 1988, p. 126- 
128. 
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changes, such as the change of attitudes and perceptions and the need "to believe in 
the possibility of peace", as an important alternative path to achieve peace. '°5 
While these analyses have been more descriptive and conceptual rather than 
postulating a way of action, a different problematique of conflict transformation 
appeared in the early 90s. This new perspective conceptualized what had been a 
maturing of ideas over the previous ten years, drawing on certain developments in the 
conflict theory and the failures the praxis of the above techniques had revealed. 
Vayrynen was the first to put these ideas into words. He developed a generic 
framework of six transformers of conflict: context transformation, structural 
transformation, actor transformation, issue transformation, personal and group 
transformation. The contribution made by that conceptualization was that conflict is 
not something that can be solved but it can be transformed and this can happen 
through different paths, which involve all the levels of society simultaneously. While 
conventional analysis stresses the emphasis on processes of interactions among 
decision-makers - and the participation of elites in PSW - transformation theories shift 
the emphasis to society as a whole departing from hierarchical approaches to peace 
processes and recognizing the complexity involved therein. 
In the last ten years, there is a burgeoning literature on the need for empowerment of 
local actors, changes in the education of societies in conflict and new 
conceptualisations of PSW based on transformation rather than resolution of conflict. 
Conflict transformation theory is a call for an even more active engagement in paving 
the way to peace. Developments in thinking about conflict have motivated conflict 
researchers-activists to make praxis the conclusions they have drawn. This, in turn, 
has resulted in a multiplication of institutions involved in coping with conflict and the 
emergence of a profession of peace workers. These developments have brought about 
a change with regard to the subject of research and analysis and the self- 
conceptualisation of the role of conflict worker. 
In what follows, I will discuss functionalism, learning processes, PSW as means 
for 
conflict transformation, Galtung's TRANSCEND method of conflict transformation 
and contingent, non-engineered transformation. 
los Smoke, Richard & Harman Willis, Paths to Peace: Exploring the Feasibility of Sustainable Peace, 
London: Westview Press, p. 73-97,1987. See also Harman, Willis, "The Quest for Security Viewed as a 
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2.2.1. Functionalism 
Functionalism is the oldest approach that challenged the rational actor model and the 
state-centric view of the world. Its origins lie with Mitrany's work on how networks 
of international institutions, based on common functions, can provide world stability 
and order. 106 This approach has inspired a lot of constructive discussion as well as 
action aiming to move societies from the pole of conflict towards the pole of co- 
operational relations. Its main unit of analysis is transactions engendered by "the 
delineation and fulfilment of super-ordinate goals". ' 07 It envisions a co-operative 
world society based on the notion "form follows function". Functionalists' arguments 
are mainly derived from the observation of world society and the emergence of 
organizations that provide `alternatives' to the state based on function instead of 
territory or legitimacy. The emphasis is on organizations able to overcome state 
boundaries. A. J. R. Groom describes the basic assumption of functionalism as "a 
`working peace system' that will tend to diminish conflict by allowing cross-cutting 
loyalties, by developing super-ordinate goals, by removing barriers to intercourse and 
by creating a sense of security through fulfilling necessary functions rather than 
through a threat system". 108 An often cited example of successful functionalism, is the 
impact of the European Coal and Steel Community on the Franco-German conflict. 
Looking specifically at how functionalism affects conflict resolution, Burton made a 
distinction between long-term processes and short-term or immediate handling of the 
conflict. Within the first category he finds a spillback process from international 
society to the national domain. With regard to the immediate handling of a conflict, he 
argued that functional institutions that develop during conflict e. g. separate ad hoc 
administrations, postal and electricity services, can pave the way to a sustainable 
106 The origins of the functionalist approach to conflict are found in Mitrany's work in 30s and its later 
development. The basic idea was that order and thus peace could be sustained through the development 
of a web of non-coercive international organizations, which would reflect the institutionalisation of 
functions. Mitrany, David, A Working Peace System, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
1943. This work has also and inspired scholars as Haas. Haas, Ernst, International Political 
Communities, New York: Anchor Books, 1966. 
107 Groom, A. J. R., "Functionalism and World Society", in Groom, A. J. R. & Taylor, P., (eds. ), 
Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations, London: University of London Press, 
1975, p. 98. 
108 Groom, A. J. R., "Functionalism and World Society", p. 95. 
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resolution. 109 The reasoning behind this is that functional practices, rather than 
"deliberate and logical decision", can induce greater integration! 10 
Functionalism has inspired thinking about the influence of the private sector as a 
powerful new dimension in coping with conflicts. Business and Conflict programmes 
aim to address this dimension through developing strategies that promote and catalyse 
peace-building practices, principles and policies of extractive transnational 
corporations and local businesses in partnership with multilateral agencies, 
governments and NGOs. "' 
Nevertheless, in evaluating this approach to conflict, Groom observes that there are 
many questions unanswered, like the fact that interests can be conflicting and based 
on different values, and that this could mobilise not only integrative but disintegrative 
forces. 112 Burton agreed with Groom that "functionalism is essentially a neutral 
concept in terms of values" while he depicted "shared values that tend to act as an 
invisible decision-maker" as the solution for disintegration! 13 He conceptualised 
functionalism in a society in conflict, as 
a condition that emerges in a highly complex and developed political system, in 
which there is a high level of overlapping role behaviour creating shared values, in 
which there are administrative skills and awareness of interrelationships between 
different functional institutions, in which the complexity of political demands and 
tasks are beyond the decision-making capacity of any central authorities, in which 
interests and values systems extend well beyond the immediate requirements of 
survival. 114 
Nevertheless, despite his genuine interest in complexity - characteristically enough 
Burton closes his essay on functionalism with a comment on the inability of the 
theory to deal with the number of factors that influence these processes - he does not 
elaborate further on this issue. 
115 Instead, in his later writings, he turned from 
transactions to an emphasis on the human needs approach. Reading carefully Burton's 
early functionalist approach we realise that he followed a technocratic conception of 
109 Burton, John W., "Functionalism and the Resolution of Conflict", in Groom, A. J. R. & Taylor, P., 
(eds. ), Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations, p. 246. 
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html 
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function, rationalised by a means/ends schema. When, however, his functionalism is 
supported by the human needs theory, it ends up in a tautology. If we take seriously 
the argument that human needs are the motives, we end up in a tautological cycle 
where the predetermined result is the same as its cause. 116 This perspective produces a 
scientific perception of the world where there is a natural tendency for adaptation 
without friction and without conflict. 
2.2.2. Learning Processes 
Thucydides, who wrote The Peloponnesian War, believed that "knowledge of the past 
can be an aid to the interpretation of the future". 117 That seems to have been the case 
with Barbara Tuchman's book The Guns of August. President Kennedy appears to 
admit in the aftermath of the crisis that his management during the Cuban crisis was 
affected by Tuchman's analysis of the First World War. 118 Scholars in the field of 
conflict analysis invest heavily in learning processes. 119 Smoke, Willis and Vasquez 
argue for the need to learn a culture of peace as we have learned a culture of war. 
It is suggested that education imbued with principles of peaceful conflict resolution 
may be the key for a profound transformation from a war to a peace culture. A whole 
new generation of peace researchers-activists has emerged over the last decade, 
dedicated to the application of the lessons drawn from accumulating and developing 
research and analysis in the field of societies in conflict. Many projects over recent 
years in countries in conflict - like Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and Yugoslavia - include 
revising history text books in schools and universities in order to prevent the instilling 
of "enemy images" in children's minds. Several non-governmental conflict resolution 
organizations have started implementing media projects to educate the media to be 
tolerant of differences and train them in peace journalism. A number of web sites have 
also been created making knowledge of these issues available to a great number of 
16 The tautology implied in the application of human needs theory on conflict resolution in general is 
described also by John Warfield. Warfield, John N., "Cognitive Equilibrium: Experimental Results and 
their Implications", Sandole, Dennis J, & Hugo van der Merve, (eds. ), Conflict Resolution Theory and 
Practice: Integration and Application, p. 67. 
117 Thucydides, The Peloponesian War, Translated by Richard Krawley, New York: Modern Library, 
1951, p. 14. 
' 18 "At the time of the Cuba Crisis John Kennedy made sure that at least some members of his staff 
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read The Guns of August by Barbara Tuchman so as to strengthen and refresh their memories of 
1914". 
Deutsch, Karl W., "Crisis Decision making-The Information Approach", in Frei, Daniel (ed. ), 
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119 See about co-operative education in Burton, John & Dukes, Frank, Conflict: Practices in 
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people. Conflict analysis and conflict resolution courses and university programmes 
all around the world, aim to develop the necessary skills to deal with conflicts in a 
peaceful and creative way. 
This approach to education looks at learning as a positive and uni-linear process. But 
are schools and universities the only educational institutions? What about cultural 
centres in conflict sites like Bosnia for example, set up by parties in conflict or those 
who want to influence the development of the conflict by reproducing the dividing 
lines within a society or between states? 120 
Functionalists also see the establishment and development of new, co-operative 
functions as an automatic learning process with positive effects. They assume that 
once people experience the beneficial results of co-operation, they will be motivated 
to improve co-operation. 
Studies on the Cuban crisis and Soviet-American relations often view the experience 
of crisis as an automatic, trial and error learning process. They refer to the lessons 
drawn from the experience of the crisis. It is assumed that Russians and Americans 
drew similar conclusions, which they operationalized in the conduct of their relations 
during the Cold War. Decision-makers are supposed to have learned how to prevent 
an increase of tension that could lead to a hot confrontation between the two 
superpowers. 121 Lebow's discussion of the lessons drawn from crises, however, 
demonstrates that crises can have both positive and negative effects. The Cuba and the 
Fashoda crisis for example, had ameliorating effects upon the relations of France and 
Britain, while the Berlin crisis deepened the hostility between the USA and Western 
Europe on one hand and the Soviet Union on the other. 122 
Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov' s study demonstrates how the simplicity of a trial-error 
pattern of learning is defied in practice. Rather than crisis he discusses conflict 
resolution as a learning process in the context of the protracted Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 12' He develops a three-stage learning process model 
from conflict 
suppression to regulation and institutionalisation. According to this approach, 
120 Turkey, a country torn by conflicts - islamists/secularists, Kurds/Turks - 
is an interesting case study 
from that perspective. There are educational programmes of Peaceful Conflict 
Resolution established 
by universities like the Sabanci University in Istanbul which involve training of civil servants 
in 
peaceful conflict resolution techniques. At the same time, in the same city, certain religious 
leaders 
preach in mosques, after the Friday prayer, the enmity against the non-believers. 
21 Lebow, Richard, Ned, Between Peace and War, p. 3. 
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decision-makers try different methods in the conduct of the conflict; depending on the 
response they get or the results of their actions, they adapt their next step. That 
approach assumes a mechanistic, stimulus/response interaction that accounts for the 
events. Nevertheless, testing this model on the Syrian-Israeli, Jordanian-Israeli and 
Palestinian-Israeli conflicts, the author found that "learning developed in each dyadic 
conflict, separately, independently and differently from other dyadic conflicts. 024 
That led him to the conclusion that "the complexities of the Arab-Israeli conflict - 
many actors and different issues - hindered the development of the same rate and 
scope of learning in each dyadic conflict". 125 
The non-linearity of leaders' learning and the cognitive processes involved in that has 
been discussed extensively by Jervis in his study on perceptions and misperceptions. 
He maintains that leaders "learn broad general lessons from history, but this kind of 
learning hinders rather than aids productive thinking". 126 Decision-makers do not 
"understand the detailed causal linkages". Moreover, Jervis points to the `generational 
cycles' in policies. Generations with immediate or close experience of wars or other 
traumatic experiences learn the lessons "especially well but because of the flawed 
nature of the way they will have learned, the lessons will be oversimplified and over- 
generalised and therefore will be likely to be applied to inappropriate situations". 
127 
Leng's study on six pairs of states, involved in three successive disputes, corroborates 
this view. He discovered a learning pattern according to which the loser of the 
previous dispute may initiate the second dispute as the result of the attribution of the 
loss to his failure to demonstrate sufficient resolve. 128 Several other studies have 
pointed to these aspects of learning from the past. Stern maintains that leaders use the 
past "to buttress pre-existing policy preferences". 129 Similarly, Burke argues that 
history for decision-makers is "a magical mirror where everyone sees what he 
wants". 13o 
This discussion stresses the emphasis on the importance of cognitive processes in 
decision-making. The conclusion of this section is that learning processes constitute 
124 ibid., p. 90. 
125 ibid., p. 91. 
126 Jervis, Robert, "How do decision-makers learn from History", p. 151. 
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an indispensable part of conflict transformation. Nevertheless, the mainstream 
discussion of learning processes in conflict transformation follows an uni-linear 
understanding of learning. In most of the cases learning is approached as something 
positive and self-evident that leads to progress and mutual understanding, when in 
fact, it is neither always positive nor self-evident. Learning is a neutral, continuous 
process. It builds on the basis of existing knowledge. New information is processed 
either in order to change or to reinforce existing images, expectations and schemas of 
interpretation. Thus, learning processes may reinforce the structures of a conflict, that 
is the expectations each side holds for the other. Yet, learning can also contribute to 
attitude changes towards co-operation. 
To sum up this section, a theory of conflict transformation should accommodate the 
above-described seemingly contradictory trends. For that purpose it should be able to 
explore in depth, through rigorous empirical research, the mechanisms of learning 
processes in modern society. The relevant literature places the emphasis mainly on 
how leaders learn or do not learn. There is scant research about the learning process 
societies as a whole undergo and even less about scientists' learning processes. 
2.2.3. PSW as the Means for Conflict Transformation 
So far, PSW has been discussed as the means to resolve a conflict through analysing 
it. This approach is based on instrumental rationality and it assumes that the 
participants in the PSWs go through a learning process, which can break down 
stereotypes and misperceptions. A strand of the conflict theory, drawing on various 
criticisms to this approach, developed an alternative, more modest aim for the PSW 
on the basis of discursive rationality. The argument here is that the workshop can 
enable the transformation rather than the resolution of the conflict. Scholars have 
sought to describe and explain the processes of transformation focusing on the 
emergence of a new language and new `thematic relevances', which can then 
be 
conveyed to society. 
The emphasis in these analyses is on the process of communication and the 
management of difference. Benjamin Broome lays the emphasis on 
learning how to 
approach the conflict, and "how to deal with difference". 
13 1 Dryzek in a similar line of 
t31 Broome, Benjamin, "Managing Diffeences in Conflict Resolution: The Role of Relational 
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thought argues that "individuals can seek consensus on what is to be done while 
differing about why". 132 Tarja Vayrynen, in her study of Burton's analysis of PSWs, 
built upon these approaches, to follow a phenomenological interpretation of the PSW 
as an alternative ontological basis. This approach enabled her to develop the 
hermeneutic elements in PSW. 133 She argues that 
[T]he problem-solving workshop is, thus, an attempt to find a shared reality 
between the parties in conflict. It deals mainly with the interpretative schemes of 
the participants by offering them a framework for 'negotiations over realities'. The 
finding of a common language game both presupposes and facilitates the finding of 
a shared reality. 134 
This shift of emphasis has practical implications regarding the role of facilitator, as 
well as the problem of the insertion of the results of the workshop into society. The 
facilitator undertakes here the role of participant-observer. As for the problem of the 
re-entry of the outcome of the workshop to the society, Tarja Vayrynen argues that it 
depends 
on the issues through which a shared reality is achieved. If the issues discussed 
relate to the `real' problems of the conflicting parties and a shared language game 
is created to deal with them, the relevances are more likely to be transferred than, 
for example, in the case where personal feelings are focused on in the workshop. 135 
Another important implication of this conceptualisation of PSWs is the conclusion it 
draws with regard to the principle of secrecy. It argues that secrecy might not be 
necessary; in fact it might be detrimental to the process of relating the new themes out 
of the workshop. '36 
These observations generate many questions about the kind of "thematic relevances" 
and the mechanisms through which the "relating" can happen in a modern society. It 
creates questions about the competing thematic relevances that may appear in a 
society. Nevertheless, it is an important contribution to the problematique of conflict 
transformation. 
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learn about psychological processes, about themselves, interpersonal relations, groups and social 
systems. Appley, Dee & Alvin, Winder, T-Groups and Therapy Groups in a Changing Society, 
London, San Fransisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973, p. 85. 
132 ibid., p. 43. 
"' Vayrynen, Tarja, Sharing Reality: An Insight from Phenomenology to John Burton's Problem- 
Solving Conflict Resolution Theory, p. 133. 
134 ibid., p. 211. 
'35 ibid., p. 189. 
136 ibid., p. 190. 
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2.2.4. Peace Process as Complexification 
Galtung, one of the founders of the conflict theory field, incorporated his experience 
from 40 conflicts over the last 40 years in what he named the TRANSCEND 
approach. 137 This approach is close to the above discussion of PSW but it comes to 
make one important contribution. The original element in the TRANSCEND method is 
that it provides a new understanding of complexity in the context of peace processes. 
TRANSCEND addresses all possible levels of society, leaders, media, civil society 
organizations, peace activists and academics, rejecting top-down approaches. The 
question is how this is possible, what kind of processes can connect the different 
levels and bring about a change. The main method is "dialogue" or more correctly 
`dialogues', which should take place at all possible levels of society. As regards the 
level of leadership, it starts unconventionally in that instead of trying to "bring the 
parties to a table", the conflict worker is engaged in dialogues with the different 
parties separately. (S)he does not try to argue with the parties and bring about a 
compromise. Rather, the aim is to "stimulate creativity" and prepare the parties for the 
table. To do that, the conflict worker looks at the nature of the goals of the parties, 
exploring their multiple dimensions and opening "a cognitive space to new outcomes 
not envisaged by the parties". These are elements incorporated in the other 
conceptualisations of PSWs too. The TRANSCEND method, however, conceptualises 
this process as complexification. Complexification means introducing "more goal 
dimensions with or without clashes, more actors, more concerns". 138 The idea behind 
this process is that conflict is `embedded' in a dualistic framework. By introducing 
more complexity, it can get `disembedded' from this restrictive frame. It is argued that 
after the process of complexification, the parties "may not even have to meet, the 
conflict may simply have 'evaporated"'. 139 
The conflict worker has a different task to accomplish here. The TRANSCEND 
method is not "a Socratic ̀ dialogue' in which the conflict worker knows in advance 
what s/he wants as a conclusion. This is a reciprocal process taking place inside the 
conflict worker too". 140 The conflict worker does not rely upon rationality. He is 
'37 The TRANSCEND approach is presented in Galtung, Johan, &Jacobsen, Carl, G., (eds. ), Searching 
for Peace: the Road to Transcend, pp. 207-227. 
"" ibid., p. 212. 
139 ibid., p. 210. 
140 ibid., p. 214. 
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"bound to the principle of hope: somewhere there is some exit". This belief drives him 
"[A]nd then the same process again... and again, until something fruitful emerges; if 
necessary by replacing both the conflict parties and the conflict workers". 
The contribution of the TRANSCEND method to our understanding of peace 
processes is important for one more reason. It makes a breaking with mainstream 
theory with regard to the issue of complexity. So far, complexity has been discussed 
as a problem that threatens peace efforts, the main obstacle in the praxis of peace 
processes. Here Galtung' s argument is innovative in that he suggests that it is 
precisely the increase of complexity that can enable the transformation of the conflict. 
Furthermore, it acknowledges that the conflict worker does not control the interaction. 
On the other hand, the function of complexity is not fully analysed in the 
TRANSCEND method. As a matter of fact, this formulation generates many 
questions. If we imagine the introduction of complexity on different levels of society, 
through "dialogues", what will happen? How do changes occur within society and 
how do different levels of society interact? Could the result be more conflict? Or 
could it be more reflexive communication? Or both? These are questions, which again 
refer to society as a whole and thus demand a comprehensive theory of society instead 
of a theory of peace processes. Luhmann's theory of social autopoiesis can address 
these questions and provide us the analytical tools to explore complexity and 
contingency in modern society. 
2.2.5. Contingent Transformation 
The above discussion referred mostly to intentional or engineered transformation of 
conflict. Nevertheless, in the last years we have witnessed transformations of conflicts 
that are not engineered by a specifiable actor. Raimo Vayrynen observes that "the 
transformation of conflict may be either intended or unintended" and "conflict 
resolution is not only a form of stepwise rational action in which the actors involved 
try to adjust their competing interests to each other. It is also associated with everyday 
and broader historical changes transforming the scope, nature and functions of 
is lal collective violence.... 
141 Vayrynen, Raimo, "To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on the Resolution of National and 
International Conflicts", in Vayrynen, Raimo, (ed. ), New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict 
Resolution and Conflict Transformation, London: Sage, 1991, p. 6. 
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Let us reflect on some examples: Gorbachev's becoming the head of the government 
of the USSR is one interesting example. This change opened the way to important 
developments in the USA-USSR relations and in other conflicts around the world. 142 
The dissolution of the USSR allowed many conflicts in different parts of the world to 
move towards resolution. The conflict between the Black and the White communities 
in South Africa was affected by these developments. De Klerk's regime could not be 
justified any more as an anti-communist pillar. The important aspect that we shall 
draw attention to is that in cases like South Africa the transformation of the conflict 
was not directly related to the issues that these conflicts were about. The leaders of the 
parties in conflict did not achieve major breakthroughs in the form of agreements over 
the central issues of the conflict. Let us take another example, this time from the 
development of the rapprochement between Israelis/Palestinians during the 90s: the 
Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzak Rabin's assassination by opponents to his policy of 
rapprochement with the PLO, was an event that empowered this policy and enabled 
his successor, Shimon Peres, to speed up the peace process. 143 
What are the processes that may bring about changes all around the world, far beyond 
a specific context where certain events emerge? One element our explanation should 
include is the contingent nature of these changes and their impact on the conflict. The 
above processes of conflict transformation did not emerge as necessary developments, 
which could be explained through a rational calculation - realist approach - or the 
prevalence of the value of peace -as normative approaches could argue. We cannot 
find some sort of direct learning process or institutionalised practices that led to that 
direction either. Could we talk about a kind of complexification with the introduction 
of new issues, seemingly irrelevant to the conflict issues, and thematically 
interconnected changes? 
On the other hand, we should keep in mind some other parallels: the collapse of the 
Soviet Union also triggered a number of crisis processes with the infamous examples 
of Yugoslavia and the ex-Soviet Republics. The question then comes back here too: 
how were these processes carried out? How does the same event in one part of the 
world unleash dynamics that may lead to peace and in another it can lead to violence? 
What is the constitutive element of these processes of change? Theory has observed 
142 Kriesberg, Louis, Constructive conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution, Lanham, Md; Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, p. 25. 
143 ibid., p. 209. 
35 
these phenomena but it has not elaborated on the implications of these observations 
regarding the nature of crisis and peace processes. 
3. The Greek-Turkish Crisis and Peace Processes Literature 
The Greek-Turkish dispute is often cited as a protracted conflict that has the potential 
to lead the two countries to war. 144 Azar defines a protracted conflict as processes 
instead of events or clusters of events. The term is employed to describe: 
hostile interactions, which extend over long periods of time with sporadic 
outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity. These are conflict 
situations in which stakes are very high -the conflicts involve whole societies and 
act as agents for defining the scope of national identity and social solidarity. While 
they may exhibit some breakpoints during which there is a cessation of overt 
violence, they linger on in time and have no distinguishable point of termination... 145 
The Greek-Turkish conflict goes back to the years of the Ottoman Empire. The 
Modern Greek State was founded in 1830, after the Greek revolution against the 
Ottoman Empire. Today the conflict is centred around the Cyprus problem, the 
demarcation in the Aegean Sea and issues related to minorities in both countries. Six 
main issues are involved in the Greek-Turkish dispute: the demarcation of the 
continental shelf, territorial sea and airspace, the Flight Information Region, the 
demilitarisation of certain Greek islands close to the Turkish coasts and, more recently 
(since 1996), the unclear demarcation of borders from Evros to the Dodecanese (grey 
areas). '46 To these initial problems, others have been added, like the Kurdish issue 
with Turkey accusing Greece of supporting the Kurdish separatists, and the 
"diplomatic war" between the two countries within the EU and NATO and elsewhere 
in international fora. '47 
Greece and Turkey have come to the brink of war four times over the last three 
decades. In 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus, which created a major crisis and 
'44 Miall et al. Contemporary Conflict Resolution, p. 211. Richard Haass writing about the Greek- 
Turkish dispute presents several scenaria of escalation of the conflict arguing that "[T]he Aegean is an 
accident waiting to happen". Haass, Richard, Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional 
Disputes, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990, p. 58. 
145 Azar, Edward E., Jureidini, Paul & McLaurin, Robert, "Protracted Conflict: Theory and Practice in 
the Middle East", Journal of Palestine Studies, VIII, 29,1978, p. 50. 
146 Greece and Turkey do not agree either on the definition of the problems or on the methods they 
should employ in order to deal with them. For a presentation of the issues of dispute in Greek-Turkish 
relations see Heraclides, Alexis, Greece and the "Threat from the East ", [in Greek], Polis, 2001, pp. 
202-250. 
147 ibid., p. 200. 
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overburdened thereafter Greek-Turkish relations. After that, the two countries lived 
through three more crises in the Aegean Sea, which invited full mobilisation of the 
armed forces: the first in 1976, the second in 1987 and the third in 1996. During the 
last two decades, several peace initiatives have been undertaken by the two parties - 
and sometimes by a third party - in order to pave the way to sustainable, peaceful 
relations between the neighbours. Negotiations, mediation efforts, facilitation, good 
offices, conferences and problem solving workshops have been employed as the 
means to achieve that aim. 148 Greek-Turkish relations display an additional interest 
for research and analysis for one more reason: an accidental event, a devastating 
earthquake that occurred in the area of Marmara in Turkey, in 1999, seems to have 
provoked a sudden and abrupt change of attitudes on the level of Greek and Turkish 
civil societies. 
The empirical part of this thesis focuses on the last two crises and the peace processes 
that followed them, as well as the co-operation initiated after the earthquake. Here, I 
will provide a brief overview of the relevant literature on the Greek-Turkish crises of 
1987 and 1996 and the peace processes that followed them. This section aims to 
prepare the ground for the analysis that follows in the empirical part. Thus, it is 
confined to the description of the analytical tools employed by scholars when they 
examine these phenomena and some observations regarding the paradoxes created by 
this application. 149 Detailed analysis and critical evaluation of these approaches, 
however, can only be finalised after the presentation of the results of my empirical 
research into the same phenomena in the light of Luhmann' s theory. 
A first observation regarding the literature on Greek-Turkish relations is that more 
emphasis has been given to the study of the crises than to the study of the peace 
initiatives. The second main point is that crises and peace processes in Greek and 
Turkish literature have been basically approached through the rational actor model in 
both countries. 
148 Furthermore, after the crisis of 1976 Greece lodged an appeal to the International Court of the 
Hague, in parallel with the intervention of the Security Council. For a discussion of this issue see 
Syrigos, Angelos, The Status of the Aegean Sea According to International Law, Sakkoulas/ßruyant, 
1998, pp. 125-140. 
149 For an authoritative study on the detrimental effects of the application of realist and deterrence 
theories on Greek-Turkish relations in general, on the part of Greek scholars, see Heraclides, Alexis, 
Greece and the "Threatfrom the East", pp. 162-194. In the same study Heraclides discusses Greek 
perceptions of hostility against Turkey and policies of antagonism that emanate also from a part of the 
Greek elites and intellectuals driven by an extreme Greek nationalism and a religio-cultural 
nationalism. 
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Greek and Turkish analysts argue that the crises of 1987 and 1996 were the 
instruments employed by the other side in order to gain some advantage in the Aegean 
Sea dispute. 150 The other side is accused of having designed the crisis in order to bring 
about a favourable for it change in the Aegean Sea by the threat of force. As for the 
de-escalation each side argues that in the crisis of 1987 the determination it displayed 
forced the other to withdrawal. The crisis of 1996 was more complex and left the 
Greek side with the feeling of defeat, convinced that the USA intervened in favour of 
Turkey. 
The sharply opposed interests of the two states have frequently been considered the 
reason for the failure of peace initiatives. A great deal of the literature focuses on 
official negotiations and seeks to explain the failure to bring about a positive result. 
The conclusion often reached is that the maximization of profits and the 
incompatibility of the demands each side makes do not allow for a solution to the 
conflict. 151 Thus, the emphasis is on the outcome of various peace initiatives not the 
process. They do not question for example the timing of the emergence of these 
processes and their every time conditioning. Additionally, a great part of the literature 
is devoted to the legal issues of the dispute and exhausts its efforts in the repetition of 
the legal arguments official authorities employ. 
The striking paradox here, however, is that although scholars look at the same 
phenomenon, the same crises and employ the same tools of analysis - the realist 
perspective - they reach diametrically opposed conclusions. Furthermore, they do not 
seem to understand and provide an explanation for this paradox. 
Finally, following carefully the literature on Greek-Turkish relations during the last 
ten years and especially after the crisis of 1996, we observe that alternative to the 
above mainstream explanations to the Greek-Turkish conflict have started to emerge. 
Scholars have employed analytical tools from conflict resolution and conflict 
150 For the crisis of 1996 from the Greek perspective see Mavrides, Panayiotis, & Fakiolas, Eustathios, 
"Strategic crisis management and the Greek-Turkish Dispute", [in Greek and English] in Hristodoulos 
Giallourides, Greece and Turkey after the end of Cold War, Sideris 1999, pp. 133-176. For the crisis of 
1987 see Giallourides, Hristodoulos, The Greek-Turkish Conflict from Cyprus to Imia 1955-1996, The 
Press Perspective, [in Greek], Sideris, 2001, Veremis, Thanos, History of Greek-Turkish Relations 
1453-1998 (sec ed. ), [in Greek], ELIAMEP, Sideris, 1998. From a Turkish perspective Gürel, Sükru 
Sina, The Greek Turkish Relations (1821-1993), [in Turkish] Ankara, 1993, and Ayman, Gülden S., 
"The Kardak (Imia) Crisis and Turkish-Greek Relations", Hellenic Studies, Vol. 9, No 2,200, p. 56. 
Pazarci, Hüsseyin, The Status of Demilitarisation of the Islands in the Eastern Aegean, Ankara 
University, 1986. 
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transformation perspectives. Before 1996 there were only a few exceptions of 
alternative analyses attempting to explain cognitive, psychological and systemic 
parameters involved in the Greek-Turkish conflict in general. '52 After the 1996 crisis 
these studies have multiplied. Insights from sociology and history and the trend of 
discourse analysis have broadened the scope of the study of Greek-Turkish relations 
introducing a self-critical perspective into the relevant literature of both sides. 
Additionally, it is after 1996 that academics became engaged with peace initiatives 
undertaking themselves initiatives towards the direction of conflict transformation. 
Institutionalised meetings among Greek and Turkish academics and programmes of 
action aiming, for example, at changing history texts books and organised seminars 
regarding multicultural education are only some examples of Greek and Turkish 
academics' joint action. The emergence of these initiatives and their development will 
be discussed analytically in chapter IV, in the empirical part of the thesis. 
4. The Blind Spots of Crisis and Peace Processes Theories 
In this part of the chapter, I will further discuss the relationship between theory and 
empirical research. The aim is to clarify certain requirements of a theory for the 
examination of the phenomena of crisis and peace processes. The above review of the 
theory demonstrated that the recognition of the complexity of these phenomena is the 
limit of the available theoretical analysis. Existing theories explain aspects, pieces of 
the puzzle of crisis and peace processes but they do not provide an explanation about 
their dynamics. 
A common problem of theories of crisis and peace processes is that they define their 
subject matter in certain ways and then `prove' that their definitions are appropriate 
by reading the empirical evidence in certain ways. 153 Their positivist ontological 
's' Coufoudakis, Van, "Greek Political Party Attitudes towards Turkey: 1974-1989", in Constas, 
Dimitri, The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences, London: 
Macmillan, 1991, p. 49. 
'52 Volkan, Vamik, D., & Itzkowitz, Norman, Turks and Greeks: Neighbours in Conflict, The Eothern 
Press, 1994, Artunkal, Tugrul, "The Greek stereotype in the Turkish school textbooks", in Semih, 
Vaner, The Greek-Turkish Dispute, [in Turkish], Istanbul: Metis, 1990, p. 229-239, Heraclides, Alexis, 
The images of National "Self and "Other" in International Relations: the Case of the Greek Foreign 
Policy", Modern Issues, (in Greek), Vol. 54, January-March 1995, Ayman, Gülden S., The Turkish 
policy of Negotiation and Deterrence in the Aegean Sea" in Sule Kut, The Longest Decade: the '90s in 
Turkey's National Security and Foreign Policy Agenda, Boyut, Istanbul, 1998, pp. 285-325. 
153 John Burton writes that "the great majority of scholars work within paradigms without question, 
work inductively and seek support for their theses". Burton, John, Global Conflict, p. 36, 
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foundation has pre-determined their approach to the phenomena of crisis and peace 
processes. Nevertheless, scholars cannot perceive how they construct their analysis 
through the tools they have employed in the first place. 
The underpinning assumptions of the theories are reflected in the way they perceive 
themselves and how they define their own task as regards these phenomena. Crisis 
theories' aim is to provide the means for control and management of crises. On the 
other hand, the majority of the literature on peace processes discusses how the 
academic-facilitator can engineer the resolution of the conflict. In other words, 
scholars are assumed to have knowledge about an `objective world'. Taking this for 
granted, they believe that they can produce prescriptions about phenomena, and 
function in a therapeutic mode within society through diffusing knowledge. '54 
However, this assumption is often based on an understanding of crisis and peace 
processes that separates these phenomena from society at large and that ignores the 
function of theory itself, within society. 
To further explain this aspect, I will employ an example taken from my research on 
Greek-Turkish relations and the role of science within society. Analyses of the Greek- 
Turkish crises of 1987 and 1996 have re-entered society through writing and printing. 
These analyses have reproduced and reinforced the structures of the Greek-Turkish 
conflict itself. Furthermore, they have constituted the basic material of further 
discourse within Greece and Turkey about Greek-Turkish relations: material for 
courses in the universities, journalistic discourse and the material for political and 
military planning and decision-making. 
This phenomenon is not unique to the crisis in Greece and Turkey. We find similar 
accounts of the function of science within society in the American international 
relations literature, in particular with regard to the Cold War. Banks and Burton 
discuss the role of American scholars in the service of their government'55. Deterrence 
theories have been criticised as another case of theory entering the praxis of foreign 
policy and which can create paradoxes like self-fulfilling prophesies 
leading 
eventually to crisis escalation. 
"Functionalism and the Resolution of Conflict" in Groom, A. J. R., and 
Taylor, Paul (eds. ) 
Functionalism, 1975, p. 249 
154 Vayrynen, Tarja, Sharing Reality.., p. 126. 
155 See Burton, John, World Society, London: Macmillan, 1972 and Banks, Michal, 
"The International 
Relations Discipline: Asset or Lability for Conflct Resolution? ", in Burton, John 
& Dukes, Frank, 
Conflict: Readings in Managent and Resolution, London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 51-70. 
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Transformation theories enter modem society too through scholars/activists who seek 
to apply the conclusions of their theoretical analysis and empirical research to 
societies in conflict. The re-entry of theory to society, has been institutionalised, as it 
was demonstrated above, in several NGOs for conflict resolution, conflict 
transformation and crisis prevention. Furthermore, a first evaluation of their role 
argues for both positive and negative effects that they may have with regard to the 
development of a conflict. In many cases, they have saved lives by providing early 
warning, which allowed timely intervention and prevented the escalation of conflicts. 
Nevertheless, there is evidence too that their action in the field of conflict supported 
warlords, or these organizations looked to serve their own institutionalised interests. 
To sum up the argument here, the re-entry of theory in society results in a paradox: 
namely, theory is not something different from its object; it changes its own object 
and ultimately it becomes its own object. Nevertheless, it cannot see its role in 
society. This is the blind spot of theory, which remains invisible to it. Producing a 
theory restricted to a narrow examination of crisis and peace processes based on 
empirical observations with occasional injections of sociology and philosophy, does 
not help us to conceptualise the relation of the part, that is the role of the theory, and 
the whole, that is society. By creating isolated theories, which are not integrated with 
society, we run the risk of losing touch with reality. We may end up creating artificial 
esoteric constructs, which do not help us understand society's complexity but instead 
increase our confusion. 
Thus, a call for control or social engineering through scientific knowledge in a 
functionally differentiated society seems to be inappropriate and misleading. It 
presupposes that scientists can control, that is they can intervene and plan the totality 
of society. However, paradoxically, the theory undertaking that role is itself not a 
theory, which can understand and describe its own operation, let alone the mode of 
operation of society. The pretension of `scientific' validity excludes self-reflection 
and the open admission of self-reference and circular reasoning, which are 
characteristics of our modem society. 
Burton's passionate demand for scholars to reconsider their assumptions is an attempt 
to induce self-referentiality, to stimulate discussion and self-reflexive processes about 
how we think about thinking, about what kind of decisions are made prior to decision 
making, for decision making and about how we learn to learn. Conflict transformation 
theories have modified the ambition of control and our tools of observation of society. 
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Furthermore, the current interest in discourse analysis contributes important insights 
on how knowledge is constructed and is taken for granted. 
This section of the chapter put forth two correctives for a theory of crisis and peace 
processes. First they should be theories of society and second they should be designed 
to include their own self-reference, their own operation within society as an object of 
their analysis. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter crisis and peace processes theories were reviewed. Rational 
cost/benefit calculations, psychological and cognitive processes and systemic 
parameters have been examined as important aspects of the analysis of crisis and 
peace processes. The main endeavour of theories of crisis and peace processes has 
been to discover patterns of crisis escalation and conflict resolution. Underpinning 
assumption of the mainstream theory is that crisis and peace processes are interaction 
processes in a society that is constituted on the level of -rational- action. This 
approach emanates from a more profound philosophical tradition, which 
conceptualises society as stable, hierarchically differentiated and directed by decision- 
makers and elites. The role of science in this framework is perceived as the key to the 
problems of society. It is assumed that science can provide society with knowledge 
that will enable control and social engineering. 
Nevertheless, the above review demonstrated that crisis and peace processes resist 
linear analysis. They are highly complex phenomena, characterised by 
unpredictability, lack of control and constant change. This is further substantiated by 
the paradox we are facing in the turn of the 200' century: despite the outpouring of 
scientific studies on crisis and peace processes, a significant increase in crises and 
violent conflicts raging all over the world has been observed over the last 40 years. 
The above review revealed the need for more pertinent analyses of today's complex 
reality and also the classical problems of knowledge and objectivity. Accumulated 
empirical evidence and attempts to theorize about these phenomena have explored 
aspects of this complexity but they cannot afford to go beyond simplistic description 
or normative claims. 
The conclusion drawn in this chapter is that a theory of crisis and peace processes 
should be designed in such a way as to enable comparative analysis and the 
exploration of these processes from the point of view of complexity and contingency. 
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That also requires a different conceptualisation of theory's task. Theory should 
approach itself as one of its objects that takes part in the world of objects it describes. 
It should be designed to contemplate its re-entry in society. This enterprise requires a 
completely different scope and framework of analysis; a theory of society, which will 
provide us with tools, sophisticated enough to cope with the problems indicated 
above. I propose to use Luhmann's theory of modern systems for this purpose. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AUTOPOIESIS 
In the first chapter I discussed how theories conceptualise crisis and peace processes 
as being constituted through actions, interactions and inputs of individuals and 
decision-makers. In this part I will present Niklas Luhmann's theory of social 
autopoiesis, which I used in the research and analysis of my case studies. Luhmann's 
theory argues that modem society is constituted, and more precisely self-constituted, 
on the level of communications. Actions and decisions presuppose communication 
and thus they cannot be considered the elementary units of social systems. Luhmann's 
voluminous work is devoted to the development of analytical tools for the exploration 
of this self-constitution. 
Modem society is seen as shaped and re-shaped through the constant activity of the 
processes of communication. It is described as a free-floating reality, a multi-centred 
world differentiated according to the principle of function and not hierarchy. Here 
`individuals', as understood by Luhmann, have an important role to play but they are 
not considered to be `parts' or `elements' of social systems. This turn to a highly 
abstract conceptualization of social systems and society as a whole changes 
completely the way of perceiving and thinking about the world. The restless and 
creative nature of social systems and their autonomy - rather than homeostasis and 
equilibrium - become the focus of analysis. 
Niklas Luhmann's modem systems theory integrates the theory of evolution, the 
theory of social systems and the theory of communication. The theoretical 
architecture of Luhmann's systems is built on carefully crafted relationships among 
concepts employed from these theories. Niklas Luhmann needed 40 years to develop 
the whole of his theory but his research interests were clear from the beginning. 
156 
From early on he problematized social complexity, contingency and the dynamics of 
societal evolution. Developments in different fields of knowledge and research during 
these years gave him the tools he was looking for to complete his project. In order to 
build up his approach, he adopted and further elaborated existing theories or different 
elements of existing theories. General systems theory, developments in information 
and decision theories and cybernetics, thermodynamics, functionalism, and Husserl' s 
156 For a comprehensive account of the development of Luhmann's theory, see Rossbach, Stefan, On 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, and Niklas Luhmann, Badia Fiesolana, San Domenico, EUI 
Working Paper SPS No. 93/10, pp. 81-119. 
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phenomenology were incorporated in a theoretical edifice, which makes the theory of 
modem social systems. 
To be specific, Luhmann integrated in his theoretical framework the two important 
paradigm shifts of the last decades in general systems theory. First, he followed the 
move from the `whole/parts' conceptualization of systems to the 
`system/environment' approach of open systems. Second, he conceptualized systems, 
including social systems, as self-referential systems. Self-reference clarifies how 
social systems can be open and closed at the same time. They communicate with their 
environment only through their own meaning world, through self-contact. The 
system/environment difference and the self-reference combined with functional 
analysis provide the (empirical) epistemology of autopoiesis. 
This chapter is divided in three main parts. In the first part I present the basic 
principles of Luhmann's systems theory. In the second part, I describe modem society 
as the overall encompassing system and outline its main characteristics. In the third 
part I discuss the implications of the theory for empirical research. Furthermore, I 
seek to demonstrate the change of perspective Luhmann's theory offers by 
formulating new questions for the study of crisis and peace processes. 
Luhmann has been one of the most productive thinkers of the last century, as his work 
includes some 40 books and 400 articles. 157 In this part of the study I do not intend to 
present a full account of this voluminous work. Instead I just want to introduce the 
necessary tools for my research. For that reason I tried to keep this section brief - 
hopefully not at the expense of the necessary clarity. 
1. Principles of Social Autopoiesis 
1.1. Social Autopoiesis 
Autopoiesis is a Greek word and literally means self-production. 1 58 Luhmann 
borrowed this concept from biology in order to describe a form of system building 
valid not only for living but also for social systems. Through autopoiesis systems 
produce and reproduce themselves by generating their constitutive elements, their 
structures, their boundaries and also their unity. 
157 For a full account see Luhmann, Niklas, Social Systems, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995. 
158 It was first coined by the Chilean biologists Maturana, Humberto, R. & Varela, Fransesco G., 
Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the living, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980. 
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Luhmann conceptualizes society as an autopoietic system. He distinguishes in 
particular three main levels of system formation: Life systems, psychic systems and 
social systems. Life systems are biological systems, cells, organisms, brains etc. For 
the theory of autopoiesis, life systems form a different level of existence than social 
systems. The autopoiesis of society needs this level and uses it as a necessary 
precondition for its own operations but it does not `include' or `constitute' living 
systems. Life systems exist in the environment of society. Similarly, psychic systems 
- consciousness - are not `parts' of society. They too exist in society's environment. 
In other words, the three levels - life systems (organisms), psychic systems 
(consciousness), and social systems (communication) - are strictly separate although 
the systems that exist at these levels are all autopoietic systems. In particular, 
Luhmann emphasizes that society is not an organism. Psychic and social systems are 
both autopoietic systems but they have very different modes of operation: life and 
communication respectively. Psychic systems too are autopoietic systems but they are 
different from life systems and social systems in that their mode of operation is 
consciousness. 
The difference between living systems on the one hand and psychic and social 
systems on the other is that psychic and social systems can internally represent the 
complexity of the world through `meaning'. In fact, this is exactly what `meaning' is: 
an internal representation of the world. In other words, psychic and social systems can 
construct an image of themselves and the world, which `guides' them in their ongoing 
autopoiesis. Whether and how such systems respond to `irritations' and 
`perturbations' depends on whether and how they are able to assign `meaning' to 
them. 
Traditional sociology considered `individuals', `actors' or `persons' as the 
fundamental elements or units of society. In Luhmann's theory there is no entity that 
directly corresponds to the "individual" of traditional sociology. `Individuals', 
`persons' and `actors' are' constituted through communication in society, a process 
that helps society externalize its self-reference. But for society, these constructions 
correspond to entities that it perceives in its environment. In turn, the self-description 
of psychic systems - the meaning that consciousness assigns to itself - may or may 
not correspond to such constructions. The fact that in Luhmann's theory `individuals' 
are found, by society, in society's environment has led some critics to argue that 
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Luhmann's theory is `a-human'. '59 However, a careful reading of the theory shows 
that modern systems theory allocates an important role for psychic systems. Both 
psychic and social systems are necessary for society's autopoietic evolution. Without 
psychic systems there would be no communication at all. The innovation here 
however is that psychic systems cannot interact directly, because they cannot make 
the contents of their consciousness, their own complexity, part of the other system's 
consciousness. Instead, it is only through social systems - communication - that they 
can get in contact and interact with other psychic systems. 160 
For Luhmann, the term `interaction' has a precise technical meaning. `Interactions' 
are social systems that require the (physical) presence of at least two psychic systems 
for their autopoietic reproduction. A typical example of an ̀ interaction' is a `meeting'. 
There is a sense in which `interactions' are the most basic social systems. More 
complex systems, such as `organizations', have an identity and continue to exist 
regardless of whether their members attend the required meetings. Interaction systems 
were extremely important for society's autopoiesis because they provided social 
systems with the `raw material' for their autopoiesis. In other words, it is out of the 
noise of interaction systems that other social systems created order. Nevertheless, with 
the invention of printing and writing society became less dependent on interactions. 
As a result, the unity of society is no longer accessible through interactions. Less 
complex societies were based on interaction, but in modern societies `function' 
became the principal mode of society's differentiation. Today's principal function 
systems are the systems of economy, politics, family, law, religion and science. 
Function systems are subsystems of society; they perform specialized functions that 
are important for society's autopoiesis. They continuously differentiate internally and 
externally in order to cope with increased complexity and contingency. 
There is no general ̀ rationality' - such as e. g. `stability' - that social systems follow. 
Their rationalities are system-specific. This emphasizes the autonomy and 
159 Conventional sociological theories attempt to socialise the individual or deconstruct it through 
language-centred views. Here individuals are segregated from society but it is precisely this move that 
recognises their special hypostasis. 
160 Gunther Teubner's example illustrates the nature of interaction and its relation with psychic 
systems. "There are sixteen human beings in the room in which the seminar takes place. But the 
seminar's "social system" is also a seventeenth cognitive unit active in the meeting in the form. This is 
a meaning creating entity with similar dynamics to the kinds of things going on in the minds of its 
physical actors. However, this social system does not consist of the physical people and their 
interrelations, but solely of the seminar's communication acts based on expressed language, gestures 
47 
independence of social systems. However, this autonomy does not mean that social 
systems are `isolated' systems. On the contrary, social systems are constituted 
precisely through their difference with the environment, i. e. in relation to the 
environment. 
1.2. Social Systems: the unity of system/environment difference 
Traditional sociological theory perceived systems as units isolated from their 
environment. Social systems theory argues that it is precisely the difference between 
system and environment that constitutes the system. In order to understand this, we 
need to discuss the basic operations of a social system: self- and other- (or hetero-) 
observation as well as self-description. 
The system does not communicate directly with its environment; it only observes it. 
In particular, the system takes information or is stimulated to construct information 
about its environment and it uses that for the creation of its own `meaning world'. 
This internal world can be constituted of highly artificial and even esoteric constructs 
about the external world. This mode of operation makes understandable why self- 
reference is the central concept of the theory of modern systems. The meaning of self- 
reference is that the contact of social systems with their environments is shaped 
through their contact with themselves. Hetero-reference is possible only through self- 
reference. 
Every observation is at the same time a distinction because the observation of 
`something' necessitates that this `something' is distinguished from everything else. 
Observing a tree, for example, means that I distinguish it from the rest of the objects 
entering my optical prism. Thus, as the system observes, it produces distinctions. In 
fact, an observation is the unity of a distinction and a denotation. For as I observe the 
tree, I not only distinguish it from everything else, I also `denote' it, in this case by 
calling or naming or identifying it as a `tree'. When distinctions are introduced and 
incorporated into the system's `meaning world', they can be represented in language - 
which is in itself an evolutionary achievement of the co-evolution of psychic and 
social systems - through words, types and concepts, which in turn become important 
for the processing of further distinctions, and for connecting the various distinctions in 
the system's repertoire. In order to avoid misunderstandings I should make clear at 
and other sensory interplay. It is a world of meaning, with a life and cognition of its own". Teubner, 
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this point that the ̀ observer' is not a subject that operates outside the observed reality; 
instead the observer is to be understood as a system constituted of observations 
connected to each other and differentiated from its environment. 
Social systems may use binary codes in order to proceed with their operations, that is, 
in order to make distinctions and connect them with further distinctions. Through 
binary codes, systems observe the world with a view to applying either of the two 
sides of the code. Codes "fix a positive and a negative value whilst exclude every 
third possibility". 16 1 For example, the social system of science uses the true/false 
code, with `true' as the positive and ̀ false' as the negative value; the economy uses 
the code have/have not, and the media system uses the information/non-information 
code etc. Binary codes are implemented through programmes. 
This mode of systems operation stresses the fact that social systems are operatively 
closed but at the same time they are open to external influence through their basic 
operations of self and other-observation. The system's environment is not a unity 
itself capable of operations, because it cannot perceive, have dealings with, or directly 
influence the system. 
The system-environment relationship is asymmetric. No system can match the 
complexity of its environment, because a system cannot have enough information 
about all the other systems that constitute its environment. 162 The difference in 
complexity between system and environment is the fundamental problem of modem 
systems theory. Social systems are built up as selections responding to complexity. 
According to Luhmann, complexity is exactly this: enforced selectivity. Under the 
conditions of complexity, for something to happen, it must be selected among a 
multitude of diverse possibilities. The very existence of a system is already a 
reduction of complexity because it actualizes only one of a multitude of possibilities. 
Thus, the system's existence is contingent, and its continued existence remains fragile 
and requires continuous selectivity. Accordingly, the emergence of a system itself is a 
contingent event; it does not follow a causal law. Systems emerge through selective 
operations guided by distinctions and above all by the system/environment 
difference. 163 
Gunther, "Law as an Autopoietic System", LSE Complexity Study Group Meeting No. 3,18 June 1997. 
'61 See in particular the discussion of binary codes in the context of mass media function system. 
Luhmann, Niklas, The Reality of Mass Media, Polity Press, 2000, p. 16-18. 
162 Luhmann, Niklas, Social Systems, p. 182. 
163 ibid., p. 32. 
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The principle of self-reference emphasizes the autonomy of autopoietic systems vis-a- 
vis their environment. It also means that the environment cannot be reached through 
cognition, but the system's operational closure enables it to process external 
influences through an internal circular causal process. The reproduction of social 
systems does not follow linear cause-effect links but results from a recursive, self- 
referential process. 
I will now try to illustrate the system/environment relationship for autopoietic systems 
with two metaphors. ' 64 The well-known `butterfly effect' metaphor - as seen from the 
perspective of self-referential systems - is one of them. The `butterfly effect' was 
initially discussed in the context of meteorology where it was demonstrated that, 
depending on the overall weather dynamics, a butterfly that flies over Canterbury can 
trigger a local turbulence which can cause a hurricane in the Atlantic. This metaphor 
illustrates the point that microscopic fluctuations may produce macroscopic changes. 
However, from the point of view of systems theory, the butterfly is not the cause of 
the hurricane. The internal dynamics of the weather conditions at that specific 
moment enabled the butterfly to induce this result. In other words it is the system- 
environment synergy that brought about the hurricane phenomenon. 
The same point, now applied to meaning-based systems, is further illustrated by the 
following metaphor. Let us imagine a man who is dreaming that he prepares a dinner 
for his partner. While his dream unfolds he sees himself preparing the food and laying 
the table. Then suddenly his alarm clock rings. But instead of waking him up, he 
perceives it as the doorbell and thus the sign of his guest's arrival. Accordingly, his 
dream continues. In this situation, it is the context of the dream - the dream's 
`meaning world' - that incorporated the sound of the alarm. The noise was 
incorporated into the dream by perceiving it in a certain way. The noise itself is a 
mere irritation, the meaning of which is determined by the overall dynamics of the 
dream. Note how the environment has a ̀ real' impact on the system, but the nature of 
this impact is determined by the system. In this sense, the system creates its own 
elements from the noise provided by the environment. 
'64 Rossbach, Stefan, "The Myth of the System: On the development, purpose and context of Niklas 
Luhmann's Systems Theory", Paper prepared for ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Copenhagen, 
April 2000, pp. 13-14. 
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The question that arises next is how the system manages this complexity, how it 
makes selections. The answer is that it uses different strategies but above all it copes 
with complexity through the evolutionary achievement of meaning. 
1.3. Meaning: the System's Response to Infinite Complexity 
Meaning consists of references, which are the result of the system's observations. 
References are connected to other references forming contexts useful for the 
orientation of the system's operations. 165 Without meaning contexts, communication 
would not be possible at all. 
In meaning systems everything is given as meaning, including elements, boundaries 
and structures. Social and psychic systems evolve together through meaning, 
differentiating themselves with respect to it. The difference between them, as we 
noted above, lies in that psychic systems use consciousness as their mode of 
autopoietic reproduction and, in their self-descriptions, their elements are 'thoughts', 
while social systems use communication and their elements are `actions/events'. But 
in both cases psychic and social systems make up their own meaning worlds, which 
include what is important for them. 166 Through meaning, social systems create a 
history for themselves to which they can refer and which they can use for further 
connections. 
Meaning fulfils two important functions: it constrains and preserves complexity at the 
same time. 167 It constrains complexity and helps systems to order experience, handle 
selectivity and self-reproduce. The system observes its environment, makes 
distinctions and then it uses the distinctions that it extracts for connective information 
processing. Every element of the system refers back to other elements and at the same 
time it makes itself available for future connections in different situations. In that way 
meaning solves the problem that systems are continuously confronted with: they have 
to decide, at every moment of their autopoiesis, what state they select as their next 
state. Nevertheless, each actual selection does not imply the elimination of what has 
not been selected. Each selection of meaning simultaneously includes its negation, all 
that has not been selected. In that way enough complexity for further system 
16$ Luhmann, Niklas, "The Modernity of Science", New German Critique, Winter 94, Issue 61, 
available also on the website http: //www. libfl. ru. Luhmann3. html. 
166 Rossbach, Srefan, The Autopoiesis of the Cold War, An Evolutionary Approach to International 
Relations?, p. 9. 
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formation is preserved. Therefore, meaning serves another function as well, that of the 
preservation of what has not been selected. Meaning provides the system with "a 
surplus of references to other possibilities of experiences and actions". 168 Every actual 
state of the system refers to far more than itself, and every actual experience of a 
psychic system "by far exceeds what can be realized through action or actualised in 
experience". 169 
This surplus of references prevents a static and deterministic conceptualization of 
meaning. Meaning is conceptualized by Luhmann in terms of horizons, which include 
all possibilities and indicate further ones. 
This can be better understood if one looks closely at the self-referential constitution of 
meaning. The self-referentiality of meaning is possible by means of generalisation. 
Meaning is generalised in all the three dimensions, the factual, the temporal and the 
social. Once a system has come into existence - in other words, once an identity has 
emerged - it becomes independent and autonomous from the concrete events that 
brought it about - Luhmann refers to this as a `generalization' in the factual dimension 
of meaning. Furthermore, the system looks for other references to connect with in the 
past and extrapolates itself into the future -a further `generalization' but this time in 
the temporal dimension. There is a social dimension as well, where the system's 
existence can be reinforced and reproduced in that other systems make their 
autopoiesis dependent on the first system's existence. In other words, the system's 
existence is `generalized' by other systems. As an example from the empirical part of 
this thesis, consider how a `crisis', once it has been given an 'identity', can become 
independent of the concrete facts that brought it about. It becomes taken for granted as 
a fact of its own. The concrete events are not important anymore; rather, what is of 
importance is the new entity/identity that is the crisis, which is then explained through 
references to the past of the conflict, i. e. to the already existing structures of a conflict. 
The self-referential processing of meaning requires, apart from language, symbolic 
generalizations, which define the identity of things, events, types or concepts and they 
are condensed in the form of structures of expectations. What we consider today as 
part of a self-evident reality is the history of meaning that has been consolidated to 
structures of expectations. That does not imply that there is no reality at all. Reality 
167 See Luhmann, Niklas, Social Systems, pp. 59-102, Luhmann, Niklas, Essays on Self-Reference, 
r21-79. 
a Ibid., p. 60. 
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itself can never be fully accessible due to its infinite complexity. Reality serves 
however as a background, as `noise', from which distinctions and differences are 
extracted selectively and continuously processed as information. 
The question that will occupy us next is the way in which meaning is formed at the 
moment of the emergence of a system. The basic condition for that is double 
contingency. 
1.4. Double Contingency: the Basic Condition for the Emergence of Meaning 
Double contingency is the basic condition for the formation of social systems and thus 
for the emergence of social order170. In a situation of double contingency every 
participant in a social action considers his action to be dependent on the action of the 
other: "I will do what you want if you do what I want". 171 In that sense an ego is also 
an alter ego as he anticipates alter's reaction to his own action and to his own 
expectations. The "I will do what you want if you do what I want'- in its `double' or 
reciprocal form - is a paradox that attracts accidents. In other words, double 
contingency creates sensitivity to chance. As ego and alter observe each other, and as 
they try to make their actions dependent on the other's actions, any change in their 
behaviour will in fact be interpreted as `action', as a selection, as a reduction of the 
infinite contingency implicit in double contingency. Once alter or ego has `acted' in 
this way, it becomes possible for ego or alter to re-act, to connect. From then on the 
interaction between alter and ego constitutes a self-referential system that renews 
itself from within. 
Double contingency is thus a situation around which a new system/environment 
difference can crystallize and thus a new social system can emerge. In a situation of 
double contingency, every alteration is perceived as a selection, as a non-random 
event, to which it becomes possible to respond with a further selection. Hence, double 
contingency gives rise to the formation of the system and on the other hand the 
autopoietic operation of the system continues to `process' and `manage' this double 
contingency by creating themes, information, and meaning, that is, by creating order 
out of noise. Every subsequent selection the system makes is an action with a 
contingency reducing, determining effect - be it positive or negative. Connections 
169 Luhmann, Niklas, Essays on Self-Reference, p. 26. 
170 E. Shils was the first to express the theorem of double contingency, see Parsons, T. & Shils, E., 
Toward a General Theory ofAction, N. York, Evenston, 1951. 
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between selections and further selections create structures as well as a history for the 
system. In this sense double contingency works autocatalytically, as it is both the 
factor that enables the formation of the system and at the same time it becomes a 
component carried along by the system that it forms. According to Luhmann, the 
parameter of time is important for a social system as a functional equivalent to socio- 
cultural patterns that constrain double contingency. 172 
In some sense, of course, double contingency is a `limit' situation. `Pure' double 
contingency without any pre-given is not possible. This is because wherever and 
whenever alter and ego ̀ meet', they will be able to draw on already existing structures 
and expectations to navigate their respective ̀actions'. But while these structures may 
be able to reduce the contingency of the situation in some respects, other aspects of 
alter's and ego's behaviour may remain undetermined. In fact, it is exactly in this 
sense that double contingency remains a factor in the encounter and requires the 
continued existence of a system to `process' and ̀ channel' this contingency. 
The system ensures that selections after selections are made - with subsequent 
selections building on and presupposing previous selections - and transformed into 
expectations. At this point at the latest, the system ceases to be open indiscriminately 
to anything and it acquires sensitivity to specific items. 173 Expectations, as structures, 
reduce the `everything is possible' of double contingency into the more manageable 
"some things are possible, and others (normally) are not". Expectations allow systems 
to take aspects of their reality for granted and thus to direct their observation to the as 
yet `untamed' areas of their reality. This, of course, involves risks because 
expectations can be disappointed. For example, organizations have institutionalized 
routines and rules of operation that entail certain expectations as to what situations 
they will have to deal with in the future. These institutionalized expectations will lead 
them to deal with different issues in the same way. The nuances of reality are 
overlooked. Nevertheless, this risk is just another way of looking at the difference in 
complexity between system and environment: the environment is always more 
complex than the system. 
Whatever unfolds from a situation of double contingency, however, cannot be 
interpreted as a form of understanding that alter and ego reach with each other. 
171 Luhmann, Niklas, Social Systems, p. 117. 
172 Ibid., p. 127. 
173 ibid., p. 132. 
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Luhmann emphasizes that the systems involved - whether psychic or social - remain 
black boxes for each other. What they do achieve is a form of co-evolution, a co- 
ordination of their autopoiesis. In their meaning worlds, the systems will see 
themselves as reacting to each other. However, the self-perception of one system may 
be very different from how the other system perceives it. The systematicity of their 
coordination is thus a new reality that cannot be reduced to the `intentions' or 
`purposes' of the contributing systems. Thus, Luhmann's take on double contingency 
follows the traditional understanding in that it emphasizes the social dimension of 
action and illustrates the point that the social domain cannot be reduced to 
`individuals' and their intentions/actions. 
1.5. Communication as the Autopoietic Mode of Social Systems' Operation 
For Talcolt Parsons, a social system is a system of action, made up of interactions 
between individuals. For Luhmann, in contrast, the elemental unit of the self- 
constitution of social systems is communication. 174 After the inventions of writing and 
printing and the developments in communications technology, the gap between 
interaction and society became deeper and wider. The unity of society became 
inaccessible to interaction and accordingly a higher degree of abstraction was 
necessary for the theory of social systems. 175 According to Luhmann, it is only as 
communication that self-reference can be adequately conceptualized since 
communication - and not actions/decisions - can thematize itself (self-reference) and 
everything else (hetero-reference). 
Communication is defined as the unity of three selections: ̀ information', `utterance' 
and ̀ understanding' (including misunderstanding). Information should not be thought 
of something that already exists out there in the environment of the system ready to be 
picked up by the system. Information both presupposes and actualizes the use of the 
system's structures. In that sense it is the system itself that produces information 
through its basic operations of self-observation and other-observation, self-description 
and reflection. 176 Communication is a self-referential process. Every social system 
determines what is accepted as communication for its meaning world. This decision 
follows its own rationale, aims and programmes. Luhmann criticizes Habermas for 
174 For the autopoiesis of communication and its relationship to action see Luhmann, Niklas, Social 
Systems, pp. 137-175. 
175 ibid., p. 430. 
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suggesting that communication aims at a `consensus'; according to Luhmann, the 
abstract notion of communication does not entail a substantive ̀aim'. All that we can 
say is that communication invites further communication. 
Utterance is the reproduction of information within the system itself. The system 
duplicates information, reformulates it through utterance by providing it with a 
linguistic - be it acoustic, written, or other - form. 
'77 Utterance itself is a selection in 
that the form of utterance has to be decided upon. 
Understanding is the third selection of the unity of communication that enables the 
self-referential evolution of the system through the connection of one communication 
with another. ̀ Understanding' refers to the understanding of the distinction between 
information and utterance and not any kind of acceptance or rejection - this comes 
later and it is not part of the unity of communication. In other words the third 
selection of communication denotes an understanding of reality as a two-sided form 
of the `what' is being observed and the `how' it is being observed. ̀ Utterance' adds 
something to the information. The fact that the information was reproduced through 
utterance is in itself significant and must be `understood' for communication to 
emerge and continue. What has to be `understood' here is not the contents of a 
message but the basic distinction between information and utterance as different kinds 
of selection. If we only perceive information but not utterance, then we have 
perception but not communication. If for example I see someone rushing about and I 
interpret it as a sign of haste then it is perception. If I consider the particular way in 
which the other person is rushing about as an ̀ utterance', as a sign, as a selection, then 
we have communication. In other words, communication entails that alter anticipates 
that ego anticipates his anticipation and it is precisely this aspect of communication 
that makes it the constitutive element of the social domain. The consequence of that is 
the self-referential nature of communication. 
Understanding does not mean that a reader, listener, or an observer will accept or 
reject communication. Rejection or acceptance follows once communication is taking 
place, and it can be seen as the transformation of the difference between information 
and utterance into the difference of acceptance or rejection. But rejecting or accepting 
communication is in itself communication. This new difference between rejecting and 
accepting is used in order to channel communication, as the basis for connecting with 
176 ibid., p. 444. 
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further communication in certain ways. Furthermore, and more generally, the 
dynamics of communication are found precisely in the unity of the three selections 
because it enables connections with further communications. Communication 
becomes a process through new connections with other references. The process-like 
character of communication can be supported by `themes', which function as 
structures in that they order communicative nexes by attracting only certain 
contributions (connections) and not others. 
Luhmann emphasizes the unlikelihood of communication. Given the fact that psychic 
and social systems are closed autopoietic systems and that in the conditions of 
modernity, reaching the addressee is a problem, and given that the `understanding' 
part of communication cannot be taken for granted, it is not clear why communication 
should occur at all. How is communication as coordinated selectivity possible? 
We find the answer to this question in the evolutionary achievements of language, 
media of mass communication and symbolically generalized media of 
communication. Language enables reflexive communication. One can always ask 
questions for example about something that is uncertain or unexpected. Thus language 
both increases the understandability of communication and thereby ensures its 
continuation. The development of technologically advanced media of dissemination 
of communication guarantees the continuity of communication by addressing an 
unspecified number of potential receivers. 
Finally, `symbolically generalized' media of communication include money/property, 
power/law, truth, love, and basic values. They increase the likelihood of 
`understanding' in that they entail `incentives' by structuring communication in 
certain ways. In other words, they pre-select possibilities of connection. For example, 
the most important symbolically generalized media of communication direct 
selections towards the principal functional subsystem of society. Money directs 
communication towards the economic system, truth directs it towards science and 
power towards politics. 
178 
The above conceptualization of communication emphasizes the autonomy of 
communication itself and its self-referential and dynamic nature based on the 
continuous activity and selectivity that underlies it. 
177 ibid., p. 142. 
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1.6. Communication and Action in Systems Theory 
Traditional sociology took for granted that action - or communicative action 
according to Habermas - rather than communication should be the unit of analysis. In 
social systems theory communications are the constitutive elements of social systems 
and ̀ actions' occur at the level of the self-descriptions of these systems. When social 
systems communicate about themselves, they break down their continuous autopoietic 
operation into a series of `actions', thereby generating a simplified description of 
themselves (and their environment). 
In the self-description of social systems, actions may appear to be incorporated in 
communication. First, the very selection of information can appear as an action. 
Furthermore, the selection of utterance - the way in which the information is uttered - 
can be interpreted as `action'. To interpret selection as `action' means to assign 
responsibility for consequences to the respective `actors'. Thus, action is the 
externalization of self-reference. The system `rationalizes' an event as `action' by 
perceiving the event as the result of a selection, a choice among alternatives, 
represented as decision, and as such as driven by motives. But this attribution is in 
itself the result of the system describing itself and its environment. The author of the 
selections is always the system itself. An `action' is thus an observer's perception of 
actualized contingency. 
Actions are used for the self-description of the system in order to `steer' and ̀ manage' 
the continuation of communication, to direct into certain directions. In order to steer 
itself the communication process must be decomposed to actions. Actions serve as 
connective points because of the combination of determinacy and indeterminacy they 
bring with them and the synchronization they achieve for the system. Actions as 
events are determinate in their momentary actuality and indeterminate in their 
connectivity. There is a sense, then, in which it may be very difficult if not impossible 
to empirically distinguish communication and action. However, communication 
cannot be reduced to action because ̀action' is constituted through communication. A 
lady dropping a handkerchief in the presence of a gentleman might have qualified as 
`action' in a previous century but does not do so today. What does and what does not 
qualify as action is communicatively constituted. 
173 Luhmann, Niklas, Social Systems, p. 161 
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1.7. Structural Couplings v Uni-linear Causality 
In the introductory chapter I discussed how the theory of international crisis and peace 
processes is engaged in a search for causal links between actions and that this search 
often leads to the unquestioned assumption of one overarching instrumental 
rationality behind actions. 
Systems theory perceives systems as co-evolving through on-going processes of 
structural couplings and interpenetration between worlds of meaning. Systems that 
constitute environments for each other make available their complexity for the 
constitution of another system. Thus, structural coupling is the phenomenon where the 
same element may be used simultaneously by several systems through an "a-causal 
synchronization of parallel ongoing processes". 179 An event like an earthquake can be 
interpreted and used by different systems, for example as a source of news for the 
media, an occasion for professional organizations like humanitarian aid organizations 
to make profit, an occasion for civil society's philanthropic organizations to become 
active, and an occasion for co-operation among interstate-organizations on a specific 
task. 
The simultaneous use of the same element does not determine the effects that it will 
have in different systems. Systems link and influence each other not in some causal 
way but blindly. This is better understood if we think of the third element of 
communication namely understanding, which also includes misunderstanding. The 
same communication can be observed by each system according to its own unique 
code and rationality, thus different meanings will be attributed to it by different 
systems. 1 80 
The emphasis here is on the lack of a linear causality as well as on the parameter of 
time. Cause-effect relationships imply a difference in time in a sequential process, 
whereas the concept of structural coupling defines synchronous - simultaneous - co- 
evolution. 
Structural couplings create zones of contact not only among social systems but also 
among social and psychic systems. Structural couplings among social and psychic 
179 Teubner, Gunther, "Law as an Autopoietic System", p. 10. 
180 Kyriakos Mikelis, in his discussion of the european integration theory through the modem systems 
perspective, points to the example of the operation of the EU and its different policy making agencies. 
He maintains that each agency responds to only locally available to it information and does not hold a 
picture of the whole of the system or the other systems. Mikelis, Kyriakos, "The Deparadoxization of 
European Integration Theory Through Social and Complex Systems Theory", Paper prepared for ECPR 
Joint Sessions, Denmark, April 2000. 
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systems are described by the concept of `interpenetration'. The interpenetration of 
social and psychic systems and thus their co-evolution is possible because they both 
employ meaning. Communication can be incorporated in the meaning worlds of 
psychic systems, and consciousness and thoughts can be incorporated in 
communication. In other words, one can think about communication and one can 
communicate about thinking. 181 Luhmann emphasizes the importance of language for 
the structural coupling between social and psychic systems because language 
"automatizes the structural coupling between psychic and social systems". ' 82 
1.8. The Formation of Social Structures 
The question in this section is the stability and change of social structures in modem 
society. Luhmann's argument is that society is constituted and self-reproduced 
continuously on the level of communication. Its elements, structures and processes are 
based on communication. Societal evolution is a process of constant production and 
reproduction of the whole of society on the level of communication through a 
reshaping and widening of the possibilities for communication. '83 
Self-observation is the operation that underlies the formation of structures in the 
social system that produces them. 184 Self-observation is an operation of 
distinguishing. In other words, self-observation establishes differences and draws 
distinctions. When distinctions are drawn, new identities are introduced and tested, 
and these identities can then be connected to other distinctions and they can be used to 
`order' already existing distinctions and differences. In this way they may crystallize 
into structures, and may even be organizationally implemented". 
Structures are established and are continuously self-reproduced through processes of 
selection and variation. The system's basis of selection is time. Social systems do not 
have the time to connect with every element in their environment because the 
environment is always more complex than the system. Complexity then enforces 
selectivity. Selection itself is a temporal concept because "it is imminent, it is 
required, is performed and finally enters the past. "' 85 Events vanish in time and then 
181 Luhmann, Niklas, Social Systems, p. 219. 
182 Rossbach, Stefan, "The Autopoiesis of the Cold War: An Evolutionary Approach to.. " , p. 13. 183 Luhmann, Niklas, Social Systems, p. 159. 
184 ibid., p. 301. 
185 Luhmann, Niklas, "Complexity and Meaning", in Essays on Self-Reference, p. 83. 
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pass away immediately after their appearance. Nevertheless, events actualize the 
existence of structures and constitute structures at the same time. 
There are several mechanisms for the intensification of selectivity. In the temporal 
dimension, speed is of essence. Themes to which one can make contributions quickly 
are preferred to other themes that require more time for thought. In other words, those 
chains of selections that can operate faster will prevail over those that require 
deliberation on how to react. Similarly, time pressures make structures change at a 
faster rate. In the factual and social dimension, connectivity is the crucial factor that 
enables the autogenesis of social systems. 186 
The function of structures is that they pre-select possibilities for choice and thus 
constrain complexity. Structures are reflexive expectations. Structures are 
expectations of expectations - rather than expectations of behaviours - in that they 
allow us to expect what others expect of themselves. 187 Anticipating the same 
expectations, different participants in communication can orient themselves towards 
the same attitudes simultaneously and thus transform unstructured complexity into 
structured complexity. Luhmann explains that in the factual dimension expectations 
are identified through roles, persons, programmes (norms or goals) and values. 188 
Networks of recursive observations of observations yield recursive patterns of 
behaviour, self-descriptions that have prevailed and become stable conditions. These 
are called ̀ eigenvalues' or `attractors'. Attractors are not final products or end points; 
rather, they remain unchanged in the course of the ongoing operation of the system. In 
most cases it is impossible to predict the emergence of attractors; the system will, or 
will not, produce such an attractor. 
The processes of systemic formation involved in social evolution are morphogenetic; 
they involve deviation-amplifying mutual causal processes. 189 Within the context of 
social autopoietic systems every change is self-change. Although the environment 
remains the stimulus, it is the system that selects its causes of change. The system 
does not adapt to external conditions; it is adapted to itself. Learning, for example, 
186 Luhmann, Niklas, Social Systems, p. 119. 
187 About the question of how it is possible to successfully expect others' expectations see Luhmann, 
Niklas, Essays on Self-Reference, p. 46. 
188 Luhmann, Niklas, The Differentiation of Society, p. 250. 
189 Buckley, Walter, Sociology and modern systems theory, Prentice-Hall International Inc., 1967 p. p. 
58-62. 
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that is the adjustment to disappointments, is understood as a morphogenetic change of 
structure within a system that is operationally closed. 190 
Structural changes accumulate depending on chance. The process of structural 
formation is a process of blind variation and selection because in an environment of 
infinite complexity it is impossible to control - and understand - the process whereby 
self-observation is filtered back to communication. What we can say, according to 
Luhmann, is that society, as it recursively bases its ongoing selections on previous 
selections, will actualize possibilities which are more and more ̀ unlikely' - unlikely in 
the same sense in which it is extremely unlikely that one could type Shakespeare's 
Hamlet by randomly hitting keys on a typewriter. That being the case, Luhmann 
concludes that societal evolution operates without goal and without foresight. 
2. The Emergence of a World Society 
The concept of world society has been discussed before in international relations 
theory. Globalisation theories, theories of interdependence and Burton's theory of 
world society, are only some examples. These theories however point to individuals, 
regimes and transactions as the basic unit of analysis. For systems theory, 
contemporary world society relies on functional differentiation and mass 
communication for its evolution. It is these two characteristics and their effects that I 
will discuss in this section. 
According to Luhmann, the functional differentiation of society is an historical 
achievement. Societal evolution is divided into three developmental stages depending 
on the principle of differentiation. Initially, traditional societies were differentiated in 
a number of sub-systems, which were `equal' in that they all had to fulfil the same 
functions, limiting complexity through redundancy. Such `equal' subsystems were 
e. g. tribes and households. As societies became more complex, the redundancy 
implicit in the traditional fragmentation was given up and a higher order of 
differentiation was introduced. The next principle of differentiation was stratification: 
subsystems of society were differentiated according to rank (social strata). The 
turning point for the evolution of society was the invention of writing and printing. 
This triggered a number of changes in the 17`h and 18th centuries, which set in motion 
the functional differentiation of society. 
190 Luhmann, Niklas, Essays on Self-Reference, p. 18. 
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The critical change writing and printing brought about, as we noted earlier, was the 
separation of action and observation in society. That freed society from concrete 
interactions, which require the `presence' of psychic systems. Reading takes place far 
from the place of action and that type of communication is different compared to 
interaction. Communicating about what is written also requires a different type of 
communication. Through writing and printing more knowledge is accumulated and 
disseminated and new arrangements for the processing of knowledge are formed. 
Themes for reflexive self-observation are opened up and complexity increases. 
Functional differentiation was the answer to the increase of complexity. Function is 
less rigid and can cope with the complexity of an open and fluctuating environment. 
Among the principal functions systematized in society are politics, the economy, law, 
science, religion, art and others. 
Functional differentiation means that problems are moved from the level of society to 
the level of functional subsystems. In tribal societies, these problems had to be solved 
in each tribe (redundancy); modem society differentiated systems, which specialise on 
particular functions and problems and deal with them for the whole of society. To 
cope with increased complexity and contingency, function systems constantly process 
information selectively and in that way they both adapt to and influence their 
environment through further internal and external differentiation. To take an example 
of internal differentiation from the system of politics, when the `state' was established 
new problems appeared which were resolved through new structures and practices 
like for example the separation of powers and the education of princes. 191 
Bureaucracy, political parties and parliament are examples of subsystems of the 
political system, which emerged in the course of the evolution of society. 
This mode of operation of society is made possible through mass communication and 
the evolutionary achievement of mass media. Luhmann suggests that mass media 
constitutes a separate autonomous function system. The creation of mass media 
through the application of advanced technologies to the printing, writing and 
electronic reproduction of language plays a crucial role in the autopoiesis of modern 
society. Mass media provides social systems with the necessary noise and irritation 
for their emergence and autopoietic reproduction. By recursively applying new 
communications upon the results of the old communications they ensure the 
191 See Luhmann, Niklas, The Differentiation of Society, p. 210. 
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continuation of communication. The dissemination of communication gives rise to a 
surplus of possibilities. That ensures high levels of freedom of communication by 
excluding the existence of a central control of communication. The mass media does 
not address a particular target group. Rather, mass communication seeks for any 
willing audience in order to experiment with possibilities. The emergence of a surplus 
of meaningful informational possibilities that is still functionally meaningful makes 
the system independent of specific relations and protects it against the danger that 
something will be lost. 192 Finally, another function of mass media is that it reduces 
complexity by creating and maintaining structural couplings among different social 
systems, which affect the whole reality of modem society. 
Functional differentiation and mass communication have considerable effects on 
society. First of all they led to the emergence of one world society rather than several 
different societies. While the political and the legal systems still differentiate along 
territorial boundaries - because that serves their function - other function systems like 
the economy, science and religion have expanded all around the globe. Society's 
boundaries no longer correspond to territorial borders. The constant increase in 
functional differentiation led to the extension of the outer boundaries of society to the 
extent that further evolution is the evolution of one unique system, of world society, 
which encompasses all possible social communication. 
Furthermore, the extension of boundaries increased both the number of the elements 
of the system and their interrelations. The meaning of this development however is 
nothing more than an increase of complexity and hence of selectivity. Functional 
differentiation is the enhancement of selectivity, which resulted in an infinite world, 
highly contingent and dynamic. These developments have an impact upon the concept 
of time in modem society. Once information is published, it is taken for granted and 
becomes the basis for further communication. This results in a change of the temporal 
dimension of experience and action, since more time is necessary and less time is 
available. 
Systems produce problems, which they cannot solve by themselves. Problems then 
must be transferred to systems that specialise in the processing of these problems. 
This specialisation reduces the `redundancy' within society. Having delegated certain 
functions and problems to specialised functional subsystems, social systems can 
192 Luhmann, Niklas, The Reality of Mass Media, Polity Press, 2000, p. 99. 
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concentrate on their own autopoiesis and build up further complexity. The increasing 
dependency on the functional subsystems in some areas increases their autonomy in 
other areas. 
None of the primary functions can describe society as a whole, nor can one function 
system gain complete control over the others. Taking the example of the system of 
politics, its function is decision-making and the integration of society (by making 
decisions, which are binding, for the whole of society). However, which decisions 
will be made is something decided in society as society places problems on the 
political agenda. To be able to cope with increased complexity the political system 
then needs to maintain a level of complexity that somehow remains adequate to that 
of its environment. The political system responds to the environment's indeterminacy, 
which always threatens to undermine the function of politics, with further internal 
differentiation. Thus, whether politics can fulfill its function to integrate society 
through binding decisions ultimately depends on complexity. 
3. The Epistemology of Autopoiesis 
The theory of social autopoiesis comes with its own epistemology, a specific way of 
observing modem society. Its method draws on both functional analysis and systems 
theory. Luhmann developed traditional causal functionalism into a functionalism of 
equivalencies. In the first case, the analysis seeks to establish laws of causality, which 
describe one cause that can produce a specific result. 193 In contrast, Luhmann 
conceived functionalism as an analytical tool for comparing different causes that were 
functionally equivalent in that they could all produce the effect in question. A 
function is a conceptual scheme, which represents a field of equivalencies. Hence, 
functional analysis in systems theory helps the sociologist to establish a point of 
reference, a problem that may have many solutions. From this point of reference, the 
contingency of each solution is obvious. The aim here is not to identify final elements 
but to analyse complexity and change, as well as possibilities of variation and 
replacement. Identity is hence not an invariable ontological entity based on 
193 Human needs theory is an example of causal functional analysis, which however cannot avoid its 
own tautology. See the assessment of Burton's 
human needs theory, Introduction, p. 27. 
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knowledge, but it is a system, ̀a co-ordinating synthesis' which includes references to 
other possibilities. In the theory of social autopoiesis method and theory merge. 194 
Traditional functional analysis is commonly criticised on the grounds that it is static 
and conservative in the sense that everything the system does is causally reduced to 
the necessity of preserving the system. This criticism does not apply to Luhmann's 
theory. The concepts of self-reference and the system/environment difference direct 
the empirical analysis. In spite of its high level of abstraction, the theory is very 
empirical. This is because Luhmann's theory is a social system. In other words, as 
Luhmann emphasises, the theory applies to itself. That being the case, the theory is 
constituted through the system/environment difference. Thus, the theory is 
operationally closed and cognitively open towards its environment. 
From the point of view of the theory, the decisive empirical question is how systems 
come to do what they do, how they externalise their self-reference. First order 
observation focuses on actions, that is, it tells us what social and psychic systems do 
and what their self-simplifications are. Second order observation compels us to 
proceed and explore not only the observations but also the complex processes of their 
constitution: how do systems observe and simplify themselves? How do social 
systems narrow down their choices and select what they select and not something 
else? Social and psychic systems pick up irritations from their environment and they 
incorporate them into their meaning world by taking for granted what they take for 
granted. Second order observation can see that the system cannot see what it cannot 
see. It employs the distinctions manifest/latent and aims to reveal the `blind spots', the 
a priori of the observed systems. 195 
Luhmann emphasizes that there is no central and therefore no objective point of view 
from which we can start building up causal connections. Luhmann's theory asks us to 
preserve complexity while we explore it, and not to reduce it as traditional theoretical 
frameworks do. As we noted in the introductory chapter, conventional crisis and 
peace processes theories seek immediately for direct links between actions. In 
Luhmann's systems theory causal relations based on a sequence of interactions are 
replaced with simultaneous and contingent structural couplings. We then need to ask 
how these structural couplings became possible, and how they emerged. Here second 
194 Rossbach, Stefan, "The Myth of the System: On the development, purpose and context of Niklas 
Luhmann's Systems Theory", Paper prepared for ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, p. 5. 
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order observation attempts to disentangle the connections between multiple processes. 
In order to find out how these recursive processes are interrelated, we need to find out 
first how they are closed to each other. 
The question of rationality is important for conventional theory, but in light of 
Luhmann's analysis, this question has now become a question of several distinct 
rationalities. Luhmann understands `rationality' as a `re-entry' of the distinction 
between system and environment into the system. 196 In other words, the system's 
rationality represents the way in which it describes itself in relation to its 
environment. 
The unquestioned emphasis on control and stability that we find in traditional theories 
is here replaced with an emphasis on dynamics. Dynamics is defined through the 
connectability of themes that are available to the system for selection. As we shall see 
in subsequent chapters, in the case of Greek-Turkish crisis and peace processes the 
themes of crisis or co-operation emerged as an attempt to reduce complexity. The 
empirical questions we need to ask in this context are question such as the following: 
What are the themes that emerge during a crisis and then reproduce the crisis? How 
do processes of amplification of an initial microscopic fluctuation to macroscopic 
change occur within society and contribute to the crystallization of communication 
processes so that they become systemic structures of crisis or co-operation? This 
thesis argues that answers to these questions can be found in the investigation of 
deviation-amplifying processes and the systematization of communication processes 
into social structures like themes, expectations, roles and institutions. The news media 
form a social system that amplifies communication processes within a functionally 
differentiated society. The examination of the news media's function involves 
empirical research about news production and also about the structural couplings that 
news media enable among different social and psychic systems. 
The systems theory perspective puts new demands on empirical research. 
A second 
order observer cannot rely on existing accounts about the phenomena she examines. 
In the case of crisis and peace processes, history books, press, 
international relations 
literature and political discourse are considered to be constructions of observing 
systems - be it media, science or politics. 
For they too are communication, and as 
195 Luhmann, Niklas, "The Modernity of Science", New German Critique, Winter 
94, Issue 61, 
available on the website http: //Iibfl. ru. Luhamnn3. html. 
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such they constitute elements in the systems of crisis, conflict or co-operation. 
Therefore, historical literature as well as the international relations literature and press 
articles become the subject of research too. 
Interviews with participants, the interrogation of their actions and their underlying 
perceptions, as well as the analysis of the rationalities of participating systems 
illuminate the various contributions and coincidences constituting these phenomena. 
The comparison of these rationalities reveals their blind spots. 
This last point illustrates one more difference between conventional theory and 
systems theory as far as their research interests are concerned. Systems theory is 
interested not only in phenomena of being but also in phenomena of becoming, 
change and movement. Conventional analysis identifies the end of a crisis and/or a 
peace process with its de-escalation or the conclusion or the failure of conclusion of 
an agreement. Systems theory is interested in both the constitution of crisis and peace 
processes within society and their re-entry into society. The communicatively 
constructed accounts - through selections of information, utterance and understanding 
- and their reproduction through writing and printing provide social systems with 
information for their autopoiesis. In other words, the academic analysis of the system 
does not stand outside the system but re-enters it and hence both unfolds from, and 
impacts on, the system's autopoiesis. 
We close this part on the epistemology of social autopoiesis by commenting on the 
epistemological status of the results of our analysis. Luhmann's theory does not claim 
that it is `the' representation of reality. Just like any other communicative system, the 
theory has contact with reality only through self-contact. The theory itself understands 
itself as constructed knowledge, though as second order knowledge, knowledge based 
on second order observation. Still, even second order observation has its blind spot. 
Luhmann would contradict himself if he were to argue that his theory offers `the' 
description of reality. How are we then to assess the usefulness of the theory and the 
adequacy of the analysis present here? As with all communication, its success 
depends on its `connectability', on the way in which it is integrated into further 
communication. If the present analysis provokes such communication, it will be 
possible to submit it to the second order observations of other observers. 
196 Luhmann, Niklas, "Globalisation or World Society: How to conceive of Modem Society? ", p. 7, 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I presented the basic principles of Luhmann's theory of social 
autopoiesis, a comprehensive theory of modem society. Niklas Luhmann draws the 
picture of the world as a free-floating, a-central world where social systems are 
operationally closed and cognitively open. Their operational closure gives them a 
certain autonomy vis-ä-vis each other. Luhmann's theory radically changes the 
emphasis from rational action and decision to the transformational dynamics of 
communication and the fundamental problem of modem society, its self-referentiality. 
Observing systems make distinctions about their environment according to their 
meaning world. This means that the `knowledge' social and psychic systems have 
about the world constitutes them. 
Within the context of modem systems theory, social phenomena appear to be 
contingent developments rather than final products determined by historical laws. The 
acknowledgement of the absence of an objective reality and the emergence of 
different realities and rationalities does not lead to a relativist or constructivist 
approach, which would discourage empirical research. The theory of autopoiesis 
accepts that there is a reality, which social and psychic systems use in order to extract 
differences and build new elements in the process of their self-reproduction. It adds 
though that social and psychic systems can come into contact with reality only 
selectively, by reducing the infinite complexity of reality through selections. The 
question then is -- and this is an empirical question - how systems select what they 
select and how they neglect everything else. In this way, the theory motivates an 
eminently empirical investigation. The self-referential design of systems theory 
enables us to deal with the paradoxes engendered by the blind spots of social systems. 
Additionally, the theory of social systems guards us against its own paradox because 
its design enables the theory to problematize itself as an object of its study. 
In the next four chapters I will demonstrate that systems theory provides us new 
analytical tools for the exploration of the emergence and development of phenomena 
such as crisis and peace processes in a highly complex modem society. 
available on the website, www. libfl. ru/Luhmann/Luhmann2. html. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE IMIA/KARDAK CRISIS AS A "BUTTERFLY EFFECT" IN GREEK- 
TURKISH RELATIONS 
In this chapter I will examine the emergence and development of the Greek-Turkish 
crisis that broke out in January 1996 and brought the two countries to the brink of war. 
The crisis centred on the dispute over the sovereignty of two rocky islets, located in 
the Eastern Aegean and called Imia for Greeks and Kardak for Turks. After the 
grounding ashore there of a Turkish vessel, the two ministries of foreign affairs 
exchanged two notes verbales claiming ownership over the islets. ' Days after that, the 
issue came to the media and a full-scale Greek-Turkish crisis emerged. According to 
existing analyses of the crisis, which follow basically the rational actor model, the 
cause of the crisis was the dispute over the sovereignty of the islets. This view 
considers the crisis to have been the means used by the one or the other state - 
depending on which side analyses it - in order to change the status quo in the Aegean 
Sea in its favour. 
This chapter seeks to demonstrate that the crisis emerged through the dynamics of 
communication processes rather than rational calculations. The trigger of the crisis was 
not an event, an action or decision undertaken by governmental authorities. It is argued 
that the transmission of information about the incident that happened in the Aegean 
Sea by the news media and its interpretation - and not the communicated event alone - 
triggered the crisis in the Aegean Sea as a "butterfly effect". It gave rise to a chain of 
a-causal and spontaneous meaning constituting processes within a multitude of 
autonomous but mutually interfering social systems. That increased the complexity of 
the situation, which enforced the formation of crisis by means of successive selections 
made by social and psychic systems. 
It will be demonstrated that various social systems such as the Greek and Turkish 
politics, media, military, civil society organizations, contributed to the emergence of 
the crisis through their normal operations of meaning determination. They both 
increased and eventually constrained the complexity carrying out selections toward the 
direction of crisis, by operating according to their pre-established distinctions, their 
own rationale, aims and programmes of action/goals. They observed, that is selected to 
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observe, events, which they rationalized as `actions' in order to continue their 
autopoiesis. Furthermore, it is argued that social systems were not aware of their 
contribution to the emergence of the crisis. This is what was described in the theory 
chapter as the blind spots of social systems. The semantics employed by various social 
systems in their processing of information are explored. 
Accordingly the argument made here is that the dynamics of crisis is found in 
simultaneous and contingent structural couplings among social systems. The analysis 
that follows seeks to disentangle the connections among them. 
The examination of the process of de-escalation of the crisis after the American 
intervention illuminates further the crisis's constitution as a communicative system. 
The argument here is that it was reflexive communication rather than the use or the 
threat of use of power that de-escalated the crisis of 1996. 
This approach challenges traditional analyses of interstate crises, which focus on the 
decision-making process as rational processing of information. Comparison with the 
traditional theory of international crisis is occasionally employed throughout the 
chapter in order to clarify the arguments made and the method of research employed 
here. It will be demonstrated that the traditional view is rather static and cannot explain 
the type of crisis dealt with here. 
The chapter is divided in seven sections. The first three sections describe the 
emergence and development of the crisis of 1996 as a "butterfly effect". It is 
demonstrated that an unimportant event, an accident in the Aegean Sea, provoked 
macroscopic changes in Greek and Turkish societies. It increased the complexity and 
created the need for its reduction. The meaning processes that reduced complexity 
through selections towards the direction of crisis are explored in the fourth chapter. 
The fifth section discusses the de-escalation of crisis. The sixth section seeks to 
explore further the mechanisms of communication that enabled the emergence of the 
crisis of 1996 as an autonomous self-referential system. Finally, the last section 
examines how the crisis of 1996 re-entered the system of conflict through academic 
analyses of the crisis and thereby it reproduced it. 
'The two uninhabited islets lie 1.9 miles from the Greek island of Kalolimnos, 5.3 miles from the 
Greek island of Kalymnos, 2.3 miles from the Turkish island of Cavus and 3.8 miles from the Turkish 
mainland. For the chronicle of the crisis see Appendix, p. 
251. 
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1. Antenna' s Report as the `Butterfly' 
Conventional analysis from the Greek point of view starts with the assumption that 
Turkey instigated and/or exploited the incident that occurred in the Aegean Sea with 
the Turkish vessel Figen Akat, in order to dispute Greek sovereignty over the two 
islets. On the other hand, the Turkish view of the matter argues that the crisis started 
after the Greek mayor hoisted the flag on the islet. This incident, they suggest, was an 
attempt to bring forward Greek claims in the Aegean once again, with the ultimate 
goal of expanding Greek territorial waters and transforming the Aegean Sea into "a 
Greek lake". 
The Greek view ignores the fact that this was not the first time that Turkey disputed 
the ownership of these islets. During the late 1970's, Turkey had refused to sign NATO 
Document MC 38/4, which had to do with the operational control of the islets' 
immediate area. This document had recognised that the two islets are part of Greek 
territory. 2 However, from that time until 1996 this disagreement neither constituted the 
cause of any crisis nor did it ever become a major issue in Greek-Turkish relations. 
Furthermore, the first Turkish note verbale sent on the 29th of December was not the 
result of an official decision made by the Turkish leadership. The Turkish bureaucracy 
had taken the initiative to send this note verbale, and the arguments made in it were 
based on the existing files of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Document 
MC38/4 in particular. 3 Second, after the exchange of diplomatic correspondence 
between the two countries, which stated each side's positions, the incident was 
considered to have ended by the official authorities, diplomats and politicians in both 
countries. Careful consideration of the crisis' timetable demonstrates that the 
increasing tension and the definition of the situation as a `crisis' began in Greece and 
this only happened after the Greek television channel Antenna reported on the issue. It 
was after Antenna aired the story about the incident with the Figen Akat and the 
diplomatic correspondence that followed it that a chain reaction unfolded rapidly and 
eventually led the two fleets to confront each other in the Aegean. 4 Antenna's story and 
2 Interviews with Ambassador Yalim Eralp, Istanbul, 04.05.02 and 10.05.02. 
ibid.. 
In addition, the fact that there had not been any previous planning is further substantiated by the lack 
of preparation by various Turkish State organizations. Turkish Admiral Attila Kiyat, who was the Head 
of the Turkish delegation to NATO headquarters in Brussels, had not been informed about the incident 
and its development. At that time he found himself in an extremely difficult position when colleagues 
from other countries started asking him about the Imia/Kardak crisis. Interview with Attila Kiyat, 
Istanbul, 08.11.01. Furthermore, the fact that in the aftermath of the crisis the Turkish government 
initiated an investigation regarding the Figen Akat incident substantiates the previous argument. "State 
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the developments that followed it can be described with the "butterfly effect" 
metaphor. 5 
Antenna's story about the Figen Akat and the diplomatic correspondence between the 
two Ministries was broadcast on the 24th of January. This story, from the very moment 
of its first broadcast on Antenna's main news bulletin at 8: 30 p. m., triggered a number 
of information processes within several social and psychic systems. This is very well 
reflected in Fourlis's narration about the first hours after the story was aired. 6 
Immediately after the airing of the story, panic ensued. At the Antenna offices, we 
received phone calls from the office of the Minister of Defence and the office of the 
Foreign Minister. They seemed to be somewhat disturbed, but not in any 
exaggerated way. The question was `why did you air this? ' At eleven o' clock Mr. 
Bikas, the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, called me personally. 
Colleagues from other channels were also calling us, requesting more information. 
Antonis Liaros, chief news editor of Mega Channel, and Georgios Giorgiadis from 
Star channel called Antenna. From a journalistic point of view, everyone was 
congratulating us, saying `bravo', `great story' ! That same evening, reporter Argiris 
Dinopoulos received orders from his news director, Mr. Spyropoulos, to go to the 
islet, using whatever means of transport he could find. Dinopoulos flew to Kos and 
then travelled by ship to Kalymnos. From there he went to Imia. We needed to have 
the follow-up of the story. 7 
The next evening, the 25th of January, Antenna managed to keep the same news story 
high on its agenda and the day after that they presented one more exclusive fact about 
it: the hoisting of the Greek flag on the islet by the mayor of Kalymnos. 
The mayor, along with some other inhabitants of Kalymnos, amongst them a priest and 
some children, went to one of the two islets. The newscaster's first phrase was: 
"Antenna reveals a new provocation by Ankara, after the incident of Imia. The Turks 
have voiced territorial claims against the Greek islets". 
The hoisting of the Greek flag was a decisive step in the emergence of the crisis, since 
it brought the story to the attention of the Turkish media and also onto the Turkish 
political agenda. The rationale behind the hoisting of the flag will be analysed later in 
officials looked into whether there was any link between the ship's grounding at Imia/Kardak and any 
initiative by individuals, or by any Turkish state official. This means that one hand of the Turkish State 
started was suspecting what the other hand was doing". Interview with Kemal Kirisci, Professor of 
International Relations at Bosphorus University in Istanbul, Istanbul, 03.10.01. 
s The "butterfly effect" was first used in metereology in order to describe the unpredictable and chaotic 
evolutionary patterns of climatic changes. After that, however, it was transferred to other disciplines in 
order to explain how microscopic fluctuations can lead to macroscopic changes. See Stewart, Ian, 
"Does God play Dice?: The New Mathematics of Chaos", London: Penguin, 1997. 
6 The translations of the interviews as well as the translations of other sources such as press and books 
from Greek and Turkish to English are the author's, unless otherwise indicated. 
7 Interview with Antenna's journalist, Antonis Fourlis, Athens, 18.09.01. 
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the section that explores the blind spots of social systems. This incident however, 
further increased the complexity of the situation. The airing of this new story, the 
hoisting of the Greek flag by the inhabitants of the nearby island, triggered a number 
of information processes, this time in the Turkish news media. Nur Batur, the Athens 
correspondent of Hürriyet (the best-selling Turkish national newspaper) described how 
this process started in Athens. Ferai Tinc, the then foreign news editor of Hürriyet, fills 
the gaps of this narration with the description of the information processing at 
Hürriyet's offices in Istanbul. 
On the evening broadcast of Antenna (at 20: 30), I first saw the hoisting of the 
Greek flag on the islet. I immediately called Antenna to ask for a photo and at 23: 00 
I went to Antenna's offices, bought two photos, and sent them to Hürriyet 
immediately. The next day (26th of January) the photos and the story were on the 
front page ... Then there was an alarm 
in Ankara. Journalists started asking questions 
about it. Suddenly bureaucrats realized that something is happening in Greece. 
They wanted politicians to pay attention to that. Correspondents were pushing. 8 
Ferai Tinc says that 
it was Nur Batur and the Anatolian Agency who reported on Antenna's broadcast of 
the 26th of January. At that time, in the morning meeting of news editors in 
Hürriyet's offices, we started talking without knowing anything. A news editor then 
said that we could go and put the flag up because we had done it in Cyprus some 
time around the end of the `60's and it had been good journalism. Another friend, 
who had contacts with the airlines, arranged the helicopter. The next day Milliyet 
came out with the title `We Found the Islet'. They also had a photo from the islet. 
We learned that it was not the right islet... The orders we gave our people, who 
were sent there, were: 'go there, put the Turkish flag up, and take a photo. ' It was to 
be a mere response to the Greek priest. We knew that it was the priest who went 
and put the flag up. We did not know anything about the mayor of the island. 
9 
The reaction to the Greek priest stems from the perception in the Turkish society that 
the Greek Orthodox Church and its representatives have always been on the front line 
of the Greek-Turkish conflict. 
10 Greek Orthodox priests are distinguished from 
ordinary citizens because they wear clerical garb. This explains why the figure of the 
priest impressed the Turkish journalists when they saw the photo. 
The next morning, the Turkish flag was located on the islet by a Greek war ship. When 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces was informed, he was attending a 
8 Interview with Nur Batur, Athens correspondent of the Turkish national newspaper Hurriyet, Athens, 
16.05.00. 
Interview with Ferai Tinc, editor of foreign news of Harr yet, Istanbul, 19.02.01. 
10 This is a very common perception among Turkish journalists. Discusions I had with Turkish 
journalists from CNN-Turk and Canal-8 confirmed this perception. 
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Sunday morning church service. He ordered the mayor of the island of Kalymnos to 
replace the Turkish flag with a Greek flag. However, communication with the warship 
was not possible and so the Greek flag was hoisted by the warship's personnel. 11 Later 
on, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces told the Minister of Defence about 
the steps he had taken and the Minister agreed that a guard detachment should be sent 
to the islet. Although that action added a military parameter and thus further increased 
the complexity of the situation, it was not a decision of the kind that contemporary 
crisis literature discusses. It was not decided after consultations with the Prime 
Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 12 This decision was made within the 
framework of routine practices followed by the Greek naval forces in the Aegean Sea. 
This decision did not create the perception of crisis on the part of the Greek or Turkish 
decision-makers. This is further substantiated by the fact that the National Council of 
Foreign Policy and Security was not convened in Greece, as happened, for example, in 
the crisis of 1987.13 On the 280' of January, the crisis had not yet emerged. For that 
reason there could not be a plan regarding the management of the crisis. The actions 
taken by the media and the military emanated from their routines that is their 
institutionalised practices. It was at a later stage that a specific meaning, and thus 
causality, was attributed to these events to produce the system of crisis. Nevertheless, 
these un-coordinated and autonomous operations of social systems increased the 
complexity of the situation and enabled the emergence of a bifurcation stage. 
2. A stage of Bifurcation 
The television story of the Figen Akat and the Turkish claims to the islets' sovereignty 
provided the Greek society with an irritation. Communication of this event spread in 
every direction, through the news media, setting in motion processes of 
communication in a multitude of social systems, generating noise and increasing the 
complexity of the situation. Ongoing interactions among different systems such as 
journalists, politicians, and citizens through news media increased the communicative 
possibilities and led to the emergence of an unstable situation, a stage of 
undecidability. That situation entailed an increasing observation of the other side, and 
each side's actions depended on what the other side was doing. Mutual close 
" Hristos Lyberis, "National Strategy and Crisis Management", 1997, Poiotita, p. 193. 
ýZ This is what the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theodoros Pangalos, admitted in a press conference he 
gave on the 30th of January. 
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observation and potential infinite complexity were the features of this stage. At this 
stage the crisis had not emerged yet. Nevertheless, under such circumstances of double 
contingency every accident, every error could be productive. 
The stage of bifurcation is reflected in the contradictions that we see in the media 
accounts of these events as well as in the political rhetoric of these critical days. 
Furthermore, this stage is also marked by a search for a rational explanation. The 
Greek press initially did not follow Antenna's interpretation of the facts but it did not 
ignore it either. The first articles concerning the Imia/Kardak problem appeared in the 
Greek press the next day, on the 25th of January. Eleftherotypia and Ta Nea presented 
the issue as one of the ̀ usual' attempts by Turkey to increase tension between the two 
countries and minimised the incidence's importance. Moreover, the articles' size and 
use of language came in stark contrast with Antenna's presentation of an imminent 
threat and a serious issue of national security. 14 On the other hand, the newspapers 
Eleftheros Typos and Apogeumatini, which represented the views of the political 
opposition, reproduced Antenna's story. 
The day after the televised broadcast of the hoisting of the Greek flag (January 26th), 
the other private channels followed Antenna's story and attitude. The channel Sky 
started its broadcast as follows: "Step by step, there is an escalation of the provocative 
actions at the islet of Imia. Alert at the Ministries of Defence and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The Greek Armed Forces are in high state of readiness". 15 The 
newspaper Ta Nea ran the headline "The Turkish Provocations Were Premeditated". 16 
The stance of the Greek and Turkish officials, vis-a-vis the media's disclosure of this 
incident, from the time the Figen Akat was driven ashore to the day the incident came 
into the public eye, is another indication of the undecidability of the system of crisis. 
They kept the incident covered up until it was introduced to the public eye by various 
media outlets. It was on the 25th, after the question of the Figen Akat had emerged in 
the Greek media, that the Minister of Press and Information, Reppas, and the 
spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bikas, admitted that the Imia/Kardak 
issue existed. Bikas, in a laconic statement, said that "there is no question of 
disputing Greek sovereignty over the islet Imia, according to the Peace Treaty of 
13 llristos Lyberis, National Strategy and Crisis Management, 1997, Poiotita, p. 150. 
14 Eleftherorypia, 25.01.96, p. 4. 
's Antenna news bulletin at 8: 30 p. m., 26.01.96. 
16 Ta Nea, 26.01.96. 
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1947". 17 Reppas was also careful with his choice of words, when he stated that: 
"Turkey thinks that it has rights to the island. We do not think that any dispute over 
our national territory is conceivable". 18 On the 26th of January the Greek Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Theodoros Pangalos, in his first press conference after his 
appointment as Foreign Minister, insisted that "the issue of the islet is not important 
and there is a lot of noise about nothing". 19 
Even on the 28th of January, three days after the Antenna story had broken, Pangalos 
appeared in an interview he gave the previous day to the newspaper To Vima, saying 
the following: The Figen Akat incident "is not a serious incident... several similar 
incidents have occurred in the last years between Greece and Turkey, not only in the 
Aegean Sea but also along the Greek-Turkish border, at the River Evros. There, a 
small island in the middle of the river changes position as the river flows the way the 
current takes it". 20 
This indicates that the Greek government initially distanced itself from the noise that 
was created by the media concerning the incident. At the same time it was waiting for 
the other side to make a move. 
The stage of bifurcation is also characterised by the search for a rational explanation 
of what was happening. The Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 26th of January 
expressed the hope that the incident in Imia was an accidental one and that this would 
not be continued. He said, "the issue has been closed. I do not consider this a matter 
that should create a crisis atmosphere". 21 On the other hand, he added that "it is an 
absurd claim" that might have come from a Turkish diplomat "who in this way 
nurtures bad feelings against Greece". 22 Furthermore, he made an important addition, 
saying "it is the first time that Turkey doubts Greek sovereignty over Greek land. We 
do not know if this claim is part of a well-organised plan". 23 
Another attempt at rationalisation of the events appears in the editorial article of 
Eleftherotypia, where we read "the USA may be behind this". 24 It is argued that "it is 
obvious that the USA have not abandoned their plan to impose confidence-building 
17 Ta Nea 26.01.96. 
'8 Antenna news at 8: 30 p. m., 24.01.96. 
19 Eleftherotypia, 26.01.96. 
20TO Vima, 28.01.96. 
21 Eleftherotypia, 27.01.96. 




measures in the Aegean, which is best served every time Ankara provokes an 
'accidental' incident in the Aegean". 25 The hoisting of the Turkish flag, reported on the 
first page, was interpreted as an act committed by "journalists of Hürriyet with 
Ankara's blessing". In the paper's inner pages we see another interpretation saying 
that "it is the first time that Ankara chose a `hot-headed' newspaper as a `vehicle' and 
`lever' for the initiation of its territorial claims". Finally, in another article, the 
following description of the days of the crisis appears. "At the beginning it was 
difficult to believe that simple citizens could perform such an act.... Later on some 
talked about an organised operation with `special' journalists, and `special' pilots of 
helicopters who were trained in military flights, which means trained to fly low so as 
to avoid the radar even in bad weather". 
On the other side of the Aegean, during the same days and until January 28th, the 
Turkish media did not put the issue on their agenda. The correspondents of the 
Turkish newspapers in Athens argue that from the first day they learned about the 
Figen Akat incident, that is the 24th of January, they tried to give the story to the 
Turkish media, as they usually do, but this time they failed. The reason was that their 
editors considered the incident to be one of the many times that Greek media talk 
about the `Turkish threat' and this was not at all interesting, compared to the internal 
political scene. The `hot' issue of the days was the formation of a government by the 
then interim Prime Minister Tansu Ciller. The focus was on the Islamic party (Refah) 
and its recent electoral success. 26 Nevertheless, the Greek flag hoisted on Imia/Kardak 
islets was the irritation observed by various social systems in Greece and Turkey and 
stimulated a number of meaning constituting processes, increasing the complexity that 
enabled the emergence of the crisis/non crisis difference. 
Initially, the Turkish officials and politicians followed a similar attitude to that of the 
Greek administration. Turkish diplomats were emphasising the legal nature of the 
dispute, and the need for the issue to be solved through bilateral negotiations and 
other peaceful means. When the Greek correspondent of the Athens News Agency, 
Alkis Kourkoulas, asked Turkish diplomats in Ankara about the issue, they said they 
were surprised at the "inexplicable" and "exaggerated" dimension the issue had 
25 Eleftherotypia, 29.01.96. 
26 Interviews with Stelios Berberakis, correspondent in Athens of the newspaper Sabah and the 
television channel Atv, 15.05.00, and with Nur Batur, correspondent in Athens of the Turkish 
newspaper Hürrryet, 16.05.00. 
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assumed in Greece. 27 Stelios Berberakis, a correspondent in Athens, for the Turkish 
newspaper Sabah, corroborates this view: "The day after Antenna's story I met the 
Turkish Ambassador in Athens and I asked him what was going on. His answer was 
`this surprised me too. This issue was closed one month ago"'. 28 The President of 
Turkey, Suleyman Demirel, on January 28`h said that "there is some tension but we 
believe it will be resolved by peaceful means". 29 Turkish officials kept a low tone. 
The spokesman of the Turkish Foreign Ministry stated on January 29th, argued that 
"the Greek flag may stay, but if it does, it would not serve any peaceful purpose". 30 
On the other hand, after the issue entered the agenda of the Turkish media, Turkish 
columnists also tried to explain and rationalise the events. The hoisting of the Greek 
flag was connected with Greek claims over the islets' sovereignty. Their 
understanding was that Greece was trying to profit from the vacuum of power in 
Turkey, since no Turkish government had yet been formed. 31 On January 29th, Ferai 
Tinc wrote in Hürriyet that "what happened is not accidental.... Greece is not 
satisfied with Holbrooke's proposal for Cyprus and thus has created this crisis in order 
to expose Turkey internationally". 32 
Apart from the politicians, it is also possible to see columnists, especially in the 
Turkish newspapers Cumhuriyet and Milliyet, trying to understand this sudden crisis 
whilst maintaining a distance from it. Articles, which appeared in Cumhuriyet and 
Milliyet at the time, emphasised the existence of Greek-Turkish friendship. Sami 
Kohen, for instance, wrote an article at the time entitled "For a Small Rock? " and 
made a distinction between the underlying and the immediate causes of the crisis, 
suggesting that: 
The blowing up of the problem is due to two reasons: the first is related to the 
existing dispute in the Aegean Sea. The second is related to the way the problem 
has been used by the news media... Without any doubt, the lack of communication 
and dialogue, and on top of that, the lack of mutual trust, have played a role in this 
27 See Alkis Kourkoulas, Imia, A Critical Approach to the Turkish Factor, Sideris, 1997, p. 29, see also 
Eleftherotypia 26.01.96 where it is reported that diplomatic sources consider the significance attributed 
to this issue exaggerated and the Turkish public was informed about it through laconic reports. 
28 Interview with the correspondent of the Turkish newspaper Sabah in Athens, Stelios Berberakis, 
Athens, 11.03.01. 
29 Hürr ret, 28.01.96. Furthermore, the same issue of Hürryet referred to the reactions of the Turkish 
military. Military officers argued that they do research about the legal aspects of the Imia/Kardak case 
in order to better support their arguments but they claimed this research to be a matter of routine. 
30 Hürriyet, 29.01.96. 
31 See statements by the President of the Republic of Turkey Suleyman Demirel, Hürriyet, 28.01.96, 
the leader of the DSP Bulent Ecevit, Hürr yet, 29.01.96, p. 1, Mesut Yilmaz, the leader of the DYP, 
Hürriyet 28.01.96 p. 1, views expressed by a Turkish fisherman, Hürr yet 29.01.96. 
32 Feral Tinc, Hürryet, 29.01.96. 
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situation... The immediate cause that has created the events, and has enlarged them 
to these dimensions, is the attitude of the media. 33 
These kinds of articles however, were in the inner pages of the newspapers and the 
front pages were reflecting on and thus constructing a crisis climate. Examples are the 
titles below from Milliyet and Hürriyet "War of Flags" (Hürriyet 28/1/1996), 
"Tension of Flags", "The Greek Fleet on Alert" and "War of Law" (Milliyet, 
28/1/1996) 
3. The Emergence of the Crisis 
Antenna's report on the Figen Akat incident instigated chain reactions on the part of 
various social systems. This created a bifurcation moment, which enabled the 
emergence of the difference crisis/or not crisis. Multiple connections among social and 
psychic systems oriented towards the direction of the conflict gave rise to the crisis as 
a new attractor. An attractor is a self-description that has prevailed and become stable 
condition through networks of recursive observations of observations. The attractor 
after its emergence is employed by social systems as a guide for their selections, which 
seek to reduce complexity. Put otherwise, the operations of self and other observation 
of various social systems in Greece and Turkey produced the pattern of crisis, which 
acquired its own dynamics and then in turn guided social systems. 
There were three events in particular that became points for multiple connections 
towards the direction of the crisis. The first was the decision of the Greek government 
to "publicize" the issue. In the evening of the 28th of January, the Ambassadors of the 
fifteen European Union member states, the Ambassador of Russia, of the United 
States, and of Turkey were invited to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in order to 
be briefed on the Greek positions regarding the Imia/Kardak dispute. Second, the 
Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis issued a statement about the situation the next 
day. 
The statement said that 
the atmosphere that this change [the hoisting of the Turkish flag on the islet] 
creates, constitutes a very serious issue. It demonstrates an aggressive nationalism. 
To this and to any other signs of aggressive nationalism, we reply that Greece's 
reaction will be strong, direct, and effective. We have the means and we will use 
33 Milliyet, 30.01.96, p. 18. 
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them without hesitation. We do not accept any dispute of our sovereign rights. 
They shouldn't kid themselves 34 
The third event came from the Turkish side. The Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller 
the same day answered this statement with an aggressive statement: "[W]e do not 
have to give even one little pebble of the land of this country... We do not allow the 
raising of a foreign flag on Turkish land". 35 
The two first events, namely the publicizing of the issue and Simitis's statement, 
compared to the previous policy of keeping a low profile on the issue, marked a 
radical change in the Greek stance. Simitis's statement interpreted these events as 
`actions' of the Turkish state, as a serious Turkish provocation. Furthermore, he 
postulated Greece's decisive stance even if it had to be by military means. Simitis's 
statement showed no doubts about the meaning of the events. The Greek media and 
the Greek people interpreted the statement and the invitation of the Ambassadors as 
acts of deterrence, which show the determination of the Greek political leadership 
against Turkey. The Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Armed Forces, Hristos 
Lyberis, perceived this statement as a decision for the escalation of the crisis. He 
writes in his book: "The Prime Minister, with his statement that underlined his 
intention to use military power, has contributed to the escalation of the crisis". 36 This 
statement was, therefore, a turning point that reversed the hesitant attempts of both 
countries' diplomats, who had been trying to reassure each other that they had no 
intention to challenge the other side. 
These three actions ultimately determined the crystallisation of the crisis. After that, 
all attention was focused on the military aspect of crisis, as a military presence had 
started to build up in the Aegean Sea from early in the morning of January 29th. By 
the evening of January 30th, the two countries were living in the whirlwind that the 
crisis had created, and the system had completely emerged. The Greek Foreign 
Minister, Pangalos, at that time stated that for the Greek side "there is no doubt" about 
the Turkish motives. Greek and Turkish decision-makers, military officials, and 
3a Eleftherotypia, 29.01.96. 
33 Hürrryet, 30.01.96. 
36 Hristos Lyberis, National..., p. 166. And at another point Lyberis writes in his book about the crisis 
of 1996: "On Tuesday at noon time, G. Arsenis [the Greek Minister of Defence] talking to the news 
media, showed that the political will was for de-escalation of the crisis. Here comes the question: If that 
was the case why then did the Prime Minister, the day before, make this strong statement? ". ibid., 
p. 173. 
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media, despite their previous doubts, were all now working on the hypothesis of a 
challenge from the other side which they had to resist. 
The style of reporting gradually became more belligerent. The doubts that had been 
expressed before disappeared. The following dramatic headlines selected at random 
from the Turkish newspapers Hürriyet, Milliyet, and Cumhuriyet aptly demonstrate 
the gradual escalation of the crisis and the transition from a moment of bifurcation to 
a stage where crisis became the attractor: 
"Anguish in the Aegean, Turkish and Greek Warships Nose to Nose", "Greek Flag 
on Kardak", "Clinton: Turkish-Greek War May Arise". (Hürriyet, 29/1/1996) 
"Take Back the Army or Else ... Athens Was Warned for the Last Time about the 
Soldiers who Went to Kardak. On the Threshold of [military] Operations". (Milliyet, 
29/1/1996) 
The emergence of the crisis and the subsequent focus on the military aspects 
condensed the complexity of the situation and enabled social and psychic systems to 
acquire security and continue communication. In the section below I explore how 
various social systems were oriented towards the selections they made and not others 
and how each selection reinforced the selectivity and connectability of the emerging 
order. 
4. The Blind Spots of Social and Psychic Systems 
The above presentation of the `hard facts' of the crisis does not explain the emergence 
of the crisis. Mainstream approaches to the crisis of 1996 have sought to explain the 
development of the crisis by trying to establish causal links among actions. For 
example they assume that Simitis's statement was an act of deterrence to what he 
perceived as a threat posed by Turkey. Nevertheless, these assumptions are not 
checked against empirical evidence. They appear self-evident according to the pre- 
determined distinctions the researcher himself has formed through the theory (s)he 
holds about the operation of the system of politics and the emergence of an interstate 
crisis. 
For the theory of social autopoiesis ̀ actions' are externalisations of self-reference, 
simplifications of systems' complex operations of meaning determination. 37 They are 
constructed, that is selected by social systems, which are observing systems and try to 
37 See Chapter II, p. 57. 
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rationalise events by attributing responsibility, by naming agents. In that way systems 
can constrain infinite complexity and continue their autopoiesis. The attribution of 
meaning, however, is an operation that systems carry out with the help of pre- 
established determinations of meaning namely, their unique code, rationality and 
institutionalised practices. Here, second-order observation seeks to explore these 
semantics and their effects. It will be demonstrated that social systems such as the 
Greek and Turkish politics, the media, the military, civil society and psychic systems 
like the mayor of Kalymnos and journalists, could not see the introduction of their 
previous determinations of meaning back to the society and how these affected their 
information processing. These are their blind spots. Furthermore, systems cannot 
control the effects of their own operations for the autopoiesis of society and the 
constitution of crisis. As social systems operate autonomously, they link up and 
influence each other not in a causal or intentional way but blindly. The research has 
sought to disentangle these interconnections, the structural couplings of the various 
systems, which constrained the complexity of the situation and enforced the 
emergence of crisis as increased selectivity. 
4.1. The System of News media 
The role of the news media in the emergence of the crisis of 1996 was catalytic. News 
media are observing social systems, which employ the binary code news/not news for 
their function. Their attitudes during the days of the crisis were rather determined by 
their goals of high ratings and their own rules of operation. The media's rationale is 
basically to have an exciting headline, which will boost their ratings. 
The leak of the specific story to Antenna, and its subsequent presentation, was the 
irritation that set in motion chain reactions in a multitude of social systems, increased 
the complexity of the situation and enabled the formation of the system of crisis 
through autocatalytic processes of communication. This very story was an accidental 
event, and not an event designed by the Greek government or any other official 
authority. The report regarding the Figen Akat's grounding and the correspondence 
between the two ministries was presented by the young journalist Fourlis - he was 
about 25 at the time. His narration as to what happened on that day is illuminating of 
the processes of meaning determination carried out within Antenna: 
... I personally 
knew the man who gave me the papers. He is an official in one of 
the two ministries directly involved in this case [the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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and the Ministry of Defence]. He called me at 3 in the afternoon, on January 24th, 
and he told me that he had documents, which had to do with some dispute over 
Greek territory. He asked me to meet him at 5, two hours later. He then gave me an 
envelope with all the documents namely the correspondence and the orders for 
increased vigilance issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of 
Defence. 38 He believed that by doing this, he was doing a service to his country. He 
thought he was revealing `dark' actions of the government to Greek public opinion. 
I called Costas Spyropoulos straight away. He was then the director of Antenna. I 
read some of the documents aloud over the phone to him. I was at the Parliament 
building at that time. The first question was where is this island. They started 
poring over maps in the offices of Antenna, and they could not find it! I told them 
over the phone `look near the island of Kalymnos' and eventually, after a lot of 
effort, they found it. Then the television story started to be prepared, and at the 
same time Costas Spyropoulos and I were looking for officials who could provide 
us with information. We tried to contact the Foreign Minister's office. I called 
twice between 5 and 8 but he was in a meeting, so I left a message with his 
secretary saying that it was about a very serious matter which concerns Imia- with 
an accent on the first or the second "I"! We did not know then how it was correctly 
pronounced, because we had only seen the name in capitals. I contacted Mr. Bikas, 
who was the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at that time, and he said 
that he did not know anything about the issue, but it did not sound serious to him. 
So we should not be concerned with it. We tried to contact the Prime Minister' s 
diplomatic office. There we found a young ambassador, who seemed surprised 
when he heard us. He thought the issue was very serious, but he was very young 
and he did not undertake any initiative... Some time after the events I met Pangalos 
for other reasons and I asked him about those days. He told me that his secretary 
did not want to interrupt him because he had a very important meeting with the 
Greek Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Christos Zaharakis 39 
Fourlis's narration demonstrates clearly that Antenna constructed a television story 
about the Figen Akat, following its own way of making news, as television channels 
do. In other words, Antenna's operation in this case was formulated within the context 
of institutionalised practices and aims. The usual practice, the routine of checking with 
the authorities for issues of significance, were employed, but they did not work out. 
Furthermore, Fourlis argues that the perception of the people of Antenna was 
that since this has started a month ago and nothing has happened so far, it means 
that it's over. Since the last telegram was dated January 9, we interpreted it this 
way. So, we then thought we would reveal it afterwards. We could not know and 
no one could have known that one flag would follow and then another, and so on. 
4° 
38 See the chronicle of the crisis, Appendix, p. 253. 
" Interview with Antonis Fourlis, the Greek journalist who first presented the Imia/Kradak case on 
Antenna TV, Athens 18.09.01. 
40 Interview with Antonis Fourlis, Athens, 18.09.01. 
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Antenna's coverage of the Figen Akat story on the 24th and the hoisting of the flag on 
January 25th, were marked by two characteristics: the continual repetition that this was 
an "exclusive story" for Antenna, and the dramatic way the story was presented, with 
the use of red headlines and sensational words. The title of the story was "Mysterious 
Meeting". It referred to a meeting that the Prime Minister had had with the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and the Minister of the Interior on the previous day, January 23`d. The 
reporter presented four possible scenarios regarding the topic of the discussion, 
suggesting that most likely, the meeting was related to the Turkish vessel incident, and 
the subsequent Turkish claims. To conclude: "All this presents a picture of escalating 
tension between Ankara and Athens over the islet. , 41 Words like "revelation now", 
"new Turkish provocation" and "new serious threat against Greek sovereignty" were 
repeated continuously on this day and during the following days. Paradoxically 
enough, Fourlis admits that even today - six years after the crisis - he does not know 
whether the meeting he was referring to at that time had any connection with the 
Imia/Kardak incident! 42 
The logic of the media is further reflected on the explanations of Turkish media 
directors and journalists with regard to the hoisting of the Turkish flag by journalists. 
The Turkish journalists who hoisted the flag worked for the newspaper Hürriyet and 
the television channel Canal D. Ertugrul Özgök, Hürriyet's director, explained the 
motives behind this action in an interview he gave in the aftermath of the crisis: 
I do not think that Turkey and Greece would have fought in the end for this rock. 
That would be very silly and really I would not forgive the Turks and the Greeks if 
they ended up making war over such a trivial matter. For us it was just a 
journalistic matter. We went there, took photos and videos; we sold these pictures, 
and we made a lot of money. We sold these pictures to Greek journalists as well. 
We were happy about it. 43 
Media editors underlined that "their decisions were made on a daily routine basis". 44 
They did not have the time to think about their next step, neither could they have 
foreseen what that step could have been. Furthermore, according to the people of the 
private television channels, the inter-media chain reaction was inevitable, as "one of 
the basic rules of television is the viewer ratings". 45 
41 Antenna, News at 8: 30,24.01.96. 
42 Interview with Antonis Fourlis, Athens, 18.09.0 1. 
43 Interview of Ertugrul Özkök by George Vlavianos, on Antenna 3.02.96. 
44 Interview with Costas lordanides, chief news editor, Kathimerini, Athens, 20.05.00. 
45 ibid.. 
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Haluk Sahin who became news director of Canal D after the crisis, placed the Turkish 
media attitudes in January 1996 within the context of the media antagonism at the 
time: "The private television channels had just discovered the way that news bulletins 
can boost viewing ratings. It was the lowest point for the private Turkish television 
channels". 46 
This climate of antagonism is illustrated by several incidents. On January 29th, the 
Turkish channel Interstar disseminated scenes of some people on another island 
hoisting the Turkish flag and the flag of the television channel. 47 They claimed to be 
on one of the two Imia/Kardak islands, but it was quickly proven that this film had 
come from some island near Istanbul. Excessive comments by journalists followed the 
hoisting of the Turkish flag on the disputed islet. Interstar again, on the day of the 
crisis' climax, started asking people "Should we go to war with Greece? "48 On the 
other side of the Aegean, the Greek news media covered the sortie of the Greek fleet 
live, giving details about the time, the types of warships, and their destination too. 49 
To conclude this section, the above analysis demonstrated that technological 
innovations in the mass communications field and the self-referential nature of 
communication itself enable media to operate as providers and amplifiers of irritations 
within modem society. In the crisis of 1996, the media multiplied the possible sources 
of contributions to the system of crisis by disseminating communications rapidly and 
effectively to an undetermined number of receivers. This operation of news media 
increased the complexity and speeded up structural couplings among various social 
systems whose selections were simultaneously oriented towards the same direction 
namely the direction of crisis. It is important to stress that it was news medias' normal 
operation that accelerated the selectivity and connectability of the emerging system. 
4.2. The System of Politics 
Both governments initially attempted to keep a distance and keep a low profile 
concerning the noise about the crisis. The Greek decision to raise the tone and the 
reply by the Turkish Prime Minister were turning points in the emergence of the 
crisis, which must be explored further in terms of the processes of their constitution. 
46 Interview with Halluk Sahin, Director of the News Programme of Canal D after the crisis, Istanbul 
10.08.98. 
47 Interstar Evening News, 29 January 1996. 
48 Interstar Morning Programme, 30 January 1996. 
49 Hristos Lyberis, National Strategy and Crisis Management, 1997, Poiotita, p. 299. 
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In the afternoon of January 28th, the Greek cabinet met in the Parliament to discuss the 
newly elected government's programme. At that moment the crisis had not emerged 
yet. For Greek politicians and diplomats, this was a problem that the media created. 
That afternoon it was once again agreed upon that the government should follow a 
policy of keeping a low profile regarding the Imia/Kardak issue, in order to avoid the 
exacerbation of the already increased tension. 50 The same evening however, the Greek 
cabinet was informed that the Greek television channels had a videotape with the 
hoisting of the Turkish flag on the islet. At that moment they changed their initially 
decided policy on the issue. sl 
The Greek government found itself in a difficult position not only could it not control 
the noise in Greece about the incident, but it found itself in the difficult position 
where it had to convince everyone that it was defending the national interests of the 
country. It had to act on four fronts at the same time: the opposition within the 
government which was supporting a more aggressive policy vis-ä-vis Turkey, the 
opposition to the government, public opinion, and finally Turkey itself. Furthermore, 
the vote of confidence for the newly elected government scheduled to take place in 
the parliament within the next days was another concern of the Greek cabinet. 
Simitis's statement was enforced selectivity, an emerging order that reduced 
complexity and served the interests of the system of politics. The system of the Greek 
politics with its own particular need to appear as defending the country's interests, its 
practices and routines was acting under the limiting condition of the institutionalised 
within society Greek-Turkish conflict. The statement was more a contingent selection 
than a necessary and natural move according to some imperative rationale. 
Furthermore, as it will be demonstrated later, the Greek government could not predict 
the effects of its actions. 
The next day, the interim Prime Minister Tansu Ciller replied more aggressively "we 
do not have to give even one little pebble of the land of this country... We do not 
allow the raising of a foreign flag on Turkish land". 
52 This statement was also a 
selection and thus reduction of complexity of the situation. In those days, Ciller had 
been too preoccupied with domestic politics, in particular with negotiations about the 
new government's formation. She had been trying to find a formula for an alliance 
S0 Interview with a high-ranking Greek diplomat [1]. 
51 Interview with a high-ranking Greek diplomat [1]. 
52 Hürrryet, 30.01.96. 
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with another political party, which would make her Prime Minister. Therefore, she 
was not informed about the issue of the Imia/Kardak islets until January 29t'. On the 
afternoon of January 28th, she flew to Antalya for the inauguration of a building. On 
her way back to Ankara, Hürriyet's correspondent, Sedat Ergin, asked her about the 
Imia/Kardak islets. Her answer was "we will discuss this on our next trip". 53 As it 
became known later, she had not read the briefings that Turkish diplomats had given 
her and thus replied "give me some time, we will look at this later". 54 
When the issue emerged in the Turkish media and on the political agenda, diplomats 
and officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the army started researching the 
legal status of the islets. As it was revealed later on the Turkish press, a dispute 
occurred at the time within the Turkish Foreign Ministry, regarding the ownership of 
the islets. Furthermore, the Turkish Ambassador in Rome informed the Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the diplomatic correspondence between Italy and 
Turkey after the two 1932 agreements related to the status of the islets. This 
memorandum suggested that Greek sovereignty over Imia/Kardak was indisputable. 
According to the Turkish press, this document was destroyed. 55 The day the National 
Security Council (NSC) convened, Ciller asked the Secretary of the Ministry, 
Ambassador Oynur Oymen, whether the Turkish arguments regarding the islets were 
well substantiated. Oymen, during this briefing, did not let Ciller know about the 
different views expressed within the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His answer 
was positive and that became the basis of her tough and belligerent position during the 
meeting of the NSC. Ciller attempted to rally people around the flag and reinforce her 
own position within Turkey. Her real agenda was that she wanted to become the 
Prime Minister of Turkey's next government. 
At the aftermath of the crisis, criticism was levelled against the then interim Turkish 
Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, as well as against Oynur Oymen. Mesut Yilmaz, who 
succeeded Ciller to the premiership after the crisis, accused her of irresponsible 
behaviour, and of having let the crisis escalate. Additionally, in a speech within the 
Turkish Parliament, Yilmaz argued that, in the case of the Imia/Kardak crisis, the 
bureaucrats of the Foreign Ministry "took the government's place and dictated the 
53 Faruk Bildirici, Masqueli Leydi, Umit Yayincilik, Ankara 1998, p. 345. 
54 Faruk Bildirici, Masqueli Leydi, p. 346. 
55 Ganery Civaoglu, Mill yet 28.03.96. 
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policy that was to be followed by themselves". 56 Yilmaz believed that high-ranking 
officials within the ministry, led by Oynur Oymen, had hidden from the political 
leadership documents, which substantiated the Greek arguments regarding the legal 
status of the Imia/Kardak islets. 57 When he became Prime Minister, he tried to remove 
these people from their positions, but he was not successful, as the new Turkish 
government was a coalition between his party and Ciller's party. The latter sought to 
keep her proteges in the ministry. 59 
Thus, the results of the empirical research on what appears to be key points in the 
escalation of the crisis, namely the publicizing of the issue, the statement made by the 
Greek Prime Minister and finally the statement made by the Turkish Foreign Minister, 
demonstrate that they were not made according to an imperative logic of national 
interests. Nevertheless, they became points for further connections, structural 
couplings that amplified the initial condition, the incident about the Figen Akat, 
constraining complexity towards the direction of crisis. As demonstrated above, the 
system of politics in Greece was a-causally coupled with various other social systems, 
which interpreted Simitis's statement, each one, according to its specific rationale. 
These connections enabled social systems to continue their recursive operations and 
thus their autopoiesis. Ciller' s statement also set in motion similar processes in 
Turkey. 
4.3. The Military 
Social systems, when they carry out their operations of self and other observation, 
employ different distinctions, simplified schemes of interpretation for their connective 
processing of information which correspond to their own rationale. The difference of 
rationale between the Greek military and political leadership was made clear during 
the crisis. Furthermore, it came to the surface the day after its de-escalation, and 
eventually caused the forced resignation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Greek 
Armed Forces, Admiral Hristos Lyberis. 
Admiral Lyberis himself admits the existence of a difference in the interpretation of 
the events and he describes it as follows in the book he wrote after the crisis: "there is 
a contradiction in the evaluation of the incident's importance. The worst case scenario 
56 Mesut Yilmaz's speech in the Turkish Parliament, Reuters, 17.04.96. 
57 Alkis Kourkoulas, Imia, a Critical Approach to the Turkish Factor, p. 103-104. 
58 ibid., p. 104. 
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should constitute the basis for the planning of further diplomatic and military 
actions... The Greek Armed Forces were activated on that basis". 59 The Greek 
government however, as it was analysed above, not only did not choose that option 
but it basically had not thought of this incident as capable of causing a Greek-Turkish 
crisis and it decided to handle it in a different way. 
This difference in rationale was manifested in the first decision, which introduced the 
military. That decision was not a closely deliberated decision. The Commander-in- 
Chief of the Armed Forces was the person who issued the order for the hoisting of the 
flag. In addition, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Hristos Lyberis, also 
issued an order for dispatching of Special Forces to the islet after consultation with 
the Minister of Defence, Gerasimos Arsenis. 60 The Minister of Foreign Affairs was 
not only not asked about this, but he was not even immediately informed of it. It was 
on the next day that he learned about this development by accident. 61 Pangalos 
himself asserted this in a press conference on January 30th: "If I had been asked, I 
would have told them to take the [Turkish] flag but not to leave forces there, not even 
the Greek flag, so as to avoid getting involved in this game, since those were not 
Turkish soldiers but journalist-spies". 62 
Nevertheless, the activation of the Greek military forces on the basis of the worst case 
scenario was observed by the Greek news media and possibly by the Turkish news 
media and other organizations. They in their turn attributed a different meaning to 
what was happening, which contradicted the statements of the political leadership. For 
example the moment the Greek authorities were trying to play down the noise about 
the crisis, the media focused on the preparations on the military level. Sky's Evening 
News Bulletin on the 26th started with the headline "[A]lert at the Ministries of 
Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Greek Armed Forces are in high 
state of readiness". 63 Lyberis could not see how his own distinctions re-entered 
society and contributed to the constitution of the crisis. 
The rules of engagement became one more point of dispute between the military and 
the political leadership in Greece. When admiral Lyberis asked the Greek political 
leadership for permission to issue Rules of Engagement to the fleet, the answer that he 
s' Hristos Lyberis, National Strategy..., p. 170. 
60 ibid., p. 193, see also Eleftherotypia, 18 February 1996, pp. 9-10. 
61 Interview with a high-ranking Greek diplomat, [1]. 
62 Hristos Lyberis, National Strategy..., pp. 167-168. 
63 Antenna news bulletin at 8: 30 p. m., 26.01.96. 
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received was "leave the rules of engagement; now we are negotiating". 64 However, 
Lyberis admits that "[I]t was inconceivable to me that there could be a possibility of 
confrontation, without rules of engagement.... For that reason I never recalled the 
rules of engagement established by the Council of the Greek Armed Forces, with the 
political cover of the Minister of Defence". 65 
On the Turkish side, the different rationales of the military and the system of politics 
emerged when the Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller asked the Admiral Güven 
Erkaya to suspend the operations of the occupation of the other of the two islets, 
during the most critical night of the crisis. Admiral Güven Erkaya did not accept this 
proposal. His reasoning derived from the technicalities of the operation. 
When Admiral Erkaya retired from the military, he became a member of a Greek- 
Turkish civil society organization, the Greek-Turkish Forum, which was actively 
engaged in second track of diplomacy. His own explanation about his participation in 
this effort was based on his experience from the crisis. 66 Being one of the people that 
managed the crisis of 1996, he explained his own understanding of how crises emerge 
in the Forum's first meetings. He believed that there is always the risk of a crisis 
breaking out, because of the problems of communication and the lack of contact 
between the two sides. "Many times an event which might have been accidental or 
might have been organized by some mischief makers can acquire huge dimensions, 
because there is no possibility for direct communication of the two sides which can 
help clear up the situation immediately. " He emphasized that in the framework of the 
army "crises of this type lead to automatic procedures, which lead to other actions and 
these to further actions, ending up in a snowball effect, which cannot be controlled". 67 
Finally, it seems that another coincidence contributed to the building up of the two 
fleets in the area. The Greek side brought out war-ships in order to patrol the area of 
the islets because at that time the Greek coast guard had only inflatable boats and no 
metallic ones. Nevertheless, the presence of the Greek warships was interpreted by the 
Turkish side as a signal of escalation leading to an automatic increase of the military 
presence. 68 
M Hristos Lyberis, National Strategy..., p. 150. 
65 ibid., p. 150. 
66 Admiral Güven Erkaya was the co-ordinator of the Turkish part of the group until 1988. His health 
condition did not allow him to follow the work of the Forum after 1999. 
67 Interviews with Paulina Lampsa, Athens, 19.02.01 and Soli Ozel, Istanbul, 18.01.01. 
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4.4. Opposition Parties 
The policy of the main opposition political party in Greece, Nea Dimokratia, ranged at 
the time from national solidarity to exploitation of the issue for political reasons. In a 
parliamentary speech broadcast live on television, the leader of the main opposition 
party supported the policy of the government regarding the crisis. On the other hand, 
high-ranking members of Nea Dimokratia, as well as members of the press who were 
affiliated with the opposition, criticised the government for its way of handling things 
at the time. The spokesman of Nea Dimokratia, on January 28th, accused the 
government of "bad reflexes, which led to delays that can cause damage to Greek 
national interests" and the day before, it was suggested that a police force should be 
sent to all the islets. 69 
These messages provided points for connections within society, which continued the 
reproduction of communication about the crisis and thereby constituted the crisis 
itself. News media reported on them and they also posed questions to the Greek 
government. Members of the opposition party commented on the developments 
promoting their party's image. "The Deputy President of Nea Dimokratia, loannis 
Varvitsiotis, has said that the matter is particularly serious, and he has also revealed 
that when he was Minister of Defence a regiment regularly went to the area of these 
islets". 70 
The right-wing newspapers in Greece were using provocative and populist language at 
the time. They adopted the opposition's point of view, that is, that the government's 
reaction had been inappropriate, and they also started advocating an even more 
decisive reply. 7' On January 29th Eleftheros Typos, under the headline "The Turks 
Humiliated Us", criticised the government for the way it had dealt with the matter. 
This article argued that "[T]he irresponsibility Simitis' government displayed to the 
initial Turkish provocation over the islet gave ground for Ankara to continue... The 
unprecedented Turkish provocation occurred because of the government's inertia... "72 
68 Interview with Ambassador'Fotis Xydas, 22.04.01. 
69 Sky Evening News at 8: 30,26 January 1996. 
70 Eleftheros Typos, 29.01.96, pp. 8-9. 
71 Apoyevmatini, a right wing newspaper, reported on January 26th on a meeting that took place in the 
offices of the main opposition party Nea Dimokratia, where the Imia issue and the lack of government 
reaction had been discussed. The same newspaper emphasised the need for military measures. 
' Eleftheros Typos, 29.01.96, pp. 8-9. 
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4.5. Individuals 
This section discusses the role certain individuals played in the emergence of this 
crisis. The focus is particularly on the initiative undertaken by the mayor of the island 
of Kalymnos, Dimitris Diakomihalis, to hoist the Greek flag on one of the two islets 
and the Turkish journalist who replaced the Greek with the Turkish flag. The aim here 
is the exploration of the constitution of these actions and the effects they had in Greek 
and Turkish society. Luhmann argues that psychic systems are not constitutive 
elements of social systems but they make part of systems' environment. Psychic 
systems in their attempts to communicate supply social systems with disorder and 
sufficient complexity for their autopoiesis. 73 In what follows I seek to explore the 
constitution of what appears to be decisive actions in the development of the crisis. 
The focus is particularly on the initiative undertaken by the mayor of the island of 
Kalymnos, Dimitris Diakomihalis, to hoist the Greek flag on one of the two islets and 
the Turkish journalist who replaced the Greek with the Turkish flag. Two points are 
made. First, these ̀actions' emerged as the selective reduction of their complexity and 
the complexity of their environment. Second, these actions were events selected by 
other social systems, according to their own rationale and thus they reflect the 
externalization of the self-reference of the observing systems rather than the "real" 
purpose of the agent. 
4.5.1. The Mayor of Kalymnos 
The hoisting of the Greek flag on one of the two islets on December 25th by 
Diakomihalis, the mayor of the nearby island of Kalymnos, should not be attributed to 
the specific individual but to the broader environment from which this action 
emerged. Considering the mayor's action we should investigate its conditioning. The 
island of Kalymnos is close to the Turkish coast. During the years before the crisis, 
tension had started to build up in the region. The inhabitants of Kalymnos had the 
feeling that there was a kind of "psychological war" between them and the Turks who 
lived on the coast opposite their island. This psychological war had developed its own 
routines: Turks and Greeks did not fight with guns but they drew flags as signs of 
sovereignty. There were large Turkish flags on the mountains opposite Kalymnos. On 
the other hand, Greek fishermen had made a tradition of painting Greek flags, using 
73 For the differences between life, psychic and social systems see Chapter II, p. 4. 
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simple paint and brushes, on small Greek islands or rocky islets, as a kind of reply to 
the Turks. 74 Furthermore, there were other incidents in the fishermen's daily routine 
that intensified this "warlike" climate. It must be noted that Greek and Turkish coasts 
are so close that while Greek fishermen were going about their everyday work, that is 
while they were fishing, they frequently entered Turkish territorial waters without 
noticing. The Turkish coast guard often went after them. The islanders had 
approached the mayor of the island many times, asking him to do something about the 
situation. Diakomihalis is reported to have said at the time, that if he had not put up 
the flag, everyone on the island would have accused him of having embarrassed 
Greece. 75 
Furthermore, in an interview that the mayor of Kalymnos gave to Eleftherotypia on 
January 29th , he defended 
his actions, suggesting that the hoisting of the flag was in 
the same line of action as "the initiative he had undertaken along with other mayors of 
islands and towns of the Eastern Aegean Sea, a decision to find a way to protest 
against Turkey for its provocative actions, which were indications of Turkey's general 
aims in the Aegean Sea". 76 Diakomihalis referred here to an initiative undertaken by 
the Municipalities of several Greek islands in the region, an initiative that was 
supported by the Ministries of Defence and of the Aegean Sea. The goal was to 
establish settlements on remote islets that were considered to be part of the Greek 
territory. The future inhabitants of these islands, according to media reports on that 
matter, were to be volunteers, retired military officers. The first steps of this initiative 
had already been implemented, and publicised by the Greek news media in September 
1995. The Turkish authorities had considered that action to be centrally orchestrated 
by the Greek state as part of a broader plan, within the proclaimed goal of expansion 
of Greece's territorial waters to 12 miles. Turks have always considered the 
possibility of the expansion of Greece's territorial waters to 12 miles, as a 
"nightmare". Nevertheless, the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not involved in 
this initiative. 7 
74 Interview with Georgia Dama, journalist of Eleftherotypia, Istanbul, 25.07.00. 
's Ibid.. 
76 Eleftherotypia, 29.01.96. 
" "Although the programme for the 10 islets had a serious political and defensive dimension, it was 
planned more with emotion and less with logic. This programme had not been the subject of discussion 
in the Council of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The General Staff of Defence did not 
know about it. As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, I was informed about it through the 
press. I assume that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not know about it either". Hristos Lyberis, 
National Strategy and Crisis Management, Poiotita, third edition, 1997, p. 243. 
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The occurrence of the hoisting of the Greek flag was simultaneously selected by 
various social and psychic systems for their further autopoiesis. Each of them 
attributed meaning to it - that is it attributed selectivity and connectivity - according to 
its own meaning world. In other words, the hoisting of the Greek flag on the islet, 
observed by the Turkish news media and evaluated against their previous knowledge 
about the islets - that they were Turkish land - was considered by Turkish journalists 
to be a threat to the Turkish territorial integrity and as such it was `news'. This event 
immediately set in motion the media routines. It motivated Nur Batur, the 
correspondent of Hürriyet in Athens, to find a photo and send an article on that event 
to Hürriyet, making it a story to be discussed in the editors' meeting of the newspaper 
the next morning. In this meeting it was decided to send journalists to the islets. On 
the other hand, the same event was news for the Greek Antenna TV channel which 
gave it another exclusive. 
4.5.2. Cesur Sert 
Cesur Sert was the Turkish journalist who replaced the Greek flag with the Turkish 
flag. At that time he was working for the Dogan Group - one of the biggest media 
groups in Turkey. What follows below is his own account of his role in the crisis of 
1996. ßg 
... I was told that 
day to abandon everything else I was doing. We were briefly 
informed about the situation, and we departed. Just as I was about to leave the 
newspaper's offices, one of the newspaper's executives caught up with me, and 
gave me a big Turkish flag. He told me to try to land on the islet and take photos 
with the flag. I didn't know that there was a Greek flag already on the islet. 
Nobody had told us this. Nor had anyone told us to remove the Greek flag and put 
the Turkish one there. They only told us to take photos of ourselves holding the 
Turkish flag. This is the truth that I'm telling you ... Nobody had given us any 
orders to do what we did. Not the state, not the military, not even the newspaper. 
The pilot tried to land the helicopter on the islet, and it took him more than ten 
minutes. Eventually he landed it next to the flagstaffs. We ran out, as if we were 
soldiers, with the engines of the helicopter on and the rotor turning. I felt that our 
actions resembled those of a military squad. Even today I wonder why... We 
removed the Greek flag, I put it in my pocket, I handed the Turkish flag to the 
others, and we raised it. We stayed 7-8 minutes on the island, all in all. We all took 
photos of each other, one by one... 
Whatever I did, I did it only for a headline with my name under it, on the first 
page. I remember that I started trembling when I saw the Turkish commandos 
departing for Imia. 
78 Interview with Cesur Sert by Stratis Balaskas in Eleftherotypia, "Imia: I Was the Flag-bearer in a 
Comedy", 19.01.99. 
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What was Cesur Sert thinking when he took the Greek flag and replaced it with the 
Turkish flag? 
Have you ever been beaten by a woman in front of 5 thousand people? And the 
whole of Turkey saw what had happened in the photos published the next day in 
the newspaper. For me the Imia story started in April 1991. It is not related to the 
Greek side but it is related to something very important to me, personally. At that 
time I was a sports journalist at Hürriyet, 21 years old and only two years on the 
job. I had to take photos of the losers in a game, and when this specific game 
finished, the Greeks were the ones who had lost the game. I saw that a Greek 
player had started crying. I went close to take a picture of her. Her name was Deli. 
But when she saw me taking photos of her, she pushed me away and started hitting 
me in front of five thousand people. I did not react. What else could I do anyway? 
She was a woman... My Turkish colleagues took photos of that, too. The next day 
all the Turkish newspapers had a picture of Deli hitting me. 
Sert's narrative about the hoisting of the Turkish flag and the way it occurred 
demonstrates that this action, as it happened with the mayor's action, emerged as the 
reduction of the complexity of the situation. That complexity included organizational 
patterns of action like the media routines, social and cultural patterns and the meaning 
world of the specific psychic systems. The event of the hoisting of the flag enabled 
the continuation of communication about the Figen Akat incident. Social and psychic 
systems observed it - that is they selected to observe it - and thus they attributed 
causality that is responsibility according to their schemes of interpretation. By doing 
that they decreased complexity and they were enabled to continue their operations. 
The observation of the Turkish flag by the Greek warship patrolling in the region 
activated established mechanisms of action within the system of the Greek navy. It 
was also ̀ news' for the Greek media. Furthermore, it developed into a major problem 
for the system of Greek politics. 
5. The De-escalation of the Crisis 
In this part of the chapter, I will discuss the de-escalation process and the role of the 
American intervention. Conventional theories of international relations and politics 
focus on power as the means that parties in a crisis employ, in order to avert the other 
and achieve their aims. Analyses of the crisis of 1996, that employed this perspective, 
argue that the American intervention was a characteristic case of mediation with 
muscle where the use of threat and power was very important. Here, two main points 
are made. First, that reflexive communication played an important role in the de- 
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escalation of the crisis. Second, the development of the crisis and its de-escalation was 
a contingent development, that is it was neither necessary nor impossible it was only 
one of the possible developments of the crisis. 
Although the American administration had closely followed the developments in 
Greek - Turkish relations during the last days of January, it was only in the morning 
of the 300` that they realised how critical the situation was. 79 At that point they 
decided to intervene, establishing contacts on different levels. The United States 
Secretary of Defence, William Perry, called the Greek Minister of Defence, 
Yerasimos Arsens. The United States Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, called 
the Greek Foreign Minister, Theodoros Pangalos, as well as the Turkish Foreign 
Minister, Deniz Baykal. The United States Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General John Shalikashvili, became also involved in the effort to avert the possibility 
of war in that region. By late the same night several contacts had been made at the 
level of Ministers of Defence, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Commanders-in-Chief 
of Armed Forces. In addition to these contacts, the American President, Bill Clinton, 
called both the Greek Prime Minister Simitis and the Turkish Prime Minister Ciller in 
person, at 1: 00 a. m. Tuesday night. The role of Richard Hoibrooke, the US 
Undersecretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, as co-ordinator of the 
negotiations was also very important. 
Initially, the American intervention attempted to clarify each side's allegations about 
the other side. Turkey had argued that Greece had planned these events in order to 
expand its territorial waters to 12 miles, and Greece's perception was that Turkey had 
instigated the crisis in order to dispute Greek sovereign rights in the Aegean once 
again. The Turkish view was reflected on the second note verbale addressed by the 
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Greek Foreign Ministry on January 29thso 
There, reference was explicitly made to Greece's plan to bring Greek settlers to 
deserted Aegean islands, a plan launched, as it was already discussed above in 
September 1995.81 When the Greek Foreign Minister, Theodoros Pangalos, presented 
the situation later on, in a press conference, he said about the negotiations of that 
evening the following: "[US Secretary of State Warren] Christopher told me [on the 
79 Interview with Alexis Papahelas, correspondent in Washington of the Greek television channel 
Mega. Papahelas conducted an interview with Richard Holbrooke in the aftermath of the crisis. Athens, 
27.06.02. 
8° See the chronicle of the crisis, Appendix, p. 253. 
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phone] that the Turks are saying that you have started the expansion of your territorial 
waters to 12 miles. I replied to him that I am very happy because I spent the afternoon 
talking in the Parliament about the government's programme, and I repeated the 
invariable Greek position that this, the 12 miles issue, is our non-negotiable right, that 
we will exercise it when we wish, and that in any case we will not exercise our right 
now". 82 
The goal of the American efforts was to assure both sides that neither of the two 
would proceed with a fait accompli and that there would thus be an immediate return 
to the status quo ante. The American administration tried to function as a guarantor 
with regard to the basic assumption upon which the communication between Greek 
and Turkish authorities was taking place: the threat of a change of the status quo. 
Furthermore, the important aspect of this mediating effort was reflexive 
communication, that is communication about the way the parties had been 
communicating and the interpretation of their signals. Basically, the American 
intervention tried to make up for the lack of trust between the two sides. 
On the last night of the crisis, the crucial issue in the negotiations was not the 
sovereignty over the islets. The American intervention did not take a position vis-a-vis 
the problem of the islets' sovereignty per se. It kept an equal distance from the legal 
arguments of both sides. Furthermore, the Greek and Turkish politicians did not try to 
solve the problem of the dispute over the islets either. In any case, both governments 
had made their positions about the legal status of the islet clear before the crisis 
escalated. Turkey had argued that Imia/Kardak is part of the Turkish territory, and 
Greece argued that according to international law, those islets constitute part of its 
own territory. 
The mediation efforts that took place during that evening were not about the 
sovereignty issue. They were about the lowering of the flag and they were about the 
subsequent withdrawal of the fleets from the region of the islets. Specifically, they 
were about when exactly the Greek flag would be taken away from the islet. "What 
Holbrooke was basically saying to Ankara was `We ask you to have a little patience; 
we can assure you that the Greek forces will withdraw, but that cannot happen now, 
for as long as the government has not yet taken the vote of confidence'. To Ankara's 
Si See the second note verbale, 29 January 1996, on the website of the Greek Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, http: //www. mfa. gr/ 
82 Hristos Lyberis, National Strategy.., p. 168. 
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question about how long they would have to wait, Holbrooke answered ̀ about two 
weeks"'. 83 What made the situation difficult was that both sides had already taken a 
clear position on television - Greek politicians had assured the Greek people that "the 
flag will stay" and Turkish politicians had assured the Turkish people that "the flag 
will go". 
On the other hand, while the negotiations were going on, the military forces on both 
sides had already been mobilised, and that mobilisation had taken their own 
dynamics. The Turkish Special Forces had already started out for the area of the islets. 
The decision to occupy the second islet, close to the one where the Greek forces were 
stationed and the Greek flag had been hoisted, was taken two days before the peak of 
the crisis, in the first Turkish National Security Council meeting. Tansu Ciller after 
the briefing she had with Oynur Oymen suggested the re-occupation of the islet where 
the Greek forces were. The Turkish military is reported to have reacted hesitantly and 
carefully, saying that the meaning of this act would be declaration of war with Greece 
and that this kind of decision was the responsibility of the political authorities. Then, 
Ambassador Inal Batu suggested the occupation of the adjacent islet as an alternative 
solution. 84 
The execution of the operation started the night of January 30t'. However, around 
midnight, before the Turkish Special Forces left the port of Bodrum for the islets, 
Ciller, after the discussions she had with the American mediators tried to stop the 
operation by calling Admiral Erkaya and asking him to suspend the operation. The 
answer was that this would put the success of the operation at risk, as time was critical 
and tiredness and stress could undermine the performance of the soldiers. 85 At the 
end, the Turkish occupation of the islet gave an advantage to Turkey regarding the 
demand of the simultaneous withdrawal of both sides' flags, forces and fleets. 
When the Greek decision-makers were informed about the occupation of the adjacent 
island by the Turkish television and the American mediators, they contemplated the 
83 This is quoted in Alkis Kourkoulas's book. The information was collected from discussions Alkis 
Kourkoulas had with Greek officials and Holbrooke himself. p. 54. 
84 See the programme by Mehmet Ali Birand "32nd Day" on Atv, 20.05.96. 
85 "Again a phone call [by Turkish Prime Minister Ciller] asking to postpone the operation and again I 
told her to discuss it with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. She then asked what would 
happen if we postponed the operation. We had planned that our team would stay in the sea one and half 
hour that is from twelve o' clock to one thirty. The more you postpone it, the more the boys will stay in 
the water and that means that the risk of giving in and the risk of the failure of the operation increase. "
Interview with Admiral Güven Erkaya who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy during the crisis, 
by Mehmet Ali Birand for the Programme "32°d Day", Atv, 20.05.96. 
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possibility of a military reply. The Greek Prime Minister asked Admiral Lyberis about 
how long the operation of the re-occupation of the adjacent islet would take. The 
decision to negotiate a solution rather than to re-occupy the island was finally 
determined by time limitations. If Greece had had the capability to react quickly to the 
Turkish Special Forces' occupation of the islet, then a limited or more expanded war 
could have developed and another solution could have been negotiated. 
Conventional analysis argues that the American intervention was decisive as to the 
de-escalation of the crisis, making the point that America's supreme power imposed a 
solution. This however cannot be substantiated, as neither Turkey was prevented from 
proceeding with the occupation of the islet, nor was Greece stopped from considering 
the possibility of the re-occupation of the islet. In that sense, the crisis did not de- 
escalate because of the threat of force by the USA. Furthermore, the development of 
the crisis proves that there could have been a different turn of events. Power within 
this context can be seen as a medium of communication that increases the selectivity 
of already made selections. 
The American intervention was framed within the rationale of the paramount strategic 
importance the USA attached to the Aegean Sea region. It was in accordance with the 
plans and institutionalized aims of the American government. First, a Greek-Turkish 
war would put at risk the Southeast flank of NATO with multiple consequences for 
the region. Furthermore, the Turkish army is considered to be an important asset in 
this area for the United States. The position of Turkey, in control of the Bosphorus 
and the Dardanelles, and also Turkey's vicinity to the Persian Gulf and to Southeast 
Asia, are all very important. On the other hand, Greek air and naval facilities 
contribute to the American control over the Mediterranean. 86 Finally, both countries 
are near the Balkans, an area already in turmoil during those years. 
6. The Autonomy of the System of the Crisis of 1996 
In the previous sections, I explored the emergence of crisis through self-referential 
processing of meaning by various social and psychic systems. In this section, I will 
further elaborate on the mechanisms of communication that enabled the constitution 
86 See Haass's observations as regards the American interests in this region. Haass, Richard, Conflicts 
Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990, pp. 57- 
58. For the importance of Turkey for the USA see Fuller, Graham E., "Conclusions the Growing Role 
of Turkey in the World", in Fuller, Graham, E., Lesser Ian 0., Turkey's New Geopolitics, Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1994, pp. 164-166. 
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of the crisis of 1996 as an autonomous system independent of the control of other 
systems; the argument being that the self-referential processing of meaning is possible 
by means of generalisation and re-specification. Communications are complex self- 
referential systems generalised in all three dimensions of meaning, the factual, 
temporal, and social. Generalisations enable connectivity as every element of the 
system frees itself from the specific and concrete events - the factual dimension -that 
took place at a specific time. Furthermore, it makes itself available for connections, 
which can refer to both the past and the future - the temporal dimension - and be 
accomplished through contributions by various social participants - the social 
dimension. Thus, a process emerges and is crystallised into systemic structures, when 
chains of references are formed to which quick contributions can be made, 
suppressing others that need deliberation. Factual, temporal, and social references 
independent of each other are complex enough to adapt themselves to complicated 
interdependencies with other factual, temporal and social meaning references. 
The information about the Figen Akat, for example, was picked up by different social 
and psychic systems, which interpreted and reproduced it according to their own 
rationale, attributing different selectivity and connectivity to this event. References to 
the events surrounding the Figen Akat incident detached themselves from the time and 
place of their occurrence and sought connections to references within the Greek- 
Turkish conflict. The personal political interests of politicians and bureaucrats, the 
perceptions or misperceptions of the other side's intentions, all these did not matter. 
Ultimately, the specific incident with the Figen Akat and its presentation on the 
Antenna channel did not have any importance any more. 
The linking device for the structural couplings that enabled the autopoiesis of crisis 
was language. The language employed here was the language of the conflict. The 
communication about the Figen Akat incident found further connections in the themes 
derived from the history of the long-standing Greek-Turkish conflict. Many incidents 
that had occurred in Greece and Turkey's long and eventful history were recalled in 
this instance as bearing similarities to the current incident. The historical roots of the 
Greek-Turkish conflict go back hundreds of years, basically back to the years when 
the Ottoman Empire, the historical ance , 
'för occupied for four hundred 
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years what is today the land of Greece. 87 The Greek War of Independence, which 
resulted in the founding of a Greek state, the memories of the Balkan Wars and the 
war in Asia Minor, are all part of a past that still plays an important role in how 
present situations are perceived. Furthermore, the Greek trauma over the invasion of 
Cyprus in 1974, the Turkish view of the events that preceded this invasion, and thus 
justified it, and the dispute in the Aegean which had given rise to three serious crises 
since the mid-70's - all these issues were connected to the current crisis. 
References that built up the crisis unified the past, present, and future, and a specific 
causality was attributed to them. Generalisation on the temporal dimensions means 
that past events are recalled and connected to present occurences and future 
expectations are formed through extrapolations from the past and the present. A 
system of crisis is explained as something that is always imminent. In the 
interpretations of the developments the adverb "always" (alternating with "never") 
indicated a lasting existence over time. News media reports were constructed in that 
way. For example, on January 28`h, the Turkish channel, Kanal D started its news 
bulletin with a scene recalling the events in Izmir in 1922, after the "War of 
Salvation" (as Turks call the war fought against the Greeks in Asia Minor. ) The 
newscaster 's introduction started as follows: "74 years ago we lowered the Greek flag 
in Izmir. Now we have lowered the Greek flag from our island and we have raised the 
Turkish flag". 88 The Greek television channel Sky, for example, replayed the scene 
with the changing of the flags six times in only 1 minute and 25 seconds, as well as 
parts of the interview with one of the Turkish journalists who hoisted the flag, Aykut 
Firat, saying: 89 "In 1932 a Convention was signed between Turkey and Italy. This 
island belongs to us... " Similar episodes in which the Turkish flag was hoisted on 
other small Greek islands in the past were presented again and again by the Greek 
news media, concluding that "Turkey's ultimate goal is to repeat the events of Cyprus, 
Istanbul, Izmir, etc". 90 
87 For further information regarding Greek-Turkish relations see Clogg, Richard, A Concise History of 
Greece, 1992, Cambridge University Press. 
88 Canal D, News bulletin at 7: 30 p. m., 28.01.96. 
89 Sky News bulletin at 8: 00 p. m., 29.01.96. 
90 See the newspaper Apoyevmatini 26.01.96 which reported on a similar incident which had occurred 
in 1985, and also the newspaper Eleftherotypia 30.01.96 reporting on two other incidents that had 
occurred in 1975 and 1995 respectively. 
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The legal language that was used to describe the conflict offered further possibilities 
for connection. 91 Issues of constant friction between the two countries such as the 
delimitation of the continental shelf, the dispute about the territorial waters, and 
airspace were all themes connected with the incident of Figen Akat. 92 
Generalisation on the social dimension means that there is no constrain about who is 
going to make what contribution and when that will happen. Different social partners 
can make a contribution to the new order. Various personalities, from "realist" 
professors of international relations to politicians of the opposition party, to 
columnists and ordinary citizens from nearby islands who felt extremely concerned, 
participated in the reproduction of communication about the perceived crisis and thus 
in the crisis itself. "The aim of Turkey is the reconsideration of Greek-Turkish 
relations on the basis of the negotiations that took place in 1913 between the then 
Greek government and the government of Young Turks" argued Professor of History, 
Neoklis Sarris. 93 Scholars in Greece employed strategic approaches to explain Turkish 
expansionist plans and Turkey's ultimate goal of changing the status quo, as they saw 
it. Politicians and especially members of the opposition used this issue to attack the 
newly elected government for not being able to cope with a serious threat to Greek 
territorial integrity. News reports started reflecting the feelings of ordinary people - 
the fear of war, a fighting mood - about the events, which had their roots in the 
television broadcasts and press stories. The Greek government itself could not avoid 
contributing in turn to this cyclical self-reproduction of the crisis, as it was obliged to 
answer the questions that the media posed. Although governmental officials initially 
tried to stop this re-cycling of the uproar over the crisis, in truth, they actually fed it, 
and eventually they were swept away by its tide. An apt illustration of this is the 
statement of the Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos, who said, "the Figen Akat incident 
itself is not important" -a statement which then gave rise to a fierce attack on him by 
91 Statements of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on Antenna evening news at 8: 30 p. m., 26.1.96. 
92 According to the Turkish point of view, if Greece eventually decides to extend its territorial waters, 
the Aegean will become a Greek lake. On the other hand, Greece has so far reserved its right to 
expansion that derives from the 1982 Convention of the Law of the Sea. Research in the continental 
shelf was the cause of the 1976 crisis, which led Greece and Turkey to resort to the International Court 
of Justice. Finally, the Flight Information Region (F. I. R. ) of Athens in the Aegean Sea has been another 
continuous source of tension. 
93 Eleftherotypia, 26.01.96. For comments about the strategic and historical importance of the islets 
which were made by the same professor as well as by other international relations experts see 
Eleftherotypia, 30.01.96. 
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the opposition party. Similarly, in Turkey the same issue was news for the Turkish 
media and was also a field of battle for the highest ratings. 
The system of crisis was autonomous and independent of the various social and 
psychic systems that contributed to its emergence. The political system or any other 
system could not, by itself, control and plan the crisis so as to use it as the means to 
force the other into some specific attitude. Furthermore, the examples above 
illustrated the independence of communication vis-ä-vis the specific events that 
produced it. The Figen Akat incident was a trigger for all these themes to emerge and 
increase complexity. The crisis of 1996 was the system that reduced complexity and 
enabled psychic and social systems to continue their autopoiesis. 
7. The Re-entry of the Crisis to the Greek-Turkish Conflict 
The crisis did not end with the withdrawal of the two fleets from the region of 
Imia/Kardak on January 31st. After its de-escalation it was interpreted according to the 
meaning of the Greek-Turkish conflict. Academic discourse, journalistic accounts and 
political rhetoric reproduced it making it an integral part of the conflict through which 
it emerged in the first place. 
Here, I will explore the way that the function system of science contributes to the 
reproduction that is self-constitution of conflict through the mechanisms of 
construction of scientific knowledge. The argument being that what is claimed to be a 
"scientific" explanation of reality is only a construct of the system of international 
relations theory coupled with other social systems like cultural patterns and pre- 
established knowledge about Greek-Tukish relations. As a case study, I will use a 
characteristic example of academic analysis of the 1996 crisis, an essay published by 
Eustathios Fakiolas and Panayiotis Mavrides 94 The authors analyse the crisis from the 
point of view of the strategic approach. This means that they consider the use or threat 
of use of power as the most important factor in the 1996 Greek-Turkish crisis, the 
factor that determined the development of the crisis. 5 The authors, nevertheless, do 
not justify the adoption of this perspective. However, their choice can be explained by 
94 Panayiotis Mavrides, Eustathios Fakiolas, "Strategic crisis management and the Greek-Turkish 
Dispute", in Hristodoulos Giallourides, Greece and Turkey after the End of the Cold War, Sideris 1999, 
pp. 133-176. This is one of the most thorough presentations in the narrow Realist strategic tradition. 
ibid., p. 135. 
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the fact that the authors are familiar to this approach, as both of them have been 
specialised in strategic studies. 96 
The main position of their essay is that the 1996 crisis "signals a change in the way 
Turkey pursues its aims". 97 The authors argue that this specific incident was the first 
incident of this kind in which Turkey used military power to dispute its borders with 
Greece. This thesis is justified as follows: "the bloodless occupation of the western 
islet of Imia, the way that this was expressed in the military field, and later on its 
political legitimisation, justify the conclusion that Turkey's leadership has started to 
adopt new policies to achieve its aims". 98 Clearly, here the authors have deduced their 
main argument from what they define as "the results of the crisis" and not from 
empirical research. In the section "analysis of the events" there is not a presentation of 
what had happened, but rather an interpretation of certain events, based on articles 
from the daily, periodical, and electronic press of those days ' The main theme that 
they present is how Greek deterrence operated and the reasons for its failure. 
Therefore, the authors select those actions, which they can interpret them as acts of 
deterrence. These acts included the dispatch of the Greek squad to the islet, and the 
invitation given to the ambassadors of the 15 European Union member states, as well 
as the American and the Turkish ambassadors, to attend a meeting at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs on January 28th. The second section of the essay has the title 
"explanation of the events" and starts with the question of "how the events of the 
crisis are connected with each other". Nevertheless, this section, instead of providing 
an answer to this question, it puts forth two other questions based on their 
qualification of the above acts as acts of deterrence: "Why did Greek deterrence 
collapse in this case, and why did Greece finally compromise? "' 00 The answer to the 
first of these two questions is that political and military actions were not co-ordinated, 
and thus there was a lack of coherence in these actions. In response to the second 
question, they suggest that Greek `actions' did not follow a strategic rationale. The 
authors argue that what determined the positive result for Turkey, was its strategic 
96 See the background of the authors, ibid., pp. 521-522. 
97 ibid., p. 133. 
98 ibid., p. 133. 
99 See footnote 69 of the essay, ibid., p. 175. The authors do not clarify the source of their information 
and in particular whether Turkish sources are included, but it becomes evident from the analysis that 
follows that they collected their information from mainly Greek sources. 
100 ibid., 190. 
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logic, its aim "to win the crisis with strategic management of the crisis" whereas 
Greece wanted to "win in peace or win in a war". ' 01 
Fakiolas and Mavrides' essay assumes without question that there was a crisis from 
the very beginning of the incident with the vessel Figen Akat and the subsequent 
Turkish claims. It further assumes, then, that the different stages of the crisis were 
well thought out and organised by both countries' governments from the beginning to 
the end. The existence of a Greek or a Turkish system of strategic logic to cope with 
this crisis is another assumption they make. Based on this assumption they argue that 
Greece, therefore, made strategic mistakes because it was trapped in the strategic 
logic of the dilemma "peace or war". Turkey, on the other hand, followed a strategy 
that in this matter proved to be more flexible, changing positions with ease, moving 
gradually among the different stages that exist in between the two extremes war and 
peace. This argument ignores the process of the development of the crisis. It conceals 
the statements made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pangalos that he did not know 
about the regiment sent to the islet, and if he had been asked he would not have let 
this happen, as he said. The essay also does not discuss the efforts of the Greek 
government and the Turkish bureaucracy to keep a "low profile" at the beginning. It 
does not examine the motives behind the decision of the Greek government to bring 
third countries like the EU countries into the issue, which was shown above to be a 
reaction addressed to the internal constituency rather than another clear message of 
deterrence for Turkey. The authors do not examine any of the other actions that were 
important in the building up of the crisis, like for example the hoisting of the Greek 
flag and the role that the news media played in it. For this framework of analysis, only 
two actors exist and these are Turkey and Greece. 
Furthermore, the authors, using arguments from their own analysis of the 1996 crisis, 
and based on the existing international literature, 102 argue that the Greek-Turkish 
crises of 1976,1987 and 1996 are all connected with each other. The element that 
connects them is Turkey's aim to force Greece into total negotiations on the status of 
the Aegean Sea. '03 This argument illustrates the self-referential operation of 
`o1 ibid., p. 134. 
102 I assume that they are based on the literature because the authors do not substantiate this view for 
the crises of 1976 and 1987 with any reference to literature. 
103 ".. the crises over Imia and the crisis of 1976 and 1987 .. are connected with each other as regards 
their political aim, which is to force Greece into unlimited negotiations concerning the status of the 
Aegean Sea.... "Panayiotis Mavrides, Stathis Fakiolas.., p. 165. On the other hand the editor of foreign 
news of Hürryet Ferai Tinc was writing about the crisis from a Turkish viewpoint: "Greece is not 
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communication by means of generalisation in the factual, temporal, and social 
dimensions of meaning. 
This analysis is static because it ignores the actual process of the emergence and 
development of the crisis. It cannot describe the crisis as a phenomenon of 
`becoming'. Adopting an ontological determinism, it assumes that the consequences 
of the crisis had been Turkey's ultimate aim from the very beginning. The authors 
assume the existence of some Turkish designs as the driving force behind the events 
of the crisis. 
Nevertheless, it is the authors who select the events and construct purposeful actions 
through meaning attributions they make aposteriori according to their analytical tools, 
namely the theory of strategic studies. This framework of analysis based on two 
"rational" actors, Greece and Turkey, is too simplified and most importantly it is 
restrictive in terms of empirical research. This is manifested in the empirical material 
used for this article. First, the information about the crisis was mostly gathered from 
the daily, periodical, and electronic press. 104 Having discussed above the way the 
news is constructed in Turkish and Greek news media, many questions should be 
asked about the validity of this material. Media reports do not reflect a mirror image 
of reality. They too select information, which they interpret according to their own 
rationale, programmes and aims. This means that they construct the information the 
present. Second, reading carefully the footnotes of this essay we see that from the 80 
footnotes that support the article and substantiate their arguments, about 70 refer to 
strategic studies literature: Thomas Schelling, Liddell Hart, John Baylis, John Garnett, 
and other strategists. This literature describes aspects of the strategic management of 
crisis and is used in the essay to explain the events the authors have chosen according 
to this theory at the first place. The theoretical framework guided the selection of 
information, the attribution of meaning to it, and constructed causal relationships, 
which reinforce the framework of analysis. The construction of this analysis is thus 
self-referential. The other reference, that is, the events of the crisis, is interpreted 
through the self-reference of the system of strategic studies. The product of this self- 
satisfied with Holbrooke's proposal for Cyprus and creates this crisis in order to expose Turkey 
internationally". Ferai Tine, Hürrryet, 29.01.96. 
104 See the footnote of the essay number 69. Nevertheless, the authors do not clarify whether the press 
they refer to includes the Turkish press too. Panayiotis Mavrides, Eustathios Fakiolas, "Strategy of ... ", 
p. 175. 
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referential process is a highly artificial, esoteric construct of the system of strategic 
studies. 
This example offers an apt illustration of the autopoietic constitution of conflict. The 
new system became a constitutive element of the system of the Greek-Turkish conflict 
through which it was initially emerged. Fakiolas and Mavrides' essay can provide the 
language for further structural couplings within Greek society. It can become an 
element for the structural couplings of the system of Greek-Turkish conflict with 
other social systems like the educational system, the political system, and the media 
system. This essay became part of one of the most recent and respected works on 
Greek-Turkish issues. It could thus become part of the curriculum of university 
courses, courses on international relations and foreign policy. It is this kind of analysis 
that is often published in newspapers. Finally, it could also constitute a guide for 
political decision making, as often scholars become advisors to politicians. The 
proclaimed aim of Fakiolas and Mavrides's essay was to point out the weaknesses of 
Greek policy and/or strategy. The authors assume that since the result of the crisis was 
not in favour of Greece, a change in Greece's strategic logic should be made. 
Extrapolating from the assumed difference in the strategic culture of the two states, 
they argue that Greek political and military leaders, in order to face the Turkish threat, 
must "change their strategy into highly strategic crisis management with the aim of 
preventing [conflict by] using the defensive logic of limited war". los 
Conclusion 
The argument substantiated in this chapter was that the 1996 crisis did not arise 
because of the dispute about sovereignty over the two islets in the Aegean. The 
analysis of the crisis, through modem systems theory perspective, demonstrated that 
communication processes not actions and/or decisions constituted the crisis in an 
autopoietic way. The crisis emerged as a "butterfly effect" through morphogenetic 
processes of evolution. Once information relevant to the crisis was transmitted 
through the news media, it was immediately dispersed and thus multiplied, increasing 
the complexity of the situation and the need for a selection within a number of social 
and psychic systems. 
pos Panayiotis Mavrides, Eustathios Fakiolas, "Strategy of ... ", p. 167, See also statement by Yerasimos 
Arsenis, then Minister of Defence: "The problems between Greece and Turkey could only be resolved 
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In a condition of infinite complexity, social and psychic systems make selections 
guided by previous determinations of meaning such as social and cultural patterns of 
behaviour and institutionalised practices. Here these selections were performed under 
the limiting condition of an institutionalised Greek-Turkish conflict that operated as 
an attractor. The various social systems selected and interpreted information 
according to the structures of the conflict that is the expectations Greeks and Turks 
hold for each other. Nevertheless, they could not see that they were introducing their 
own distinctions, in the emerging order of crisis. They could not see that they could 
not see what they could not see - their own blind spots. Paradoxically, they constituted 
the crisis in their effort to avoid it! 
The crisis of 1996 emerged as enforced selectivity. Selections made simultaneously 
by a multitude of social systems constrained complexity towards the direction of 
crisis. Each selection was reinforcing the selectivity and connectability of the 
emerging order. The dynamics of crisis is found in the connectivity of communication 
rather than in the purposefulness of action. The crisis of 1996 was the result of the 
dynamics of uncoordinated structural couplings. These couplings were largely 
accidental, which means that they were not motivated by the advantage of couplings 
themselves. This aspect of social systems' operation places the emphasis on the 
contingent and not the necessary nature of crisis. 
Another important conclusion drawn from this analysis is that the emergence of the 
crisis of 1996 involved the whole of the Greek and Turkish societies and not only the 
decision-makers. The systems of Greek and Turkish politics, media, the military, civil 
society and psychic systems contributed to the constitution of the crisis simply by 
following their own rationale and implementing their functions within society. The 
crisis emergence and escalation cannot be attributed to specific individuals for one 
more reason. The constitution of the semantics employed by various systems in their 
operations cannot be attributed to rational processing of information by a subject. 
They are evolutionary achievements of society. 
The above analysis also shed new light on the role of news media in the context of an 
international crisis. In the crisis of 1996, news media did not `decide' and/or 
`construct' the crisis `on purpose'. It was rather through their normal functions as 
by the deterrent of a strong army. " CHA, "Screams of War from Athens", Dogan Ertugul, 28 March 
1996. 
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those who provide society with irritations and amplify them that they contributed to 
the autopoiesis of the Imia/Kardak crisis. 
This further illuminates in a new way the key issue of whether international crisis can 
be controlled. The conclusion being that the political system did not have the capacity 
to control other function and psychic systems in society. The emergence and 
escalation of this crisis did not reflect the intentions of the governments. The crisis 
emerged despite the initial conviction of the authorities of both countries that an issue 
that could produce a crisis did not exist in this matter, and despite their initial efforts 
to prevent the escalation. The argument put forth here differs from conventional 
theories, which define the problem of crisis management as lack of co-ordination. It is 
argued that co-ordination is not possible anyway. One system cannot gain complete 
and constant control over all the other systems. The autopoiesis of this crisis was 
enabled through the stimulating power of accidents and paradoxes. 
Finally, the Greek argument that the crisis was employed by Turkey in order to 
advance its position in the Aegean Sea, which stems from the "rational actor" 
framework of analysis cannot be substantiated for one more reason. Turkey in the 
aftermath of the crisis had to face the predictable Greek reaction within the EU with 
regards to the Turkish candidature to become a member of the EU and profit from the 
European funds. Furthermore, with regards to the dispute over the Imia/Kardak, 
Greece, in the aftermath of the crisis, insisted on the arguments used on the 10th of 
January 1996, that the two islets are part of Greek territory and that if Turkey disputed 
the status of the islets it should take the issue to the International Court of the Hague. 
The victims of the crisis, however, were the three young Greek military officers 
whose helicopter crashed during the most critical evening of the crisis, in a 
reconnaissance flight. Furthermore, the mobilisation of the armed forces cost the 
budgets of the two states hundreds of thousands of dollars. Finally, as it was 
demonstrated in the last section of this chapter, the crisis that employed the structures 
of the conflict for its autopoiesis, re-entered the conflict through academic discourse, 
the political rhetoric and journalistic accounts, reproducing and reinforcing it. 
Nevertheless, paradoxically, the same crisis became an irritation, which resulted in a 
new stage of bifurcation and the emergence of peace initiatives, which I will explore 
in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV 
1996-1999: PEACE PROCESSES AS AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEMS 
In this part of the thesis, I will examine examples of peace initiatives undertaken by 
governmental and non-governmental organizations from the aftermath of the crisis of 
1996 until the earthquake of 1999. The relevant literature of Greek-Turkish relations 
is confined mainly to the analysis of initiatives undertaken by governmental agents 
and it places the emphasis on bargaining processes. An argument frequently cited to 
explain the failure of these initiatives to produce some progress with regard to the 
issues of the conflict is that politicians themselves understand these processes through 
a realist perspective and their sharply opposed national interests of the parties. ' 
Mainstream Greek-Turkish literature assigns a secondary role - if at all - to civil 
society initiatives, due to the belief that these initiatives cannot produce a major 
breakthrough in interstate relations. Another additional reason that seems to reinforce 
this argument is that the contribution of civil society initiatives cannot be easily 
evaluated. 
The relevant literature does not ask how - if at all - these processes are connected with 
each other and with their environment that is the society within which they emerge 
and develop. It does not put forth the question how it comes that several peace 
initiatives have been launched over the last years but no progress has been made with 
regard to the issues of the conflict. It has not questioned what practitioners say 
lowering their voice namely that an important obstacle to the success of governmental 
peace initiatives is the resistance of the Greek and Turkish societies to accept a 
compromise with regard to the issues of the conflict and the every time 
contingencies. 
Here, I examine peace processes of negotiation and mediation undertaken by 
governmental authorities - of the two countries or a third party - and non- 
governmental initiatives such as conflict resolution workshops, and conferences with 
Greek and Turkish academics, journalists and other professionals. I will explore the 
Nimet Beriker discussing the Turkish policy vis-A-vis Greece maintained that the realist framework of 
decision-making employed by Turkish foreign policy designers accounts for the lack of some kind of 
progress in Greek-Turkish relations over the last years. Nimet Beriker, Assistant Professor of 
International Conflict Analysis in Sabanci University in Istanbul, Seminar given to MA students of 
International Conflict Analysis and International Relations, University of Kent at Canterbury, 09.01.03. 
2 Byron Theodoropoulos, a retired Greek Ambassador who served in important posts in the Greek 
Ministry as well as abroad said characteristically that when Greece was ready for an agreement there 
was political instability in Turkey and vice versa. Interview with Byron Theodoropoulos, Athens, 
10.09.01. 
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emergence and development of these initiatives without making a hierarchical 
distinction as to their importance. These initiatives are considered to be essentially 
similar from the perspective of their constitutive elements, their nature and their 
potential to bring about a change with regard to the conflict. 
Following Luhmann's assumptions, as in the previous chapter on the crisis of 1996, 
society is considered functionally and not hierarchically differentiated. Accordingly, 
peace processes are approached as highly complex social systems of communication 
constituted on the level of communication. They come about through the a-causal 
synchronization of parallel on-going processes, multiple connections of selective 
occurrences of communication. The task, from a second order observation 
perspective, is to disentangle these connections. Here, I will explore the semantics 
with which various systems refer to the system/environment distinction and how these 
semantics affect their information processing that is their orientation towards peace 
and co-operation. 
This approach makes a shift in the focus of analysis from the outcome of peace 
initiatives to the process of their emergence and development. The commonsensical 
generalisation that peace initiatives stem from the desire for peace, which often 
implies a mechanistic process of rational calculation therein, is challenged. Detailed 
empirical research seeks to explore the complexity that gave rise to each of these 
initiatives and the operations involved. 
Negotiations, mediation efforts, problem solving workshops and other meetings 
among Greeks and Turks oriented to some sort of co-operation are considered as 
systems of interaction. Placed within the system/environment perspective of the 
theory of social autopoiesis they appear as a field of experimentation for Greek and 
Turkish society rather than the means to resolve conflicts. This shift of perspective 
can help us to cope with the fundamental problem of the complexity of modem 
society and the increase of contingency. It will be demonstrated that this approach can 
also deal with the features of non-linearity and discontinuity that characterise peace 
processes and the crucial problem of linking a concrete peace initiative with its 
broader environment. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section demonstrates that the crisis 
of 1996 was a stimulus for Greek and Turkish societies which set in motion a number 
of information processes and thus gave rise to a bifurcation moment, that is a moment 
of increased complexity that enabled the emergence of the difference co- 
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operation/conflict. The second part discusses the processes of the amplification of this 
difference on the side of co-operation3 through connections with existing social 
systems such as politics, science, and civil society organizations. This emerging 
complexity yielded various peace initiatives such as negotiation and mediation 
processes as well as PSWs and conferences among Greeks and Turks. The 
development of these processes is described as a process of a-causal synchronization 
of parallel on-going recursive processes of communication. These processes are 
defined as a field of experimentation for Greek and Turkish societies. The fourth 
section elaborates on the structural changes that peace processes have brought about 
in Greek and Turkish society. 
1. A Stage of Bifurcation 
As noted above conventional analyses do not question the process of the emergence of 
peace processes. Rather, they immediately seek to explain their outcome. Here it is 
argued that the stimulus for the emergence of peace processes is very important and it 
reveals a great deal about the nature of these processes. Furthermore, it will be 
demonstrated that the stimulus for various Greek-Turkish peace initiatives 
governmental and non-governmental was the crisis of 1996. The crisis as played out 
in the media, was an irritation for a multitude of social and psychic systems in Greek 
and Turkish societies. It set in motion recursive processes of communication, which 
increased the complexity of the situation and enabled the emergence of a bifurcation 
stage, which produced the difference co-operation/conflict. This difference found 
connections on both sides. Thus, we can observe the reinforcement of the existing 
system of conflict as well as the emergence of alternative ways of thinking about 
Greek-Turkish relations and a re-interpretation of the conflict and its causes. 4 
In the chapter on the crisis of 1996, I described the recursive processes of 
communication, which reinforced the conflict. I explained, in particular, how the 
3 It should be noted here that the same difference found also connections on the side of the conflict and 
it was eventually crystallised into structures of organizations like "The Central Team 21 - Network 21 - 
Movement of Patriotic Awakening". Interview with Failos Kranidiotis, member of the "Network 21.. ", 
Athens, 12.10.01. 
4 This is a paradox that cannot be explained by conventional analysis, which argues on the basis of a 
uni-linear causal rationale, that the crisis of 1996 had only detrimental effects. Gülden Ayman writes 
"[O]n the contrary adversarial attitudes were toughened, official theses were opposed, feelings of non- 
confidence were deepened, negative images were strengthened and the prejudicial judgements of Turks 
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crisis re-entered the system of conflict through academic analyses guided by, - and 
thus further reproducing - the existing expectations - that is the structures - of the 
Greek-Turkish conflict and the pre-established structures of the system of science. Re- 
entries of the crisis in the system of conflict are reflected in Greek and Turkish 
journalistic accounts, the political rhetoric and civil society initiatives. A 
characteristic example of this kind of initiatives in Greece is the establishment of the 
Greek NGO "The Central Team 21 - Network 21 - Movement of Patriotic 
Awakening". 5 This initiative emanated from a specific interpretation of the crisis. 
Founding members of the Network maintain that the Imia Kardak crisis was the 
decisive point that compelled them to undertake this initiative and set up this 
organization. 6 More precisely, they were motivated by what they perceived as failure 
of the Greek government to protect the interests of their country. According to them, 
the crisis was designed, instigated and escalated by Turkey, and Greece failed to 
effectively deter Turkey from its plans. Additionally, they perceived the decision of 
the Greek government to withdraw the Greek flag as humiliating Greece. The 
constitutional act of the NGO provides that the organization was established in order 
to promote discussion about the protection of Greek national interests and activate 
civil society for that purpose. Members of this NGO are academics, ex-politicians, 
military officers and journalists. 
While the withdrawal of the Greek flag was the crucial `action' selected and 
interpreted in a specific way to become the point for connections leading to the 
`Network', other systems selected other `actions' according to their own pre- 
determined distinctions, rationale and programmes. For example, some journalists 
perceived the hoisting of the Turkish flag by journalists as breaking the code of 
conduct of journalism and this `action' became another connective point for the 
emergence of a journalists' peace initiative. The inability of the system of politics to 
control the escalation of crisis was an irritation for the system of Greek and Turkish 
governments which experienced very embarrassing moments during the crisis. The 
`actions' of representatives of civil society, like the mayor who hoisted the flag, was 
the stimulus for civil society peace initiatives. International organizations like the EU 
and Greeks towards each other were encouraged". Ayman, Gulden, S., "The Kardak (Imia) Crisis and 
Turkish-Greek Relations", Hellenic Studies, Volume 9, No 2,2001, p. 66. 
s Interview with Failos Kranbidiotis, member of the "Network 21.. ", Athens, 12.10.01. 
6 ibid.. 
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and NATO and members of these organizations ̀ saw in the events of the crisis the 
potential of a Greek-Turkish war. The expectation that Greece and Turkey are 
considered allies so they must forego military confrontations was seriously challenged 
and it alarmed those who were interested, for their own reasons, in ensuring peace 
between the two allies. 
In short, in what follows it will be demonstrated that organizations like the EU, the 
American administration, Greek and Turkish governmental authorities, civil society 
organizations, academic institutes, and individuals reacted to their own selected - that 
is constructed - aspects of the crisis of 1996. The `disappointment' of different 
expectations various systems held until now enabled the emergence of new 
distinctions, which were connected with existing strata of meaning in society. 
Differences such as the unity of EU and NATO v disruption to their unity, Turkey's 
accession to the EU v Turkey's exclusion from the EU, civil society v politics, 
journalists as reporters v journalists as instigators of crisis, female v male approach to 
international politics were successful in fording further connections and forming 
chains of selections, which eventually constrained complexity towards the direction of 
co-operation. 
2. The Emergence of Peace Processes 
The focus of this section is the emergence of peace initiatives undertaken by 
governmental and civil society organizations from 1996 to 1999. The aim of this 
section is to explore the distinctions that guided various systems' selections and led to 
the emergence of peace initiatives as the unity of the system/environment difference. 
Only after we will have examined the complexity that brought about these initiatives 
we can take a step further and explore their development and their transformations. 
This perspective signifies a definite departure from uni-linear, cause-effect 
relationships towards the exploration of multiple causality. Instead of assuming a 
general simple cause for all these initiatives such as the value of peace for example, 
here each initiative is examined separately as to the environmental and internal 
complexity that enforced its constitution. It will be demonstrated that there is not one 
path or specific conditions necessary and/or natural to bring about a peace initiative. 
There are multiple paths, formed by different combinations of interconnected meaning 
nexuses, institutionalized practices, social patterns of behaviour and contingencies. 
While conventional theory approaches these initiatives in terms of rational 
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actions/decisions, "actions" in this context of analysis they are considered to be 
simplified self-descriptions of complex social systems and their environments. 
2.1. Governmental Initiatives 
In this section, I will examine initiatives launched by the Greek and the Turkish 
governments, the EU and NATO, members of the EU such as the United Kingdom 
and Germany, and the USA. 
The crisis of 1996 was the stimulus for the peace initiative launched by the Turkish 
Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz in a press conference given on the 24th of March of 
1996. He invited Greece to enter into negotiations with Ankara on all the outstanding 
issues between the two countries, without preconditions. Additionally, he stated that 
Turkey was ready to "discuss with good will, appropriate third-party methods of 
settlement" and would not, "from the beginning, exclude any method of settlement 
including third party arbitration". 7 Although Yilmaz did not refer directly to the 
International Court of Justice, which was Greece's demand, his statement marked an 
important change in the traditional Turkish stance. Turkey's official stance regarding 
the resolution of the Aegean dispute was that it should be resolved through bilateral 
negotiations, that is, political and not judicial means. 
The initiative was a reduction of the complexity of the Turkish politics and its 
environment. Yilmaz was elected Prime Minister of a coalition government two 
months after the crisis. 8 As it was demonstrated in the previous chapter, he had 
criticized both Ciller and the Turkish bureaucracy for escalating the Imia/Kardak 
crisis for political reasons .9 This initiative reflects Yilmaz and his advisors' perception 
of their environment too. They felt that the crisis increased the awareness that war 
between the two countries was possible and thus it created a basis of support for a 
peace initiative by a broader constituency in Turkey. 1° Additionally, Yilmaz, as the 
new Prime Minister, had to deal with the repercussions of the crisis and Turkey's 
failure to gain EU funds due to a post crisis Greek veto. Nevertheless, this proposal 
fell through after a negative Greek reply, a development that will be extensively 
7 Angelos Syrigos, The Status of The Aegean.., p. 365. 
The two parties that formed the new Turkish government were Mesut Yilmaz's Motherland Party 
(Anavatan Partisi) and tiller's The Party of the Right Path (Dogru Yol Partisi). 
See Chapter III, p. 87. 
'o Interview with retired Ambassador Yalim Eralp who was Yilmaz' s advisor at that time, Istanbul, 
04.05.02. 
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analyzed in the next section. In this part of the chapter, I confine the analysis only to 
the process of the emergence of the various initiatives. 
The Greek Prime Minister, Costas Simitis, took the next step during his visit in 
Washington. Simitis stated that Greece would be willing to discuss the question of air 
space and air-control over the Aegean with Turkey. On the 27`" of April, the Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs met in Bucharest, where they agreed to explore the possibility of 
bilateral negotiations and they arranged to meet in May in Berlin. The new leader of 
the PASOK government, Simitis, was determined to make Greece an integral part of 
the European Union. Full membership in the single currency (Euro), economic and 
monetary union, were an important challenge for Greece's economy and the Greek- 
Turkish conflict was a serious impediment on the road towards the EU. 1 1 In the 
context of their bilateral problems and the Cyprus problem, Greece has often sought 
to put pressure on Turkey through the institutions of the EU. This has resulted in a 
constant Greek-Turkish diplomatic war over the years, adding another dimension to 
the Greek-Turkish conflict, apart from the problems in the Aegean and Cyprus. 
Turkey has frequently accused Greece of an obstructionist role with regard to its 
efforts to enter the EU. 12 Firmly committed to the EU, Simitis, after his accession to 
the Greek premiership in 1996, has sought for ways to overcome this problem. 
Nevertheless, these first efforts were destined to fail due to the Gavdos crisis. This 
crisis broke out when a Turkish military officer in a meeting of NATO, in Napoli, 
disputed the Greek sovereignty over the island of Gavdos. 
Apart from the two governments, initiatives were also launched by other states within 
the parameters of international organizations like the EU and NATO. Hans Van 
Mierlo, President of the EU Council of Ministers and Dutch Foreign Minister, 
proposed the establishment of a "Committee of Wise Men" to resolve the Greek- 
Turkish differences. The proposal was made in April 1997 in the Maltese capital, 
during the Euro-Mediterranean Conference. After each side clarified its approach to 
this initiative and their expected outcomes, it was decided the two parties should 
11 Greece has been a member of the European Union since 1981. Turkey submitted its application for 
EU membership in 1987. The Greek-Turkish affairs within the EU involve also the Cyprus problem. 
One of Greece's main goals since 1989 has been to secure Cyprus accession to the European 
Community. The Nicosia government submitted its application for accession in June 1990. That has 
further strained the Greek-Turkish relations and has increased the diplomatic skirmishes within the EU 
bodies. For the history of Greece and the EU see 
www. mfa. gr/english/foreign_policy/eulgreece/history. html 
12 According to former Foreign Minister of Turkey Hikmet Cetin, "Greece has been the main obstacle 
in Turkey's course to the EU". Interview with Hikmet Cetin, Ankara, 12.06.01. 
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proceed. The results of their work would be submitted to the President of the EU 
Council of Ministers. 
The European initiatives for facilitation of a Greek-Turkish rapprochement should be 
examined in the context of the implications Greek-Turkish relations have for the 
triangular Greek-Turkish-EU relations. 13 As Greece's policies towards Turkey often 
appear to conflict with the interests of the European Union, the EU countries have 
tried to strike a balance between the policy of the EU toward Turkey, and the policies 
of Greece, one of their allies. 14 
In 1998, German officials exerted pressure on the Greek government to lift its veto of 
the financial protocol for Turkey, which had been a constant source of friction 
between the two countries after 1996.15 The reply of the Greek government was that 
they expected Turkey to first undertake a move of good will. In addition, the Greek 
government demanded that Turkey lodges an appeal over Imia/Kardak to the 
International Court of Justice or accept the general jurisdiction of the International 
Court for the resolution of the Greek-Turkish disputes in the Aegean. By exerting 
pressure on the Greek government, the German government wanted to make the EU's 
Luxemburg decision (12-13 December 1997) more attractive to Turkey. Britain and 
France suggested at the Summit of Cardiff in 1998 that the Luxemburg decision 
should be reconsidered, while Germany resisted this proposal. 16 The pressure exerted 
on Greece by the German administration reflects the dynamics of domestic German 
politics. Germany is reluctant to precipitate the accession of Turkey to the EU 
13 The German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel in an article he wrote on "Frankfurter Allgemeine ", 
underlined that the key for Turkey-EU relations is Greek-Turkish relations. See Ta Nea, 16.02.98. 
14 See statements by Commissioner Van den Broek about this development, where he points out that 
the release of the MEDA funds for Turkey is considered very important for the relations of the EU with 
Turkey, the economic interests of the EU as well as for the problems in the Aegean and Cyprus. 
Eleftherotypia, 23.10.96. 
's This is also reflected in the statement made by the German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, saying 
that "detente is imperative, but it is clear that both sides must get over themselves (get over their 
shadow)... Greece could give an important push towards that direction with the unblocking of the 
funds the EU promised to Turkey since 1995 and Turkey should seriously examine the thoughts my 
Greek colleague, Pangalos, expressed in January 1995 regarding the jurisdiction of the International 
Court of the Hague for a decision over the Greek-Turkish dispute for the continental self and other 
problems in the Aegean... ", Ta Nea 6.02.98. See also articles on this matter in the same Greek 
newspaper Ta Nea, 16.02.98. 
16 The Luxemburg decision excluded Turkey from the list of the countries with which the EU would 
initiate membership talks. For the stance of the French and British leaders vis-a-vis Turkey in the 
Luxemburg Summit see Ta Nea, 13.12.97. For the Cardiff Summit and the stance of the different 
European countries see Ta Nea, 16.06.99. 
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considering the impact that development can have with regard to the minority of 
Turkish immigrants living in Germany. 
In late May 1997, the American administration and NATO entered the scene 
launching a new peace initiative. The Secretary General, Javier Solana, stated the 
Atlantic Alliance would be ready to mediate between Turkey and Greece in order to 
search for a solution to their problems. He proposed Confidence Building Measures 
which included an emergency telephone line between Greece and Turkey connected 
to NATO headquarters in Brussels, with a view to prevent the escalation of crises. 
Solana proposed two more measures. First, he proposed the use of Airborne Warning 
Control Systems during NATO maneuvers in the Aegean to monitor flights and 
prevent violations of national air space. Second, he suggested the revival of the 1988 
Greek-Turkish protocol, under which both sides had pledged to abstain from 
provocative actions. The NATO initiatives reflected the practical needs of the 
organization. The different bodies of NATO offered another field for diplomatic 
skirmishes between Greeks and Turks. '7 In particular, discussions about the 
operational limits of NATO in the Aegean became extremely intricate at certain 
points. The complexity of the Aegean Sea, with more than three thousand Greek 
islands and islets and the open Greek-Turkish dispute over the demarcation of the 
continental shelf and the territorial waters, made the planning of NATO military 
exercises in this area extremely difficult. Additionally, the need for unity and 
coherence in the organization was threatened by a conflict between its allies. 
In the NATO Summit of Madrid, 8 July 1997, the US Secretary of State, Madeleine 
Albright, hosted a meeting of the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers. The statement 
of Madrid, which was an important step towards rapprochement, was an American 
initiative. For the USA, Greek-Turkish relations were a political nuisance, as it had 
bearing upon both American foreign policy and domestic affairs. The location of the 
two countries, between the Balkans and the Persian Gulf, also made the conflict 
paramount to American interests. Furthermore, the role of the Greek lobby in the USA 
17 "Within NATO Greece and Turkey vetoed each other's 'country chapters' at the NATO Defence 
Review Committee and each country raised objections to NATO infrastructural spending towards the 
other. Greece once again boycotted the annual 
NATO 'Display Determination' manoeuvres in October 
[1988]. More recently there has been disagreement over responsibility for search-and-rescue operations 
in the eastern Mediterranean, with Turkey claiming responsibility 
for the area east of the median line, 
and Greece maintaining that 
her search-and-rescue responsibilities extended to the whole of the Athens 
FIR. " Clogg, Richard, "Greek-Turkish Relations in the Post-1974 Period", in Constas, Dimitri, (ed. ), 
The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s - Domestic and External Influences, London: Macmillan 
Press, 1991, p. 21. 
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had another input by actively advocating Greek causes be it the Cyprus question or 
the Aegean dispute, and playing a crucial role in elections. On the other hand, the 
USA has been the main arms provider to both countries. '8 Further increasing the 
complexity are the American military bases in both countries, which have been used 
by the USA more frequently over the last years since the Gulf War and the increased 
tensions in the Balkans. 
Turkish-European relations were further complicated during the last months of 1998 
and the beginning of 1999 when the Kurdish leader, Abdullah Ocalan sought refuge in 
Europe. Turkey accused Europe of condemning terrorism in its documents but 
supporting it in practice. 19 The situation was further complicated when Ocalan went 
secretly to Greece and members of the Greek government (in fact no lesser figure than 
the then foreign minister Theodoros Pangalos) send him to the Greek Embassy in 
Kenya. In February 1999, after an operation of Turkish, American and Israeli secret 
services, Ocalan was arrested there. This situation brought Greek-Turkish relations to 
a very low point and resulted in a stormy political crisis within Greece. The Ocalan 
crisis gave rise to nationalistic rhetoric in both countries. Turkish officials, politicians 
and journalists interpreted this event as the ultimate evidence of the truth of Turkey's 
previous accusations against Greece, namely that it offers support to separatist 
Kurdish guerrillas, undermining Turkey's integrity and stability. Greece argued that 
Ocalan's presence in the Greek Embassy in Kenya was the result of contingencies 
rather than designs against Turkey. The Greek response did not find a sympathetic 
hearing and these events led to an internal crisis in Greece, resulting in major changes 
within the government. Three important ministers - the ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Public Order, and Internal Affairs - were dismissed. The change in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, with the new Minister George Papandreou as a moderate and 
supporter of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement, proved to be important for the 
developments in Greek-Turkish relations. 20 
1$ For the importance of Greece and Turkey for the American interests see Haass, Richard, Conflicts 
Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes, New Have and London: Yale University Press, 
1990, p. 58. Ekavi Athanassopoulou writes that it is also possible that arms dealers would have a 
particular interest, and thus lobbying in favour of a relative stability in the region because in such a 
case their contracts would not be in danger and the two rivalries would continue their race of arms. 
Athanassopoulou, Ekavi, "Blessing in Disguise? The Imia Crisis and Turkish Greek relations", 
Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3, Winter 1997, p. 85. 
19 See the statements made by President Demirel on a Turkish channel, Ta Nea, 01.12.98. 
20 Alexis Heraclides, after interviews he had with Greek foreign ministry officials, maintains that 
George Papandreou, after his appointment as foreign minister "had prepared the ground for the thaw in 
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The Ocalan crisis in February was followed by the crisis in Kosovo, which escalated 
with NATO's military intervention in March 1999. A stream of refugees fleeing 
Kosovo towards the neighbouring countries was one of the consequences of the crisis 
affecting both Greece and Turkey. This occasion offered an opportunity for close co- 
operation between the newly appointed Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou, 
and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismael Cem. Initially, they coordinated their 
activities regarding refugee camps and the dispatching of aid to refugees, as 
neighbours to the crisis and members of NATO. 
On the 24th of May 1999, the Turkish Foreign Minister sent a letter to his counterpart, 
George Papandreou, proposing the conclusion of "an agreement to combat terrorism" 
in the framework of a broader plan of Greek-Turkish reconciliation which would 
include all the peaceful means referred to in the UN Charter. 21 Nevertheless, the way 
the proposal was formulated covered a trap for Greece, as it implied Greece's 
intentional involvement in the Ocalan issue. 2 Turkey would appear to the world as 
the initiator of reconciliation, scoring an easy point against Greece in the diplomatic 
arena. The more so, because terrorism was an international concern - even before the 
11th of September. 
Papandreou's reply to the Turkish Prime Minister's letter came about one month later. 
It counter-proposed the signing of an agreement, not only on terrorism, but on a 
number of issues which could be of common interest including: culture, tourism, the 
environment, economic co-operation, organised crime, drug trafficking and illegal 
immigration. Five days later, the two ministers met in New York on the occasion of a 
UN meeting concerning Kosovo. At this meeting, they decided to initiate a dialogue 
on the above issues. The earthquakes in Turkey and Greece in August and September 
1999 were followed by a dramatic change in Greek-Turkish relations at the level of 
civil society and in the news media, and "moved to a highway what had started in a 
narrow street". 3 
the Greek foreign ministry (predictably not without difficulty)". Heraclides, Alexis, "Greek-Turkish 
relations from Discord to Detente: A preliminary Evaluation", footnote 11, p. 31. 
21 See the letter from the Turkish foreign minister Ismail Cem on the web site of the Greek-Turkish 
Forum, www. greekturkishforum. org. 
22 Heraclides, Alexis, "Greek-Turkish relations from Discord to Detente: A preliminary Evaluation", 
21. r;  
This is how the Turkish Ambassador to Athens, Ali Tuygan, described the impact of the earthquakes 
upon the discussions. Interview with Ambassador, Ali Tuygan, Athens, 18.07.01. 
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The peace initiatives examined above were not motivated by the improvement of 
Greek-Turkish relations or the value of peace as such. The `actions' through which 
these initiatives are identified are simplified descriptions of the system of politics and 
its complex environment. In the section below on the development of these initiatives 
I will argue that these initiatives did not constitute a solid foundation for further 
decision-making and action. Rather, they provided a field for experimentation in a 
self-organizing society and their development was determined by the complexity of 
their environment. Whether they were successful in connecting and developing to 
chains of communications crystallizing to some sort of structural formation will be 
examined in the next section. At this point however, it should be emphasized that their 
emergence cannot be reduced to individuals. `Actions' were constituted socially, that 
is through the structural couplings of social and psychic systems, multiple connections 
of institutionalized practices of conflict resolution practices, institutionalized interests 
of organizations and persons as politicians. In other words `actions' were socially 
constituted rather than being constitutive of the social. 
2.2. Civil Society Initiatives - Some Examples 
Civil society initiatives, as used here, refer to problem solving conflict resolution 
workshops (PSWs), but also conferences and meetings between journalists, 
academics, business people and other professionals. Conventional analysis begins 
with the general assumption that these initiatives are based on a rationale for peace. 
Although this might not be totally wrong, I will argue that it is necessary to 
investigate the details of the timing, the specific rationale and the conditions that set in 
motion each initiative, as I did with the intergovernmental initiatives. 
2.2.1. Helsinki Citizens Assembly 
The Helsinki Citizens Assembly (HCA) is an institution born in 1990 in Prague, from 
the euphoria generated by the developments in Eastern Europe at that time. It is an 
international NGO with national branches in Europe. Its aim is to promote European 
integration and to serve the causes of democracy and human rights by reinforcing civil 
society initiatives. 
24 It was the Greek HCA that undertook the first initiative in the 
aftermath of the crisis, to create a space for communication between Greek and 
24 www. paremvassi. gr. 
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Turkish societies. The president of the Greek organization contacted her counterpart 
in Turkey and together they organized a meeting following the crisis, in March 1996. 
The meeting was attended by about 50 Greeks and Turks in Nauplio, a Greek city two 
hours from the Greek capital of Athens. 
The President of the Greek Helsinki Citizens Assembly, Paulina Lampsa, explained 
the rationale of this initiative as follows: 25 
... Until that time, 
Greeks and Turks were cooperating in the framework of the 
international organization, Helsinki Citizens Assembly, at the level of civil society, 
basically in multiparty activities. We had neither thought about nor aimed to 
promote some kind of bilateral activity. This may be because the nature of the 
problems were technical and gave the impression they required a specialized 
knowledge or that some problems were frozen between the two countries .... When the crisis of 1996 happened, some of us thought the frozen problems were not only 
the concern of the governments and the military, but these were problems that can 
concern our personal, everyday lives, and our interests, the interests of ordinary 
citizens. We could not stay indifferent, especially because of the way the crisis 
happened in Imia. It was not a crisis where a military aircraft enters and violates 
the national airspace and there is a quarrel, which is somehow clearly military. It 
was a crisis caused partly by journalists and the mayor of Kalymnos, people who 
belong to the civil society. And we realized that this concerns us and we could not 
leave it without any reaction. From that point, we could start a more systematic 
contact of people who shared the same thoughts.... The idea behind it was that 
precisely because we were confronted with a dangerous crisis, it was time for 
voices to be heard to transform the prevailing climate. We believed that a strong, 
public reaction was required or things were at risk of getting much worse. Bridges 
would be cut and that would be very dangerous at the official level. 
The initiative undertaken by the Greek HCA is a simplified description of the system 
of the organization and its environment. The above narrative described the semantics 
that guided the system in its operations of self and other observation and in its 
autopoiesis. Her evaluation of the situation as "dangerous" and concern about the role 
civil society had played and should play in the developments between the two 
countries, led to the emergence of this peace initiative. Furthermore, the existing 
structures of the organization and its pre-established co-operation with the Turkish 
branch of the HCA further constrained complexity towards the direction of co- 
operation. The Greek HCA contacted the respective Turkish organization because as 
Lampsa says "we co-operated with them in the past and we trusted them... They 
made the choice of the Turkish participants... "26 At this point it is important to stress 




that these meaning constituting processes were set in motion after the irritation of a 
contingent development, the crisis of 1996. 
The organizers of this meeting did not have any official help or the approval of the 
government. On the contrary, pressure was exerted on them to abandon their plans 
concerning this meeting. Officials were afraid of the consequences such a meeting 
could have, especially in the after crisis climate marked by high, nationalistic 
passions. Nevertheless, several politicians participated as individual citizens. Former 
and current members of the Greek parliament, who had in the past expressed their 
belief in the co-operation of the two peoples, were present at this meeting. For 
example, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mihalis Papakonstantinou, joined the 
two-day meeting. 27 George Papandreou, founding member of the HCA, Minister of 
Education at the time, and later appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, gave a dinner 
for the Turkish participants on the last evening of their stay in Athens. 
Although there were no other meetings organized by the Greek and Turkish national 
branches of HCA, the meeting represented an important contribution to processes of 
rapprochement. Some of the participants continued organizing similar meetings and 
activities. 
2.2.2. Journalists for Peace in the Aegean and Thrace 
The movement "Journalists for Peace in the Aegean and Thrace" was initiated in 
February 1996 and since its foundation has a long record of meetings and contacts 
between the two sides on the Aegean Sea. These contacts are not confined to 
journalists, as the name of the organization might indicate. The movement has 
developed a network of people and organizations, working for the promotion of co- 
operation and friendship in the region of the Aegean Sea and Thrace. 
The idea for this initiative was conceived by two Greek journalists, one from the 
Greek island Lesvos, Stratis Balaskas, and the other, Giannis Tzoumas, from Chios, 
which is another island in the same region. They took the initiative to contact Turkish 
colleagues and open a channel of communication. It is interesting to explore further 
the emergence and motives of this initiative. 
After. living through the crisis of 1996, Balaskas and Tzoumas felt that they were 
concerned with the developments in Greek-Turkish relations both as journalists and 
124 
islanders. They were concerned as journalists, because it was the first time they 
realized journalists were not only reporting but also creating events. They were also 
concerned as islanders thus they were more sensitive to what happens in their region. 
Suffice it to refer to Balaskas's words: "the night of the crisis we were called on by the 
army and dressed in a military uniform. Although the next morning we were 
dismissed, this was enough. If I am to die, I want to know why. For what should I 
die? "28 This initiative also reflects the perception of the initiators of their local 
environment. Having traveled on the Turkish coasts opposite their islands, Balaskas 
explains, "they knew the geography and the history of the region and met people from 
both sides. They have realized that Turks and Greeks hold a similar, mirror image of 
the enemy, which does not reflect reality". 29 
Here, the initiative of the journalists as a simplification of itself and its environment 
reflects multiple connections of different semantics like the journalist's professional 
code of conduct, the sudden awareness of the possibility of a journalist forced into the 
role of soldier and the background of a culture of peaceful conflict resolution and co- 
operation that allowed him to analyze the situation in terms of mirror images and 
stereotypes. 
It was around the end of February, that they decided to send a fax to the "Yeni Asir", 
a newspaper published in Izmir, the biggest city on the Turkish coast opposite their 
islands 30 Their stimulus was an article in the Greek newspapers about a statement 
made by Turkish journalists, condemning the attitudes of some of their colleagues 
during the Imia/Kardak crisis. "When we read that, we evaluated it as an conduit to 
the other side, that - if nothing else - it could be fertile ground for the discussion of 
issues of common interest". 31 
The "Yeni Asir" newspaper was chosen because it was the biggest newspaper in this 
region. The founders of this NGO did not want Athens or Ankara to interfere. They 
preferred to have "eye-to-eye contact with the other side". 32 They did not know the 
receiver of their fax. As Balaskas said "we sent it to nowhere". 
27 Interview with Mihalis Papaconstantinou, former minister of foreign affairs of Greece, Athens, 
09.07.02. 
28 Interview with Stratis Balaskas, journalist in Eleftherotypia, Athens, 20.09.01. 
29 "We believed and we still believe that citizens can be informed beyond the prevailing in the 
journalists' world stereotypes, ̀here a bad Turk there a bad Greek'. I think that Greek-Turkish relations 





The person who received our fax was the best possible person to receive that letter, 
Suleyman Yonsel. Yonsel is a descendant of Turk-Cretans. His origins and his 
family's memories motivated him to learn more about Greek-Turkish relations. He 
lived in Athens for some time and learned Greek. Furthermore, he had conducted 
research on the co-existence of Greeks and Turks during the 19th century. "33 
Yonsel's reply to the fax, coming from Greek collegues, was positive and sent the 
very same day. Other journalists in Greece, like loannis Tzanetakos, joined the 
movement. Tzanetakos became the Director of the Greek State Radio Station in 1998. 
He lauched another initiative there, for co-operation among journalists in the Balkans, 
where Greek-Turkish co-operation was an important part of the effort. 34 
2.2.3. Businessmen 
Businessmen have been in the forefront of efforts to improve Greek-Turkish relations. 
The reason for this is that there is a great opportunity for economic co-operation 
between the two countries and for making economic profit. Nevertheless, this is 
conditional on a stable political climate. 35 
The crisis of 1996, in particular, endangered the plans businessmen had made for the 
immediate future. The Custom Union Agreement signed between Turkey and the EU 
in 1995, which should have been activated after 1.1.1996, raised high expectations for 
joint ventures and economic co-operation, increasing profits for businessmen on both 
sides. The crisis of January 1996, however, created a climate unfavourable to any 
entrepreneurial activity. 
36 Their reaction to this situation was a series of meetings to 
discuss ways to overcome the seemingly endless political obstacles to the 
development of trade and economic relations. 7 Their first meeting took place in 
Athens in December 1996. Their goal was the development of a climate of mutual 
trust, as well as discussions about enhancing co-operation. In the fourth Greek- 
Turkish Business Forum in 1998, the Vice-President, Sarik Tara, emphasized that 
Turkish businessmen "were pressing both political and military leaders in their 
33 Discussion with Suleyman Yonsel, Komotini, 27.03.02. 
34 Interview with loannis Tzanetakos, Athens, 7.03.02. 
35 According to Haralambos Tsardanidis, an expert on this subject, economic relations follow political 
relations. Haralambos Tsardanidis, "The Greek-Turkish economic relations, 1999-2000", in Review of 
Defence and Foreign Policy 2000 - The Greek-Turkish relations 1999-2000, Couloumbis, T., Dokos, 
T., (eds), ELIAMEP, Athens 2000. 
36 Interview with Costas Zeppos, retired Ambassador, Athens, 14.09.01. 
37 For the first Greek-Turkish Business Conference that was held in Athens from 10-11 December 1996 
see the Daily Bulletin of the Athens News Agency, 10.12.96 and the Turkish newspaper Radikal, 
11.12.96. 
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country to improve Greek-Turkish relations. Furthermore, he called upon his Greek 
counterparts to do the same". 38 
The sudden awareness of the possibility of a Greek-Turkish war, its potential impact 
upon their plans and the detrimental consequences the crisis had on their prospective 
profits, led business people to initiate these exchanges. Apart from their capacity for 
lobbying and their efforts to enhance co-operation in the economic field, they also 
financed many academic conferences, scholarship programmes, journalists' meetings 
and research programmes. The structural couplings among different systems like the 
system of the economy, the system of education and the system of media enabled new 
possibilities of communication and speeded up structural change. 
2.2.4. International Peace Research Institutes 
Several recognized international academic and research institutes have also been 
involved in the reconciliation efforts between Greece and Turkey from 1996 until 
1999. Among them we find the well-known names of the Carnegie Endowment, the 
RUSI and PRIO in a joint project, Harvard University, the Fletcher Legal Diplomats 
School, the Conflict Research Group at Yale, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and 
the Search for Common Ground Foundation. Some of them organized conferences 
and workshops with Greeks and Turks on a regular basis. Many of these activities 
were organized by academics of a Greek and/or Turkish origin, who were staff 
members of the universities or institutes involved. Furthermore, these projects were 
implemented in co-operation with Greek and Turkish academic institutes and think- 
tanks. Other times professionals from established institutes of conflict resolution were 
invited to attend and facilitate meetings organized and by Greek and Turkish civil 
society organizations. 39 
These initiatives emerged through the structural couplings of institutionalized 
practices of conflict resolution, the interests and the routines of the organizations, a 
specific approach to the phenomenon of international conflict, and the interests of 
those who fund these programmes. The process of the undertaking of these initiatives 
is specific. After an idea has been fully developed as a programme proposal, funds are 
sought to enable its realization. The main sources of financing are large international 
38 See the Daily Bulletin of the Athens News Agency, 24.10.97. 
39 The yearly summer conference of the Greek think tank ELIAMEP in Chalki, was facilitated by a 
professional from George Mason University. Interview with Kemal Kirisci, Istanbul, 03.10.01. 
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organizations, government organizations or NGOs, states and individuals such as the 
Greek and Turkish business people as discussed above. This presupposes that the 
programme conforms to the needs of the sponsor too. 
0I will present here the details 
of a joint programme, organized by RUSI and PRIO, which gave birth to the Greek- 
Turkish FORUM, a civil society initiative that has a special place in the Greek- 
Turkish process of reconciliation. 
The Greek-Turkish Forum 41 
The Greek-Turkish Forum was born out of an initiative by the director of the Robert's 
Center James Bruce Lockhart. 42 Lockhart initially proposed the project to the English 
institution RUSI. Later, the Norwegian Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO), was 
also invited to participate in the project. 
43 RUSI initially hosted a meeting of some 30 
opinion leaders from the two countries. Among the participants of the first meetings 
were journalists, academics, ex-politicians, ex-diplomats and ex-military officers. 
Most of them were familiar with this type of exercise, as they had previously 
participated in workshops of that kind. Furthermore, most of them had been involved 
in the conflict because of their past professional positions. The first meeting was held 
in 1997, at Wilton Park. 
Today, four years later and after several transformations, the active part of this large 
group of people is the Political Analysis Group (PAG), with 15 members and a 
productive role in the reconciliation process. The Forum has discussed complex issues 
such as the demarcation of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea, coming up with 
elaborate proposals for its resolution as 
Here I should clarify the aims of the founders of the Forum. According to Dan Smith, 
"the goal of the first meeting was simply to find ways of building bridges between 
Greece and Turkey. The feeling or analysis of that moment, was that the situation 
was so bad, any contact was better than the existing situation" 45 
4o Interview with Professor of International Relations, Theodore Couloumbis, Director of the Greek 
Institute of European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens, 03.09.2001. Interview with Dan Smith, 
PRIO's Director for 8 years and currently Senior Advisor of PRIO, Istanbul, 14.10.01. 
°1 From this point forward, we will call it just Forum. For information regarding the Greek-Turkish 
Forum you can visit its website www. greekturkishforum. org. 
42 Interview with Dan Smith, Istanbul, 14.10.01. 
43 ibid.. 
44 See the paper they produced on their web page, www. greekturkishforum. org. 
45 Interview with Dan Smith, Istanbul, 14.10.01. 
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The stimulus for James Lockhart, a retired, British Foreign Commonwealth Office 
(FCO) diplomat, who became director of the Robert's Center after his retirement, was 
the crisis of 1996. He conceived the initial idea, which he proposed to RUSI, and also 
found the sponsor for its realisation, the British FCO. For Britain, the prevention of an 
open conflict in the Aegean, between two NATO allies, was important. The crisis of 
1996 was perceived as an alarm signal. After the end of the Cold War, there was no 
longer a common enemy to bind Greece and Turkey together under NATO's umbrella. 
In this new international environment, a Greek-Turkish war appeared to be possible. 
46 
After the first meeting, PRIO was invited to join the project to offer its experience in 
facilitation of problem solving workshops. Norway then undertook the burden of 
financing this project. The rationale for Norway was twofold. On one hand, it was 
simply an altruistic move. On the other, it matched the profile Norway was 
developing over the recent years as an important actor promoting peaceful conflict 
resolution in the world. After the negative referendum on Norway becoming a full 
member of the EU, Norway sought alternative methods of influence and leverage in 
the international arena. 47 
The above analysis illustrates the complexity of themes, institutionalised practices and 
contingencies that gave birth to the Greek Turkish Forum. 
2.2.5. Other Initiatives 
Women for Peace48 
In the aftermath of the crisis of 1996, Margaret Papandreou, ex-wife of Andreas 
Papandreou - former Prime Minister of Greece - sent a letter to a Turkish friend of 
hers, who was an academic. The letter protested against the traditional "male" 
46 This is how members of the forum, as well as Dan Smith, perceive the involvement of the British 
FCO in this initiative. 
47 Norway became known for promoting peace and conflict resolution facilitation after the back 
channel communication it provided with two old enemies, the Israelis and Palestinians, in 1993. 
However, at that time, Norway's role was neither perceived nor planned as such. The Oslo process was 
more the result of the personal initiatives of individuals than a governmental decision. It was later on 
that Norway decided to capitalize on this. Three factors played an important role in this decision: the 
first was the publicity the Oslo process gained as a successful peace initiative and thus the prestige 
Norway gained. The second factor was the negative result of the referendum for Norway's membership 
in the EU. It was in 1995 when Norway, which has a particular national interest in energy matters, 
found itself out of the Ministerial Council of the EU on energy. That was a traumatic experience, which 
pushed Norway to seek for a new place in the international community. This led to investment and 
further institutionalisation of the peaceful conflict resolution section. Last, but not least important, 
peaceful conflict resolution fits the Norwegian 
idiosyncrasy, which is characterised by a low and 
dialectic profile. Interview with Dan Smith, Istanbul, 14.10.01. 
48 www. geocities. com/win-peace/. 
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management of Greek-Turkish relations. It was a call for active participation in a 
search for alternative methods of action in order to enhance chances for peace by 
improving understanding and co-operation. This movement brought together many 
educated women from both countries under the umbrella of the NGO "Women for 
Peace" (WINPEACE). The members of the organization come from different 
professional fields. WINPEACE has organized conflict resolution workshops in 
Athens, Ankara and Istanbul. Within the context of this activity, academics try to 
nurture a culture of dialogue and reconciliation with their students by organizing 
exchanges and summer camps with Greek and Turkish students. Journalists advocate 
these causes through their articles. 49 
Greek and Turkish academic and research institutes 
Until 1996, Greek and Turkish academics mainly met at international conferences, 
which were taking place outside of Greece or Turkey. 50 After 1996, the initiatives 
undertaken by Greek and Turkish institutes and universities were multiplied. Two 
Greek institutes, ELIAMEP and IDIS, organize a one-week summer conference on 
two islands, Halki and Ydra respectively, which offered the opportunity for an 
exchange of views among academics. 51 Panteion University in Athens and Sabanci 
University in Istanbul have also organized various events. 
Individuals 
Artists, intellectuals, academics and journalists, as individuals, contributed to the 
change in the conflict environment. Mikis Theodorakis, the Greek composer whose 
music inspired the Greek people's resistance against the dictatorship of Papadopoulos, 
was always in the forefront of efforts for the Greek-Turkish rapprochement. Along 
with his Turkish friend, composer and writer, Zulfu Livaneli, he propagated 
friendship and solidarity between the two peoples. He organized or participated in 
49 See the article written by Zeynep Oral in Milliyet, 03.05.98. 
50 Interview with Professor Ersin Kalaacioglu, Istanbul, 09.10.01. 
51 The "Southeast European Joint History Project" brought together the Greek Association for 
Democracy in the Balkans, the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe and 
ELIAMEP. That was realised after the generous financing of the British government but also a 
contribution from the Austrian Government and the Governments of Switerland and Norway. See 
preface in the book, Christina Coulouri ed., Clio in the Balkans - The Politics of History Education, 
Thessaloniki, Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe, 2002, p. 11. 
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many initiatives aimed at strengthening the bonds of friendship and increasing 
knowledge and understanding of the other. 52 
Pavlos Moschakis, a Greek painter from Istanbul, used his art to promote peace and 
co-operation. His paintings demonstrated the quiet, harmonic, multicultural life of his 
city's past. 53 
Alkis Kourkoulas, the Greek correspondent for the Athens News Agency, wrote a 
book on the crisis of 1996, focusing on the Turkish factor. His incentive was 
frustration about the way the crisis was instigated and developed and in particular, the 
detrimental role played by news media. 54 
Alexis Heraclides, Associate Professor of International Relations at the Panteion 
University in Athens, started working on Greek-Turkish relations because of the 
Imia/Kardak crisis: "The crisis of 1996 impelled me to work on Greek-Turkish 
relations and this book is the result of it". 55 The book is titled "Greece and the Danger 
from the East". 56 This is a comprehensive analysis of the hostile perceptions Greek 
elites and intellectuals hold vis-ä-vis Turkey based on nationalism, religious 
nationalism and deterrence theories. The author demonstrates how this thinking has 
not only influenced the way Turkey is perceived in Greece but it has also seriously 
impaired empirical research. 
To these initiatives, I should add the activities of a group of Greeks who have a 
personal relationship with Turkey. They were born in Istanbul, but had to leave 
Turkey in the 1960s. 57 They speak the Turkish language and understand the Turkish 
culture. Most of them, leftists and well educated, have developed contacts with 
Turkish intellectuals and have followed closely the social and political developments 
52 In May 1997, Theodorakis and Livaneli gave a concert in Berlin for Greek-Turkish friendship. 4.000 
Greeks, Turks and Germans attended this concert. Eleftherotypia, A. Galanopoulos, 06.05.97. 53 See article on Hürriyet about Pavlos Moschakis, . 12.06.98. 54 Interview with Alkis Kourkoulas, Istanbul, 05.10.01. 55 Discussion with Alexis Heraclides, Associate Professor of International Relations, Athens, 15.06.01. 56 Alexis Heraclides, Greece and the "Threat From The East", [in Greek] Polis, 2001. 57 Tens of thousands of Greeks, who could no longer bear the heavy taxes, legislation and 
discriminatory practices against the Greek minority of Istanbul, left Turkey in 60s and 70s. Most of 
them had large fortunes, which were confiscated or blocked by the Turkish state. Back in Greece they 
had to start their lives from the beginning. Many of them joined the anti-Turkish and sometimes 
extreme nationalist rhetoric within Greece. They started publishing newspapers and periodicals in order 
to inform the Greek society about their painful experience and they supported tough anti-Turkish 
policies. Nevertheless, the group of people to whom I refer here, distanced themselves from the bipolar 
restrictive framework of the Greek-Turkish conflict. For the Greek minority in Turkey see Alexis 
Alexandris, The Greek Minority in Turkey 1918-1956 and Greco-Turkish Relations, Athens, 1983. 
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in Turkey. 58 Given the advantage of fluency in both languages, they translate Turkish 
books, participate in the organization of events and facilitate communication in many 
ways, thus contributing to the remediation processes. 
Also, the internet has become a place for virtual civil society diplomacy. Personal 
websites appeared on the internet to provide a place for active dialogue on Greek- 
Turkish issues. 59 
3. Peace Processes as a Field of Experimentation 
In the previous section I explained the governmental and non-governmental initiatives 
as simplified descriptions of the systems themselves and their environments. This 
section explores their development. The literature on peace processes has given much 
attention to the results of peace initiatives, that is a declaration, statement, an 
agreement and not to the processes that led to the every time result. Indeed, less effort 
has been made for example to explain the many failures of these initiatives to generate 
positive change in societies in conflict. The outcome of peace initiatives is assumed to 
ensue from a linear costibenefit calculation. Uni-linearity is further reflected in the 
conventional conceptualization of the relationship between governmental and non- 
governmental peace processes as hierarchical. The way the various peace initiatives 
are connected - if at all - and their relationship with their environment, that is the 
society within which they develop, is a problem that conventional theory has 
difficulties to address through a comprehensive theoretical framework. 
The argument put forward here is that the above presented peace initiatives offered a 
field of experimentation to the Greek and Turkish societies, which are functionally 
and not hierarchically differentiated societies. Whether these initiatives were 
successful or not to find connections and develop further to a process was conditioned 
by their own complexity and the complexity of their environment, which consists of 
pre-established social and cultural patterns, institutionalized practices and psychic 
systems. It will be demonstrated that there was not a super-system that organised this 
complexity according to some supreme rationality, such as a rationality of peace or a 
convergence of rationales of the various systems that can justify the assumption of 
S$ Interview with Frango Karaoglan, correspondent of the Greek newspaper, TA NEA in Istanbul since 
April 2001, and translator of many books of Turkish literature and politics in Greek, Istanbul, 
s9 See Greece-Turkey Peace Links, compiled by Nejdet Bas, a Turkey-Greece Brotherhood and Peace 
Page, created by Mustafa Cavusoglu, a Personal Web-site dedicated to Greek-Turkish Peace and Co- 
operation constructed by Dimosthenis Yagcioglu, http: //mason. gmu. edu/-dyagciog/ 
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uni-linearity. Rather the various social and psychic systems link-up through structural 
couplings. Furthermore, the theory of social autopoiesis provides us with the 
analytical tools to explore the role of time in the development of peace processes. It is 
argued that coincidental structural couplings of different time frames is a further 
constrain of double contingency in social interaction. 
Thus, while conventional theory sees negotiation, mediation and PSWs as a narrowly 
defined process of interaction among individuals, here these interactions are 
conceptualized as episodes in the course of society's autopoiesis. As modern society 
is in constant movement, continuously shaping and reshaping its elements, processes 
and structures through communication processes, peace processes are the means of 
society to expand its boundaries and change them. The development of peace 
initiatives is portrayed below as a continuous testing of the `boundaries' of society. It 
is argued that the results of interactions like negotiations, mediation and meetings 
among Greek and Turkish professionals, such as declarations, programme for further 
action etc., are emergent orders, which reduce infinite complexity through selectivity. 
3.1. Governmental Initiatives 
In the previous section, I presented examples of initiatives launched by governmental 
authorities, namely the Greek and Turkish governments, the EU, the USA and states 
like Germany and the United Kingdom. In this part I will further investigate the actual 
development of these peace processes. 
The peace initiative launched by the Turkish Prime Minister received an official 
negative reply. The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theodoros Pangalos, replied 
that "apart from positive points, there were many inaccuracies and remarks made for 
the sole purpose of making an impression on international public opinion". 60 
Furthermore, Greek officials accused Turkey of insincerity. The invitation for talks 
coincided with the meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council and many analysts 
in Greece perceived it as "targeted at getting Greece to lift its veto over EU credits of 
the Customs Union Accord with the EU'. 61 Nevertheless, the unofficial Greek reply 
was different. The Prime Minister, Costas Simitis, sent a message through Turkish 
businessman, Sarik Tara, to the Turkish Prime Minister, Mesut Yilmaz, saying that he 
60 See Athens News Agency, Daily Bulletin, 26 March 1996. Furthermore, about three months later, the 
Greek government came back to this proposal to add that it would assess it, if Turkey takes the Imia 
issue to the international Court of the Hague. See Athens News Agency, 18 June 1996. 
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could not undertake any action prior to his next party congress, which was to take 
place in June. 62 This can also explain the statement made by Turkish Foreign 
Minister, Emre Gönensay, that "Turkey should have the patience to wait for a 
reasonable period". 63 
The Greek answer to Yilmaz's initiative, and thus the development of the initiative, 
was based on the Greek government's perception of its environment in the aftermath 
of the crisis. M When the Turkish Prime Minister made this proposal, Simitis was still 
under pressure from the opposition, not only the opposition to his government but also 
the opposition within his own party. He was being accused of yielding to Turkey 
during the Imia/Kardak crisis. Additionally, Yilmaz's proposal was made only three 
months before the elections for the leadership of PASOK at the party congress. If 
Simitis had shown signs of reconciliation with Turkey under these circumstances, he 
would have committed political suicide. 65 The selection of the unofficial envoy to 
communicate with Yilmaz, illustrates acknowledgement by the Greek Prime Minister 
of the existent ̀ boundaries' within Greek society, what could be possible. 
When Simitis was ready, after his election as the president of his party, Tansu Ciller 
had already succeeded Mesut Yilmaz in the Turkish Premiership and there was no 
follow up to the initiative. Ciller, who was the leader of the main opposition party, 
when Yilmaz announced his proposal to Greece, now she rejected it for political 
reasons 66 
61 Angelos Syrigos, "The Status of the Aegean", p. 367. 
62 Interview with Ambassador Yalim Eralp, Istanbul, 04.05.02. 
63 Interview of Emre GSnensay by Mehmet Ali Birand, for the TV programme "32°d Day", 27.03.96. 
64 Angelos Syrigos examines the same initiative, as well as Greek-Turkish relations in general from 
1950-1990s from the international law perspective. His study is a laborious one and includes many 
details regarding Greek-Turkish relations. Nevertheless, it cannot explain the non-legal aspects of the 
conflict. In his attempt to apply the legal framework to every official interaction the author ends up 
justifying legally the Greek actions - even sometimes using pettifogging arguments. For example, for 
the proposal made by Yilmaz, he argues that some of the statements like "Turkey's respect for the 
territorial integrity and inviolability of borders of all its neighbours" should be disregarded because of 
the Cyprus issue and its attitude in the Kurdish problem. Angelos Syrigos, "The Status of the Aegean 
Sea", p. 367. 
6s This is the evaluation of analysts and journalists. Interviews with the Greek journalist Nikos 
Georgiadis, Athens, Alkis Kourkoulas, Istanbul. See also Ekavi Athanassopoulou, " Blessing in 
Disguise? The Imia Crisis and Turkish-Greek Relations" Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3, Winter 
1997. 
66 According to people who were close to Tansu tiller, she wanted to present a similar proposal to 
Greece when she would become Prime Minister. Nevertheless, when Yilmaz undertook this initiative 
she took the opportunity to attack him for not protecting Turkey's interests. Interview with [4] 
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This initiative, however, was also a test of the internal Turkish front. Yilmaz was 
attacked by the hard-liners from within his own party, 67 as well as by the opposition. 
One of the leading figures of the hard-liners, Mumtaz Soysal, portrayed Yilmaz's 
proposal as representing defeat. 68 Nevertheless, despite these reactions this initiative 
revealed at the same time a broader consensus within Turkish society, which had 
emerged after the crisis of 1996.69 
The initiatives undertaken by the Greek and Turkish authorities, after Simitis's 
statements in Washington and the first meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
failed after the emergence of the Gavdos crisis. On the 30th of May, the Turkish 
representative to NATO, in planning the military exercise "Dynamic Mix", suggested 
that Turkey considered the island of Gavdos to be a disputed area and for that reason 
it should not be included in NATO's operational planning. Gavdos is not in the 
Aegean, it is located hundreds of miles away from Turkey, south of Crete, and hence 
it could not explain the Turkish interest. Its size is 30 sq. km and the last census 
showed that 115 Greeks live there. The Greek sovereignty over Gavdos is 
indisputable. According to Article 4 of the London Peace Treaty of 1913, Turkey 
renounced all sovereign rights over Crete and Gavdos. 
The dispute of the Greek sovereignty over the island was an initiative of a Turkish 
military officer in NATO, which had not been preceded by previous communication 
or preparation within the Turkish Foreign Ministry. In fact, it caught Turkish officials 
by surprise. 70 Turkish officials found themselves in a difficult position and tried to 
play down this incident. The Foreign Minister made a statement maintaining that "the 
Turkish representative at the NATO meeting had not made a political statement but a 
technical announcement". 71 Nevertheless, the issue immediately gained publicity. 
This piece of information, once disseminated in Greece, was immediately structurally 
coupled with the themes of Turkish expansionism and the plans of the Turkish 
military. It provided these themes and thus the system of conflict from which they 
67 See statements made by Kamran Ivan on the Turkish Daily News, 26.03.96. 
68 Hürriyet, 24.03.96. 
69 Interview with Ambassador Yalim Eralp, Istanbul, 04.05.02. 
70 The incident about the island of Gavdos was not planned by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
This is also confirmed by people within the ministry. Interview with [4] See also article on Milliyet, 
17.06.96, regarding this issue, written by the retired Ambassador of Turkey to Washington, Sukru 
Elegdag. "Every time there is a political gap in Turkey, governments do not inspire respect and 
confidence to the military and there emerges a diarchy... " 
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emanate, with further complexity for their autopoiesis. Once the issue passed through 
the media, the Greek government had to demonstrate a determined attitude to protect 
Greek national interests. The Greek government expressed a strong reaction and 
pulled out of the talks. Furthermore, it used this episode to expose Turkey in the 
international community as aggressive, and not respectful of International Law and 
the agreements it has signed. 72 As a matter of fact, the Greek authorities' attitudes 
were framed by existing social structures and practices. 
The Gavdos incident was not immediately related to the initiative for rapprochement 
that was underway at that time - at least not for the initiator and participants in that 
interaction. Nevertheless, this incident illustrates the element of unpredictability in the 
evolution of social systems and their dependence on their perceived environment. 
As for the proposals made by the USA and NATO, the Greek government accepted 
NATO Secretary General Solana's proposal to prolong the two-month moratorium on 
military exercises in the Aegean through the summer, with a four-month period of 
monitoring military flights over the Aegean as a confidence building measure. It 
proceeded with the establishment of a hot-line between the Ministries of Defence and 
Foreign Affairs and Solana's office in Brussels. 
The initiative of the European Presidency on the establishment of the Greek-Turkish 
Committee of "Wise Men" was never concluded. The development of this initiative is 
described by Professor Couloumbis, a member of the Committee as follows: "it was 
December 1997, just prior to our first meeting, which was meant to be a discussion on 
procedural matters. The Luxemburg Summit was convened at that time. The decisions 
of the 15 about Turkey were a real blow". 73 
On the 16th of December 1997, the EU made it clear that Turkey was not on the list of 
the countries with which the EU would initiate membership talks. Meanwhile it 
confirmed that negotiations on the accession of Cyprus to the European Union were to 
start in 1998. The Turkish response was an increase in the number of flights over the 6 
71 See the Turkish Daily News, 6.06.96, as well as the written statement of the Turkish Foreign 
Minister, Emre Gönensay, that the Gavdos issue was a "military technical" matter and not a political 
one. Turkish Daily News, 12.06.96. 
72 Ambassador Elegdag in his article in Milliyet continues: "Our position on the issue of Gavdos was 
wrong and costed a lot to Turkey. Not only did we give an advantage into the hands of our adversaries 
but we created a situation which could harm our interests in the Aegean dispute and it could mar the 
image of Turkey ... The only viable move 
left to us would have been to recall our representative at the 
headquarters of NATO in Napoli, saying that "he transgressed his orders" and to definitively close this 
matter". Millyet, 17.06.96. 
73 Interview with Professor Theodore Couloumbis, Athens, 03.09.01. 
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to 10 mile zone, part of the Greek Flight Information Region, which is contested by 
Turkey. Turkish officials also threatened to proceed with the integration of occupied 
Cyprus to Turkey if pre-accession negotiations with Cyprus started. 74 
"The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reacting to that decision, intervened in the 
process of the Committee. It asked for the activation of the committee of "Wise Men" 
between the two governments and their Embassies, not through the `evil' EU. The 
Greek government did not reject this proposal but said this was an initiative 
undertaken by the EU. Finally it was never activated". 75 In this case as well, the 
parameter of time emerged as an important structural constraint of the process. 
The statement from Madrid, issued by the President of Turkey, Suleyman Demirel, 
and Prime Minister Costas Simitis on the 8t' of July 1997, included a mutual 
commitment to peace, security and good neighbourly relations, respect for each 
other's sovereignty and for the principles of international law and international 
agreements. In a joint declaration, the two sides promised to improve their bilateral 
relations. Greece accepted a freeze on its right to expand its territorial waters during 
discussions. Furthermore, the two parties agreed to refrain from unilateral acts on the 
basis of mutual respect and willingness to avoid conflicts arising from 
misunderstandings. Additionally, they were committed to settle their disputes by 
peaceful means. 76 This was an initiative undertaken by the American administration 
and the statement included a special reference to the name of the US Secretary of 
State, Madeleine Albright, underlining her role in the process. In Athens this 
statement caused a heated debate. Thirty-two parliament members of the 
government's party, PASOK, and a few members of the cabinet, signed a declaration 
against the results from Madrid. Nevertheless, any analysis of the Madrid statement 
should also take into consideration its timing. Simitis proceeded with the signing of 
the Madrid statement after his election as leader of PASOK and the consequent 
strengthening of his position. 
The Kosovo crisis was an occasion for close co-operation between the two Foreign 
Ministers. This initiative emerged due to the proximity of the two countries to the 
crisis and constraints imposed by existing institutional structures like NATO. 
74 See the Greek and the Turkish press of the 15`' of December 1997. 
75 Interview with Professor of International Relations Theodore Couloumbis, Athens, 03.09.01. 
76 For the full text of the statement see http: //www. usia. gov. 
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Furthermore, "rumors that the crisis could expand to a Greek-Turkish war further 
motivated the two foreign ministers towards the direction of co-operation". 77 
Therefore, at the end of this section, the conclusion is that the development of these 
processes and their results - declarations, decisions and programmes of co-operation - 
or their failure to generate a result were not directly related to a particular rationale 
such as the objective of peace and co-operation. Rather, each and every outcome of 
these interactions was a contingent emerging order constituted of selections carried 
out by various social systems according to their own rationale. As such, their function 
was the reduction of complexity. The above analysis illustrated also another aspect of 
social systems operation in modem functionally differentiated society: time is a 
functional equivalent to social and cultural patterns. When different time frames are 
structurally coupled with each other, this has the effect of increasing contingency and 
constraining complexity. For the political system, time was structured by election, for 
the press, by the next edition and for a peace initiative by dates that had been set. 
Time frames constrained the domain of communicative possibilities for further 
connections of emerging peace processes. The change in the Turkish premiership 
doomed to failure Yilmaz's peace initiative, the Gavdos crisis undermined the process 
that had been initiated by the two governments and the decision of the Luxembourg 
Summit was an impediment for the initiative undertaken by the European Presidency. 
3.2. Civil Society Initiatives 
This section seeks to explore the development of peace initiatives undertaken by civil 
society organizations. It focuses on workshops, conferences and other meetings 
among Greek and Turkish professionals. These meetings are considered to be 
interaction systems. As such, they constitute episodes in society's course of 
autopoiesis and their result is a reduction of the complexity of themselves and their 
environment through selectivity. It will be argued that environmental conditions that 
function as structural constraints upon the emergent order of the interaction are trust, 
themes, persons, social and cultural patterns, psychic systems, and time. 78 
Mainstream theory discusses problem-solving workshops separately from other 
initiatives, like conferences for example, due to the special rules of organization and 
77 Interview with Ambassador Ilter Turkmen, Istanbul, 13.11.01. 
7$ Within the framework of systems theory the environment is not less important than the system. For 
the discussion of the system/environment relationship see Chapter II, p. 47. 
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conduct applied to the workshop. In this study, however, I do not distinguish them 
from the other interactions. From the social systems perspective these rules of conduct 
are considered as social structures, part of the complex environment of the interaction 
that guide social and psychic systems' selections and constrain infinite complexity. 
The results of empirical research demonstrate that most of these meetings, whether 
they were called PSWs or whether they were conferences among academics or 
meetings of organizations like the "Journalists for Peace in the Aegean and Thrace" or 
"WINPEACE", included elements of conflict resolution workshop theory. By that I 
mean that either the organizers invited a facilitator from a conflict resolution 
institution to facilitate the meeting or the meeting was organized by one of the big 
conflict resolution institutions or the participants had experience of this kind of 
workshops and applied these rules. 79 Additionally, the name of the workshop or the 
organizer should not be considered as an indicator of the rules that would be applied. 
In other words, even meetings organized by reputable institutions of conflict 
resolution did not follow the rules of contact that every basic conflict theory handbook 
includes. Among the complaints raised by Greek and Turkish participants to several 
PSWs was that these rules were disregarded. Some of the workshops organised with 
Greek and Turkish participants were not successful either in terms of facilitation or of 
organization. In some cases, participants felt they were rushed to sign a document that 
would ultimately justify the role of the organisers. 80 Lack of preparation, which is 
often connected to the careless choice of participants, has been evaluated as another 
factor contributing to the failure of PSWs. 81 At other times, meetings were successful 
even though they were not facilitated. The key feature of these meetings was the 
relationship that had been developed among the participants. 82 
Examples from -these initiatives will provide an insight into the multiple causality 
involved in the constitution of peace processes. Kemal Kirisci's observations from a 
conference organized by ELIAMEP and facilitated by a professional from George 
Mason University point to the internal environment of the interaction. Kirisci tries to 
explain why this meeting did not produce a paper reflecting some progress, as it had 
79 Some of the WINPEACE meetings but also yearly conferences of the ELIAMEP, were facilitated by 
p°rofessionals from George Mason University. 
Interviews with Paulina Lampsa, Athens, 19.02.01, Costas Zeppos, Athens, 14.09.01. 
81 Interviews with Assistant Professor of International Conflict Analysis in Sabanci University, Nimet 
Beriker, 14.03.02, Ambassador Costas Zeppos, 14.09.01, Paulina Lampsa, Athens, 19.02.01. 
82 An exemplary case is the Journalists for Peace in the Aegean and Thrace, where the friendly and 
collegial atmosphere helped the progress of their work. 
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been aspired. His description emphasizes in particular, that persons and themes also 
function as social structures that constrain the selectivity of the emerging order. 
"From discussions I had with participants, I understood that some of them were 
intimidated or deterred from expressing their ideas in front of people they knew to be 
hard-liners.... It was unfortunate that persons, who could have balanced the 
discussion, personalities known as moderates or soft-line, did not come to the 
workshop because they had other commitments... For example, it was unfortunate 
that Professor Couloumbis was not there. Couloumbis's presence, because of his 
position, his status and his line of thinking, could have been crucial in salvaging the 
workshop from drifting into an aura of pessimism". 83 
Trust is one of the first conditions participants in these meetings refer to when they 
discuss their experience of these meetings. 84 Pavlos Tsimas, a Greek journalist and 
participant in many workshops, says: "There was a strong distrust. Were there 
journalists of a different national identity or people from the other position? Are they 
agents? That was the problem to overcome. Last October there was not a sign of the 
old distrust; on the contrary there was a warm-hearted spirit. The test of time is 
required. It is long contact that forms a relationship of trust". 85 This description 
illustrates the boundary testing and the experimental character of the interaction. The 
difference agents/journalists, friends/enemies was being continuously tested. 
The constant process of testing the boundaries of the systems is illustrated in 
participants' narratives about these processes. Tsimas again says: "We had thought to 
do a common journalistic research about the origins of the Cyprus problem. We 
started with the finding that there is a lot of ignorance about the events and history of 
the 60s, especially about the Cyprus problem. But we concluded that it is still very 
early to procceed with the project". 86 loannis Tzanetakos talks about another 
workshop with journalists where again the issue of Cyprus came up. "It was suggested 
we discuss the Cyprus issue and we avoided it because it was an issue fraught with 
pitfalls and traps. We thought the group conditions had not matured enough for this 
discussion. There was another proposal to hold this meeting in Cyprus. There were 
many implications. Where would each of us enter Cyprus and from where would we 
83 Interview with Kemal Kirisci, Istanbul, 03.10.01. 
84 See Interviews with Pavlos Tsimas, Athens, 19.03.01, with the President of the Greek HCA, Paulina 
Lampsa, Athens, 01.09.01. 
L Interview with Pavlos Tsimas, Athens, 19.03.01. 
86 ibid.. 
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leave? Were passports necessary, etc". 87 The existing institutionalised practices and 
the drawn boundaries of conflict become an impediment for the new systemic 
formations. Alexis Papahelas maintains the programme he produced on Turkey for the 
Greek TV channel Mega in July 2002, would not have been possible 3 years ago; the 
managers of the channel for which he works would not have accepted it. 88 Alkis 
Kourkoulas also . argues that "the change of a comma" in his book about the 
Imia/Kardak crisis could have put him in trouble. 89 
The development of these initiatives is dependent upon contingent factors like fund 
raising, or constraints emerging from their broader environment such as the state of 
Greek-Turkish relations in general. 90 The HCA did not continue its activities after the 
meeting in Nauplio, due to financial constraints. The Turkish HCA, despite the efforts 
of its members, could not find the resources to organize a meeting in Turkey. 91 
Meetings of other organizations were postponed or even canceled because of 
environmental conditions. A characteristic example was the annual meeting of the 
NGO "Journalists for Peace in the Aegean and Thrace" which was planned to take 
place in Komotini, at the end of January 1999.92 This meeting was initially postponed 
until April, after the organizers received warnings from hard-liners who believe this 
kind of activity harms the national interests of the country. 93 A car bomb destroyed 
the car of one of the organizers, when another bomb was placed opposite of the 
General Consulate of Turkey in Komotini. The climate of tension the Ocalan crisis 
created in mid-February 1999, was a reason for a further postponement of the 
meetings, this time without a specific date being set. However, this group did continue 
its work, in contrast to other groups, which interrupted their activities after the arrest 
of Ocalan. 
Ocalan's arrest and the crisis it created within Greece, as well as in Greek-Turkish 
relations, had a considerable impact upon these efforts. Many of the cited groups did 
not manage to survive the rampant consequences of this incident. One of the most 
87 Interview with loannis Tzanetakos, the then Director of the Greek State Radio Station, Athens, 
07.03.02. 
88 Interview with Alexis Papahelas, Athens, 19.06.02. 
89 Interview with Alkis Kourkoulas, Istanbul, 05.10.01. 
90 The Turkish columnist Sami Kohen particiant in many workshops with journalists stresses the 
emphasis on the general state of Greek-Turkish relations as a determining factor of the development of 
these initiatives. Interview with Sami Kohen, Istanbul, 23.08.01. 
91 Interview with the President of the Turkish HCA, Professor Murat Belge, Istanbul, 27.09.01. 
92 The date of the meeting is also symbolic as it reminds the crisis of January 1996. 
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active groups of this kind, which was created and propelled by businessmen from both 
sides of the Aegean Sea, stopped operating. It was the President of the Turkish side of 
the Greek Turkish Chamber of Commerce, Rahmi Koc, who denounced continued co- 
operation, declaring that it would stop every co-operation "with Greek businessmen in 
protest of the aid Greece offered to the Kurdish leader". 94 This reaction was framed by 
the environment created after Ocalan's arrest within Turkey, marked by fierce 
polemics in the Turkish media against Greece, enraging Turkish public opinion. 
Rahmi Koc could not ignore his environment, particularly as he had exposed himself 
in pursuing the development of Greek-Turkish co-operation. The activities of the 
Greek-Turkish Business Council had seen the full blaze of publicity from 1996 until 
February 1999.95 This decision reflected the interests of Turkish businessmen, which 
at that moment, conflicted with the rationale of Greek-Turkish rapprochement. As 
such it was an emergent order constituted as the unity of the system/environment 
difference. Although it was not directly related to the businessmen' peace initiative it 
affected it. 
The Greek-Turkish "WINPEACE" was another civil society initiative affected by this 
crisis. After the Ocalan crisis, when Greek and Turkish participants met in Istanbul, 
they realized that they could not communicate and therefore, they did not complete 
their two-day meeting 96 
The Greek-Turkish Forum has managed to get over the obstacles cast in its way from 
the time of its inception in 1997 until the earthquakes in 1999. The Ocalan crisis has 
been a turning point for the group. It reinforced its bonds of trust and solidarity. At the 
first meeting after the crisis, they decided they should meet more often. The Greek 
members of the Forum and the facilitator, Dan Smith, agreed on the important role 
Turkish members played in this meeting, pointing in particular to Ambassador Ilter 
Türkmen's stance. Ambassador Turkmen was the coordinator of the Turkish section of 
the Forum and his stance was determined by two main factors. One was his previous 
professional experience from Greek-Turkish crises from within the Turkish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and his experience as representative of Turkey to the United 
Nations. These experiences had formed his firm belief that at the most critical times, 
93 Interview with Jenny Katsarea, publisher of the local newspaper of Komotini Paratiritis, Komotini 
01.11.01. 
94 Nautemporiki 25.02.99. 
9s Interviews with Alkis Kourkoulas, Istanbul, 05.10.01 and Ilter Turkmen, Istanbul, 13.11.01. 
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communication should be sustained. Another factor was that the Forum, and thus its 
Turkish members, had not been exposed to publicity in Turkey. That helped them to 
continue their work quietly, without the risks of being accused of co-operation with 
the "enemy". 7 
The earthquake that occurred in August 1999 has been another turning point in the 
development of these initiatives. As we shall see, initiatives that had slowed down or 
even died out were re-activated and reinforced after the earthquakes. 
The above exploration of these interactions from the perspective of social autopoiesis 
provides us with an original insight to the multiple causality involved in their 
development and the contingent and dynamic nature of these initiatives. 
4. Morphogenesis v Conflict Resolution 
In the previous two sections, I sought to explore the emergence and development of 
governmental and non-governmental peace processes. It was demonstrated that they 
emerge as autopoietic systems in a self-organising world society, as combined 
selectivity, which reduces the complexity. The focus of analysis was on the 
conditioning in the environment of peace processes pointing to various structural 
constraints of complexity such as institutionalised practices, patterns of behaviour, 
persons, themes, and time frames. In this section, I probe into the changes these 
initiatives brought about in their environment and thus in the environment of conflict. 
Conventional theory and in particular theories of conflict resolution argue that PSWs 
can resolve a conflict. On the other hand, conflict transformation theories 
acknowledge the complexity involved in these interactions and maintain that PSWs 
can enable the emergence of a new language and a "shared reality". Galtung's more 
recent TRANSCEND approach makes the argument that a conflict can be transformed 
through the increase of complexity. Finally, participants in this kind of interaction 
point to the expansion of their knowledge about the `other', the complexities of the 
societies, the participants as persons, but also about themselves 
98 They often use the 
96 Interview with a member of the movement, chief editor of foreign news in Hürriyet, during the crisis 
of 1996, now columnist in Hurriyet, Ferai Ting, Istanbul, 19.02.01. 
97 Interview with Ambassador Ilter Turkmen, Istanbul, 13.11.01. 
98 ibid. 
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expression "these meetings opened a window to the other side" and two different 
worlds could communicate. 99 
In this section it will be demonstrated that the new input, the structural gain ensured 
through these processes of interactions, is not accumulated with time in a linear way. 
The perspective of social autopoiesis emphasises multiple causality complexity and 
contingency and further breaks down the assumption of uni-linearity. Furthermore, 
the analysis below will illuminate the processes involved in the transformation of 
conflict and advance our theorizing about conflict transformation. 
Three main points will be made. First, social change is self-change that comes about 
through morphogenetic evolutionary processes. Morphogenetic processes are not uni- 
linear and accumulative processes, which imply some kind of effective rational 
calculation. Learning processes are examples of morphogenesis. Second, peace 
processes are reflexive processes. Reflexivity increases the complexity of the 
environment of conflict because it enables the emergence of new social structures like 
a new language, themes, roles, programmes, persons and institutions. Third, the 
increase of the complexity speeds up the self-observation and self-description of 
social and psychic systems and their structural couplings. This enables a reorganizing 
of complexity in a self-referential way. Nevertheless, it is argued that structural 
changes are not planned or announced, they can even remain latent to social systems 
themselves until a new decisive point is reached and they are uncovered. 
4.1. Conflict Transformation as Self-change 
Conflict transformation theory makes a strong argument that only the parties in the 
conflict can transform the conflict. Luhmann's theory corroborates this view and 
illuminates the processes involved in this change. Here I will examine in particular 
learning as a morphogenetic process of structural change. Conventional theory 
conceptualizes learning as a generator of change, equating communication with 
understanding. Luhmann's understanding of learning, as a self-referential process of 
structural change, approaches learning processes as neutral which can both reinforce 
the structures of conflict and transform them too. This is better understood once we 
treat expectations as knowledge. Social systems observe information reinforcing their 
99 These are the words Alkis Kourkoulas, a well-known Greek correspondent in Turkey, used to describe the impact of this process. Interview with Alkis Kourkoulas, correspondent of Athens News Agency, and the national newspaper To Vima, Istanbul, 05.10.01. 
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meaning world, what they already know. When expectations are disappointed, social 
structures may change. But again, it is the system that selects information that will 
change its state. Often social and psychic systems ignore information that may 
contradict their previously acquired knowledge. In what follows, I will highlight the 
neutrality of learning processes by presenting specific examples from systems of 
Greek-Turkish interactions (problem solving workshops and conferences) where the 
structures of the conflict were reinforced instead of changed and other meetings where 
a structural change took place. 
The meeting of Greek and Turkish journalists in Paris, under the auspices of 
UNESCO, is a characteristic example of a meeting, that was not productive. '00 
Although a facilitator was present, the meeting was not facilitated and at a certain 
point, "it turned into a battlefield"101 where participants walked out of the conference 
room. An openly expressed lack of trust for the other side and the Kurdish issue were 
the trigger points of a chain of exchanges which led the workshop to failure. 
Participants argued they did not learn anything new from this workshop, nor did it 
help their understanding of the other side and the situation of the conflict. 
Furthermore, they admit that they left the workshop with a feeling of despondency for 
the situation. Soli Ozel, one of the participants in this meeting, said characteristically 
"when I came back, I thought that's it, we are going to have a war with Greece. The 
situation is really bad. " 102 The paradoxical and contingent nature of this interaction is 
further exposed if we take into account that many of the participants of this meeting 
had participated in other, successful initiatives launched by journalists. At another 
meeting among journalists and academics held in Athens a speech by a hard-liner was 
sufficient to spark a fight and led to an exchange of personal accusations. 103 
Nevertheless, in cases like these, participants underwent a learning process. '°4 
Learning involved drawing conclusions, which reinforced existing schemas of 
100 13 journalists from each country were invited to participate in this workshop organised by 
UNESCO, in May 1998. See relevant web page http*//www. unesco-org/opi/eng/unescopress/98- 
101e. htm. 
101 Interview with Nur Batur, correspondent in Athens of the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet, and 
participant in the meeting in Paris, Athens, 10.09.01. 
102 Interview with Soli Ozel, member of the teaching staff of the University of Bilgi, advisor of the 
President of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TUSSIAD), Muharrem Kaya, and 
columnist in national newspapers, Istanbul 18.10.01. 
103 Interview with the journalist of Cumhuriyet Leyla Tavsanoglu, Istanbul, 16.10.01. 
104 Interviews with the diplomatic correspondent of Eleftherotypia, Kyra Adam, Athens, 07.03.02, Soli 
Ozel, Istanbul, 18.01.01, Leyla Tavsanoglu, Istanbul, 16.10.01. 
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interpretation about the conflict and the `other'. 105 The meaning attributed to the 
experience of this workshop was that there was no change. 
Communication is never an event with only two points of selection - such as giving 
and receiving. Rather, it involves a synthesis of three selections namely information, 
utterance and understanding, which includes misunderstanding. Another example 
from one of the meetings between Greek and Turkish academics, illustrates the highly 
complex and selective nature of these interactions. Kemal Kirisci participant in this 
workshop describes the following incident: "One of the participants from the Turkish 
delegation, during a presentation regarding the admission of Cyprus to the EU, said 
that if the admission is not accompanied by a solution to the Cyprus problem, it would 
be unsatisfactory for both sides. He said this would be less than satisfactory for the 
Turkish side and will cause problems. This was interpreted [by the Greek side] as a 
threat. I think the point the person tried to make was that if Cyprus is admitted to the 
EU without a satisfactory solution it will play into the hands of Turkish hard-liners 
and this has to be taken into consideration. That part of the message got left out and 
the meaning was misinterpreted as a threat by the Greek participants of the 
workshop". 106 
Understanding is the specific form of observation suited to the social dimension of 
meaning. It requires observation with the help of the system/environment difference. 
In other words, it requires that we look at the system as a system operating in its own 
environment. Greek and Turkish participants observed - that is selected - the same 
piece of information but attributed a different meaning to it according to their own 
pre-established distinctions. Turks were concerned with the developments in Turkey 
after a possible admission of Cyprus in the EU without a sustainable solution for the 
divided island. Greeks were sensitive to anything would appear as a threat from 
Turkey. The above example illustrated that social and psychic systems are oriented to 
their environment and thus they remain opaque and incalculable to each other. 
In the next two sections I will further explore the structural change involved in these 
interactions. 
1° Interview with Kyra Adam, Athens, 07.03.02. 
106 Interview with Kemal Kirisci, Istanbul, 03.10.01. 
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4.2. The Emergence of New Structures of Co-operation: Themes, Roles, Persons, 
Institutions, Programmes of Action/Goals 
Communication is a reflexive process that is a process applied to itself. Reflexivity is 
a tool in the differentiation of society and thus in the increase and reduction of 
complexity. It enables the emergence of new structures like a new language, themes, 
persons, institutions, programmes of action and programmes of goals. Reflexive 
processes are autocatalytic processes, re-entries into the complexity of the unity of 
what is complex. 
The interactions that emerged after the crisis of 1996 were based on a particular kind 
of reflexivity. This section presents examples of the reflexive and thus creative nature 
of the communication process in these interactions. These interactions did not attempt 
to solve the causes of the Greek-Turkish conflict. Participants in meetings organised 
by civil society organizations discussed the way Greeks and Turks communicate and 
they were learning how to learn, or deciding about how to decide. Their organizers 
aimed to do something in order to change the environment. 107 The Greek journalist, 
Pavlos Tsimas, maintained: 
Of course the disagreements in the meetings of recent years still exist when we 
pass from journalistic issues to diplomatic issues. Who is right and who is wrong. 
But we are committed to discuss the process and not the essence of the conflict. 
We do not discuss in order to solve the problems but in order to discuss about the 
problems. 108 
The function of reflexive communication consists in that it allows the formation of 
new semantics for the processing of information. Processes of reflexive 
communication enabled the emergence of a new language. Members of the Greek- 
Turkish Forum point to language as an aspect of structural formation. Ambassador 
Zeppos put it very succinctly when he said that through the process within the Forum 
"I am searching for a new language. A philological not a legal language. All this is 
about the difficulty of eliminating stereotypes, the language patterns". 109 
Furthermore, the members of the Forum argue that the technique of facilitation 
employed by the facilitator, Dan Smith, played an important role in the emergence of 
1°' Interviews with Paulina Lampsa about the HCA, Athens, 01.09.01, Soli Ozel about businessmen' 
initiatives, Istanbul, 18.10.01, Dan Smith about the Greek Turkish Forum, Istanbul, 14.10.01. 
108 Interview with Pavlos Tsimas, Athens, 19.03.01 Ambassador Zeppos, in one of the Greek-Turkish 
meetings of the NGO Black Sea Platform, in Istanbul, December 1998, proposed this toast "to the 
dialogue that is to communication about communication". 
109 Ambassador, Costas Zeppos, Athens, 14.09.01. 
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the new language and the formation of an environment conducive to co-operation. 110 
Dan Smith describes this technique as follows: "What I did was to attack certain bad 
habits of the participants. Every time one would step up and read or give a semi- 
prepared statement, I would immediately stop him and give the floor to another 
participant". "' The facilitation did not allow the interaction to be bounded by 
language patterns, legal and historical constitutive and thus reproductive of the 
conflict. Journalists too argue that "the words `Greece' and ̀ Turkey' themselves have 
acquired a new content" and even they have been redefined through these 
experiences, contacts and research. ' 12 
The new language reflected and further enabled structural couplings among different 
social systems. The language of Greek-Turkish relations before 1996 was basically 
confined to the patterns of the legal argumentation and references to the history of the 
conflict. Now, it included elements of sciences like psychology, sociology and mass 
communication, but also the system of economy, media and the military as most of 
the meetings between Greeks and Turks included journalists, politicians, scholars, 
retired diplomats, military officers and civil society representatives. 113 
Reflexivity gave rise also to new themes of communication such as the roles of 
stereotypes in communication between the two countries, the way history was written, 
the Greek and Turkish news medias' contribution to the exacerbation of the conflict 
by means of the construction and reproduction of enemy images, and the way the 
educational systems of the two countries are oriented to construct the image of the 
other as enemy. Civil society organizations reflected upon their role in peaceful 
conflict resolution and they sought new ways to enhance the knowledge and the 
understanding about the other. The development of economic co-operation, as well as 
co-operation in the field of science and arts and how this can affect the relations 
between the two peoples also became an important theme. Another category of 
themes concerned the European orientation of Turkey including issues concerning the 
development of Turkey and the structural changes necessary for the convergence of 
"o Interviews with Paulina Lampsa, 01.09.01, Costas Zeppos, 14.09.01, Theodore Couloumbis, 
03.09.01, Ilter Turkmen, 13.11.01. 
111 Interview with Dan Smith, 14.10.01. 
112 Interview with Nur Batur, Athens 10.09.0 1. 
113 See for example the first meeting organised by the Greek and the Turkish HCA in Nauplio in May 
1996, the meetings organised by the Journalists for Peace in the Aegean and Thrace, in June 1996 and 
January 1997, the meeting under the auspices of UNESCO in May 1998, the meeting organised by the 
Black Sea Platform in December 1998 and the meetings organised by the NGO Greek and Turkish 
Women Journalists for Peace. 
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Turkey and European expectations e. g. changes in its constitution and the 
improvement of its human rights record. Furthermore, a new question often raised in 
this context was how Greeks could assist Turks in their pursuit of EU membership. 
The third category of new themes was related to the domestic politics of the two 
countries and the way they influence relations between the two states. ' is 
Themes correspond to the factual dimension of meaning which enables connectivity 
and thus structural change. The emergence of new themes expands the `boundaries' of 
the systems, what systems perceive as possible to communicate about. In social 
systems' new environmental condition, systems can carry out the transformation of 
input into output by action; they can summarise their own selections in this way. This 
occurs in the form of programmes of action and goals. 
Many of these interactions produced some sort of declaration or programme of action 
and goals. Business people and media organizations made plans of action and set 
goals to be achieved. For example, they signed agreements for technical support and 
exchange of information. The media designed training projects in order to improve 
co-operation among young Greek and Turkish journalists. ' 15 
Nevertheless, as Tzanetakos argues, in the case of media co-operation, discussions 
about training programmes for young journalists, exchange of articles, and other 
similar activities were not realized because of practical and technical difficulties, such 
as the lack of secretarial assistance. What happened, however, was that many 
journalists from both countries, in the framework of these initiatives, started traveling 
and developing contacts with collegues from the other country. These initiatives then 
enabled the emergence of a network of personal relationships. Tzanetakos describes 
this development as follows: "When I write about Greek-Turkish issues, I think about 
what we have said to establish a climate of mutual trust. If I come out very 
aggressively, I always think what Turks are going to think about me if they read it". 116 
The identification of persons with specific expectations is another social structure that 
guides selections. Security is acquired and complexity is reduced through 
acquaintance. In the section above I referred to persons as social structures that may 
both constrain and enable the emergence of a new order. I presented an example with 
114 The programme followed in the meetings of the Greek-Turkish Forum reflects the 
institutionalisation of a process that enhances reflexivity. The first day the members of the Forum meet 
they discuss the domestic developments, the complexities and particularities of the two countries. This 
discussion introduces complexity into what is complex. 
115 Interview with journalist Ioannis Tzanetakos, Athens, 07.03.02. 
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Professor Couloumbis. The Turkish journalist, Mehmet All Birand, could be another 
example. Another case of expectations related to a specific person is the Greek 
Foreign Minister, George Papandreou. As Minister of Education, he participated in 
the organization of the first meeting of the Helsinki Citizens Assembly (March 1996). 
As Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, he consistently expressed moderate views 
regarding Greek-Turkish relations and a culture of peaceful resolution of the Greek- 
Turkish disputes. Finally, after his appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs, in 
February 1999, he closely cooperated with his counterpart, Ismael Cem. 117 
The Greek-Turkish Forum is an example of an institutionalization of an initiative. The 
Forum, after successive transformations, has been recognized in both countries and by 
their governmental authorities, as an institution that facilitates the search for a 
peaceful resolution of the conflict. 
Another aspect of the institutionalization of the processes within society is that 
participants in these activities gradually started getting important institutional 
positions within the state apparatus. For example, Paulina Lampsa, the director of the 
Greek HCA, became advisor to the Minister of Macedonia and Thrace and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs after 1997. Stratis Balaskas, journalist of Eleftherotypia, 
and founder of the Journalists "Movement for Peace in the Aegean and Thrace", 
became spokesman and advisor to the Minister of the Aegean after 1998. Nikitas 
Lionarakis, director of the Greek radio station and participant in the movement, 
undertook the office for NGOs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after 1999. 
To sum up this section the understanding of peace processes through Luhmann's 
theory as reflexive processes provides us with the analytical tools to theorize and 
explore the process of complexification as emergence of new social structures like a 
new language, themes, institutions, roles, persons and programmes. These emerge 
through a process of constant boundary testing as it was described in the previous 
section. The emergence of new themes expands the boundaries and the thematic 
repertoire of the existing systems hence opening a new horizon of possibilities 
through ̀ impossible' structural couplings among different systems. The process of the 
emergence of these new systemic formations is not an accumulative or an automatic 
linear process. The emergence of new systemic formations depends on their 
116 ibid.. 
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complexity, the complexity of their environment and their sensitivity to information. 
Therefore it is neither necessary nor impossible; it is contingent. In what follows, I 
will present examples that highlight this aspect of self-change in particular. 
4.3. Latent Social Structures 
The argument of this section is twofold: First, elaborating on the non-linearity of 
peace processes it is argued that the autopoiesis of peace processes and thus, the 
emergence of new systemic formations, do not even require the operations of self- 
observation and self-description of social systems. Second, and in connection to the 
first point, although changes may occur they may remain latent to the systems 
themselves until a decisive point is reached and they are uncovered. 
The operations of self-observation and the change of self-description of social systems 
are achievements, which may or may not emerge later after structural changes have 
occurred. In other words, social systems do not describe themselves accurately or 
even objectively. The Greek journalist, Pavlos Tsimas, says, "... at the end of these 
meetings, we had the feeling that nothing tangible had been produced through this 
process". " The Turkish columnist, Cengiz Candar, when he was first asked about the 
utility of these meetings said, "they do not offer anything". ' 19 This evaluation of these 
interactions was explained by the fact that they "have not solved the conflict". 
Nevertheless, the same person, Cengiz Candar, offers another dimension of this 
process, which concerns the emergence of a new self-description that remains latent to 
itself. Candar described a very lively process of demystification that came out of his 
participation in these processes. 
What I've learned through these meetings is this: For many years we ran after these 
people (politicians and diplomats) when there were negotiations or something 
similar, in Athens, Ankara... 'Mr. x, undersecretary, deputy minister, tell us Mr. 
minister, one word. ' We have been waiting for them to give us one word and make 
a whole story out of that. We have been waiting in the rain, snow, and under the 
hot sun. Now, I understand what they have been talking about in these meetings. 
One was taking a position and the other a counter position. They were captives of 
their own inflexible, 'rational' policies and dogmas and very keen not to be on the 
half way for domestic purposes. What I understand now is that we attached great 
17 As member of the Helsinki Citizens Assembly and at that time, Minister of Education, Papandreou 
offered a dinner to the Turkish participants of the first meeting organized by the HCA, after the crisis 
of 1996. 
"'Interview with Pavlos Tsimas, Athens, 19.03.01. 
119 Interview with Cengiz candar, Istanbul, 10.11.01. 
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importance to them ... They are very mediocre... Now we could actually see them 
conducting their relationship. 120 
These meetings provided another environment and new roles for the participants. 
Journalists could discuss issues with politicians and diplomats in an environment 
other than a press conference room where each one has a specific role to perform, one 
as speaker and the other reporting on the speech. Now politicians had to explain and 
justify their policies to their new audiences and they had to publicly discuss them with 
their colleagues. The modeling of complexity within complexity provided by these 
interactions, intensified the operations of the system, which are self-observation and 
self-reflection and enabled the emergence of new self-descriptions. 
Now journalists had a concrete idea about what they were writing, whereas before, 
they had a general image of this process and they relied on what politicians and 
diplomats were saying to them. A Turkish diplomatic correspondent in one of these 
meetings repeated precisely the same expression "before, politicians were saying a 
word to us and we were making a story out of it". 121 This very sentence illustrates the 
process of generalisation and respecification in the construction of reality through 
news media. Journalists reporting on Greek-Turkish, were employing their own pre- 
established knowledge to compensate for the lack of information. 
Peace processes that emerged in the aftermath of the crisis of 1996 increased 
complexity and speeded up structural couplings, which created zones of contacts 
among different social and psychic systems. This increase of the complexity enabled a 
reorganization of the complexity and resulted to a further functional differentiation of 
society and the emergence of new structures. 
Nevertheless, the realization of the emergence of new systemic formations by 
different systems is an evolutionary achievement that is not necessarily synchronous 
to the change. Journalist Tsimas says: "[A]posteriori we realize that there was a 
preparation of the ground through these meetings. First, when the Ocalan crisis 
happened and then when the earthquake occurred". 122 The Ocalan crisis was a 
decisive point in Greek-Turkish relations. Bringing Greek-Turkish relations again at a 
low ebb, it was an irritation, a motive for some Greek and Turkish journalists who had 
120 ibid.. 
121 This is what the Turkish correspondent told to Ambassador Korantis in the opening ceremony of 
one of the big events organised in Athens at the aftermath of the earthquakes with Greek and Turkish 
journalists. Interview with Ambassador loannis Korantis, Ankara, 8.06.01. 
122 Interviews with Pavlos Tsimas, Athens, 19.03.01. 
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participated in many workshops to co-operate and attempt to discuss publicly this 
crisis, both in Greece and in Turkey. This decision emerged through the routines of 
journalists connected with the new systemic formations of reflexive communication 
and the contingency of the Ocalan crisis. A debate on the Turkish channel AN with 
Greek journalists as guests and two other programmes in Greece, contributed 
significantly to the development of these processes. 
These dialogues among journalists from both countries were decisive moments that 
made them realize the changes that had occurred. These interactions provided good 
ground for the employment of the institutionalized structures of peace and co- 
operation, which had emerged through the interactions examined above such as the 
new language and the themes. More precisely, these new interactions provided a test 
for the robustness of these systemic formations. The test proved to be successful. 
Greek journalists who went to Turkey in order to participate in this programme felt 
that this initiative was a breakthrough. The reactions of Turkish colleagues, as well as 
the reactions of the people in the streets of Istanbul the next day, after their presence 
on Turkish TV, confirmed and reinforced that a change had been accomplished over 
the last years. 123 
Nevertheless, this sudden realization of the change that had been accomplished 
through peace processes from 1996-1999 concerned only the few journalists who had 
participated in these meetings. The earthquake was another occasion that amplified 
these new self-descriptions. It triggered similar processes of communication on a 
large scale and speeded up structural couplings enabling the emergence of a new 
attractor in Greek-Turkish relations, a system of co-operation. 
Conclusion 
The above analysis provides a different conceptualization of peace processes. It 
demonstrated that peace processes emerge as an increase of selectivity towards the 
direction of co-operation and peace through morphogenetic processes of 
communication. There was not some kind of objective historical law that guided 
systems' operations determining the conditions and the course of their development in 
an uni-linear way. There was no necessity that forced the emergence and development 
123 Interviews with journalists Nikos Georgiadis, Athens, 15.03.01, and Pavlos Tsimas, Athens, 
19.03.01 and Stelios Berberakis, Sabah's correspondent in Athens, Athens, 15.05.00. 
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of the various peace processes from 1996 until 1999. Rather, it was the increase of 
complexity and the need for its reduction that enforced their emergence. 
Contingent events like the crisis of 1996, the Kosovo crisis or the Ocalan crisis set in 
motion meaning determination processes which led to the disappointment of existing 
expectations and the emergence of new differences. Whether the new differences 
would find connections to develop through deviation-amplifying processes of 
communication depended on the interconnection of system's complexity, 
contingencies and sensitivity to information. Peace processes developed through 
contingent structural couplings of different social and psychic systems in world 
society through the a-causal synchronization, the linking up of institutionalized 
practices of peaceful conflict resolution, aims of the EU, RUSI, PRIO and other 
organizations. The dynamics of peace processes depended on the selectivity and 
connectivity of the emerging structures. 
That analysis illustrated that there are multiple paths to peace, which cannot be 
identified and mapped down. The assumption of a general rationale of peace as a 
point of departure for mainstream analysis of these processes is a counter-productive 
simplification because it immediately simplifies the complexity involved in the 
autopoiesis of these processes. 
The application of Luhmann's theory of social systems advances Galtung's 
conceptualization of peace process as a process of complexification. Galtung 
conceptualised peace processes as a process of complexification. He argued that the 
conflict worker should introduce more issues, more goals and more perspectives in 
order to disembed the conflict from its restrictive dual framework. This proposal is 
mainly based on empirical observation and cannot theorize about the processes 
involved. Luhmann's theory demonstrates that complexity is both the fundamental 
problem of functionally differentiated society and also where solutions lie. 
Reflexivity enabled the further differentiation of society through a process that 
increases and reduces complexity. It generated new structural formations, themes of 
communication, institutions and programmes of action and goals, and speeded up 
structural couplings that formed new self-descriptions. 
Mainstream theory adopts an instrumental approach to peace processes focusing on 
interactions among individuals, as the means to resolve the conflict and create "a 
shared reality". The above analysis of peace processes through Luhmann's theory of 
social autopoiesis challenged this perspective. The conceptualisation of various 
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interactions as a field of experimentation for Greek and Turkish societies, which can 
test and expand its boundaries, is more fruitful. The system/environment perspective, 
within which interactions as systems of communication are placed, emphasises the 
contingent nature of these meetings and the impossibility to control their outcome. 
The processes were independent and autonomous from one social system or a 
particular rationale like for example the rationale of peace. 
This analysis joins conflict transformation theory in its argument that the 
transformation of conflict cannot be imposed from outside but involves the societies 
in conflict. More precisely, it is a selection made by the whole of the society. 
Nevertheless, this is not a rational choice. Rather, it makes part of society's blind 
evolution, which is based on the selection and variation of communication. It 
illuminates the processes of transformation as non-accumulative, non-linear but self- 
referential processes. The exploration of latent changes in Greek and Turkish societies 
emphasized further the blindness and unpredictability of modem society's evolution. 
The involvement of international organizations, both governmental and non- 
governmental stresses the emphasis on the nature of world society as a multi-centered, 
functionally differentiated society, which does not recognize territorial boundaries. 
The new arrangements that emerged after the crisis of 1996 were transformed into a 
system of co-operation after another accidental event, the earthquakes of 1999. The 
earthquakes further increased the selectivity of these systemic formations towards the 
direction of co-operation. The morphogenetic evolutionary processes triggered by the 




THE EARTHQUAKE OF 1999: ANOTHER "BUTTERFLY EFFECT" IN 
GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS 
On 17 August 1999, Turkey's Marmara region was ravaged by one of the century's 
most devastating earthquakes. This accidental event had an unprecedented impact on 
Greek-Turkish relations. It seems that it have brought Greeks and Turks closer to co- 
operation than ever. Initially, Greeks were mobilized to gather aid for the victims of 
the earthquake. The months after the earthquake however, this expression of solidarity 
was transformed to co-operation in a number of fields such as politics, business, trade, 
arts, education and sports taking some institutionalized form too. 
There are not many analyses in the literature of Greek-Turkish relations that attempt 
to explain and evaluate the impact of the earthquake and the emergence of the 
phenomenon that followed it. Practitioners, like politicians, journalists and diplomats, 
are puzzled by the phenomenon that followed the earthquake. Some have employed 
traditional theoretical approaches to explain it. Isolating the rapprochement process on 
the level of inter-governmental relations, they seek to establish continuity in the aims 
each government held before and after the earthquake and they base their analysis on 
an assumed rational calculation made by the Greek and Turkish decision-makers. 
Thus, they do not consider the earthquake an important factor in the emergence of 
these positive developments in Greek-Turkish relations. ' 
Other approaches suggest that peace initiatives, both governmental and non- 
governmental, that developed between 1996 - in the aftermath of the crisis over the 
Imia/Kardak islets - and 1999, prepared the ground for and built up this phenomenon. 2 
Analytical tools from conflict resolution theory have also been employed to describe 
this phenomenon. This approach attempts to consider and evaluate developments on 
different levels of society, such as politics, media, and civil society organizations. 
Nevertheless, it fails to establish links among the different levels and cannot explain 
This is the approach adopted by some journalists and diplomats in Greece and Turkey. Interviews 
with the Turkish journalist Ferai Tinc, Istanbul, 19.02.01 and interview with the Greek diplomat 
Theodoros Theodorou, Komotini, 08.03.99. 
2 Alexis Heraclides provides the most comprehensive, academic analysis of this phenomenon. In his 
study he employs the conflict transformation theory and functionalist approach to conflict as tools of 
research and analysis. Heraclides, Alexis, "Greek-Turkish Relations from Discord to Detente: A 
Preliminary Evaluation", The Review of International Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Spring 2002. Furthermore, 
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the timing of the developments and the dynamics that emerged after the earthquake. 
In the end, this analysis too, returns to governmental politics, frustrated by its inability 
to provide an explanation for the complexity involved. 
In this section, I examine the phenomenon that emerged after the earthquake as a 
dynamic process of morphogenetic social change in the Greek and Turkish societies. 
It is argued that the earthquake was the decisive point for a shift from the existing 
self-description of Greek and Turkish societies, according to the system of Greek- 
Turkish conflict, to a new self-description, which developed around themes of co- 
operation. The earthquake was the irritation, the stimulus that triggered fast-moving 
meaning constitutive processes in a multitude of social and psychic systems in Greek 
and Turkish societies. Communications structurally - that is a-causally - coupled with 
each other increased the complexity which then enforced the emergence of a new 
emerging order, a new attractor: a social system of Greek-Turkish co-operation. 
This new attractor emerged as another "butterfly effect" in Greek-Turkish relations 
through deviation-amplifying mutual causal processes of communication. The initial 
interactions of co-operation, the Greek mobilization in support of the earthquake 
victims in Turkey, operated as a field of experimentation for Greek and Turkish 
society. New links emerged, were tested and eventually established, guided for their 
connective operations by previous determinations of meaning, already established 
structures, such as existing themes, programmes and institutions. The social structures 
of co-operation created from 1996 to 1999 made an important contribution to the 
emergence of the new order. They became operational in the new situation brought 
about by the earthquake and were transformed through improbable connections into 
structures of co-operation. 
This chapter is divided in five main parts. The first part presents the "butterfly effect" 
describing the autocatalytic chain reactions the earthquake triggered in the Greek and 
Turkish societies. The second part seeks to explore the self-referential and thus 
paradoxical nature of the operation of social and psychic systems, which produced the 
new attractor. It exposes the blind spots of self-referential systems by examining the 
semantics they used in order to describe the system/environment distinction. The third 
part describes the transition from the stage of bifurcation that is a stage of increased 
representatives of civil society who had participated in many peace initiatives after the Imia/Kardak 
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complexity to the emergence of the new attractor of co-operation. Here, we probe into 
the mechanics of communication in order to demonstrate that the new order emerged 
after the establishment of new differences through a process of generalization and 
simplification. The last part argues that the new system is autonomous from the other 
social systems. 
1. The Earthquake of 1999 as a ̀ Butterfly' 
The previous two chapters described the emergence of the crisis of 1996 and the 
various peace initiatives as the result of "butterfly effects". The transmission of 
information about an event, the accident on one hand and the sudden emergence of the 
crisis on the other, provoked simultaneous autocatalytic reactions on the part of 
various systems in Greek and Turkish societies enforcing in both cases the emergence 
of a new order. Here the initial condition for the emergence of the new system of co- 
operation, the `butterfly', was the devastating earthquake that occurred in Turkey at 
3: 02 a. m., on the 17th of August of 1999. 
The earthquake registered 7.4 on the Richter scale. Its effects amounted to more than 
30.000 people dead, hundreds injured and innumerable private houses and public 
buildings completely destroyed. It hit an expanding area of Turkey, which stretches 
from Istanbul to Izmit. Both cities are metropolitan centres in Turkey and are densely 
populated, which means that hundreds of thousands of lives were immediately 
affected by the earthquake. 
Although the earthquake was not directly related to Greek-Turkish relations it 
triggered a chain of spontaneous reactions within a multitude of social systems and 
their subsystems in Greek and Turkish societies. 3 Contrary to what happened in the 
other countries neighbouring Turkey, not only the Greek government, but particularly 
Greek civil society - individuals, municipalities, professional associations, and other 
organizations - promptly responded to the needs of the earthquake victims, gathering 
humanitarian aid through a massive mobilization. The Greek mobilization projected 
on the news media provoked positive reactions within the Turkish society amplifying 
communication about co-operation. This section seeks to describe the autopoiesis of 
crisis, argue in favour of this interpretation. Interview with Paulina Lampsa, Athens, 01.09.01. 
3 The information presented here was mainly gathered from the Greek newspapers Eleftherotypia and 
Ta Nea and the Turkish newspapers Sabah and Hürriyet. In the sections below I mainly used material 
gathered through interviews with representatives of the social systems which I discuss here. 
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communication about co-operation and its autocatalytic nature through concrete 
examples of social systems' operations during those days. 
The media was the first system that reacted immediately to the stimulus of the 
earthquake. The earthquake became a front-page headline in the Greek news media 
for the first days afterwards. Greek media organizations sent reporting teams to 
Turkey, but also co-operated with the Turkish media. On the 17`x' and the 18th Greek 
newspapers devoted tens of pages to the situation in the area struck by the earthquake, 
and Greek TV channels adapted their everyday programming to the earthquake. 
Starting from the early morning, they showed live coverage of scenes from the rescue 
operations and extensive coverage of the consequences of the earthquake. 
The first telegram of support from Greece to Turkey was sent in the afternoon of the 
first day after the earthquake, August 17th, by the President of the Greek-Turkish 
Chamber of Commerce, Panayiotis Koutsikos. The letter was addressed to the 
leadership of the Turkish entrepreneurial world. Koutsikos proposed to his Turkish 
colleagues who had suffered damage from the earthquake to continue their production 
in Greek territory, for as long as that would be deemed necessary. 
The Greek Prime Minister, Costas Simitis, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
George Papandreou, expressed their sympathy to the Turkish government on August 
18th. The first official Greek mission of people and humanitarian aid arrived in 
Istanbul in three C-130 airplanes, in the early afternoon of the 18th. 5 This mission also 
included members of a Greek rescue team for urgent situations, a team of doctors and 
nurses trained for emergency situations with ambulances, as well as expert 
seismologists and the general Secretary of Citizens' Protection, Dimitris Katrivanos. 
On August 19th, the Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit thanked Greece and the 
Greek government "for the important aid, both in quantity and also in quality, offered 
6 to Turkey". 
° Interview with the Managing Director and Official Spokesman of the Greek-Turkish Chamber of 
Commerce, Harry Caloudis, Athens, 20.07.01. 
s Many countries from all around the world sent humanitarian aid and trained teams equipped for the 
rescue works. Among them were Russia, Israel, Germany, the USA, France, Spain, Canada, Denmark, 
Belgium and Italy. For lists of the countries and information regarding the humanitarian aid they 
offered, see the articles "Rain of Aid", Hürriyet, 18.08.99, "The World Runs to Help", Hürryet 
19.08.99. 
6 Ta Nea, 19.08.99. 
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From August 18th, initiatives were undertaken by Greek civil society organizations in 
order to gather money as well as primary necessities for the victims of the earthquake. 
Organizations, associations, municipalities, academics, and ordinary citizens were 
mobilized. On the 190' a group of Greek Red Cross doctors, professional and 
volunteer nurses, and members of the Samaritans left for Istanbul. Their mission was 
to distribute humanitarian aid to the victims of the earthquake and participate in the 
rescue operations. 
The Municipality of Athens was among the first organizations to launch a campaign 
asking people to participate and offer what they could for the victims of the 
earthquake. Athenians replied positively and gathered money, food, clothes, and other 
basic necessities, which they brought to the centers that had been set up for that 
purpose. 
On the 19"' this mobilization reached the Turkish news media through Stelios 
Berberakis's articles to the Turkish newspaper Sabah. The title of his article was "Get 
Ready, Folks, We're Coming". There he referred to the humanitarian aid sent by the 
Greek government to Turkey and described the mobilization of the municipality of 
Athens and other civil society organizations for the gathering of aid. He also pointed 
out the fact that "Greek newspapers devote 10-12 pages every day to the tragedy, 
emphasizing the human obligation to the victims of the earthquake". 7 
On the 20th, medical and pharmaceutical supplies were sent to the area affected by the 
earthquake by the Greek branch of the international non-governmental organization 
"Medecins sans Frontieres" (Doctors Without Borders). A team of this organization 
with its president, Odysseus Voudouris, went to Turkey in order to co-ordinate the 
distribution of the humanitarian aid that had been gathered. 
By the 20th the mobilisation of Greek civil society had already received the name 
"Operation Solidarity" from the Greek news media. The newspaper Ta Nea itself 
started a campaign for Turkish homeless and orphaned children. It opened a bank 
account at the National Bank of Greece to gather money for these victims. The people 
working at the newspaper offered the amount of nine thousand dollars and the 
publisher of the newspaper, Hristos Lambrakis, offered another nine thousand dollars. 
' Sabah, 19.08.99. 
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Stelios Berberakis presented all these initiatives on August 20th in the newspaper 
Sabah, in a more detailed article. This article specifically referred to the various non- 
governmental organizations and the news media mobilization. It was on August 21st 
that the mobilization in Greece appeared on the front page of the Turkish newspaper 
Sabah. The title clearly expresses the surprise the Greek stance caused on the other 
side of the Aegean Sea: "Neighbour, We Could Not Have Known You Are Like 
That". After this article, news from the area of the earthquake took the lead. On 
August 21St, at the time that a Greek rescue team had brought a young boy out from 
the rubble, the Islamist newspaper Zaman wrote "The image of the Greek who could 
not control himself and started crying when he saved the Turk will never be erased 
from our memory". 8 
The news media started observing themselves and the change in their own attitudes 
and projected it as `news'. A spontaneous dialogue was initiated among the Greek and 
Turkish news media which also became `news'. The initiatives undertaken by the 
Greek newspaper Ta Nea were news for the Turkish Hürriyet. On the 22nd of August 
Hürriyet was writing about an "Earthquake in the Media.. . 
Aid Account from Ta 
Nea ". 9 "Thank You Very Much, Neighbour" was the leading article of Hürriyet on 
the 23`d, and even more importantly, it was written in Greek. 1° The Greek press 
expressed its surprise. Until those days, it was used to seeing only what were called 
"provocative articles" on the part of the Turkish media. The reply from the Greek 
media was in the same spirit. On the 23d we read in Hürriyet "The Thanks of 
Hürriyet Touched our Neighbour", referring to the positive reactions in Greek articles 
on the previous day. On the 25`h of August the headlines of the newspaper Ta Nea 
became front-page news for the newspaper Hürriyet. Another title on the front page of 
Hürriyet, "Bravo, Neighbour", referred to the proposal made by the Greek side of the 
Greek-Turkish Chamber of Commerce to its Turkish members. 
On August 23`d, the Greek Ministry of Health and Welfare sent by plane 2,000 
blankets, 100 tents designed for six people each, and large amounts of medical 
supplies. The President of the Greek Parliament contacted his Turkish counterpart to 
8 Zaman, 21.08.99. 
9 Hürrryet, 22.08.99. 
10 Hürrryet, 23.08.99. 
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tell him that the Health Service of the Greek Parliament was also willing to contribute 
to helping the wounded people. " 
On August 24th the Mayor of Athens, Dimitris Avramopoulos, went to Istanbul 
himself, where he met with his counterpart, Ali Mufit Gurtuna. In their meeting, they 
discussed details of the dispatching of the humanitarian aid that had been gathered in 
Athens. The decision for support was also unanimous in the City Council of 
Thessaloniki, the second largest city of Greece. More than 20 tons of food, 
pharmaceutical supplies, tents, and clothes were gathered and sent to the area 
damaged by the earthquake on August 24th. In addition, a special phone service was 
installed in the Municipality of Thessaloniki to provide information about the 
campaign. The Greek Red Cross, in co-operation with the International Federation of 
the Red Cross and the Turkish Red Crescent, opened an account where people could 
offer money for the buying of tents, blankets, electric generators, and other 
necessities. 
The blood donation centres in Greek public hospitals issued statements requesting 
blood that would be sent to Turkey, because the need for blood had increased after the 
disastrous earthquake. The Ministry of Health and Welfare also issued a request for 
the donation of blood. 
On the 25th of August alone, seven articles in Hürriyet referred to this new situation. 
The topics were the humanitarian aid from the Municipality of Athens and the 
Municipality of Kavala, and financial aid from Simi -a small Greek island opposite 
the Turkish coast - an article written by the columnist Mihalis Mitsos in the 
newspaper Ta Nea, another article in the Greek newspaper Rizospastis and articles in 
The Times about this radical change of attitudes. Additionally, the same issue included 
extended reports on the visit of the Chief of the Greek Naval Forces, Vice-Admiral 
Georgios Ioannides, on the 24th in order to be present at the ceremony where his 
Turkish colleague Selim Dervisoglu was succeeded by another admiral, Ilhami Erdil. 
This became a big story in the newspapers, because it was "the first time that such a 
warm welcome was reserved for a Greek officer". 
12 Finally, to the above articles it 
should be added an article reporting on the letter of a retired employee of the Greek 
11 TaNea, 19.08.99. 
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telecommunications organization sent to the Turkish Ambassador in Athens offering 
fifty thousand drachmas from his monthly pension for the victims of the earthquake. 
That was reported in the Turkish Hürriyet on the 250' of August under the title: 
"Uncle Yiannis Gives a Lesson". 
The Labour Centre of Thessaloniki, in coordination with the other authorities of the 
city and in co-operation with the Turkish authorities, sent humanitarian aid to the 
people affected by the earthquake. Smaller municipalities like Peristeri and the 
Organization of Social Solidarity called on people to participate in this humanitarian 
aid campaign. The Municipalities of Agioi Anargyroi and Piraeus also sent 
humanitarian aid to Turkey on August 24th. The Municipality of Korydallos joined 
this campaign, informing its people about the kind of aid needed and coordinated 
volunteers. It also opened a bank account for the same purpose. The Municipality of 
Sapes in Rodopi Province organized a voluntary blood donation in order to send blood 
to the area of the earthquake, and especially to the Municipality of Ereglisi, which 
was Sapes' "sister city". 
The Greek Orthodox Church entered the campaign on August 24th. The Archbishop of 
Athens and All Greece, Hristodoulos, contacted the Ecumenical Patriarch and both 
agreed that humanitarian aid was to be gathered in Athens and distributed by the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul. Archbishop Hristodoulos sent a letter to all the 
dioceses for the gathering of humanitarian aid. The Bishop of the island of Rhodes, 
the head of the Prefecture, and other local authorities also started a campaign 
gathering humanitarian aid for the victims of the Earthquake. The Prefecture of 
Kefallinia and Ithaki (two Greek islands) opened bank accounts for the victims. 
By a unanimous decision, the Rector and the academic community of the National 
Kapodistrian University of Athens decided to send medical and other aid to the 
victims of the earthquake. The Greek left-wing political party Synaspismos launched 
its own initiative in order to gather medicine and clothes at the offices of the party in 
Thessaloniki. The Association of Journalists of the Daily Press (ESIEA) sent a letter 
of sympathy to the associations of journalists of Ankara and Istanbul, expressing their 
sorrow for the tragedy that had befallen the Turkish people. The Athens Bar and the 
12 Hürryet, 27.08.99, See also articles about the same issue in the Turkish newspapers Milliyet and 
Sabah, and the Greek newspapers Ta Nea, Eleftherotypia, and Ethnos. 
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Pharmacists' Association of Attica Province started buying medicines and other 
material on the 24th of August, in order to send them to the victims. 
The same day, an article in Sabah had the title "Help the Turks". That was the central 
message that the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Papandreou had addressed to 
Greek citizens. 13 
Hundreds of Greeks visited the Turkish Embassy in order to express their sympathy 
and donate money for the Turkish victims of the earthquake. Others called the 
Embassy in order to learn how they could help or sent letters with cheques. The 
Turkish Embassy issued a statement expressing its gratitude for Greek support in light 
of the great disaster. The Turkish vice-consul in Thessaloniki, Aida Eroglu, warmly 
welcomed the mobilization of the people of Thessaloniki to help the Turks stricken by 
this natural disaster through a statement given to the Greek news media. 
The attitudes of the Greek people triggered further reactions of ordinary people from 
Turkey and all over the world who started expressing their gratitude to Greeks in 
various ways. They sent e-mails and letters to the Greek news media and the 
correspondents of the Turkish news media in Athens, asserting their personal friendly 
feelings and the feelings of the Turkish people towards the Greeks. The Greek news 
media published dozens of electronic messages and letters of thanks that had been 
sent to them by Turks. 
14 Greeks who happened to be in Turkey those days 
experienced this sudden change of attitudes in their interactions with Turks. That, in 
turn, reached the Greek news media as `news'. On the 23`d, the newspaper Ta Nea 
wrote about the way its crew in Turkey was being treated by Turks in the streets or in 
cafeterias and other public places. "The owner of the small shop outside Agia Sophia 
did not accept money and the owner of the cafe, whose grandfather was a Turk from 
Crete, burst into tears. The owner of a cafe in the centre of Istanbul, in Taxim, insisted 
on offering free beers to the Greek journalists. Yesterday was a day of celebration for 
the members of the Greek team. Wherever they went they were accepted with a warm 
welcome". 15 Turkish citizens sent flowers to the Greek Consulate in Istanbul. "An 
historical day", Hürriyet wrote, referring to the fact that, in front of the door of the 
General Consulate of Greece in Istanbul "where we usually see a black wreath of 
13 Sabah, 24.08.99. 
14 The messages displayed here are chosen in random among many messages, which appeared in the 
Greek news media. 
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protest, now there are wreaths with thanks for the efforts by the Greek rescue team, 
which showed a great deal of self-sacrifice". ' 6 On the 28th Hürriyet also published a 
story about a Turkish taxi driver who had not accepted money from a Greek 
diplomat. 17 
Foreign news media also observed these changes of attitudes between Greeks and 
Turks. This unusual process of communication and its effects, was news for them too 
and thus they started writing about it. Corriere della Sera, the New York Times, and 
the Boston News all published articles on this new situation, reproducing parts of 
articles from Greek and Turkish newspapers, and also publishing letters sent to them 
by their Greek and Turkish readers. This was fed back to the Greek and Turkish news 
media, which started reflecting on how foreign news media were examining this 
phenomenon in Greek-Turkish relations. 
Official state authorities from other' countries noticed and supported this change. The 
American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroeder praised the Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis and the Foreign Minister 
George Papandreou for the Greek help to Turkey. 18 EU officials kept on encouraging 
Greece to help its neighbour. 
The Prefecture of Xanthi and the Greek State Radio organized a concert with George 
Dalaras and Thanassis Gaifilias, two popular Greek singers, on August 30th, in the 
stadium of the city of Xanthi, for the victims of Izmit. The GSEE (General 
Confederation of Workers of Greece), in agreement with Turkish labour unions, 
organized two large concerts in Athens and Istanbul respectively, feauturing the 
famous Greek composer Mikis Theodorakis, the Greek singer Maria Farantouri, and 
the Turkish artist Zulfu Livaneli. 19 The funds raised by these concerts were offered to 
the victims of the earthquake. 
15 TaNea, 27.08.99. 
16 See also on the same issue a story on the way the Greek rescue team was treated in Istanbul. When it 
was recognised in the closed market in Istanbul people came out of their shops to applaud them, shake 
their hands, and thank them for their help. Harr yet, 26.08.99. 
17 Hürryet, 28.08.99, p. 4. 
1$ For the letter the USA Secretary of the State, Madeleine Albright, sent to the Greek Foreign Minister 
George Papandreou, see Hürriyet 29.08.09, and for the letter the German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroeder sent to the Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis, see Eleftherotypia 28.08.99. 
19 Mikis Theodorakis and Zulfu Livaneli have been in the forefront of efforts for co-operation before 
the earthquake and even in the most difficult times for Greek-Turkish relations. 
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Dimitris Kouselas, President of the Association of Bank Employees in Greece, visited 
Turkey with a committee on the 30`x' of August in order to offer hospitality to about 
100 children of Turkish bank employees, all victims of the earthquake. These children 
could stay in summer camps near Athens. Furthermore, they offered financial support 
and the organization of a school in Athens for about 50 children as well as their 
teachers, for the whole school year. 
The Onassis Foundation Board of Directors donated one hundred thousand dollars to 
the Turkish University of the Bosphorus. On the 31st, the Turkish newspapers reported 
on the offer made by the Greek football team Panathinaikos to hold a friendly match 
with the Turkish team Besiktas. All earnings would then go to the victims of the 
earthquake. 
Apart from the above-described reactions the earthquake triggered in both countries 
some the following processes that contributed to the change of the attitudes each side 
held about the other. In Greece, suddenly the focus of the public debate became the 
issue of the financing of Turkey by the EU, and the stance of Greece in this matter. 
The earthquake of the 17th of August created a totally new situation as inter alia it 
paralysed the backbone of the Turkish economy. The EU immediately responded to 
Turkey's need for aid allocating funds out of the above institutional framework. Thus, 
in the new context, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs undertook an active role for 
Turkey's financial support by the EU on August 25`''. This gesture was welcomed by 
Turkey and reinforced the climate of solidarity and co-operation. The Turkish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ismail Cem, thanked the Greek Foreign Minister warmly 
for the Greek proposal to the EU requesting generous financial support for Turkey. 20 
Then, the question centred on what the Greek stance at the Helsinki Summit in 
December 1999 would be, regarding Turkey becoming a candidate for full 
membership in the EU. Greece had agreed to the Customs Union between Turkey and 
the EU in 1995, under the condition that the process of accession of Cyprus to the EU 
would start at the same time. An implication of this agreement was that the EU would 
support Turkey's development through a financial protocol of 375 million euros. 
Nevertheless, after the Imia/Kardak crisis of 1996, Greece blocked the protocol as a 
20 In an interview he gave to the newspaper Al Kabar, on the 270' of August, he expressed his wish that 
"this process [the rapprochement between the two peoples] could be continued and that all the 
problems between Greece and Turkey should be examined and solved". 
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means of exerting pressure on Turkey. Moreover, Greece had set certain preconditions 
that had to be fulfilled before the Greek veto of the Turkish candidature for full 
membership could be lifted. These preconditions were the following: some progress 
in the negotiations on the Cyprus question and some improvement of the climate in 
the Aegean Sea. The Greek veto was an issue that kept Greek-Turkish relations in the 
limelight until December, when the Helsinki Summit was convened and Greece 
finally lifted its veto. 
On the other hand, another debate had broken out in Turkey which although seemed 
to be irrelevant to Greek-Turkish relations it had an important bearing upon their 
development as it provided with points for further connections of the communication 
about co-operation. In the wake of the earthquake severe criticisms were expressed 
against the Turkish state both by Turkish people and by the Turkish media. The 
criticisms centred on the Turkish state's inability to deal with the disaster that had 
struck the country and it led to a reconsideration of the role of the state in Turkey over 
the years. This process contributed to the demystification of the role of the state and 
the breaking down of important aspects of the national myth including the stereotype 
of the Greek ̀ enemy'. 
As it will be discussed in the section below, this was another contingency that had a 
reinforcing effect upon the emergence of the system of co-operation. For the Greek 
news media and the Greek people these openly expressed criticisms was something 
surprising. Used to talk about the censorship imposed on the Turkish media and the 
subjective way the latter treat the Greek media and society, now they were faced with 
a different reality. Thus, extensive reporting on these criticisms too kept 
communication between the two sides of the Aegean Sea going on. 
2. The Blind Spots of Social Systems 
In the previous sections I described the chain reactions that occurred simultaneously, 
in a multitude of social and psychic systems, in Greek and Turkish societies, after the 
earthquake. Nevertheless, this description cannot explain how these reactions came 
about, nor can it explain their effects. 
This section demonstrates that the above described actions and events were 
simplifications of complex processes of meaning determination carried out within 
various social systems, such as the media, civil society organizations, and politics. 
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Furthermore, it is argued that every action, after its occurrence, becomes autonomous 
from the conditions that brought it about and acquires informational and connective 
value for other systems which will in turn select it that is interpret it for their own self- 
reproduction. This further means that the same element is used by more than one 
social system and it has different meaning -different selectivity and connectivity- for 
each of them. 
It is demonstrated that the earthquake was not only a disaster which left thousands of 
people dead in the broader area of Izmit, but this event was also an element employed 
by various social and psychic systems for their further autopoiesis. It was "news" for 
the Greek and Turkish news media, the stimulus for expressing philanthropic 
sentiments which drove Greek civil society organizations to action, a profit 
opportunity for certain humanitarian aid organizations, a publicity opportunity for 
Greek politicians, an unexpected opening for a long-sought change of policy for a part 
of the Greek government etc. 
Images of the damage the earthquake had caused, projected by the news media, 
provoked a spontaneous reaction on the part of all of these different organizations and 
individuals. However, each social and psychic system remained opaque and 
incalculable to the others. It could access complexity only selectively and only 
through reference to itself, that is through its pre-established schemes of 
interpretation. By acting, it introduced its distinctions back to the emerging order. 
Nevertheless, it could not observe this re-entry and its consequences. It could not see 
that it could not see what it could not see. Systems cannot problematize their own 
blind spots. In what follows, I will highlight this mode of operation of social systems 
and I will present examples of structural couplings that occurred after the earthquake 
among various social and psychic systems within the Greek and Turkish societies. 
2.1. The System of News Media 
The news media is an observing system, which makes distinctions according to the 
binary code news/not news. The selection of the issues, that is, the construction of 
news, after the earthquake in the Greek and Turkish news media, followed the rules 
and the rationale of news production. The aim of the Greek and Turkish news media 
was not the propagation of friendship and co-operation. They only implemented their 
normal functions guided by their previously institutionalized practices and patterns of 
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behaviour. These practices in some cases included also institutionalized themes of co- 
operation established from 1996 to 1999 among the Greek and Turkish media. 
The earthquake in Turkey had all the characteristics of news for the Greek and 
Turkish news media: it was surprising and unusual and it referred to the life and death 
of thousands of people. 21 In the course of the developments that followed the first 
days of the earthquake, new issues were assigned the identity of "news, " such as the 
spontaneous reaction of Greek civil society organizations and the emergence of a 
media dialogue of friendship and co-operation. These too had the above 
characteristics of `news'. 
Greek and Turkish journalists and editors emphatically insist on the day-to-day 
development of the media agenda. There was no central planning about the way the 
earthquake or the other issues that emerged in the course of the first days after the 
earthquake should be presented. In what follows I will present examples of news 
construction, exploring the emergence of news items, as complex nexuses of meaning, 
structural couplings of various social and psychic systems. These examples are taken 
from the Turkish television channel NTV, the Turkish newspaper Sabah, the Greek 
newspapers Eleftherotypia and Ta Nea and the Greek state radio station. 
The Turkish news channel NTV was one of the most important and reliable sources of 
information about the situation in the earthquake area in Turkey. It had organized its 
own crisis management group and had offered an important service, with accurate and 
constantly updated information about the situation in the area. Many news 
programmes had references to the Greek relief workers in the area of the earthquakes 
as well as the developments within Greece. According to the foreign news editor, 
Mustafa Ascioglu, three main reasons explain why the Turkish news media made 
news out of the Greek aid story. 
First the Greek aid was news because it was unusual and surprising. Second, we 
saw that CNN-Turk [the other important news channel in Turkey] had a story 
about a Greek rescue team, and so we asked our own reporter to work on a similar 
story... Third, it was a good opportunity, a way to make up for past mistakes. We 
had all understood the bad role the news media had played in the Imia/Kardak 
crisis and the mistakes we had made and there was an opportunity to make up for 
that as well. 22 
21 For the characteristics of news see the basic handbook of mass communication theory, Denis 
McQuail, Mass Communication Theory, an Introduction, Sage, 1987, p. 204. 
22 Interview with Mustafa Ascioglu, editor of foreign news at the News Channel NTV, Istanbul, 
20.08.01. 
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Stelios Berberakis's articles from Athens for Sabah and his reports on the Turkish TV 
channel ATV provided the Turkish public with the first descriptions of the 
developments within Greece. It is from the newspaper Sabah that this news was 
passed on to other Turkish newspapers as well. 23 Berberakis described his own 
attitude as follows: 
There were two important things for me at the time; one was the Greek television 
and the second an article in Eleftherotypia noticing a sudden radical change. After 
that I realized this is something different, this is important and I immediately took 
a camera, and went to the hospitals to take pictures of the people who were giving 
blood 24 
The article in Eleftherotypia that motivated Berberakis was written by Anna Stergiou. 
The title of this article was "Weapons Have Not Brought Happiness" and the author 
pointed out the sudden change of Greek attitudes. Stergiou at that time was not a 
columnist at the newspaper; she was a young reporter. Nevertheless, that day she felt 
like writing this article to which nobody paid attention when she turned it in. 25 In 
subsequent days, however, everybody started talking about it. It was reproduced by 
Berberakis in the Turkish newspaper Sabah, and by the American newspaper The 
Boston News too. Furthermore, messages kept on reaching the newspaper from 
different parts of the world continuing the dialogue that she had initiated without 
having any intention to do so, surprising the newspaper's director, Seraphim 
Fyntanidis, and herself as well. Some of these electronic messages were published in 
the newspaper. 
Another incident which exemplifies the operation of communication through the 
structural couplings among different social and psychic systems is the following: one 
Greek rescue team left Athens on August 17th, and another followed some days later. 
The Turkish news media had dispatched many crews in different areas hit by the 
earthquake, who were providing live coverage, and were also recording the rescue 
activities taking place during the entire day. One of these crews caught the Greek 
team rescuing a little boy. That was shown on the TV screens the moment the same 
Greek team was travelling back to Istanbul by ferry. When the passengers saw the 
faces of the Greeks on the screen they recognised them immediately and offered them 
a place to sit. That was passed on to the Greek newspapers: 
23 See ZAMAN, 25.09.99. 
24 Interview with Stelios Berberakis, Athens, 11.03.01. 
25 Interview with Anna Stergiou, Athens, 07.03.02. 
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A group of tired men and women of slovenly appearance were sitting on the ferry's 
deck, a ferry that was going from Istanbul to Yalova, another area hit by the 
disastrous earthquake. The other passengers ignored the presence of the team and 
continued watching TV. Some moments later the faces of the members of the team 
came on the screen of the TV and then almost immediately tens of passengers 
embraced them; they shook their hands and offered them their places. The men and 
women were the members of the Greek Rescue Team, which succeeded in bringing 
little Güven, a 9-year-old Turkish boy, out of the ruins of a three-floor building. 6 
The reporting of the Turkish news media on the rescue work was part of their 
everyday routine for the first two weeks after the earthquake. The image of the Greeks 
in the rescue operations provided an `irritation' for the passengers on the ferry, who 
reacted to it. The Greek news media were interested in the way Greeks are treated in 
Turkey. The Turkish reaction of warmth and gratitude was news. Several similar 
processes of structural couplings occurred during these days. 
Institutionalized processes of co-operation among journalists not only offered a 
scheme of interpretation for what was happening in the form of themes for journalists 
like Mustafa Ascioglu, but they also provided the structures for further co-operation. 
The concert for the victims of the earthquake organized by the Greek State Radio 
Station in Xanthi was an initiative undertaken by the Director of the radio station, 
loannis Tzanetakos, and his close associates. The implementation of this project was 
supervised by Damon Damianos, the then Director of the local State Radio Station of 
Komotini. Tzanetakos and Damianos were both active members of the "Movement of 
Journalists for Peace in the Aegean and Thrace" at that time. After the former became 
General Director of the State Radio Station in 1998, and the latter Director of the local 
radio station in 1999, they undertook several initiatives to promote co-operation 
between Greece and Turkey "taking advantage of the inertia of the structures of state 
mechanisms", rather than by co-operating with the state authorities. 27 Similarly, the 
concert for the victims of the earthquake was an initiative independent of the Greek 
state authorities. 28 
The journalists and columnists who first described the changes in Greek-Turkish 
relations that followed the earthquake in their writings had participated in the 
26 TaNea, 27.08.99. 
27 Tzanetakos said characteristically that if permission had been requested for the concert and the other 
similar initiatives that preceded it, "we would still be discussing whether we should do it or not, with 
all the concerned agencies and councils". Interviews with then General Director of the Hellenic State 
Radio Station, loannis Tzanetakos, Athens, 07.03.02 and the director of the Radio Station in Komotini, 
Damon Damianos, Komotini, 01.04.02. 
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workshops that took place from 1996 until the earthquake, and they employed the 
themes established there as schemes of interpretation. Stelios Berberakis, Sami 
Kohen, Mehmet Ali Birand, Damon Damianos, Ioannis Tzanetakos, Zeynep G6gus 
and Alkis Kourkoulas were only some of them. 
To sum up this section, the news media, by means of their normal functions, provided 
irritations and increased the communication possibilities that enabled unexpected 
structural couplings to occur in Greek and Turkish society. The transmission of 
information to an undetermined number of potential receivers who could continue 
communication created an open field of experimentation for Greek and Turkish 
society. 
2.2. Civil Society 
Greek non-governmental organizations specialized in humanitarian aid, ordinary 
people, intellectuals, authors, and journalists made a major contribution to the 
emergence of the system of co-operation. Each system however, operated by drawing 
on different distinctions and following different aims. Social institutions of co- 
operation that had emerged from 1996 to 1999, ideological motivations, and 
organizational practices guided these initiatives. 
The Greek non-governmental organizations that specialized in humanitarian aid 
missions - like Kessa Dimitra and European Perspective - reacted not as Greek 
organizations but rather as humanitarian aid organizations. Their task was to offer 
help to the victims of the earthquake. For that reason they were also financed mainly 
by the European Union (European Community Humanitarian Office) and later partly 
also by the Greek government. Their first mission to Turkey after the earthquakes was 
completely independent of the Greek government. 29 Offering aid to the victims of the 
earthquake was their job and they had to accomplish it according to certain 
international standards. However, their Greek and not their European identity and 
source of funding was accentuated by the Turkish people they worked with, as well as 
by the Turkish news media. It was precisely this element that was selected and 
interpreted and served for further structural couplings that enabled the autopoiesis of 
Greek-Turkish co-operation. 
2S Interview with Ioannis Tzanetakos, Athens, 07.03.02. 
29 Interview with Pantelis Sklias, General Director of the Greek non-governmental organization 
European Perspective, Athens, 11.06.02. 
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Labour union leaders from various associations in Greece with a strong leftist 
ideological tone participated in the campaigns for the victims of the earthquake, in 
order to express their solidarity with their colleagues from Turkey with whom they 
had established some contact before the earthquake. There we find international 
solidarity to be consciously opposed to Greek and Turkish nationalisms. 
Leftists used the rhetoric of international solidarity and peace among people when 
they wrote about the earthquake in Turkey and the stance of the Greek people. A 
characteristic example is the article that provoked the dialogue between one of the 
best selling Greek newspapers, Ta Nea, and the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet. That 
article was written by Mihalis Mitsos, with the title "We Are All Turks". When 
Mitsos wrote this article he "projected the idea of international solidarity rather than 
something else". 30 Nevertheless, this article was a major surprise for the Turkish side. 
The paradox here was that it was reproduced by the right-wing Turkish newspaper 
Hürriyet. 31 Hürriyet was not concerned with the ideological message that the article 
conveyed. It selected this article for its striking title and also because it was written by 
a Greek journalist in one of the two best-selling Greek newspapers. When Mitsos 
wrote this article, did not think of its possible effects, nor had he been following the 
developments in Turkey after he wrote it, since he is not a specialist in Greek-Turkish 
relations. Three years later, he was surprised to hear that the Turkish newspaper 
Hürriyet had reproduced a part of his own article. 32 
Another example comes from those people who had participated in one way or 
another in the rapprochement process initiated after the crisis of 1996. The 
earthquakes have been a stimulus to resume communication that had been interrupted 
after the crisis with the arrest of the Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan. The message of 
support by the Greek-Turkish Chamber of Commerce was a spontaneous reaction that 
had not been preceded by communication with the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
or any other official authority. 
33 
Similarly, the organization of the campaign for the gathering of humanitarian aid and 
the blood donation by the Municipality of Sappes was not preceded by any previous 
contact with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The mayor of the municipality of 
30 Interview with journalist Mihalis Mitsos, Athens, 05.03.02. 
31 Hürrryet, 25.08.1999, "The Greek Ta Nea: "We Are All Turks", p. 1. 
32 Interview with Mihalis Mitsos, Athens, 05.03.02. 
33 Interview with Harry A. Caloudis, Managing Director and Official Spokesman of the Greek-Turkish 
Chamber of Commerce, Athens, 20.07.01. 
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Sappes, Dinos Haritopoulos, a proponent of Greek-Turkish co-operation, had already 
established contacts with the Turkish Municipality of Marmara Ereglisi since 1996. 
After the earthquake he directly contacted the mayor of Marmara Ereglisi and the two 
municipalities organized the dispatching of the aid. 34 
Psychic systems played an important role in the emergence of this phenomenon. The 
hundreds of Greek citizens who rushed to offer money, blood or other necessities and 
express their sympathy and solidarity with the Turkish victims of the earthquake and 
the Turks who expressed their gratitude, explained their attitudes in their letters, 
electronic messages and face-to-face interactions that they had with citizens of the 
other side. Their own explanations reflect four main motivations. First, Greeks felt 
they share a common fate with Turks because of the vicinity of the two countries. 
Second, the vivid images of destruction and pain that the earthquake had caused 
projected through electronic media stimulated feelings of compassion for the families 
of the victims. Third, some Greeks and Turks employed a leftist ideology, which put 
the emphasis on solidarity among peoples and opposed Greek and Turkish 
nationalism in favour of internationalism. Finally, personal memories that Turks and 
Greeks had from the years they were living side by side in Istanbul, or even positive 
impressions from visiting the other' s country emerged now to contradict the system 
of conflict and provide the background for their personal initiatives. 
2.3. The System of Politics 
The argument put forth here is that the systems of Greek and Turkish politics were 
hijacked by the developments that followed the earthquake. The Greek and the 
Turkish governments were not in a position to control, let alone to design these 
developments. Rather, the changes occurred in the wake of the earthquake 
transformed their environment and imposed co-operative attitudes on the systems of 
Greek and Turkish politics. These changes reinforced within both systems of politics 
structures favourable to co-operation and rapprochement and provided with points for 
their further development contributing to the overall dynamics of communication 
about co-operation. 
34 Interview with the Mayor of Sappes, Dinos Haritopoulos, Istanbul, 08.12.01. 
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The humanitarian aid gathered by Greek non-governmental organizations and the 
massive mobilization of Greek civil society brought about a new situation, which 
changed the environment of the system of Greek politics. The media noticed, 
recognized, and reinforced this change by making `news' about it. Questions posed by 
journalists to politicians invited comments on people's reactions. The new emerging 
issues of communication provided a field of experimentation not only for the news 
media but for politicians too. 
The first statements of sympathy that Greece sent to Turkey and the reply received 
were within the framework of the international official code of conduct. The same is 
true for the first aeroplanes sent to Turkey with humanitarian aid. Greece was not the 
only state that took immediate action to send help after the earthquake. The region of 
Marmara became the venue of an unprecedented example of international solidarity. 
Nevertheless, the change in the official communication between the two governments 
was important. The provocative statements usually hurled every now and then 
towards the other side were now replaced by expressions of sympathy and words of 
friendship. These statements, however formal or however technical they might have 
been, were oriented towards the direction of co-operation and thus they were coupled 
with other communications from other social systems that had chosen the same 
direction. 
The mobilization of the Greek authorities was spontaneous. Fotis Xydas, then Consul- 
General of the Greek Consulate in Istanbul, a junction point for the humanitarian help 
coming from Greece, argued that there was not a well-organized plan driving the 
action of the various governmental agencies. He said that 
[T]he TV set played a major role.... The mobilization of the Greek authorities did 
not follow a specific programme. It was just for appearances' sake because the 
Greek TV channels were showing images from the earthquake for a long time... It 
was more the result of a kind of competition among the different agencies and 
organizations regarding who would appear more on the Greek TV... 35 
The mobilization itself, however, created its own self-referential dynamics. It required 
continuous contacts on a daily basis among officials on both sides of the Aegean in 
order to cope with their tasks. The lack of understanding and the absence of common 
ground for co-operation that had been characteristics of the contact between the two 
35 Interview with the then Consul General of the Greek Consulate in Istanbul, Fotis Xydas, Istanbul, 
22.04.01. 
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sides of the Aegean over the years was now replaced by this specific and practical 
task to be implemented. 
The stance of the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, was 
important for these developments. Papandreou encouraged the Greek initiatives 
within civil society and he was personally engaged in certain efforts in that direction. 
The statements he made and his personal initiative for generous funding of Turkey by 
the European Union was in accordance with his previous policy of rapprochement 
with Turkey. Furthermore, these statements served to continue communication in 
favour of co-operation, attracting the Turkish media's attention. Nevertheless, the 
Greek government was not in control of these developments for two reasons: first, the 
statements which encouraged people to make a contribution to the aid campaign were 
made on the 24th of August, which was 7 days after the earthquake. By that time, tons 
of humanitarian aid supplies had already been gathered. Secondly, these statements 
cannot be considered as active co-ordination or engineering of the mobilization. 
Rather, the co-operative perspective of the Greek Foreign Minister vis-ä-vis Greek- 
Turkish relations was structurally, that is, a-causally coupled, synchronized, with the 
other spontaneous processes of communication emerging in various social and 
psychic systems in the Greek and Turkish societies. 
The first weeks after the earthquake, the Greek government increased its humanitarian 
aid to Turkey. A Greek fact-finding mission visited Turkey in September to gather 
information about the needs of the victims of the earthquake and how the Greek state 
could provide help. 
36 A neighbourhood of 150 prefabricated houses provided by 
Greece was established in one of the villages hit by the earthquake. Papandreou 
himself visited Turkey for the inauguration of the Greek neighbourhood. The talks for 
the agreements that had started after the proposal of the Turkish Foreign Minister and 
the reply of Papandreou before the earthquake continued and concluded with their 
signing. 37 
To explain the Greek government's stance we have to take into consideration the 
change of the dynamics the earthquake set in motion within the European Union with 
regard to EU-Turkish relations. The pro-Turkish camp within the EU raised its voice 
36 See live Interview of the head of the Greek mission, Alex Rondos, on the evening news bulletin of 
the NTV news channel, 20.09.99. 
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urging solidarity with Ankara and asked the Union to reconsider Turkey's candidate 
status 38 French President Jacques Chirac sent a letter to Finland, which held the EU 
presidency for that term and the European Commission, urging the Union to release 
financial aid to Turkey and to reconsider the status of Turkey vis-ä-vis the EU. 
Gunther Verheugen, the European Commission's main official responsible for Turkey, 
told the European Parliament that "Turkey must be given a clear path to the European 
Union if Europe wants Turkey to be a democratic and Western-oriented country 
instead of an unstable one". 39 
Facing these new pressures within the EU, the Greek government perceived the 
emergence of a stream of sympathy for the Turkish victims of the earthquake within 
Greece, as an opportune moment to change its policy with regard to the veto on the 
Turkish candidacy for membership in the EU. High-ranking officials in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs perceived that this shift of attitudes would decrease reactions 
against first the release of the funds by the EU towards Turkey with the Greek consent 
and then the potential lift of the Greek veto at the Helsinki Summit. Greece had been 
under continuous pressure, over the previous years, from the other members of the 
European Union to lift its veto both for financial aid to Turkey and for the candidature 
of Turkey for full membership. The Greek veto, however, had been considered by 
Greeks to be a stronghold in the undeclared Greek-Turkish diplomatic war within the 
various EU bodies and a lever of continuous pressure towards Turkey. Although 
certain voices had, already before the earthquake, started advocating the lifting of the 
veto, pointing to its detrimental implications with regard to Greek-EU relations and 
Greek-Turkish relations the resistance built around it within the Greek society made 
this issue seem like a minefield for any Greek government until the time of the 
earthquake. Ambassador Xydas's observation with regard to the impact of the 
earthquake on the perceptions of the Greek officials is illuminating: "[I]t was only 
afterwards [after the first weeks that followed the earthquake] that we saw its 
beneficial results' 4° Xydas's observation underlines the spontaneity of the changes 
occurred within the Greek society and challenges the assumption of engineering from 
above. 
37 As it was discussed in the Chapter IV the discussion on a number of issues of bilateral interest started 
after the Kosovo crisis and the exchange of letters of the two ministers of foreign affairs. See Chapter 
IV, p. 118. 
38 Turkish Daily News, 12.09.99. 
39 Turkish Daily News, 12.09.99. 
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The official attitudes of the Turkish government, on the other hand, also intensified 
the processes of meaning constitution in the direction of co-operation. Neither these 
attitudes, however, were determined by a rationale of co-operation or peaceful 
resolution of the conflict. They were selections guided by previous determinations of 
meaning and the perception that the system of Turkish politics formed about its 
environment after the earthquake. The first Turkish official statements thanking 
Greece for its help were among hundred similar statements issued during those days 
by the Turkish authorities, addressed to all those countries which sent humanitarian 
aid to Turkey. However, the Greek news media, looking at them from the Greek 
perspective, made these statements ̀news'. 
The unexpected phenomenon that followed the first days of the earthquake, with the 
Greek aid flowing towards Turkey from different sources within Greece, was a major 
surprise for Turkish authorities. Again, the Greek Consul in Istanbul describes as 
following the situation: "At the beginning they [Turkish authorities] were completely 
dazed at what was happening. What does this attack [of friendship] mean now? What 
is its purpose? They thought that we [Greeks] were influencing public opinion... But 
the dynamic of the whole situation made them more flexible". 41 
As will be extensively discussed in the next section, in the aftermath of the 
earthquake, the Turkish authorities had to deal with a crisis of confidence that broke 
when the Turkish people and the media questioned their competence in dealing with 
the earthquake. Their inability to meet the requirements of organization and efficient 
management of the crisis resulted in increased criticism directed towards the two most 
powerful institutions in Turkey, the government and the army. The frustration and 
anger of the victims in the earthquake area, who demanded immediate help, framed 
the Turkish reactions towards the European Union and towards Greece too. The 
European funds - and the Greek stance vis-ä-vis that issue would matter - were more 
necessary than ever in order to heal the wounds of the earthquake. Nevertheless, while 
official answers and statements were in the direction of co-operation, efforts to 
reverse these dynamics were made behind the scenes, by groups in the government 
and army, as well as columnists in various newspapers. These efforts did not succeed 
in their target; instead, they increased the complexity and added to the dynamic of the 
emerging order of co-operation. 
40 Interview with Ambassador Fotis Xydas, Istanbul, 22.04.01. 
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3. From Bifurcation to Attractor 
The previous section described the emergence of the unexpected dynamics of co- 
operation as uncoordinated selectivity, oriented to the same direction, namely the 
direction of co-operation and solidarity. Social systems and psychic systems, each 
"acting" under its own rationale, increased the complexity of the situation and 
contributed to the emergence of a stage of bifurcation, a stage of undecidability where 
alternative to the well-established explanations about the Greek-Turkish conflict 
emerged and eventually prevailed. In this section we will explore the process of 
transition from the stage of bifurcation created by the dispersion of communication 
about the earthquake to the emergence of a new attractor, a new order of co-operation. 
By attractor here we mean a self-description that has prevailed in society and has 
become stable condition through networks of recursive observations of observations. 
An attactor after its emergence is employed by social systems as a guide for their 
selections in the process of their autopoiesis. The history of the Greek-Turkish 
relations demonstrates that the Greek-Turkish conflict itself is another attractor, 
which, at critical moments, has guided the operations of social and psychic systems 
within the Greek and Turkish societies leading to the emergence of acute crises. 
Two are the foci of this section: First, the process of the emergence of a new attractor 
through recursive observations of observations. Second, it is demonstrated that 
observing systems make their selections based on existing differences or as it 
happened here by establishing new differences. 
Social and psychic systems are based on differences, which are incorporated in 
structures and guide their operations of self and other observation. The old well- 
established differences supportive of the Greek-Turkish conflict that were taken for 
granted before the earthquake were Greek v Turkish interests, Greek state v Turkish 
state. These were broken down and replaced by the differences of civil society v state, 
Greeks/Turks v politicians, co-operation v conflict, enmity v friendship. These new 
differences found connections in existing referential substrata of both societies. 
It is argued that co-operation emerged as a new identity to order the new differences, 
interpret the new phenomenon and attribute meaning to aspects of Greek-Turkish 
relations from the past. It was introduced to rationalize the new situation and help 
41 ibid 
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social and psychic systems handle infinite complexity. The linking device for the 
structural couplings, which led to the emergence of the new order was the language 
already formed through similar processes of morphogenetic evolution from 1996 to 
1999 or before that period of time. 
3.1. The Emergence of New Differences 
The mobilization of the Greek civil society in order to gather humanitarian aid, offer 
money, and express sympathy for and solidarity with the victims of the earthquake 
broke down the long-held image of Greeks as enemies who seek to inflict harm upon 
Turks. On the other hand, in Greece, the image of Turks as the worst and most 
dangerous enemy of Greeks collapsed in front of the image of Turkish people 
mourning myriad victims of the earthquake. Turks appeared as human beings 
suffering, in agony for their families who were still under the ruins. Furthermore, the 
Turkish reactions that followed the dispatch of material aid and relief workers were a 
surprise, which further broke down the expectation of the enemy according to the 
image built up over the years. It is important to bear in mind that social and psychic 
systems did not operate the way they did seeking to break down these differences. 
That was the unintentional result of the dynamics of communication, which is based 
on constant movement that is on a constant process of selection and connection. 
In this section I present the observations of social systems that is what they selected to 
observe and the semantics recalled to support their selections. Furthermore, I highlight 
the emerging differences and their central role as a guide of explanation. 
Mihalis Mitsos wrote on the 20`x' of August in his article "We are all Turks! " that, "if 
pain and joy really bring peoples together, then Greeks and Turks should be 
brothers.... we might believe in a different God, we might not believe in a God at all, 
but we pray for you, because whatever our governments say, whatever propaganda 
our channels transmit, we love you, we stand by you, we are close to you" 42 
Panayiotis loakeimidis, an academic and a high-ranking official in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, wrote in the same newspaper on the same day about the common 
elements that the two people share and pointed to the vanity of the conflict: "Looking 
at those maps and reading about the disaster of biblical proportions, a disaster that the 
experts say can strike our country at any time, one can reflect on really how pointless 
42 Ta Nea, 20.08.99. 
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it is for the two countries to come to the brink of war for some and rocks, for some 
and islets, whether they are called Imia or Kardak. The fate of the two peoples is 
indeed somehow common in many important things" 43 
"From now on, nobody will be able to follow the ̀ politics of tension' just because the 
`public wants it this way'. Nobody will be able to write provocative words by taking 
refuge in the same superficial argument. The public's wish was determined by this 
disaster", Sami Kohen stated categorically. 44 
As noted above the motive for Stelios Berberakis to write his report in the Turkish 
newspaper Sabah where he described Greek reactions was an article written by Anna 
Stergiou. He quoted a part of this article in his own report: "family, school, army 
.... with all these 
institutions and a series of historical and political examples we, the 
Greeks, fed feelings of hatred and antagonism and we believed that the Turks are our 
enemies. But how did it happen that these feelings, full of hatred and antagonism, that 
have lasted for years, are deleted and gone within a day? The enemy is becoming a 
friend overnight. "45 
On the 22"d , the columnist Zeynep Gögus wrote in Sabah about the collapse of Greek 
stereotypes. On the 23`d , Star emphasized the fact that those who were considered to 
be Turkey's enemies, such as the Greeks, Russians and Israelis, had been the first 
ones who had arrived quickly to help the Turks. "I Want This Flower" was the title of 
the article that Bekir Coskun wrote in Hürriyet on the 28th of August. That was "the 
flower of friendship of the two peoples that grew in the ruins of the earthquake" 46 
He added that he "will never again believe those politicians who instigate crises 
between the two states". 
A group of 21 nuclear physicists of Turkey sent their best wishes to Greece "which 
proved that humanism is more powerful than everything else". Another "friend from 
Turkey" thanked the newspaper Ta Nea for publishing his electronic mail message to 
the Greek people. 
"Our Brothers the Greeks, " wrote the columnist of Cumhuriyet Ahmet Kislali, who 
used to employ a strong language in his criticism of the Greek policy vis-ä-vis 
Turkey. 47 
43 Ta Nea 20.08.99. 
44 Sami Kohen, "The Public's Wish", Milliyet, 25.08.99. 
45 Sabah, 21.08.99. 
46 Bekir Coskun, Hürryet, 28.08.99. 
47 Cumhurryet, 24.08.99. 
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On the 27th of August, the newspaper Ta Nea published a number of electronic 
messages sent to it from Turkey. A characteristic example is the following, written by 
Cengiz Sarri: "We have always loved you in spite of politics. You know it and we 
know it.... I am sending you my best wishes and I hope for your friendship. I am 
sending you the best wishes of the Turkish people too! X48 
Adnan Caglayan, correspondent of the Anatolian News Agency, and Stelios 
Berberakis correspondent of Sabah, when asked by Eleftherotypia about the 
possibility of a non-aggression agreement between the two countries and cuts to both 
countries' military budgets, answered positively, arguing that "peoples' and 
journalists' initiatives can be more effective than those of politicians and 
governments". 49 
During the days after the earthquake ordinary Greek and Turkish citizens became the 
focus of the observation of various social systems whereas before the focus was 
mainly politicians. Now this primacy of the political system was bypassed by civil 
society. Greek rescue teams and humanitarian non-governmental organizations, at the 
location of the natural disaster working together with Turks side by side in the rescue 
operations and other activities broke down the difference between Greeks and Turks. 
Initiatives undertaken by ordinary people landed on the front pages of the newspapers. 
Turks and Greeks, became symbols of the friendship of the two peoples. Little Güven, 
the boy that the Greek rescue team found in the ruins of his house, became the main 
story on the TV channels and in the newspapers in both Greece and Turkey. 
Hundreds of people burst into spontaneous applause. The father, the relatives, and 
the neighbours tearfully embraced the Yunan [<(Greek» in Turkish]. In their eyes, 
sorrow, desperation and happiness too, tried to find expression. They speak in their 
language but communication does not concern `languages'. "so 
Güven, months after the earthquake, came to Greece and TV programmes were made 
featuring him, his mother, and the members of the Greek rescue team. A Greek 
woman firefighter who went to Turkey as the head of the mission that would help in 
putting out a big fire that had broken out in the refineries near the area of the 
as Ta Nea, 27.08.99. 
49 On the 15th and 17th of September Eleftherotypia made a proposal, asking 26 Greek and Turkish 
politicians and correspondents of Turkish media in Athens and other personalities to answer this 
question: "After the two societies' rapprochement due to the earthquakes' what would their opinion be, 
regarding the signing of an agreement of nonagression and mutual reduction of military expenses in the 
budget, so that the money that would be saved could be invested in the regions hit by the earthquake 
and in various projects for development. Hristina Corae, Eleftherotypia, 17.09.99. 
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earthquake became a legend in the region thanks to the Turkish newspaper Milliyet. 5' 
The pilot of a military aeroplane, who now flew a cargo plane with humanitarian aid 
for Turkey, was another story to which Greek news media paid much attention. The 
same pilot had never gone to Turkey before, but he had participated many times in the 
past in dogfights with Turkish aircraft in the Aegean Sea. 
Another focus of observation became the way the Turkish state dealt with the crisis 
the earthquake created. The earthquake revealed the deficiencies of the state apparatus 
in terms of organization. The Turkish government found itself subject to insistent 
criticism about delays and its inability to deal with the problems that the earthquake 
left behind. The majority of the Turkish news media were full of critical articles 
against the state services and their management of the crisis as well. The expectation 
that the Turkish state would be strong and could protect its people against external 
enemies and any disaster was shattered. 
Those observations were coupled with another observation namely that the 
international community rallied to help the victims of the earthquake. Trained rescue 
teams from all over the world with the necessary equipment, humanitarian aid for the 
victims, and funds for the rebuilding of the destroyed part of Turkey flowed to 
Turkey. The new situation challenged and eventually broke down the well-established 
theory in Turkey "of Turkey being isolated and surrounded by enemies". This theory 
was built upon the differences Turkey v world and Turkey v Greece. Now the 
enemies, including Greece, were running to help. 
The extracts from the Turkish press below reveal that these observations gave rise to 
the emergence of new differences such as the Turkish people v the Turkish state, 
people/civil society/world society v state, co-operation v conflict. 
Articles in Milliyet on the 19th of August pointed to the deficiencies of the state 
apparatus and the fact that the rescue teams had been waiting in the airport for hours 
without translators or any other guidance when time was extremely critical for the 
victims of the earthquake. In Milliyet on the 20th of August we see the title "Candles 
and Pencils: This Is the Crisis Table". 
On the same day another article with the title "Political Ruins" was reporting on 
"the fourth day of the earthquake and the rescue operations of the state! " 
so Zaman, 
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On the 20th of August Bekir Coskun wrote an article in Hürriyet with the title "Where 
Are You? " to state that "The most frequently asked question is `Where are you? ' This 
word of the question `where? '...... Where is the aid?..... Where are the rescue 
teams?.. Where is the state?.. ' There is no answer to those questions..... " 
On the 215 of August Cüneyt iUlsever wrote in Hürriyet: "The bureaucracy with the 
army in this state since a long time ago, justify those who say that `this state 
structure is useless. "' 
In Milliyet on the 215` Duygu Asena wrote an article with the title "Yes, they came 
into terms with that! But the state isn't there .... They work voluntarily with their 
hearts and minds. They work simply to succeed at what the state has not done. We 
were in Yalova and Cinarcik. We did not see either intensive work or anyone in 
charge from the state... Indeed, there was complete harmonic co-operation... that was 
among the citizens.... " 
On the 24th of August Milliyet wrote "The People are Unprotected", criticising the 
authorities for the serious delays to rescue operation. The Islamic Zaman reported on 
the same deficiencies; its main headline was "Disaster at Night, Scandal in the Day". 
I1nur Cevik wrote on the 29 ̀h of August in The Turkish Daily News, 
The state has been traditionally regarded by Turks as ̀ the father' who provides. 
So while in Western societies the state is seen as the `servant' that is charged with 
serving the people, in Turkey the people have turned into subjects and the state the 
master. Many Turks have never even dreamed of challenging this notion and thus 
have been rather fatalistic.... People felt deep confidence in some state institutions, 
such as the army, and kept out of any debate. Those who even tried to debate the 
role and functions of state institutions in our own semi-democratic system were 
promptly dissuaded from doing so. But the deep confidence in the state as the 
provider seemed to be shattered after the quake, when the state was too slow to 
reach the devastated areas. 52 
The revelation of the inability of the state to meet the needs of the people operated as 
a reinforcing factor for the emerging system of Greek-Turkish co-operation for two 
reasons. First, it contributed to the breaking down of the difference our nation/your 
nation. It was not the Turkish state, but the world that came to help the thousands of 
s1 That was the answer I received, when I asked people from this area 2 years after the earthquake 
"Who put out the fire in the refineries? " 
52 See caustic articles against the state and the army in the Turkish Daily News the days that followed 
the earthquake. See for example the issues of the newspaper on the 22 "d, 23rd, 24th and 25th of August. 
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victims of the earthquake. Now, worldwide civil society emerged in contrast to the 
political system. In addition, although those that had officially sent help were 
governments, Turkish correspondents could see and thus project the image of 
individuals in the field. Secondly, this contingency enabled further structural 
couplings within Greece. This critical reporting vis-ä-vis the Turkish authorities was 
important news for the Greek news media. It particularly found good ground among 
leftists who still held vivid memories of the years of the Greek junta and perceived 
the criticisms against the Turkish state as a reaction of the Turkish people against an 
autocratic regime. 
3.2. Old Differences v New Differences 
Many attempts were made in order to control the unexpected and surprising 
developments in Greek-Turkish relations aiming to redress the old differences by 
selecting to focus on past events. This phenomenon, the Greek help and the Turkish 
reply, was attributed to simple solidarity and sympathy among people without further 
political meaning. 
The main argument that appeared, regardless of whether a Greek or a Turk was 
writing, was that the expression of sympathy and solidarity was one thing and 
opposed national interests another. The hard-liner Mumtaz Soysal, former Foreign 
Minister of Turkey and advisor to Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, tried to 
convince the public that "[T]he feelings of the people and the interests of the nation" 
were two different things. 
53 In an article he wrote in Hürriyet, he attempted to clarify 
this distinction: ".. there is a fundamental mistake in this approach [of Greek-Turkish 
co-operation]: it is wrong to confuse the concepts of 'people' and 'nation'... The 
feelings of the one side and the interests of the other should not be neglected .... 
9954 
On the other hand, a former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Yiannis 
Kapsis, emphasised on the Greek radio station Flash that "the financial protocol is a 
different matter from solidarity between the people". 55 "Earthquakes and National 
Strategy" was the article that a professor of International Relations, Panayiotis Ifestos, 
wrote as an answer to an article written by Ioakeimidis. loakeimidis claimed that it 
was vain to fight for and rocks, whether they are called Imia or Kardak, and "co- 
S' Mumtaz SSysal, "The Feelings of the People and the Interests of the Nation", Hürriyet, 29.08.99. 
54 Interview with Mumtaz Söysal, Ankara, 07.06.01. 
55 Greek Radio Station Flash 9.61,27.08.99. 
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operation is the only choice, the only road for the two people, the two countries to 
pursue". 56 The answer to that was that 
.. it [this view] 
is wrong for one more reason: it neglects or bypasses the causes of 
interstate conflicts and states that international disputes are misunderstandings and 
misconceptions among individuals... the deeper causes of the conflict between the 
two states are different interests ... in cases of interstate disputes, military 
preparation, at least for the state which is on the defensive, is subordinated to the 
logic of military needs, and its aim is to make the adversary to comply with our 
political will, which in Greece's case is self-evidently defensive ... 
57 
The President of the political party D1KKI, Dimitris Tsovolas, in a statement he made, 
emphasized that "humanitarianism should not be identified or confused with foreign 
policy... and especially with our policy in Greek-Turkish relations". 58 
The restoration of the old differences was the aim of indirect efforts of certain 
columnists in the Turkish media too. Discussing how Turkey coped with the disaster, 
some Turkish journalists omitted the element of foreign aid and they sought to 
reinforce the national pride of the Turkish people. Sometimes recourse to the rhetoric 
emanating from the well-known theme of the Greek-Turkish conflict was selected. 
Oktay Eksi wrote on the 25th in Hürriyet: "It emerged again, this magic feeling of 
solidarity that took us out of the ruins of the [Ottoman] Empire and made us win the 
War of Salvation". This reference has connotations to the themes of the Greek- 
Turkish conflict as well as to the theme of the Turkish state's independence from the 
West. 
Mumtaz Soysal's article on the 18th of August implicitly attacks the West and Greece 
too making a hint about where this aid can lead to: 
The powerful states which believe that they can cope in these difficult situations 
better than we do, have always believed that the Turks do not deserve a country 
like this because they are not serious enough. At the background of their attacks, of 
their plans of dissolution, of the Treaty of Sevres which we have lived through 
over the last two centuries, there is always the conviction that `if we were [here in 
Turkey] we would have developed this land better, we would have lived better in 
it. If we do not show the necessary seriousness, Turkey will go out from under our 
feet. 
Ertugrul Özkök, the Director of Hürriyet, wrote an article on the 28th of August with 
the headline "I Rely on Ecevit". And on the 29`h : "The code name of this project is 
56 TaNea, 20.08.99. 
s' TaNea, 25.08.99. 
58 Greek Radio Flash 9.61,27.08.99. 
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`Turkey, one fist'. The slogan for everyone is obvious. Turkey is capable. Turkey can 
build again what has been demolished. Turkey can heal its wounds". 
The case of the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet provides an apt illustration of the 
bifurcation stage that emerged after the earhquake. On one side, Mumtaz Soysal, 
Oktay Eksi, Ertugrul Özkök made attempts to resurrect and reinforce the old 
differences. At the same time, as was demonstrated above, reporting from the field of 
the earthquake had extensive descriptions of the foreign aid and in particular the 
Greek aid and the changes in Greek-Turkish attitudes. Furthermore, other columnists, 
like Bekir Coskun, Cuneyt Ulsever and Hadi Uluengin provided a different 
interpretation of the phenomenon. On the 24th of August, Hadi Uluengin wrote: 
The people of our country are not stupid, and they saw in practice who it was who 
ran first to help when the black day came and who it will be. The victim of the 
earthquake who was kissing the relief worker from the French citizen protection 
agency because he took his relative out from the ruins, or the mother who 
expressed her gratitude to the Italian doctor because he examined her baby 
urgently, will not be deceived easily anymore with enmity against the West. As for 
the paranoia of external enemies, with which the `establishment' [Derin Devlet] 
has threatened us, which suddenly disappeared the moment we needed it most, will 
not cause as much fear among our people, who saw help and affection from those 
possible external enemies, as it caused in the past. 59 
On the 28`h again Hadi Uluengin wrote an article largely devoted to the Greek aid 
efforts. He reproduced the view of Sabah's columnist Raouf Tamer, whom he joined 
in his request to the Turkish government for a proposal of a movement of good-will 
towards Greece. Uluengin wrote, "we are in debt to the Greek nation, to the 
government and the state". 
On the 22°d of August Hürriyet appeared with the headline "The Minister does not 
Accept Aid Because it is Greek" and the sub-title "Ugly Politics". The article cited 
the criticism of a high-ranking official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs against this 
attitude of the Minister of Health, concluding, "... what a pity that in a situation of 
disaster some circles make politics. There should not be politics in natural 
disasters. ' 960 
59 Hürrryet, 24.08.99. 
60 In the same newspaper on the 23rd of August another article appeared about the same issue. The 
headline was "What Is This Man Saying? " stressing that the statements of the Ministry of Health had 
made people furious. Millyet's headline was even more caustic: "A Mentality That Stops the Mind". 
The article stresed the strong reactions of public opinion against the Minister of Health, Osman 
Durmus. The next day the same issue made front page headlines: "Stop It". 
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Indirect efforts to oppose these new systemic formations targeted the new emerging 
order. The first week after the earthquake, high-ranking military officers called 
journalists asking them to stop the transmission of positive, friendly images regarding 
foreigners and Greeks and to focus on the role of the army. 61 The army intervened 
through the Radio Television Council and issued the decision to close down television 
Channel 6. That was considered to be a warning towards the other media for their 
critical stance towards the state and the sacred institution of the army, which is 
supposed to be the guardian of Turkey's most important values. 62 That action aimed 
to reverse the momentum against the army and the established system of power within 
Turkey by controlling news media reporting on foreign aid and on Greece. Prime 
Minister Bulent Ecevit himself frequently attacked "demoralizing" media coverage 
critical of his government's response to the disaster. 
The next days, cameras focused in particular on the image of Turkish soldiers 
working in the ruins in the earthquake area. Nevertheless, these attempts were noted 
by journalists who understood all this as an attack against their freedom of expression 
and they projected that back to the media. Furthermore, news about Greece was kept 
on the Turkish media agenda too, due to the already established functional systems, 
which were creating their own news. The visits of official representatives, the large 
joint Greek-Turkish concerts in both countries, the football games, all these were 
news that continued to be covered by the Turkish press and electronic media. 
Another example of direct opposition to the emerging order of co-operation was the 
reaction of the Turkish Minister of Health, Osman Durmus. Durmus tried to prevent 
Greek aid from going to Turkey. He appeared to reject the blood and other aid 
donated by Greeks because "there was no need" and "there was no place to keep it". 
Durmus was a member of an extreme right-wing party, the National 
Action/Movement Party (MHP), one of the three partners in the coalition government 
in power at that time. Nevertheless, his attitude reported by the Turkish news media 
triggered simultaneous reactions coming from columnists in the Turkish news media, 
61 Information gathered through interviews conducted by the international non-governmental 
organization "Search for Common Ground", in the framework of a research project regarding the 
freedom of the Turkish media. Discussions with Giorgos Terzis who worked for that project, Komotini, 
02.04.02. 
62 These are comments made by Haluk Sahin, Professor of Mass Communication at the University of 
Bilgi, and columnist in the newspaper Radikal. 
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ordinary people in the area hit by the earthquake, and other members of the Turkish 
government. They demanded the immediate dismissal of the Minister. 
The above-examples demonstrate that efforts to directly oppose co-operation among 
Greeks and Turks reinforced the dynamics of the new emerging order. By opposing 
the new differences, they reproduced them and invited similar connections, 
crystallizing meanings and transforming them into structural gains, new expectations. 
Contingent developments like a second earthquake, this time in Athens, kept 
communication about co-operation going, reinforcing and reproducing the 
autocatalytic recursive processes of communication about co-operation. The second 
earthquake, which was less destructive, occurred in Athens on September 8'. 63 This 
earthquake offered an opportunity for all the expectations that had been created after 
the first earthquake in Turkey to be reaffirmed. The Turkish rescue teams rushed to 
Greece immediately in order to help the Greek rescue teams, whom they already knew 
from the rescue operations in Turkey. Officials and ordinary Turks expressed their 
sympathy for the Greeks. M The news media on both sides of the Aegean focused 
again on the co-operation among Greeks and Turks and thus they kept going the now 
of communication about co-operation. 
4. Morphogenesis v Conflict Resolution 
The new system of Greek-Turkish co-operation emerged as an autopoietic system in 
the process of society's morphogenetic evolution. As happened with the peace 
processes examined in the previous chapter, the new order was not the result of 
pressure nor was it a necessary development. Most importantly, it did not come after 
the resolution of the Greek-Turkish conflict, as conventional theory would expect. 
The disputes over the Aegean Sea, namely the demarcation of the continental shelf, 
territorial waters, airspace, demilitarization of Greek islands, flight information region 
and the Cyprus question, all of which have tormented the relations of the two 
countries over the years, have remained unresolved. The paradoxical nature of this 
63 On September 7t', the city of Athens was rocked by an earthquake with local magnitude of 5.4. The 
earthquake caused the collapse of two factories and the death of 139 people. 
64 The Ambassador to Ankara, Danai Koumanakou said regarding this, "[W]hen a Turkish colleague 
called me from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to tell me that they want to send help for the 
earthquakes in Athens I felt that the circle was closing. That was the happiest moment in my career 
here". Interview with Ambassador Danai Koumanakou, Ankara 07.06.01 
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positive development cannot be explained through traditional tools of analysis, which 
involve the search for linear cause-effect relationships. 
These developments were not the result of some rational processing of information. 
Even more importantly, the theory of morphogenesis argues that this is not possible 
anyway, as no system can decompose all the others analytically to arrive at final 
elements in which knowledge could find an ultimate foothold. That has important 
implications for our definition of the process that we examine here. Traditional 
analysis discusses processes of conflict resolution drawing from the rational theory. 
The above-analysis however, demonstrated that any change that might have occurred 
in Greek-Turkish relations involved the whole of the society and it was due to the 
transformational dynamics of communication. 
This part of our study further explores the process of the transformation of the Greek- 
Turkish conflict. It examines in particular the amplification and consolidation of the 
differences that emerged after the earthquake, in concrete systemic formations, which 
correspond to new self-descriptions of social systems. It is argued that processes of 
meaning determination triggered by the earthquake transformed existing systemic 
formations within Greek and Turkish societies. They gave a new impetus to initiatives 
undertaken after the 1996 crisis, intensifying processes of reflexive communication 
that had started at that time. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that every change is self- 
change. 
4.1. The Institutionalization of the Process of Co-operation 
The new system can be identified through the institutions, programmes, and roles that 
have been established in various fields. From early September, expectations for co- 
operation began to assume an institutionalized form in a number of fields, creating the 
conditions and setting the goals for further promotion of co-operation. The structures 
of co-operation established in politics, business, arts, and the media consolidated a 
broader change of attitudes at the grassroots level, which can be described as a new 
system of co-operation. 
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Co-operation on the governmental level was consolidated with the signature of nine 
agreements on economic, environmnent, tourism, security, and other issues. 65 The 
discussions about these agreements started after the Kosovo crisis in April 1999. The 
Turkish Ambassador in Athens, Ali Tuygan uses a metaphor to describe the impact of 
the earthquake upon this process saying, "the earthquake helped to place in an avenue 
what had begun in a narrow road" 66 
Greece and Turkey co-authored a resolution to the UN, creating a unit for emergency 
situations. Furthermore, Greek seismological institutes established closer co-operation 
with their Turkish colleagues on issues of scientific interest. The universities of 
Athens and Istanbul signed an agreement, which established the creation of new 
Departments of Turkish and Greek Studies, in both universities. Furthermore, many 
projects have been implemented in the last three years that is from 1999 to 2002, 
among the schools and faculties of various universities of the two countries. 
The large municipalities of Istanbul and Athens have established a permanent channel 
of communication and co-operation, which has enabled close contact and the 
development of projects in the framework of EU-funded programmes. The European 
Union's funds have encouraged co-operation among municipalities, allocating a 
considerable amount of money for the promotion of the institution of sister cities, as 
well as for developmental programmes. 67 The expectation of profit has also become 
the motive for the initiation and continuation of these joint activities. 
The Municipality of Sapes initiated and completed the creation of a network of 
municipalities, which includes municipalities in Western Thrace in Greece and 
municipalities in Eastern Thrace in Turkey. As the Mayor of Sapes, Dinos 
Haritopoulos, emphasised, it was only after the earthquake that the mayors of the 
other cities took the courage to visit Turkey and start some sort of co-operation, 
overcoming the impediment of the previous prejudices that they or their constituents 
held. 68 The municipality of Kavala also established an office in Istanbul with the task 
of providing information for tourists and those interested in trade with this part of 
65 Interview with Ambassador Ali Tuygan, Athens, 18.07.01 
66 ibid.. 
61 Some of them are the MERP, MEDA, and INTERREG programmes. For further information see 
www. europa. int. 
68 The mayor of Sappes has made many efforts to reinforce Greek-Turkish co-operation since he was 
elected in 1995. Sappes is a town close to the Greek-Turkish border and its population includes a 
191 
Greece. Thessaloniki, the second largest Greek city, has also developed close bonds 
with the municipality of Istanbul. 
Several Greek banks have expressed their interest in investing in Turkey and have 
opened offices, which actively search for local partners in Turkey. Various 
associations, artists, and organizations have found a way to develop co-operation in 
their neighbouring country. Films of Greek-Turkish production have been produced in 
the latest years and have been very successful. 69 Several exhibitions of different kinds 
of art have been organised in both countries. 
Furthermore, the number of Greeks who have visited Turkey and the number of Turks 
who have visited Greece since the earthquakes has increased impressively. 70 
Nikitas Lionarakis, chairman of the Greek Foreign Ministry's liaison committee for 
non-governmental organizations, and Ali Tuygan, the Turkish Ambassador in Athens, 
both admit that today it is impossible for the official authorities of both countries to 
catch up with the majority of these initiatives. After the two earthquakes, these 
initiatives have multiplied on a scale that cannot be followed, as most of them do not 
involve the Greek or Turkish state in any way. 71 
These processes of co-operative interactions culminated in the lifting of the Greek 
veto at the Helsinki Summit of the leaders of the 15 members of the EU, in December 
1999. 
4.2. The Emergence of New Self-descriptions 
This section seeks to demonstrate that the structural changes that emerged after the 
earthquake were self-changes. More precisely, it comes to define them as changes of 
social systems' self-descriptions. The main operations of social and psychic systems, 
minority of Muslims of Turkish origin. Interview with the Mayor of Sappes, Dinos Haritopoulos, 
Istanbul, 08.12.01. 
69 See the cinema movie "Buyuk Baba Kucuk Ask" as well as the Turkish TV series programme "Yilan 
Hikayesi" which made known to the Turkish public Katerina Moutsatsou, a young Greek actress. 
Interview with Katerina Mutsatsou, Istanbul, 20.12.01. Many established Greek artists have expanded 
their careers in Turkey. The actress Karyofilia Karabeti, who played a part in a film of Greek-Turkish 
production, and the Greek singer Angela Dimitriou, whose songs have been at the top spots of the hit 
parade of songs played by Turkish radio and TV stations, are only two characteristic examples. 
' Interview with Socrates Tragotsis, Consulate General in Istanbul, 10.03.00. 
71 Interviews with Nikitas Lionarakis, President of Foreign Ministry's Liaison Committee for NGOs, 
Athens, 07.08.01 and Ambassador Ali Tuygan, Athens, 18.07.01 "The Turkish Embassy can follow 60- 
70% of these initiatives of co-operation that are going on between Greece and Turkey. And I don't 
mean that we are involved, but they become known to us. A movie festival is taking place somewhere 
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which are observing systems, are the operations of self and other-observation and self- 
description. In the previous section, I explored how social systems observed their 
environment and themselves within it, in other words with what semantics made their 
selections of observations. This section tracks the way these observations affected the 
self-descriptions of social systems. This analysis emphasises again that a social 
system is constituted as the unity of the system/environment difference. 
Initiatives that had been suspended after the Ocalan crisis that took place in February 
1999, were activated after the earthquake. The businessmen's and women's initiatives 
for peace got back on track after the earthquake. The Greek part of the Greek-Turkish 
Chamber of Commerce was the first Greek civil society organization that sent 
messages of support and offered material support to its Turkish counterpart. 72 Mayors 
of Greek and Turkish cities were encouraged to pursue some kind of co-operation 
with municipalities from the `other side'. Furthermore, the Greek-Turkish Forum 
managed to come up with a concrete proposal about the resolution of the dispute over 
the continental shelf in May 2000, which was welcomed by the Greek and Turkish 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs as an important contribution to the peaceful resolution of 
the dispute. 73 
The above-described changes were self-changes, which emerged through self- 
referential processes of communication. The systems themselves played a part in the 
alteration of their own structures. The information systems employed was selected 
from a domain of potentialities that each system devised and held to be relevant. It 
was social systems themselves in both Greece and Turkey that perceived the 
developments after the earthquake as an important change to their environment. They 
picked up the irritation their environments provided them with and they attributed to it 
meaning, which in its turn had a further effect on their own self-description. 
To give an example, members of the Greek-Turkish Forum admit that they felt 
endowed with a different responsibility after the earthquake. They felt that the two 
people wanted peace and this justified their effort. 74 For that reason, they decided to 
be "more ambitious" and discuss the core of the conflict in the Aegean. 75 This change 
in Greece and at one moment we see in the newspapers that Turkish films were also projected there. 
People do that on their own. They don't seek official approval". 
72 For statistics about trade between Greece and Turkey over the last eight years see the website of the 
Turkish organization DEIK, www. deik. org. tr 
" For the proposal see the Greek-Turkish Forum's website www. greekturkishforum. org 
74 Interviews with Ambassador Costas Zeppos, Paulina Lampsa, Ambassador liter Turkmen 
75 Interview with Ambassador Ilter Turkmen, Istanbul, 13.11.01. 
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as well as the previous transformations of the Greek-Turkish Forum reveals the 
paradoxical nature of social change. Members of the Forum like Ambassador Costas 
Zeppos and Ambassador Ilter Turkmen had participated in many discussions on 
Greek-Turkish problems in the past from their official positions. Ambassador Zeppos 
was the Head of the Department of Greek-Turkish Relations in the Greek Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Ambassador Turkmen had served in important posts within the 
Turkish Ministry, as Turkey's representative at the United Nations and also as 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, they had never come so close to the 
production of a formula for the resolution of the dispute over the continental shelf 
accepted by both official authorities. Both of them attest to the importance of the 
environment of trust and co-operation established within the Forum. The impact of the 
earthquake upon their interaction comes to show that their perception of the 
environment outside of the Forum is equally important. 
This sudden transformation draws our attention to one more feature of these 
processes. The emerging differences established after the earthquake existed before 
the earthquake. That social and psychic systems became aware of them after the 
earthquake was an evolutionary achievement. The operation of self-description, as it 
was demonstrated in the discussion of the peace processes from 1996 to 1999, does 
not amount to some kind of accurate or objective description of reality. 
The expression of surprise that followed these developments illustrates further the 
autonomy of the operation of self-description. We read on the front page of the 
newspaper Hürriyet "The People Run Ahead of Us". The director of the newspaper 
Ta Nea, Leon Karapanayiotis, stated that "the solidarity that the Greek people express 
is not a surprise only for you [the Turks], but for us as well". 76 Politicians too 
recognized the change and the emergence of new arrangements. The Turkish Prime 
Minister, Bulent Ecevit, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem, and the Greek 
Foreign Minister, George Papandreou, have talked about the expectations this 
phenomenon has created. Ismael Cem, in an interview he gave to a Turkish channel, 
openly confessed that these developments have gone far beyond what politicians had 
thought and he expressed his fears as to the risks of disappointment but also the 
76 Harr 'et, 29.08.1999, Ferai Tine, p.! and p. 18. See also the article written by Sami Kohen in 
Mill yet, 25.08.99, "... The attitude of various levels of society from the ordinary man to the 
businessman, from intellectuals to civilian organizations, surprised not only us, but also government 
officials in Athens.... " 
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responsibility politicians bear after this. 77 "The earthquake has changed everything" in 
Greek-Turkish relations, wrote Mehmet Ali Birand. 78 
The above statements recognized the emergence of the new system. This very 
recognition reinforced the emerging order and ultimately contributed to its 
construction too. 
Causal analysis, based on narrowly defined interactions, cannot cope with these 
paradoxes of communication. Morphogenesis describes the complex processes of 
social change, going well beyond the general and abstract remarks of the sociality of 
peace processes. 79 In what follows I will further elaborate on the autonomy of the new 
system of co-operation. 
5. The Autonomy of the System of Co-operation 
In the previous sections, I explored the increase of complexity after the occurrence of 
the earthquake and I described the emergence of the new order as enforced selectivity 
towards the direction of co-operation. The new system of co-operation employed 
previous determinations of meaning for its autopoiesis. This is possible due to the 
self-referential nature of communications and the specific strategies of generalization 
and re-specification. 
As happened with the system of the Greek-Turkish crisis of 1996, communications 
after the earthquake were generalized in all the three dimensions of meaning: the 
factual, the temporal, and the social. Past events are recalled and connected to present 
occurrences and future expectations are formed through extrapolations from the past 
and the present. References to the Greek help for the victims of the earthquake 
detached themselves from the specific events of the earthquake and sought 
connections to references to a history of co-operation and peaceful Greek-Turkish co- 
existence. Turks who had memories from the years they lived together with Greeks in 
77 "The Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem, said that he has lost the capacity to control 
developments because as he emphasized "immediately after the earthquakes new expectations have 
been established in both countries. "' Eleftherotypia, 15.09.99 
78 Mehmet Ali Birand, "Efharisto Poli, File", http: //www. greekturkishforum. org/arti_6. htm 
79 Gündogdu' s essay on developments after the earthquake employs Wendt' s to discuss the impact of 
the earthquake on Greek-Turkish relations. The argument she makes is that the change of context, 
namely the end of the Cold War, the developments in the Balkans, and the Kosovo crisis enabled these 
developments. Nevertheless, Gündogdu cannot go beyond this observation and explain the timing and 
the nature of these developments. 
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Istanbul, 80 Greeks who had traveled to Turkey on holiday and had enjoyed Turkish 
hospitality, " the common elements in the cultures of the two people, all were recalled 
to support and provide points for further connections in building up the new system. 
Paradoxically enough, the system of co-operation emerged as something that had 
always been there. In the interpretations of these developments, the adverb "always" 
(alternating with "never") underlines the process of generalization on the temporal 
dimension, indicating duration and existence in time. Cengiz Sarri wrote in his 
electronic message "we have always loved you in spite of politics". Bekir Coskun 
argued "we will never again believe those politicians who instigate crises between the 
two states". "It has always been there" maintained the columnist Hadi Uluengin. 
Generalization in the social dimension means that there is no constraint as to who is 
going to make what contribution and when that will happen. As it happened with the 
crisis of 1996 and the peace processes that followed it, in the wake of the earthquake. 
Different social partners can make a contribution to the new order. As was shown 
above, not only and not mainly politicians, but rather journalists and ordinary people 
contributed to the emergence of the system of co-operation. The Greek pensioner, 
Turkish intellectuals who had contacts with Greek writers and poets on the other side 
of the Aegean Sea82 -they all made contributions to the emerging order. 
The above analysis demonstrated that the new system was independent of the will and 
planning of the various social and psychic systems that contributed to its constitution. 
It cannot be identified with the rationale of the system of politics, or media or civil 
society organizations. Ultimately, it was independent from what brought it about, that 
is, co-operation for relief of the victims of the earthquake. It acquired its own identity, 
its own existence as a complex system of Greek-Turkish co-operation. 
Conclusions 
The emergence and sudden diversification and multiplication of co-operative 
interactions between Greeks and Turks have often been described as a paradox, as 
"lacking reason". Indeed, the analysis in this chapter demonstrated that the system of 
co-operation lacked reason, as did the system of crisis in 1996 and the peace processes 
8° Hadi Uluengin in Hürryet, 26.08.99 and Turgul Savkay writing about the Greek national poet 
Giannis Ritsos, in Hürr yet 29.08.99. 
8' See article about the letter Giannis T. Kouris sent to the Turkish Ambassador in Athens, All Tuygan, 
Hürryet, 25.08.99. 
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that emerged from 1996 until 1999. It was neither instigated nor developed by a 
super-system, which was acting under a specific rationale of co-operation and peace 
in the broader region of the Aegean Sea. 
The new system of co-operation was the product of the transformational dynamics of 
communications. Recursive operations of meaning production and processing 
triggered by the earthquake, were set in motion in the news media (Greek, Turkish 
and foreign), civil society organizations, politics, and among ordinary citizens. 
Cascades of fast-moving communication flows, which happened to get caught up in 
meaning networks that intersected one another, enabled the increase of complexity 
and created the need for its reduction. Ultimately, the new system of co-operation was 
itself a reduction of complexity. In that sense there is not a cause, a reason for its 
emergence and constitution. The new system itself is enforced selectivity towards the 
direction of co-operation. 
The initial condition that gave rise to this system was a natural disaster, an accidental 
and thus contingent event. This analysis points to the role of contingency and chance, 
but it underlines at the same time that chance does not mean randomness. Chance 
means lack of co-ordination between events and the structures of a system. This absent 
coordination can nevertheless produce effects and trigger causal processes. It was the 
evolution of society that enabled the amplification and intensification of 
communication processes that constituted the new system. The unexpected 
appearance of the earthquake and the events and actions that followed it were 
incorporated and endowed with meaning and causality by their environment. Previous 
determinations of meaning and social structures like themes, institutions, persons, and 
organizations provided adequate grounds for the functional specification and 
institutionalization of a Greek-Turkish system of co-operation. The new order 
emerged in the course of the autopoiesis, the ongoing self-renewal, of modern 
functionally differentiated society. It was not imposed from outside, it emerged from 
within the Greek and Turkish societies. 
The systems theory perspective sheds light on the transformation process of the 
Greek-Turkish conflict, as a dynamic process which involves the whole of the Greek 
and Turkish societies. Furthermore, it breaks the illusion of Greek-Turkish relations as 
being in a state of stability, to describe their development as a constant process of 
92 Hürrryet, 26.08.99. 
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becoming, restless change and movement; which is a state of dynamic stability. Thus, 
the analysis through Luhmann's theory departs decisively from deterministic 
approaches, which seek to uncover cause-effect relationships according to a 
machinelike Newtonian logic. The dynamics unfolded after the earthquake were the 
dynamics of selectivity and connectivity of communication processes. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE DYNAMICS OF COMPLEXITY REVISITED: THE 1987 CRISIS AND 
THE DAVOS PEACE PROCESS 
In this chapter Luhmann's theory of social autopoiesis is applied to two more cases 
namely the crisis of 1987 and a peace initiative that followed it. The examination of 
another crisis and peace process beyond the chronologically comprehensive period 
from 1996 to 1999 serves four main purposes. First, it will be an additional test for 
Luhmann's theory. Second, the timing of this crisis and peace process enables us to 
put into perspective, in particular, systemic approaches to international crisis, which 
argue for the importance of structural parameters and above all the Cold War 
environment. This chapter will demonstrate that conventional systemic approaches to 
international crisis are static and inflexible whereas Luhmann's modern systems 
theory can better explain the complexity of these phenomena. Third, the crisis of 1987 
and the peace process that followed it, presents a further illustration of the operation 
of the Greek-Turkish conflict in Greek and Turkish societies as an attractor that 
guides social systems' selections and in that way it is being self-reproduced. Finally, 
the peace process of 1987 is an interesting case for comparison with the peace 
processes studied in chapters IV and V. In contrast to the peace processes explored 
above, this failed to take hold in Greek and Turkish societies. 
Here too, it is argued that crisis and peace processes emerge and develop through 
chains of simultaneous meaning constituting processes carried out within a multitude 
of autonomous but interfering social systems such as different ministries, the military 
and the news media which co-evolve with psychic systems. The shift of emphasis 
from structural constraints such as patterns of behaviour, institutionalized goals, 
overlapping roles and routines to structural couplings enables us to explore the 
dynamics of crisis and peace processes as the dynamics of a self-referential society. 
It is demonstrated that the simultaneity of the system/environment relationship and the 
parameter of time are important factors in the determination of the development of the 
crisis of 1987 and the peace process that emerged in the wake of this crisis. Thus, the 
focus of research and analysis is, here too, on the blind spots of social and psychic 
systems and their structural couplings. The distinctions systems employed in their 
operations of self- and other observation and the way these distinctions affected their 
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information processing are explored. Examples of chains of interconnected meaning 
processes illustrate systemic formation through structural couplings demonstrating 
that the dynamics of crisis and peace processes is the dynamics of the connectivity of 
self-referential communications. 
1. The Crisis of 1987 
This section is divided in seven sub-sections. In the first and the second section I 
explore the initial condition that set in motion recursive processes of communication 
and increased the complexity of the situation leading to another bifurcation stage. The 
`butterfly' this time, was Papandreou's decision to buy shares of the Canadian led 
consortium Denisson Morris. The communication of this decision through news 
media was the irritation that when selected by various social systems set in motion 
simultaneously, recursive processes of communication and increased the complexity. 
The third section discusses the moment of the emergence of the crisis. The fourth 
section argues that increased complexity eventually enforced the crisis to emerge as 
enhanced selectivity and explores the selections made by various social systems 
pointing to the blind spots of these systems. It examines in particular the system of the 
consortium, the system of Greek and Turkish politics, the military and media. 
Furthermore, it explores the Akiman-Kapsis interaction system, which provided other 
social and psychic systems in the Greek and Turkish societies with noise for their 
operations of self and other observation and their autopoiesis. Nazmi Akiman was the 
Turkish Ambassador in Athens and Yiannis Kapsis was the then deputy minister of 
foreign affairs with whom Ambassador Akiman met several times during the days of 
the crisis. The fifth section argues that the crisis of 1987 de-escalated through 
reflexive communication and challenges the argument conventional analysis makes, 
which is that the crisis de-escalated due to skillful use of coercive diplomacy. The 
sixth section elaborates on the self-referential nature of communication, which 
enables the crisis to emerge as an autonomous and independent social system. Finally, 
the seventh section illustrates the paradox of the re-entry of crisis back to the system 
of conflict through the mechanisms of writing and printing that is academic discourse 
political rhetoric and journalistic accounts. 
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1.1. Papandreou's decision to Buy Shares of the Consortium as the `Butterfly' 
The crisis of 1987 was built up around the issue of prospecting or drilling for oil in the 
Aegean Sea outside Greek demarcated territorial waters, namely beyond the 6 nautical 
miles from the Greek coastline. The issue of drilling appeared for the first time in the 
Greek political agenda after the statement made by Sakis Peponis, the Minister of 
Industry on the 16a' of February. His statement was that the Greek government 
intended to buy shares of Denisson Morris, the Canadian-led international North 
Aegean Petroleum consortium. The Greek Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, was 
the person who made this decision, ' and the aim was for the Greek government to 
keep control of the consortium's activities. 
This decision had not been prepared on the institutional level by the other entities of 
the Greek government. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kapsis, wrote about 
this: 
.. on the 
16`" of February, turning on the television in order to watch the news, I 
heard the then Minister of Industry Peponis, informing us that with the approval of 
the Prime Minister, he had decided in favour of the compulsory purchase of the 
shares of the consortium. We, the people in the ministry, were staggered at the 
news. That was a dramatic decision that had been made and announced without 
any consultation with us -without any careful planning, without preparation, at 
least on our part. Haralambopoulos [the Minister of Defence], Papoulias [the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs], Maheritsas [Director of the Diplomatic Office of the 
Prime Minister], - all these people were asking each other if any one of them had 
been informed beforehand about it. But no one knew anything about it. 
The announcement of this decision set in motion processes of meaning determination 
within a multitude of social and psychic systems. The `butterfly' in this case was 
Papandreou's decision to buy shares of the consortium. Although not directly related 
to the Greek-Turkish conflict, once communication about it was disseminated through 
news media, unexpected chain reactions happened, cascades of communication 
processes, which amplified it and attributed to it the meaning of the cause of crisis. In 
the section that follows, I will describe the processes of amplification of this initial 
condition and the subsequent increase of complexity. 
1 Interview with Carolos Papoulias, Athens, 13.03.02. 
2 Yiannis Kapsis, The Three Days of March, p. 41-42. Mr. Kapsis was also critical of the decision of 
the Ministry of Industry saying that "the Ministry of Industry took this decision which to my opinion 
was unexplained". Interview with Yiannis Kapsis, Athens, 18.07.01. 
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2. A Stage of Bifurcation 
The decision of the Greek government to buy shares of the consortium created a stage 
of bifurcation. It triggered processes of communication within various social and 
psychic systems, increasing the complexity of the situation in Greece and Turkey. It 
raised the question of whether the Greek government was planning exploration or 
drilling outside its demarcated territorial waters and whether by means of this action it 
planned to proceed to a de facto expansion to 12 miles. Expansion of Greek territorial 
waters was considered by Turkey as a major threat to its national interests. Thus, the 
question was: is it a threat, is it a crisis or not? This stage was characterised by 
increasing complexity, uncertainty and intense observation. It was a situation of 
double contingency as each side made its attitude dependent on the other's stance and 
where every accident and every error could be productive. 
So far, I have presented some reactions from people from within the Greek Ministries 
of Foreign Affairs and Defence. The Greek press was puzzled by Papandreou's 
decision and saw in this a lack of planning and aim. 3 The consortium reacted to that 
decision too. The President of the Board of Directors of the consortium, Parmeli, 
denied negotiations with the Greek government and argued that this decision hid 
Greek intentions to proceed on its own with the drilling. In an interview given on the 
23d of February, Parmeli replied to the invitation to negotiate, stating that according 
to the contract the company had signed with the Greek state, the consortium was 
entitled to proceed with drilling east of Thasos, beyond the 6 nautical miles. 
Moreover, he stated that the company would proceed with drilling on the 28`" of 
March. At the same time he added an international dimension to this issue - he asked 
for the intervention of countries that had vested interests in the consortium, namely 
Canada, West Germany, and the United States, since these were the nationalities of 
the consortium's companies. 
The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yiannis Kapsis, and the Minister of Industry, 
Sakis Peponis, tried to answer Parmeli's accusations in a common press conference 
they gave on February 26th. There however, a Greek journalist asked them whether 
Greece intended to expand its territorial waters. Peponis passed the question to 
3 The decision was characterised as a "spasmodic" and an "incomprehensible" move. See the Greek 
newspapers Eleftherotypia 08.03.87 and Vradyni, 08.03.87. 
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Kapsis, who was surprised. He admits in his book that "I looked for an unclear or 
vague answer and I said without having thought much the phrase that became the 
slogan repeated ad nauseam during the days that followed". 4 Kapsis's answer did not 
remove uncertainty: "Whether, when, and where Greece will carry out drilling is a 
sovereign right of Greece expressed by its legally elected government at any given 
time". 
This "slogan", which was an improvisation by Yiannis Kapsis, was the constitutive 
element employed by various systems in order to carry out their operations enabling 
their further autopoiesis and increasing the complexity of the situation. The Greek 
administration considered this statement to be the implementation of the Greek 
foreign policy. Its meaning as interpreted by them was that Greece reserves the right 
to expansion as it has always done in the past. The Greek media however, started 
speculating about the meaning of the Greek government's decision to buy the shares 
of the company and the meaning behind Kapsis's statement. The press conferences 
Parmeli and Kapsis and Peponis gave, were also the trigger for news production 
through the Greek and Turkish medias' recursive operations, which further increased 
the complexity of the situation. From the point of view of the Turkish press the "hot" 
news was that Greece invalidated the Berne Agreement. 5 Ambassador Akiman 
however, and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs had different concerns. 
Ambassador Akiman had protested against what Turkey considered Greek violation 
of the Berne Agreement several times in the past from 1984 to 1987. However, this 
time he considered Kapsis's statement a formula to hide the Greek designs for 
research and possibly drillings beyond the six miles in the immediate future, which 
would mean expansion of Greek territorial waters. Ambassador Akiman visited 
Kapsis immediately after the interview the latter gave and asked the Greek 
government to stop the consortium from proceeding with exploration outside Greek 
territorial waters. The argument of the Turkish government was that the drillings 
beyond the 6 miles would violate the Berne Agreement signed by Greece and Turkey 
4 Yiannis Kapsis, The Three Days of March, p. 50. 
s See articles in Hürrryet about this issue from the 1" of March to the 7t' of March 1987, see also 
Cumhurryet 03.03.87. The articles make a general reference to the invalidation of the Berne Agreement 
instead of informing about the different interpretations Greece and Turkey held over the Agreement 
and the background of this dispute. 
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on the 116' of November 1976.6 Article 6 of the Agreement stipulated that the two 
parties should abstain from any act or initiative related to the continental shelf that 
might prejudice the negotiations for the resolution of the dispute. However, the Greek 
answer was that there were no negotiations going on at that time; therefore, this 
agreement was not operative. 
On March 6t', a bill for the nationalization of the shares of the consortium was 
proposed in the Greek Parliament. According to the bill, the companies of the 
consortium were invited to negotiate regarding the conditions of the sale of the shares. 
If 3 months should pass without any sign of interest on the part of the companies of 
the consortium then the Greek government would proceed with the application of 
Article 106, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Greek Constitution, which made a provision for 
such a case. 
From the first days of March until the 27th of March, the day of the peak of the crisis, 
the complexity of the situation increased with the maneuvers of the Turkish 
prospecting ship Piri-Reis accompanied by warships, the increased presence of Greek 
warships and certain "dogfights" within the Greek airspace. While under normal 
circumstances these are institutionalized routines frequently employed by both sides 
in the Aegean now they acquired their own dynamics further constraining social 
systems' operations of meaning determination towards the direction of confrontation. 
3.1. The Emergence of the Crisis 
The bifurcation stage was a stage of increasing complexity during which the crisis had 
not yet emerged. Various systems were trying to make sense of and rationalize what 
was happening. It was after the decision of the Turkish National Security Council to 
6 Greece set its sea borders at 6 nautical miles from the coastline, in accordance to international law, 
with an internal law of 1936. Later on, when the Geneva Convention regarding the Law of the Sea was 
signed in 1969, Greece ratified it and declared that according to the Convention, it has the right to 
expand its territorial waters to 12 miles. Initially, Turkey did not oppose this declaration, but after the 
invasion of Cyprus in 1974, it started disputing not only the potential expansion of the Greek territorial 
waters to 12 miles but also the operational limits of its airspace and the rules to be applied for the 
demarcation of the continental shelf. In 1976, Greece and Turkey came close to war over the issue of 
the continental shelf, which led the leaders of the two countries to sign the Berne Agreement. The 
reader should bear in mind that Turkey does not dispute the expansion of Greek territorial waters 
in 
general. Turkey has already expanded its own territorial waters to 12 miles in the Black Sea and 
in the 
Mediterranean, excluding the area of the Aegean, for which it applied the 6 miles plus 6 rule. Turkey 
does not dispute the Greek right of expansion in the Aegean Sea in general. In the case of the drilling 
off Thassos, Greece has the right to drilling beyond the 6 miles and this is not disputed as such. 
However, Turkey's fear was that if Greece would start expanding its territorial waters - even in non- 
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grant exploration and exploitation licenses to the state-owned Turkish Petroleum 
Company (TPAO) that the crisis fully emerged. These permits covered areas outside 
the six miles of territorial waters off the Greek islands of Samothrace, Lesbos, Chios, 
Lemnos, and Agios Efstratios. "The Turkish National Security Council gave 
permission for seismic research to the TPAO. That was the message. The crisis had 
started" writes the then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yiannis Kapsis. 7 The 
same day the Greek National Security and Foreign Policy Council (composed of the 
Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces) was convened. Coming out of the 
meeting, the Greek Prime Minister declared that "[I]f the Turks attempt drillings we 
will hit them". To make this decision more convincing, the Greek government also 
decided to close the American military base at Nea Makri. 
In the remainder of this chapter it will be demonstrated that the crisis of 1987 was not 
designed by any decision-maker: it emerged as combined selectivity through 
selections made by various social and psychic systems and through structural 
couplings among them in the course of their autopoiesis. 
3.2. The Blind Spots of Social Systems 
The above description of the events of the crisis is not sufficient to explain the 
emergence and escalation of the crisis of 1987. `Actions' are considered to be the 
externalization of the self-reference of the social systems that observe them, 
simplified self-descriptions of these systems and their environments. As shown above, 
social systems observe events, that is they select to observe certain events and not 
others and by observing them they attribute meaning to them, according to their pre- 
established rationale, aims and programmes. Nevertheless, they cannot see the re- 
entry of their previous determinations of meaning back into society neither can they 
control the consequences of their operations. Here I examine how the social systems 
of politics, the economy, the military, media and the interaction system between 
Akiman-Kapsis carried out their selections. I will demonstrate that they were 
disputed areas - it can continue doing so for the whole of the Aegean Sea, including areas contested by 
Turkey. 
7 Yiannis Kapsis, The Three Days of March, p. 63. 
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operationally closed but cognitively open systems. 8 Furthermore, from a second order 
observation perspective, I look to disentangle the structural couplings, that is the a- 
causal connections of communications, which enabled the autopoiesis of crisis. 
Examples of structural couplings illustrate that the dynamics of crisis is found in the 
connectivity of communications and the paradoxes of systems' blind spots. 
3.2.1. The Consortium 
From the chronicle of the crisis and the consequent presentation of the events that 
composed the crisis it became clear that the stance of the consortium played an 
important role in the emergence of the crisis. The consortium is a sub-system of the 
function system of the economy. Accordingly, it observed its environment and drew 
distinctions employing the binary code of profit/non profit. 
The President of the Board of Directors of the company, Parmeli, appeared to be 
convinced that the Greek state was determined to harm the interests of the company. 
To understand the stance of the consortium we need to take into account the 
company's interests and the conditions of its activities stipulated by the contract 
signed with the Greek government. Kapsis himself describes these conditions as 
follows: 
The consortium was right on its own part to insist on its right to conduct research 
outside the six miles of demarcated territorial waters. It had the obligation and the 
right provided by its contract to carry out drillings until the 1st of April. And if it 
did not utilize its right by that date, it would lose that right on its own 
responsibility. 9 
Additionally, something that illuminates further the insistence of the consortium to 
carry out the drilling, concerns the importance attached at that time to the Aegean 
Sea's oil resources. During the eighties there was still the general conviction that 
8 Both psychic and social systems process complexity in the form of 'meaning'. In other words they 
can internally represent the complexity of the world through ̀ meaning'. Their difference is that psychic 
systems' mode of operation is consciousness and social systems' mode of operation is communication. 
For the distinction between life, psychic and social systems see Chapter II, pp. 45-46. 
9 Although Kapsis explains the rationale of the consortium in his book (p. 40), in the same book he 
argues that the crisis was instigated by some international financial interests, which also conspired 
against the then Greek socialist government. Furthermore, he makes a hint about the links of these 
interests with Turkey. "The people of the consortium and their inseparable friends were waiting for, if 
they were not preparing it, a crisis in the Aegean which would lead to the toppling of Papandreou's 
government". Yiannis Kapsis, The Three Days ..., p. 52 In the interview he gave to the author 
he 
argued clearly that this crisis "was very well designed" and it occurred "in order to serve the economic 
interests of the consortium and in order to serve the purpose of the imposition of the policy of the 
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these resources were rich in hydrocarbons. That was of considerable importance 
because the oil in the Caucasus had not been discovered yet. '° 
This explains why Parmeli, in the press conference that he gave following the Greek 
invitation to negotiations by the Minister of Industry, stated publicly that Greece 
wanted to buy the shares in order to proceed with the drilling on its own. ' 1 He rejected 
the Greek explanations regarding the possible implications that the company's plans 
for exploration outside the six miles might have on Greek-Turkish relations. Greek 
arguments based on political considerations, about the sensitivity of the issue, could 
not find a sympathetic hearing. Parmeli's interpretation was consistent with the 
rationale of the system of economy, which is expressed in the profit/not profit code. 
It was Parmeli's statements which included a definite date for the commencement of 
drillings - the 28th of March - that enabled further structural couplings and thus the 
autopoiesis of crisis. These statements put a pressure on the Greek government to 
proceed with its plan for the nationalization of the consortium employing the 
provisions of the Greek Constitution for compulsory nationalization. The same 
statements were employed by the Turkish government in its communications with the 
Greek government and with the international community. The Turkish representative 
to the United Nations, Ambassador Ilter Turkmen, referred to these statements in his 
letter to the Secretary General of the UN - as evidence of Greece's plans to proceed 
with drilling outside the six nautical miles, the limit of the Greek demarcated 
territorial waters. 
3.2.2. The Akiman-Kapsis Interaction System 
In this section I will examine the Kapsis-Akiman interaction system and I will 
demonstrate that it played a significant role in the emergence and the development of 
the crisis. 12 Akiman was the Turkish Ambassador in Athens. Kapsis was the Greek 
Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of Greek-Turkish affairs. The two of them met 
several times during February and March. The argument put forward here is that their 
American State Department ̀ sit down in a negotiations table and discuss it'. In other words a package 
deal". Interview with the Deputy Foreign Minister Yiannis Kapsis, Athens, 18.07.01. 
10 This was something that both Ambassador Zeppos and Admiral Kiyat emphasised in their 
explanation of the crisis. Today however, with modem satellite and other research systems it has been 
known that the Aegean Sea is not as rich in hydrocarbons as it was thought. Interviews with 
Ambassador Costas Zeppos, Athens, 14.09.01 and with Admiral Attila Kiyat, Istanbul, 08.11.01. 
11 Yiannis Kapsis, The Three Days of March, p. 39. 
207 
interaction was not constituted of the two individuals who participated in these 
meetings, as traditional sociology could probably argue. An interaction system is a 
highly complex social system. Psychic systems make part of the environment of an 
interaction along with other social systems. Interactions and thus the Akiman-Kapsis 
interaction too, produce noise, which can be used by other social and psychic systems 
in order to continue their autopoiesis. The Akiman-Kapsis interaction offered a field 
of experimentation for social systems in the Greek and Turkish societies, the a-causal 
couplings of which eventually constituted the crisis of 1987. 
This interaction system was constituted of structural couplings of various social 
systems such as the diplomacy, the system of the Greek socialist politics, which 
included also references to a strong anti-Americanism and the history of the meetings 
the two men had in the past. Furthermore, the operations of the above systems were 
conditioned by the institutionalised Greek-Turkish conflict. 
Diplomacy is an observing system institutionalised in modern society. Accordingly, it 
has developed its own practices and patterns of behaviour, a set of formal rules and 
language to be employed by diplomats. The role of a diplomat is precisely to 
understand the meaning behind the words said and the intentions behind what has not 
been said. Under the condition of the Greek-Turkish conflict, Akiman as a diplomat 
was observing intensely trying to see what the Greek government was preparing and 
what Kapsis in particular was concealing. He says: 
at the end of our meeting I asked him [Kapsis], `I want to be clear when I report 
this. Does the Greek government contemplate performing any exploration beyond 
the 6 miles? ' The answer Kapsis gave was this: he lay back in his chair, put his 
hands behind his head (and this is something I reported to my government too) and 
he said, ̀ We will carry out exploration wherever we want in the Aegean'. `Are you 
sure about this? ' I asked him. `This might create difficulties in our relations'. He 
said, 'Yes, I am sure'. 13 
The system of Kapsis-Akiman interaction was formed by both oral communication 
and body language. Body language is also communication which was being observed 
by Ambassador Akiman at the time, and which irritated and misled him. Ambassador 
Akiman interpreted Kapsis' body language and gestures as a signal that the Greek 
government had decided to proceed with drillings and Kapsis was engaged in some 
1Z About the nature and function of interaction systems within society, see Chapter II, p. 46. 
13 Interview with Ambassador Nazmi Akiman, Istanbul, 22.05.01. 
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form of intrigue. 14 In order to explain how the Turkish diplomacy processed 
information and attributed meaning to it, how in other words it constrained infinite 
complexity and continued its operation, we can further explore the semantics it 
employed for this task. 
The already accumulated knowledge and experience from the contact Akiman had 
with Kapsis - during the previous three years - conditioned the Turkish diplomat's 
understanding of the situation. 15 Earlier selections structured complexity and acquired 
their own dynamic. The example that follows will shed light to the process of the 
constitution of this history through successive selections. 
In 1985, Akiman was informed through intelligence reports that drilling had taken 
place in the Gulf of Strymonikos, outside the 6 miles of the Greek demarcated 
territorial waters and he went to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs to protest 
against the violation of the Berne Agreement. 16 Kapsis then maintained that the 
drillings took place within the already demarcated 6 miles of Greek territorial waters. 
Akiman asked for the co-ordinates and Kapsis did not give them to him. When 
Akiman insisted and he was given the co-ordinates, it became clear that the drillings 
took place outside the 6 miles of demarcated territorial waters. Kapsis's answer then 
was that "I had the impression that it was within the territorial waters but it seems that 
we made a mistake". 
17 This event was interpreted by Ambassador Akiman and the 
Turkish government as indicative of the intentions of the Greek government to find an 
opportunity and expand its territorial waters. Kapsis on the other hand, dismissed the 
importance of this and other similar incidents because, he argues, that the region 
where the drillings took place was not a disputed by Turkey area. 18 
At this point we should explore further how the system of Greek politics perceived its 
environment at that time. Kapsis's rhetoric vis-ä-vis Ambassador Akiman reflects the 
14 ibid.. 
15 Interview with Ambassador Nazmi Akiman, Istanbul, 22.05.0 1. See also footnote 7. 
16 The reader should keep in mind that the region mentioned here is not disputed as such by Turkey. 
Greece, according to the International Law of the Sea, has the right to expand its territorial waters in 
that area. See also footnote 3. 
17 Kapsis confirms this incident in the book that he wrote about the crisis. Another interesting piece of 
information he gives in the same book is that the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime 
Minister himself did not know for many years that exploration activities were taking place. Kapsis 
writes in his book "[I]t was a big surprise. With the first reading [of the relevant file] it became obvious 
that for 6 years, exploration and drilling were taking place without the slightest briefing of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. The only exception was probably a letter of Evangelos Couloumbis in 1982, asking 
for our opinion", Kapsis, The Three Days of March, p. 39. 
18 Interview with Yiannis Kapsis, Athens, 18.07.01. 
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structural couplings among the system of the Greek socialist politics, the Greek- 
Turkish conflict and the semantics with which the Greek politics perceived the Greek- 
American relations. An important element that determined the operations of meaning 
determination on the part of the Greek government was the interpretation of the 
presence of the US Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger and the Assistant 
Secretary of Defence Richard Perle in Ankara during these days. Their presence in 
Turkey was perceived as evidence of the involvement of the USA in instigating a 
Greek-Turkish crisis because Greece -a small country - was going against its plans. 19 
Greek politicians attributed meaning to this event concluding that the USA was 
backing Turkey in this crisis in order to teach a lesson to Greece "for not being 
obedient" as the Greek Foreign Minister Papoulias said to Bulgarian President, 
Zhivkov in the meeting he had with him on the 27th of March in Sofia. 
Kapsis writes: 
There is no probative evidence, neither the smallest, which proves the allegation 
that Weinberger agreed and Richard Perle co-operated with the military 
establishment of Turkey for the preparation of the crisis of March. But on the other 
hand, there can be no promise, no assurance, no argument to convince all of us 
who lived these dramatic moments that Perle's role was not decisive. 20 
And at another point "[I]nconceivable naivety would be required for anyone to 
believe that neither Weinberger nor Perle had understood the Turkish intentions - that 
the Turkish generals proceeded [to the crisis] without informing their real 
superiors". ' 
Kapsis's attitude and rhetoric in his meetings with Akiman was in the same line with 
Andreas Papandreou's foreign policy as it had been expressed until that time. That 
involved a tough rhetoric against Turkey, "the country that had invaded and occupied 
Cyprus" as well as the socialist rhetoric of an independent vis-ä-vis the West and 
especially the USA, foreign policy. So, Greek Deputy Minister's stance meant to 
express the resistance of Greece to the plans, Kapsis assumed that Turks and 
Americans had prepared. The same rhetoric, however, was interpreted by the Turkish 
diplomat as hiding Greek intentions for drillings. 
Ambassador Akiman did not understand the way the Greek government perceived its 
environment at that time. In a double contingent situation social systems remain 
" See references to Papandreou' s policy as regards nuclear weapons p. 60, p. 199. 
20 Yiannis Kapsis, The Three Days of March, p. 75. 
21 ibid., p. 75. 
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opaque and incalculable to each other. They are operationally closed systems, which 
communicate selectively with their environment. 
Another incident described by Kapsis in his book on the crisis substantiates further the 
above analysis and it illustrates the distinctions employed by the systems of 
diplomacy and politics when they were carrying out their meaning constituting 
operations. The night of the 270s of March, when the crisis had been de-escalated after 
the unofficial intervention of Boutos22, Ambassador Akiman was again invited to the 
Ministry, where he was given an official confirmation of what had been said 
unofficially in his meeting with Boutos. Kapsis describes an incident that took place 
the moment Ambassador Akiman was at the door of his office and he gave him his 
hand to send him off. 
Akiman pulled me slightly outside trying to give a completely unofficial and 
friendly tone to what he had to tell me. 'So,... between us Mr. Minister.. tell me 
have you planned any drilling for the foreseeable future? ' His question had a tone 
of agony..... 'Even if we wanted to do drillings, we do not have floating drilling 
machines. The consortium, as you know very well, terminated the contract of the 
floating drilling machine, which is in Keratsini for repair"'. 23 
This incident sheds light to the assumption upon which the Greek politician based his 
attitude during the previous days. Kapsis assumed that Turkey knew very well that 
Greece did not have the appropriate drilling machine to proceed with the drilling. This 
was a "fact", beyond any doubt. "It's impossible that Ankara did not know that the 
drilling machine was in Perama. Everybody knew it. Don' t they have spies? " Kapsis 
argues. 24 
On the other hand Ambassador Akiman says "[M]y perception, until Kapsis told me 
at the very last meeting that there are no drilling machines, was that they were going 
to do something.... s25 Akiman interpreted what was happening as hiding a well- 
organized Greek plan to challenge Turkey. He was convinced that Papandreou was 
behind Kapsis's attitude and that he was engaging in brinkmanship, testing the limits 
of Turkey. 26 His anxiety and agony reflected in the question he asked Kapsis, makes 
u See below the section on the de-escalation of the crisis where I present the accidental but catalytic 
intervention of loannis Boutos, pp. 215-217. 
23 Yiannis Kapsis, The Three Days of March, p. 102. 
24 Interview with Yiannis Kapsis, Athens, 18.07.0 1. 
25 Interview with Ambassador Nazmi Akiman, 22.05.0 1. 
26 "I know that Mr. Kapsis often was going to Andreas Papandreou and was boasting that he had put 
Akiman into a corner. As far as I know Papandreou did not encourage him. Nevertheless, neither did he 
discourage him". ibid.. 
211 
clear that until that moment he was convinced that Greece was planning drillings 
beyond its demarcated territorial waters. 
The above analysis demonstrates how the Greek politician and the Turkish diplomat 
interpreted certain events, which they had constructed in the first place by selecting 
them as purposeful ̀ actions'. For Kapsis, Turkey's protests were only the pretext the 
Turkish government used in order to proceed with its plans against Greece. For 
Akiman, Greece had decided to make a fait accompli in the Aegean. 
Distrust was another important environmental condition of this interaction system. 
Ambassador Akiman argues that he could not trust Kapsis. Kapsis, on the other hand, 
was very suspicious of Turkey and the role of the USA in Greek-Turkish relations in 
general. Distrust, in a way similar to trust, reduces complexity and achieves 
simplification. Furthermore, it is the case that the person who distrusts becomes more 
dependent on less information. 
What follows is another example that illustrates how pre-existing structures of 
meaning make social systems oversensitive to specific items of information and guide 
their selections towards certain events ignoring others. On the 19th of March the Greek 
Minister of Defence, Haralambopoulos, made the statement that "the Aegean Sea is 
Greek and it will remain Greek". The Turkish Ministry and Ambassador Akiman 
linked this statement causally to other events of the time, considering it another clear 
sign of the Greek intentions to expand the Greek territorial waters. Ambassador 
Akiman connected Haralampopoulos's statement with a similar statement Kapsis had 
made in one of their meetings. There, Kapsis said "we have over 3000 islands which 
also have continental shelf and this means [the Aegean Sea] is almost a Greek lake 
and this is why I think that you should not be bothered with this". 27 
The above analysis of the Akiman-Kapsis interaction demonstrates that 
communication does not necessarily mean understanding. Akiman sent a report to 
Ankara, which was clearly stating that Greece was preparing exploration activities 
outside its territorial waters. "If I had any doubts that they would [carry out 
exploration] of course I would have reported that. And if I had reported that, perhaps 
Turkey would not have acted the way it did by sending ships into the Aegean Sea". 28 
Akiman's report however, was not the result of a linear cause-effect process. Rather, 
27 Interview with Ambassador Nazmi Akiman, Istanbul, 22.05.01 
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it was another contingent emerging order. That means that it was neither necessary 
nor impossible. It was constituted through the structural couplings that is the a-causal 
synchronisation of various social systems to a common direction - the direction of the 
crisis. 
3.2.3. The Turkish Politics 
The Turkish government and bureaucracy during the days of the crisis employed its 
own distinctions in order to make sense of what was going on. The then spokesman of 
the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Yalim Eralp, illuminates the 
processes of meaning determination and the semantics that guided their information 
processing. 
You set the whole thing within a general framework. Greece had become a 
member of the European Community and inch by inch it was moving its 
position.... We don't have to look for additional information. This is the picture. 
The statement [made by Haralambopoulos] that the Aegean is Greek, the statement 
that Greece has the right to extend its territorial waters, then Greece says that it has 
the right to drill but is simply buying the shares in order to control the situation.... 
Each country was arming against each other, not against the Soviet Union". 29 
This description aptly illustrates the operations of selective gathering of information 
according to a specific scheme of interpretation and the attribution of meaning to this 
information. The Turkish politics attributed systematicity to its environment 
according to the distinctions of Greece v Turkey and Europe v Turkey, and Greece's 
aim being the expansion of its territorial waters against Turkey's national interests. It 
therefore connected various events and considered them purposeful `actions' aiming 
to harm its interests. 
3.2.4. The Turkish Military 
The crisis fully emerged after the statement made by the General Secretary of the 
Turkish National Security Council regarding the departure of the Piri-Reis and the 
permits for exploration granted to the Turkish Petroleum Company. This statement 
was perceived by Greek politicians as evidence for the determination of the Turkish 
military to proceed to a heated confrontation with Greece. 
In this section I will argue that this event too was not the result of an imperative 




couplings of different communicative systems. Institutionalized practices, the 
rationale of the Turkish military, and contingencies such as the absence of the Turkish 
Prime Minister for health reasons made up the complexity of the environment that 
gave rise to this statement. 
The involvement of the Turkish army in managing the crisis was pre-determined by 
the constitutional position of the Turkish army within the power structure of Turkey 
and the provisions with regard to the National Security Council in particular. 30 In 
addition, the military took the lead in managing the crisis at this specific moment 
because Prime Minister Turgut Ozal was away for health reasons. Ambassador 
Akiman's report from Athens was linked with the Turkish military's self-perceived 
mission as being the ultimate guard of the Turkish national interest, which stems from 
Turkish history. Given the evaluation of the situation by the bureaucrats of the 
Turkish Foreign Ministry, the army made its decisions according to its own rationale 
and based on the means it had at its disposal. Granting permits for exploration to the 
Turkish company was considered to be a reply to the Greek challenge to proceed with 
drillings in non-demarcated waters showing determination to protect the Turkish 
rights even with military power. As Admiral Kiyat put it, "after all an army exists in 
order to fight" rather than considering the alternatives to military confrontation. The 
latter was something that rested with politicians. 31 
On the other side of the Aegean however, Greek leaders interpreted the statement of 
the General Secretary of the Turkish NSC that Turkey will proceed with drillings too, 
as evidence of the Turkish aggressiveness and intent to expand in the Aegean Sea. 
The Turkish decision was coupled with Greek expectations and it formed the ground 
upon which the Greek National Security and Foreign Policy Council made its own 
dramatic decisions for military mobilization. Kapsis describes as follows the reception 
.. of the Turkish decision: "[T]hat was a crisis we have been expecting since 1985" 
32 
30 A further note regarding the institutional position of the Turkish National Security Council (Milli 
Güvenlik Kurulu) within the power structure in Turkey is required here. It is a body of special power 
which includes, besides the Prime Minister and members of the cabinet, top-level military officers. The 
synthesis and power of this institution is provided by the Constitution of 1982, which was written by 
the militaryjunta of General Kenan Evren. This arrangement allows the military to participate in all 
important political and other decisions. The elimination of the NSC as a constitutional body and the 
restriction of its responsibility only for national defence issues is included in the legislative changes 
Turkey has to make in its road to EU membership. See Bulent Tanor, "Perspectives on Democratisation 
in Turkey: Progress Report 2001", 
http: //www. tusiad. orglenglish/rapor/perspective/democsummary. pdf 
31 Interview with Admiral Attila Kiyat, Istanbul, 08.11.01. 
32 Yiannis Kapsis, The Three Days of March, p. 17. 
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and at another page of the same book ".. our most serious fears were confirmed. There 
was no doubt about it". 33 
The constitutive element of the crisis was not the statement of the Secretary General 
of the Turkish National Security Council as such, but its interpretation by Greek 
officials according to their previous determinations of meaning. Nevertheless, the 
mobilization of the military forces further constrained complexity towards the 
direction of violent conflict. 
To understand the Greek reaction we have to take into account the distinctions the 
Greek politics employed to make sense of what was happening at that time. The fact 
that the Turkish military was in charge of crisis management triggered references 
within Greece to its own past and to the way Greeks perceive Turkish history. The 
Greek perception about the Turkish military and its role in the history of its country 
emphasizes that the Turkish army has overthrown the legally elected government of 
Turkey twice. 34 Furthermore, Greeks have understood these events through their own 
history of the military junta of Georgios Papadopoulos (1967-73). In the Greek self- 
understanding, recent Greek history is marked by the resistance of the Greek people 
against the junta and the victory of democracy. This is a landmark in the Greek 
collective memory, celebrated every year throughout the country. Greeks understand 
the Turkish history - hetero-reference- through the Greek experience - self-reference. 
Thus, the Greeks observed the developments by employing the distinction Turkey as a 
non-democratic state, run by the military and Greece as a democratic country. The 
Greek perception of Turkey being a country `ruled' by the military is reinforced by 
the simplified image Greeks hold with regard to the Turkish invasion and occupation 
of Cyprus in 1974. That image has lead to overgeneralizations regarding the 
particularities and complexities of Turkish politics and the position of the military 
within Turkish society. Nevertheless, these distinctions employed by the Greek 
33 ibid., p. 63. 
34 Two coups d'etats have marked the recent Turkish history, in 1960, and 1980. Furthermore, the 
intervention of the military in 1971 was another covert coup d'6tat. The generals asked Prime Minister 
Suleyman Demirel to resign otherwise they would remove him. This is what is known as the 
remarkable ̀ coup by memorandum' as the tanks did not come to the streets. Finally in 1997, again the 
generals toppled the coalition government led by the Islamic party, the Prosperity (Refah) Party, led by 
Necmettin Erbakan because of the fear of the Islamic danger. For the three first coups d'etat see Harris, 
George, S., Turkey: Coping with Crisis, London; Sydney Boulder: Westview Press, 1985 and Dodd, C., 
(ed. ), The crisis of Turkish Democracy, London, The Eothern Press, 1990, for the last one see Cengiz 
Landar, ciktik Acik Alinla - 28 Subat Post-modern Darbe Gecidi'nde, [in Turkish], Timas Yayinlari, 
2001. 
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government during the days of the crisis simplified the complexity of the situation and 
enabled social and psychic systems to continue their operations. 
3.2.5. The Greek Politics 
The statement of the Turkish National Security Council that granted permission for 
exploration triggered as shown above processes of meaning determination which led 
to the decision of the Greek Council of Foreign Policy and Security to place the 
military forces on full alert. This action was a simplified self-description of the system 
of Greek politics and its environment. The complexity is reflected in Papandreou's 
words when he met Boutos the most critical day of the crisis: 
"it is no accident that this is happening. Ozal is returning from the United States 
where he had a medical operation, he stops in London and the day he is in London 
the Piri-Reis is coming out. Consequently, the Turkish government makes that 
move with the approval and even the exhortation of the Americans and the British 
and they pursue the humiliation of Greece. But I cannot accept this. 35 
This description of the situation by Papandreou illuminates the way Greek politics 
perceived its environment and the semantics that guided its operations of meaning 
determination. For the processing - that is selection and interpretation - of information 
the Greek government employed the simplified distinctions, Turkey v Greece, and the 
USA v Greece. 36 These distinctions guided the operations of self and other- 
observation together with the self-description of the PASOK government and 
Papandreou himself as its leader. In his search for a rational explanation, Papandreou 
selected and attributed meaning to information, causally connecting several events a 
posteriori. Ozal's trip to the USA and his stop in London on his way back to Ankara 
was considered to be relevant to the crisis, not accidental. In the meeting of the 
National Security and Foreign Policy Council, Papandreou informing the members of 
the Council said: "It is impressive - and I want to stress the emphasis before I refer to 
the second phase of the crisis - that all this time Ozal was in the USA. That only 
yesterday when the National Security Council of Turkey took the important decision, 
only then he departed from the USA. Furthermore, we cannot not take into account 
that Weinberger stayed six days in Ankara and Perle stayed even more - he left only 
35 Interview with Ioannis Boutos, Athens, 05.07.01. 
36 See the speech Andreas Papandreou delivered on the 27th of March on the television as well as the 
first words he said to Boutos when the latter arrived at his office some hours later the same day. 
Eleftherotypia, 28.03.1987 pp. 6-7. 
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yesterday despite the fact that he is supposed to have resigned from the 25 th of 
March... 07 
The Turkish rationale remained completely out of sight of the Greek government, 
media, and civil society. Papandreou's exact words when he met Ambassador Akiman 
were "Mr. Akiman, I did not know what was going on at that moment [during the 
days of the escalation of the crisis], believe me. A war between Turkey and Greece? 
This is unthinkable. How could I build the economy of that country once again? "38 
His surprise again is an apt illustration of the paradoxical constitution of the crisis as 
combined selectivity and temporalised complexity. It demonstrates that the crisis of 
1987 was not developed out of a process of rational and careful calculation. In any 
case such a process would presuppose complete information; yet under the condition 
of infinite complexity systems can access reality only selectively. 
Papandreou felt compelled by the crisis itself to take the decision for full military 
mobilization. The paradox is that he had contributed to the emergence of the crisis in 
the first place. When Boutos visited the Greek Prime Minister and explained to him 
the Turkish perception of the situation, Papandreou was seemingly surprised by the 
Turkish reading of the situation. 39 Furthermore, he exploded in anger at Kapsis when 
he realized that he had misperceived Turkey's actions and intentions on the basis of 
Kapsis's reports. 40 For that reason he used Boutos as an alternate channel of 
communication with the Turkish Ambassador. 41 Nevertheless, Kapsis's stance was 
partly constructed by Papandreou himself. Kapsis writes in his book that Papandreou 
was enthusiastic about the slogan he invented at the press conference and it was 
repeated thereafter. The themes that guided the selections of social systems in Greece 
had been constructed by Papandreou's rhetoric since his election as the first socialist 
Prime Minister in Greece in 1982. The `slogans' that prevailed these years in Greece 
were against NATO and the American military bases, and against the European 
Community as well. Although his policy was not different from his predecessors vis- 
ä-vis these organizations his anti-NATO and anti-American rhetoric, took its own 
dynamic during these days of March. Papandreou could not see the re-entry of his 
37 Yiannis Kapsis, The Three Days of March, pp. 74-75. 
39 Interview with Ambassador Nazmi Akiman, 22.05.01. 
39 Interview with loannis Boutos, Athens, 05.07.01. 
40 See below the section about the de-escalation of the crisis. 
41 Yiannis Kapsis, The Three Days of March, p. 50. 
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own distinctions back to the society as constitutive elements in the emerging system 
of the crisis of 1987. 
3.2.6. The Greek Military 
On the other hand, for the Greek military, as for the Turkish military, the important 
distinction was threat/no threat, which corresponds to the distinction of war/peace. 
Following the orders it received from the political leadership, the Greek military 
undertook advanced preparations in the light of a prospective war against Turkey, 
according to its own institutionalized practices, rationale and plans. The preparations 
included the mobilization of heavy artillery in the streets in cities in Northern Greece - 
Xanthi, Komotini, Alexandroupoli, and Orestiada - as well as marching orders for 
reservists. 
3.2.7. The Greek Civil Society 
The mobilization of the armed forces, observed by the Greek civil society was 
perceived as a sign of preparations for war and spread the panic to the habitants of 
cities in Northern Greece. They packed their belongings in their cars and made long 
queues in the streets leading to Southern Greece. 2 In the last two days of the crisis 
there were shortages of goods in the supermarkets, as people believed that an attack 
from Turkey was imminent and rushed to stockpile basic necessities. 
3.2.8. The Greek and Turkish News Media 
The Greek and Turkish press played an important role in the emergence and 
development of the crisis. The function system of media employs the binary code 
news/not news. As it was demonstrated in the analysis of the Imia/Kardak crisis, 
according to the medias' institutionalized practices, conflict and crisis are ̀ news'. The 
press conferences given by the Greek Minister of Industry, Peponis, the President of 
the Board of Directors of the consortium, Parmeli, and then Peponis and Kapsis were 
addresses to the news media. 
43 These statements were dispersed through the news 
media, triggering recursive processes of meaning determination in a multitude of 
social systems within the Greek and Turkish societies. Public opinion, opposition 
42 In discussions I had with inhabitants of Komotini it was made clear that these days have been 
engraved in their memory as a traumatic experience. 
43 At this time private television had not yet been introduced in the two countries. 
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parties, analysts and many other individuals and groups could comment on the crisis, 
increasing the noise and the complexity of the situation through a process of 
generalization and re-specification of the above communications according to their 
own pre-established semantics. 
Again, as happened with the crisis of 1996, the news media fed the system of crisis 
through their normal functions. By trying to rationalize the events they contributed to 
the increase of complexity and thus they provided the noise for the self-reproduction 
of the crisis. By posing questions to politicians, they were forcing an answer 
addressed to their constituencies. Nevertheless, the other side was a recipient as well. 
A characteristic example of the media's function and contribution to the constitution 
of the crisis is the following. The Turkish journalist Sami Kohen, in an interview with 
the United States Assistant Secretary of Defence Richard Perle, asked him about 
Greek-Turkish relations. Perle's reply was that "[T]he Greek government will do 
whatever it can to impede rapprochement between America and Turkey. It can make 
use of provocations. Be careful. I'm afraid that a small spark can open the way to 
large-scale developments". 44 While these statements might have been accepted within 
Turkey as justification of the Turkish positions, they were also received by the Greek 
officials who were observing with intensity what was going on in Ankara. These 
statements were received as evidence of the Turkish-American designs against 
Greece. They contributed to subsequent selections of meaning towards the direction 
of crisis. Connected with the Greek expectations about American plans in the region 
they were employed for further structural couplings. In the above analysis of the 
Akiman-Kapsis interaction system I presented the way Kapsis perceived the presence 
of the American officials in Ankara at this time: "... there can be no promise, no 
assurance, no argument to convince all of us who lived these dramatic moments that 
Perle's role was not decisive" and he continues "[A]fter all, himself leaving Ankara, 
the first day of the crisis he took care to make bitter statements against our country". 45 
The selective nature of news is illustrated by the way the Turkish and Greek press 
received Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal's statements about Greek-Turkish 
as Interview by Sami Kohen with Unites States Assistant Secretary of Defence Richard Perle in 
Hürriyet, 21.3.87. 
45 The importance attributed to these statements is reflected to the number of references in Kapsis' s 
book about the crisis. See Yiannis Kapsis, The Three Days of March, p. 60, p. 62, p. 75. Kapsis called 
Richard Perle the `Prince of Darkness', p. 199. 
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relations. 6 Ozal, while recovering from an open-heart operation in Houston in the 
United States, maintained on the 25`h of March in an effort to abate the crisis that 
Greece and Turkey should focus on issues of co-operation. Nevertheless, the title of 
the relevant article in the Greek newspaper To Vima was "Clear Threats against 
Greece". 47 Selecting one sentence of Ozal's statements which was saying that 
"[T]urkey will develop rapidly" led to the interpretation of his statements as 
provocation and threats. This interpretation demonstrates the attribution of meaning 
by the Greek press. On the other hand the violation of the Berne Agreement became a 
red flag for the Turkish press. Without knowing or without presenting the history of 
the Berne Agreement and its invalidation by Greece, they were making headlines with 
it. 
4. The De-escalation of the Crisis 
The de-escalation of the crisis is the focus of this part of the chapter. Even today, the 
Greek interpretation of the events of March 1987 is that the closure of the American 
military bases and the trip of Foreign Minister Carolos Papoulias to Sofia were skilful 
strategic moves that played a decisive role in the de-escalation of the crisis. It is 
argued that these actions demonstrated that Greece was determined to use force to 
protect its national rights and that stimulated the United States as well as the NATO 
Secretary-General, Lord Carrington, to intervene and exert pressure on Turkey to 
withdraw from its plans. 48 On the other hand the official Turkish view is that Turkish 
determination expressed through the departure of the Piri-Reis for the Aegean 
prevented Greece from realizing its plans for drilling in the Aegean sea. 49 
Accordingly, this theoretical analysis of the crisis follows the line of deterrence 
theories of strategic analysis, putting the emphasis on the threat of use of force. 
46 Hürryet 26.03.87, To Vima, 27.03.87. 
47 To Vima, 25.01.1987, p. 21. 
48 "Papandreou's determined response and allied quiet diplomacy defused this latest crisis between 
Greece and Turkey". See Van Coufoudakis, "Greek Political Party Attitudes towards Turkey: 1974- 
1989", p. 49, in Dimitri Constas, The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External 
Influences, London: Macmillan, 1991. 
49 The headline of the newspaper Hürriyet on the first page on the 29th of March was "What happened? 
And Athens on the other side found a determined Ankara". The article argued that "Turkey's stance 
was reprisals to Greece's actions as it had warned that she would reply in a similar way in Greece's 
moves. In the meantime, Greece had asked for support even from Bulgaria and having not found 
support she stayed ̀one to one' with Turkey. The insistence in being stubborn meant war. Faced with 
that difficult situation (war) Greece's plans collapsed". 
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Here however the argument is that the crisis de-escalated due to the emergence of a 
system of reflexive communication through the interaction system between loannis 
Boutos and Ambassador Akiman. loannis Boutos was one of the top cadres of the 
opposition party, Nea Dimokratia, who happened to know Ambassador Akiman. 
Boutos's description of his meetings with both Ambassador Akiman and Prime 
Minister Papandreou illustrates this argument. Furthermore, the role of the American 
and the British interventions will be discussed, in the context of the effect they may or 
may not have had in the de-escalation of the crisis. 
4.1. Reflexive Communication 
loannis Boutos visited Ambassador Akiman on the most critical day of the crisis. The 
purpose of this visit was to discuss about the trip Boutos had made to Ankara in early 
March 1987.50 The appointment had been arranged immediately after Boutos came 
back from his trip to Turkey. Incidentally, that day coincided with the most critical 
day of the crisis. Boutos visited Akiman on the 27th of March, at noon. At that 
meeting, Ambassador Akiman took the opportunity to let him know about the Turkish 
viewpoint on the crisis. This accidental meeting gave rise to reflexive communication 
- that is communication about the way the two countries were communicating and 
about the meaning of each side's statements. This had a decisive impact on the de- 
escalation of the crisis. At this point I should cite Boutos's narration. sl 
After I said what I had to say about my trip in Turkey, Ambassador Akiman 
wanted to tell me what had preceded the Turkish decision to take the Turkish 
research ship out in the Aegean sea. When the Greek state made known its plans to 
buy the Denisson Morris and this decision was accompanied by Mr. Kapsis's 
statement that "we will do drillings when we want, the way we want and where we 
want", Ambassador Akiman interpreted this as a clear indication that the Greek 
government would buy the shares in order to drill eastern to Thasos, which 
Denisson Morris did not want. The truth however was the other way around. 
Denisson wanted to proceed with the drillings and the Greek government, in order 
to prevent such an unwanted event that would surely have serious implications on 
Greek-Turkish relations, decided to buy the shares of the company. 
I knew about that and I said so to Ambassador Akiman. 
50 Ioannis Boutos was one of the top cadres of the opposition party, Nea Dimokratia, during the years 
of the PASOK administration. While his own party was in power, Boutos had served as Minister of 
Industry as well as in other important positions. After 1986 he left his party and he became an 
independent Member of the Parliament as well as a Member of the European Parliament. 
s' Interview with Ioannis Boutos, Athens 05.07.01. 
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He said that his impression was that my appreciation of the situation was wrong. 
He added that he had assumed from Kapsis' s attitude during all this time that we 
are preparing for drillings east of Thasos. He had already sent telegrams about this 
to Ankara. One or two days before that, Ankara had warned Athens; in fact, 
Ankara had made a pre-emptive movement, in order to show that Turkey would 
persist on the policy it had been following, which was that any drilling out of the 
Greek territorial waters, east of Thasos, would be considered as a casus bella. 
I went to my office, feeling very worried, because I could see there had been a 
misunderstanding; this was not the intention of the Greek government and the 
Turkish perception was different. On the way to my office I heard on the radio 
about the decision of the Greek cabinet to prevent Piri-Reis from doing any 
research. 52 
I called Papandreou in front of Byron lAmbassador Theodoropoulos whom he had 
called to his office to discuss the crisis 3J and he gave me an appointment for 5: 00- 
5: 30 at his house. 
So, I went to his office in Kastri... 
I said ̀ President.... Today at noon I was with Akiman and he told me that this is a 
pre-emptive movement. There is a misperception of our intentions, regarding the 
purchase of Denisson, I am afraid. Akiman told me that they have taken out Piri- 
Reis to warn us to avoid this situation'. And I explained to him what Akiman told 
me about his communication with Mr. Kapsis. 
'I'll be damned! This bastard, Kapsis, will take us to war on the continental shelf? ' 
was his reaction. 
What should we do now? What do you advise me to do? he said. I said look 
President this is a misunderstanding; the Turks have misread our intentions and we 
have this crisis on our hands ...... I told him that at this time Kapsis's credibility 
has dropped at the nadir. So, you have to find a way through other channels and not 
through Kapsis, in order to assure the Turks about your intentions and the 
government's policy. 
Then he turned to me and said: are you willing to play that role? I replied -'if you 
ask me so I will do it. You decide'. 
I also told Papandreou that after the meeting I would have with Akiman he should 
ask Kapsis to call Akiman at the Ministry so as to give him official confirmation of 
what I would have said...... 
I went to Akiman and I told him about these things. 
I told him that he had misunderstood the intentions of the Greek government. The 
Greek government did not want to buy the shares of the consortium in order to do 
research out of its territorial waters; on the contrary it wanted to stop the Canadian 
company from doing research east of Thasos. 
He accepted what I told him. I also added that all these facts will be confirmed by 
Kapsis. While I was at his office, the phone rang and Akiman told me that it was 
Kapsis who wanted to see him. At that moment, I felt that my mission was 
complete. 
52 See the chronicle of the crisis, Appendix, p. 253 
53 Ambassador Byron Theodoropoulos is a retired Greek diplomat of a high repute who has served at 
important posts related to Greek-Turkish relations. Ambassador Theodoropoulos confirmed that he 
visited Boutos at his office that day. Interview with Ambassador Byron Theodoropoulos, Athens, 
10.09.01. 
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Akiman called the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ozal in London. 54 A couple of 
hours later Ozal made a statement on BBC saying, "[I]f Greece does not proceed with 
the drillings Turkey will not do anything". This statement defused the crisis. 
Boutos' interference demonstrates the contingent character of social systems. His 
meeting with Akiman that day was incidental in that it was not scheduled by any 
decision-maker. Ambassador Akiman named that accidental element `God' as he 
emphatically said "somehow God sent Mr. Boutos to my office". 55 
The main element in the interactions between Boutos and the Turkish Ambassador 
Akiman, and later with the Greek Prime Minister, was reflexive communication. In 
both cases, the pre-eminent element was an inquiry about how things were said and 
what their meaning was. That process enabled the re-entry of complexity into the 
unity of what is complex. The oversimplified distinctions drawn before, which had 
become constitutive elements of the crisis, were redressed. 
4.2. The role of the USA and the UK in the De-escalation of the Crisis 
The view that the crisis de-escalated due to the American and British intervention has 
prevailed in both Greece and Turkey. 56 Greeks - politicians, analysts, journalists - 
suggest that Papandreou's decision to close the American military base in Makri put 
pressure on the American administration to intervene and forced Turkey to withdraw. 
I will argue however, that the American administration in Washington could not have 
intervened decisively because it realised the emergence of the crisis at a very late 
stage. It was informed about the criticality of the situation by the American 
Ambassador in Athens, Bob Keally. The American Ambassador sent two reports, one 
late in the evening of the 260' of March and the other in the morning of the 27`h of 
March. 57 These reports contradicted the CIA's evaluation of the situation. American 
intelligence seems to have been convinced that there was no risk of a dangerous crisis 
between the two neighbouring countries. 58 However, Ambassador Keally formed a 
different view after the meetings he had in Athens and the information he received 
from the American Embassy in Ankara. He was invited to the Greek Foreign Ministry 
54 Interview with Nazmi Akiman, Istanbul, 22.05.01. 
55 ibid.. 
56 See examples of the Greek and Turkish literature on crisis in the following section of this chapter 
"The Re-entry of Crisis to the Greek-Turkish Conflict". 
s' This is information presented on the newspaper To Vima, 05.04.87. 
58 See To Vima, 05.04.87. 
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for a briefing on the latest developments regarding the crisis on the 26th. At this 
meeting he had discussions with officials and the Greek position was explained to 
him; namely that Greece had no intention to proceed with drilling outside its 
demarcated territorial waters but it reserved its right to do so in the future. 59 When he 
went back to his office and read the telegrams that the American Embassy in Ankara 
sent to him, he realised that the Turkish authorities had a different perception of the 
situation. The information they had received through Ambassador Akiman was 
arguing that Greece was planning to undertake imminent action in the Aegean. 
Ambassador Keally reported this difference of interpretation to the American State 
Department and the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 60 
His report arrived at Washington some time after midnight local time. The 8-hour 
difference between Athens and Washington was critical for the reaction on the other 
side of the Atlantic. By noon time on Friday, in Washington, that is on the 27th of 
March, the issue had not yet been high on the agenda of the political and military 
agencies of the White House. The Greek Ambassador in Washington, G. Papoulias, 
asked for an urgent meeting with the American Under-Secretary Roseanna Ridgeway 
for the morning of the 27th of March. However, the meeting was arranged for 6 
o'clock in the afternoon because the Under-Secretary had already arranged to attend 
another meeting in the White House. This latter meeting concerned the relations of the 
USA with Western Europe but not the escalating Greek-Turkish crisis. Sources within 
the State Department appear to have known nothing "about any discussion by the 
Under-Secretary in the White House on the Greek-Turkish crisis". 61 When the Greek 
Ambassador met with the Under-Secretary, the crisis had wound down. In Athens, it 
was already after midnight and Boutos had met with Ambassador Akiman and the 
Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou. Finally, Roseanna Ridgeway's answer 
when asked about the American role in the crisis, in a meeting of the Sub-Committee 
of Foreign Programmes of the Funds Committee of Congress, was that "the United 
States did not intervene in the dispute and they were careful with their relations with 
both countries. 62 
59 Interview with Ambassador Costas Zeppos, Athens, 14.09.01. 
60 Interview with Ambassador Costas Zeppos, Athens, 14.09.01. 
61 To Vima, 05.04.87. 
62 Eleftherotypia, 03.04.87. 
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The importance of Boutos's intervention was acknowledged by the American 
Ambassador Keally, with whom he met after he left the Turkish Embassy the same 
evening for a dinner at a mutual friend's house. 63 
Another scenario about the de-escalation of the crisis suggests that the British Foreign 
Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, intervened putting pressure on the Turkish Prime 
Minister Turgut Ozal in London after the intervention of Lord Carrington, who was 
then the Secretary General of NATO. The rationale being that the Secretary General 
of NATO was concerned about the developments in Greek-Turkish relations 
especially after the Greek foreign minister Carolos Papoulias's trip to Bulgaria. 64 
Papoulias argues that he flew to Sofia by military plane and he carried a personal 
message from the Greek Prime Minister Papandreou to Bulgarian President Todor 
Zhivkov. According to him, this trip was decided on the basis of an agreement for 
military co-operation that Greece had signed with Bulgaria. Furthermore, he 
maintains that President Zhivkov' s reply was that "Greece should not be worried 
about the security of its borders with Bulgaria and I will give orders to move a 
division to the Bulgarian-Turkish borders". 65 Nevertheless, these allegations cannot be 
substantiated for the following reasons: First, the personal note the Greek Foreign 
Minister carried to Zhivkov made no reference to the military agreement. Papandreou 
was informing in his personal note to the Bulgarian President about the seriousness of 
the situation and asking about his thoughts. Second, the answer of the Bulgarian 
government as it was stated by the Deputy Foreign Minister, Ivan Ganev, on the 28th 
of March, - the day after the visit of the Greek Foreign Minister - was marked by a 
policy of an absolute equal distance from the two countries. 66 USSR too intervened 
63 Boutos was invited to this dinner days before the crisis. That evening everyone turned to Ambassador 
Keally to ask about the de-escalation of the crisis and the latter answered that Boutos was the one who 
knew how it happened. Interview with loannis Boutos, Athens, 05.07.01. 
64 "This move by Papandreou gave us a big advantage. It gave flesh and bones to the warning he had 
addressed many times to NATO privately and publicly. If there is a heated confrontation between 
Greece and Turkey - he was telling them - then the whole South-eastern flank of NATO will collapse. " 
Yiannis Kapsis, The Three Days of March, p. 89. 
65 Interview with the then Foreign Minister Carolos Papoulias, Athens, 13.03.02. 
66 Ganev's statement was saying: "We would like the existing problems between our two neighbouring 
countries to be resolved.... The escalation of disputes between our two neighbouring countries are not 
in favour of peace, stability, good neighbourhood and co-operation in the region of Balkans and thus it 
is not in the interest of Bulgaria. For that reason we want a peaceful solution to be found for the 
problems that really exist. However, in interstate relations non-existing issues emerge too, which 
cannot be solved through any kind of negotiations. That is why the most important thing is those who 
are responsible, governments and leaders, to follow pragmatic policies and to put forward existing 
problems and not constructed. We would like in our relations with our neighbours on the basis of equal 
dialogue to ask the resolution of all the problems and especially to direct our efforts towards the 
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during these days asking both parties to solve their problems peacefully. Finally, this 
understanding of the de-escalation of the crisis did not convince Turkey. Ambassador 
Akiman considered that to be a move on the part of Greece to show off. 67 
Nevertheless, it is possible that Lord Carrington and Sir Geoffrey Howe contacted the 
Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal and they did the same with the Greek Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs as well. But these contacts were of a general nature asking the two 
parties to resolve their dispute peacefully. 68 There is no indication that Lord 
Carrington took a position in favour of Greece, as Kapsis argues in his book. 69 Nor is 
there any evidence that he was convinced that the Turkish officials were responsible 
for the crisis. In discussions Lord Carrington had some days after the crisis in 
Washington with American officials, he asked the American administration to 
intervene on both sides in order to prevent another dangerous Greek-Turkish crisis. As 
for the crisis of 1987 and the Greek-Turkish conflict, he referred to "the political 
exigencies in both countries, which according to his view prevented the resolution of 
70 the conflict". 
establishment of peace and security transforming our region to a zone without chemical and nuclear 
weapons. " Bulgarian daily newspaper, Trud, 29.03.87. 
67 Interview with Ambassador Nazmi Akiman, Istanbul, 22.05.01. Ambassador Zeppos too agrees with 
that when he says that this movement "was for the sake of appearances. On the other hand the 
Bulgarian leaders did not commit themselves very much". Interview with Ambassador Costas Zeppos, 
Athens, 14.09.01. 
68 Another indication about the way the crisis was de-escalated may be drawn from the foreign press. 
American, British, and French newspapers argued that Papandreou used the crisis in order to serve his 
own personal political interests. Furthermore, there was no reference for involvement on the part of 
Lord Carrington and the United States. The New York Times saw Papandreou's crisis management as a 
political red herring in order to gain ground in the domestic front. The article was based on American 
diplomatic sources in Athens. There was also the argument that Papandreou's decision to close the 
American bases in Nea Makri might turn against him as this move demonstrated that Greece was a less 
reliable ally than Turkey. 
It is interesting to see the way the Greek press received this information and analysed the foreign press. 
"Western Press Embittered over the Success of Greece in the Aegean" wrote Eleftherotypia on the 31 S` 
of March. The message this title conveys is that the Western press did not accept Greece's "victory". 
This however is not a "fact". Rather, it is an interpretation, an attribution of meaning to the information 
presented in the foreign press through the Greek understanding of the crisis. The logical question of 
how it happens that the American diplomats in Greece transmitted this information and why there are 
so many doubts not only in the American but in the foreign press in general regarding the emergence 
and development of the crisis was not put forth by the Greek press. The articles written on Greek 
newspapers selected information that was confirming their previous determinations of meaning. They 
did not questioned the content of those articles, they immediately proceeded in interpretating the views 
expressed there. The information presented by the foreign press was simply employed for the further 
autopoiesis of existing themes in Greece, such as the theme of the Greek victory against Turkey and 
Greek independence vis-ä-vis the West. The article is an illustrative example of the nature of social 
systems as closed and open at the same time. The Greek press as a function system is operationally 
closed and it communicates with its environment selectively rather than through some kind of rational 
processing, careful examination and evaluation of information. 
69 Yiannis Kapsis, The Three Days of March, pp. 88-90. 
70 Eleftherotypia, 03.04.87. 
226 
5. The Autonomy of the System of Crisis of 1987 
In the previous sections, I explored the emergence of the crisis of 1987, as 
temporalised complexity. The argument was that the crisis was the outcome of 
selections carried out in a multitude of social and psychic systems, guided by 
previously established schemes of interpretation. Simultaneous selections moving 
towards the same direction, namely the direction of confrontation, structured infinite 
complexity. Each selection had a reinforcing and self-reproducing effect on the 
emerging order of the crisis. The dynamics of crisis was found in the selectivity and 
connectability of communications. It is this aspect of communications operation that 
will be highlighted here as it was done in the other case studies too. It will be 
demonstrated that this is possible due to the self-referential nature of communication 
and the meaning specific strategies of generalization and re-specification. 
Each social system, the politicians, the military, the media, and the consortium 
selected its information - sometimes the same piece of information - and interpreted it 
according to different distinctions. The consortium employed the profit/non profit 
distinction, the media the news/not news distinction etc. assigning to it different 
selectivity and connectivity. For example, the decision made by the Greek Prime 
Minister and the Minister of Industry to buy shares of the consortium was perceived 
by the consortium as harmful to its interests. At the same time, it was perceived by the 
Turkish authorities as revealing the Greek intentions for expansion of the Greek 
territorial waters. It was perceived as an act of sovereignty by part of the Greek press, 
and as a bluff of the Greek Prime Minister by the American intelligence services. On 
the other hand, the decision of the Turkish military to grant permission to the Turkish 
petroleum company was perceived as an act of deterrence by the Turkish military and 
media and as an act of aggression by the Greek state. 
In the case of the crisis of 1987, references to the facts, e. g. the Greek decision for 
buying shares of the consortium, Kapsis's behaviour, the statement of the Secretary 
General of the Turkish NSC and other events, were detached from the time and locus 
of their occurrence to be connected to the history of the Greek Turkish conflict. For 
the Greek government, diplomacy and media, everything that occurred was relevant to 
the Turkish intentions to change the status quo in the Aegean. Every event or action, 
which took place in Turkey, was linked to previous crises like the invasion of Cyprus 
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in 1974, and the crisis in the Aegean in 1976.71 The details of the emergence and 
development of these crises were not important. For the Greek side it was Turkey that 
disputed the status quo. Turkish Prime Minister Ozal's trip to the USA and the 
statements made by a military and not a civilian officer were causally linked to 
become the basis of further action on the part of the Greek authorities. 
Similar processes were carried out within the system of Turkish politics, the military 
and the media. On the 14U' of March, Turgut Ozal stated that "our history with Greece 
is not new. It goes back before the 1980s"72 and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs on the 26th of the same month said that "the fact is that Greece tried to invade 
Anatolia in the 1920s and by declaring that Cyprus is an extension of Hellenism tries 
to annex it to Greece. It proves who is the expansionist to the entire world.... And its 
stance now.... is the clearest proof of Greek expansionism". 73 
The initial condition, the Greek decision to buy shares of the consortium was not the 
cause of the system of crisis. The trigger of the crisis could be another incident as 
well. The crisis did not develop because Greek or Turkish sovereign rights were 
disputed; it was, the expectation that these rights would be disputed that directed 
social systems operations to the definition of the situation as crisis. Paradoxically 
enough, the Turkish and Greek governments had been making the same claims about 
the Berne Agreement for many years before the crisis. These claims and actions 
provoked official protests and public statements. Nevertheless, it was only in March 
1987 that the claim of the violation of the Berne Agreement was perceived as the 
cause for a serious crisis. 
The complexity explored in the previous section was condensed into the system of 
crisis. This development enabled various social and psychic systems to handle the 
complexity of the situation - now they had to deal only with the crisis - and absorbed 
uncertainty. The understanding or misunderstandings between the Deputy Foreign 
Minister and the Turkish Ambassador did not matter. Whether actually Denisson 
Morris or the Greek government was planning to carry out drilling beyond the 
demarcated 6 miles was irrelevant. The Canadian-led consortium, although appeared 
to trigger the crisis, it disappeared from the scene from the beginning of March. It is 
71 ".. Turks were testing us. The same happened with the crisis of 1976 and 1996. ", Interview with 
Carolos Papoulias, Athens, 13.03.02. 
72 See statement by Turgut Ozal, Hürriyet, 14.03.87. 
73 The statement of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs appeared in Turkish newspapers on the 21 
of March 1987. 
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another paradox that no account of the crisis asks questions about the fate of the 
consortium after Parmeli's statements. 74 
The above analysis demonstrates that the crisis of 1987 cannot be identified with one 
of the social and psychic systems that appear to have contributed to its constitution; 
neither could it be subjected to control or planning by any of them. It emerged and 
developed as an autonomous autopoietic system through the normal operations of 
social and psychic systems in a modem functionally differentiated society. 
6. The Re-entry of the Crisis of 1987 to the Greek-Turkish Conflict 
Traditional crisis theory assumes that when a crisis has de-escalated it has come to an 
end. Here I argue against this view, following the same argument I put forth regarding 
the crisis of 1996: the crisis of 1987 has not yet ended. It did not end after the 
withdrawal of the two fleets to their harbours. On the contrary, a simplification of the 
crisis itself has re-entered the system of conflict and even today it is reproduced 
through the mechanisms of writing and printing as manifested in political rhetoric, 
academic literature and products of the media. In the analysis of the re-entry of the 
crisis of 1996 to the Greek-Turkish conflict, I stressed in particular the role of the 
system of science in the autopoiesis of the conflict. Here, I seek to demonstrate the 
process of the self-reproduction of the Greek-Turkish conflict through the normal 
operations not only of science but other function systems like politics, and media as 
well. 
In the aftermath of the crisis neither Boutos nor the Greek Prime Minister himself or 
the Turkish Ambassador Nazmi Akiman revealed what had happened during the most 
critical day of the crisis. Boutos's stance was determined by his pre-established 
understanding of Greek-Turkish relations. First, although he believed that during the 
crisis of 1987 important mistakes were made on the part of the Greek authorities and 
that the Greek people should know about that, he did not want to provide justification 
for the Turkish side and expose the Greek side. 75 It should be noted that his conviction 
that Turkey had expansionist aims against Greece also constitutes the background for 
his stance in the wake of the crisis. 76 Second, Greek-Turkish relations had come to a 
critical point and the revelation of his own experience might have complicated things 
74 Interview with the then Foreign Minister Carolos Papoulias, Athens, 13.03.02. 
75 Interview with loannis Boutos, Athens, 11.07.02. 
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further. Andreas Papandreou had warned him that he would deny anything he would 
say about his own intervention and asked him to transmit this message to Ambassador 
Akiman too. Therefore, he also thought that any revelation might not help the 
improvement of Greek-Turkish relations. 77 
As for Papandreou's stance, the day after the crisis, he was concerned with his 
political survival. In particular, at that moment he was being attacked by the leader of 
the main opposition party, Constantinos Mitsotakis, for having constructed the crisis 
in order to unify the internal front. 78 Any revelation about Boutos's role would not 
have helped him to cope with this front. On the other hand, it would not have helped 
the aim of the Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal to bring Turkey closer to the EU as 
he knew that the road was also passing through Greek-Turkish relations. Accordingly, 
those decisions were selections made by self-referential systems; based on their own 
distinct rationales and aims and their understanding of their environment. These 
decisions, however, framed the existing accounts of the crisis. 
Kapsis has written a book about the crisis and he has participated in many public 
discussions in Greece on Greek-Turkish relations. His belief was that the crisis was 
de-escalated after Papandreou's decision to send Papoulias to Sofia and his own 
active diplomacy through his communication with Lord Carrington and the American 
Ambassador Keally. Nevertheless, some years after the crisis he was informed about 
Boutos's intervention from a speech Ambassador Akiman gave at Harvard University 
in Boston on the occasion of a seminar in 1998.79 He interpreted that revelation as 
follows: 
Akiman said that a forgotten politician who had left the party of Nea Dimokratia 
asked to see Papandreou about this matter [the crisis] and he saw him. I asked 
many members of the government and they told me that that was impossible. 
Nobody could see Papandreou. You see, for an ex-member of the parliament... to 
meet with the Prime Minister.. [unfinished sentence] ... There is only one case in 
which [Papandreou] could have received him [Boutos]: if he was an envoy of the 
Turks or the Americans. There is no way that he was an envoy of the Turks, 
therefore he was an envoy of the Americans, but of other services besides the 
Embassy -I emphasize this - other services apart from the Embassy, which was 
doing its job at that time. 80 
76 ibid.. 
" ibid.. 
78 See Constantinos Mitsotakis' s statements at the aftermath of the crisis that there was no crisis but 
Papandreou had deceived the Greek people. Eleftherotypia, Ta Nea, Kathimerini, Eleftheros Typos 29th 
and 30th of March 1987. 
7' Interview with the then Deputy Foreign Minister Yiannis Kapsis, Athens, 18.07.01. 
so ibid.. 
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Kapsis attempted to make sense of this piece of information - Boutos's involvement - 
interpreting it according to his pre-established distinctions. The pattern of "the evil 
role" of the American secret services is recurrent in his rhetoric and it is coupled with 
his understanding of the Greek-Turkish conflict. This is what is implied here too. This 
political rhetoric and the journalistic accounts in the same line have contributed to the 
construction of a generalized and simplified image of the events of March 1987, 
which re-entered the Greek-Turkish conflict. 
In what follows I will present some examples of the process of re-entry of the crisis to 
the Greek-Turkish conflict through academic analysis demonstrating that the system 
of science employed its own distinctions to compensate for the lack of information on 
the emergence of crisis. 
According to Hristodoulos Giallourides, Professor of International Relations at 
Panteion University of Athens, who has also served as special advisor to the Greek 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence "[T]he Greek-Turkish crisis 
of March of 1987 started with the decision of the consortium, which was exploiting 
the oil of Thassos, to proceed with exploration for the existence of new oil deposits at 
the site of Babouras, east of Thassos, beyond the 6 nautical miles... It might be the 
case that the crisis was initially provoked by a third party - the consortium - but 
Turkey attempted to exploit it for the purpose of promoting its constant aim for 
resolution of the continental shelf problem in the Aegean through political 
negotiations". 8' Another expert on Greek-Turkish relations, Professor Thanos 
Veremis of Athens University, argues that "[T]he crisis of 1987 started with the 
Turkish intention to prospect for hydrocarbons in the underwater area of the Aegean, 
which is considered to belong to the Greek continental shelf, and led the two countries 
closer than ever to conflict". 82 The Greek analyses of the crisis are based on the 
unquestioned assumption that Greece did not want to provoke Turkey and this is 
something that Turkey knew. 83 
" Giallourides, Hristodoulos, The Greek-Turkish Conflict from Cyprus to Imia 1955-1996, The Press 
Perspective, Sideris, 1997, pp. 281-284. 
82 Veremis, Thanos, History of Greek-Turkish Relations 1453-1998 sec ed., ELIAMEP, Sideris, 1998, 
154-155. 
See also Angelos Syrigos's understanding of the same issue: "In early March 1987, the international 
consortium announced its plans to drill a promising new well in the Babouras area. The Greek 
government decided to nationalize the consortium in order to avoid any problems with Turkey. " 
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Moreover, politicians, diplomats, academics, journalists, and ordinary citizens still 
believe that Greece gained an important victory against Turkey at the end of March 
1987, due to Papandreou's strategy, which included Papoulias's mission to Bulgaria 
and the closing of the American base in Makri. The Deputy Minister of Defence, 
Nikos Kourris writes about the crisis: "The crisis of March 1987 is, I think, the 
crowning achievement in the political career of Andreas Papandreou". 84 Admiral 
Hristos Lyberis, who was the Commander-in-chief of the Navy during the crisis of 
1987, and the Commander-in-chief of the Greek Armed Forces during the crisis of 
1996, evaluates Papandreou's crisis management as follows: "Independently of the 
view one has of the person of Andreas Papandreou, his stance [during the crisis] 
cannot be related to anything else than to his ability to understand the strategic 
dimensions of his country's foreign policy and of seeing the choices and problems 
beyond the horizon and the duty to the country". 85 
On the other hand Turkish scientific analyses argue that Greece was the instigator of 
the crisis. Sükru Sina Giirel, professor of International Relations, who has also served 
in important posts within the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, wrote about the 
crisis: "In March 1987, a Greek company, after the decision of Papandreou's 
government, started research for oil east of the island of Thasos, that is, not yet 
demarcated Aegean continental shelf'. 86 As far as Ozal's crisis management is 
concerned, Turkish analysts argue that it was skillful and increased the prestige of the 
Turkish Prime Minister within Turkey and abroad. 87 
These analyses project an over-simplified image of the emergence and development 
of the crisis, which seeks to establish direct and simple causal links among the events 
and actions. The paradox here is that although they claim to base their analyses on 
real facts they defy reality. What really happened does not become the subject of 
research. These very facts are obscured through vague expressions and inaccuracies. 
As was shown above, Gürel argues that it was a "Greek company" that was preparing 
84 Kouris, Nikos, Greece and Turkey, the Fifty-Year War, Nea Synora, A. A. Livani, p. 15, Hristos 
Lyberis, National Startegy and Crisis management, Poiotita, 1997, p. 113. 
85 Lyberis, Hristos, National Strategy and Crisis Management, Poiotita, 1997, p. 113. 
86 Gürel, Sükrii Sina, The Greek Turkish Relations - 1821-1993, Ankara, 1993, p. 94. Gtlrel became 
Turkey's Minister of Foreign Affairs after the resignation of Ismail Cem on the 100' of July 2002. 
87 Cengiz candar, a Turkish analyst, writer of several political books and Ozal' s special advisor, 
experienced the crisis in both countries as he traveled to Athens on the 27`h of March. His own view is 
that the de-escalation of the crisis was Ozal's major victory not only on the domestic front but on the 
international one too. Interview with Cengiz candar, Istanbul, 10.11.01. 
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to drill. Veremis maintains that it was "the Turkish intention to prospect for 
hydrocarbons". 88 
Academic analyses of the crisis of 1987 are self-referential communicative systems 
which process selected information about the events of the crisis - hetero-reference - 
through theories they have already constructed - self-reference. Deterrence theories 
and game theory have been employed in order to rationalize a posteriori the events 
scholars have selected in the first place, according to these schemes. Professor 
Giallourides writes "[Turkey] acting as a rational actor after the calculation of costs 
and benefits that were involved, preferred to withdraw"89 and at another point ".. the 
crisis of 1987 was a Chicken Game and the threats of the Greek Prime Minister aimed 
at making his threats of military confrontation as believable as possible". 90 Here, 
constructions of science like theories of deterrence attribute causality to the events. 
Furthermore, the general theoretical frameworks of international crisis analysis is 
coupled with the constructions of the Greek and Turkish international relations theory. 
Greek interpretations of the crisis perceive the crisis as another premeditated Turkish 
attempt to draw Greece to the negotiation table, which will lead to the change of the 
status quo in favour of Turkey. Turkish interpretations still can see the `Megali Idea' 
behind the crisis of 1987, that is, the plans of Greece to incorporate all the Greeks and 
all the lands where Greeks had settled since antiquity within its borders. 91 
The role of these accounts within a functionally differentiated society is very 
important. Sukru Sina Gürel says in the preface of his book on Greek-Turkish 
relations that he prepared his study over ten years of teaching Turkish undergraduate 
and graduate students of political science and international relations. His book on 
Greek-Turkish relations is an internal artificial construct of Turkish social science and 
in particular political science. His lectures are communicative systems, constitutive 
88 See op. cit. 86 and 82 respectively. 
89 Giallourides, Hristodoulos, The Greek-Turkish Conflict from Cyprus to Imia 1955-1996, The Press 
Perspective, Sideris, 1997, p. 290. 
90ibid., p. 287. 
""The lessons that Turks drew from the Cyprus problem is that the Greek Megali Idea of restoring the 
lost Byzantine Empire of the former Constantinople and the Anatolian heartland was not dead and any 
Greek designs and attempts aimed at creating or benefiting from a window of opportunity to extend 
Greece's borders at the expense of Turkey should not be tolerated in Cyprus, in the Aegean or 
elsewhere. " Ayman, Gulden, S., The Kardak (Imia) Crisis and Turkish-Greek Relations", Hellenic 
Studies, Vol. 9, No 2,200, p. 56. See also similar references to the Megali Idea in the preface of the 
book written by Hussein Pazarci on The Status of Dem ilitarisation of the Islands in the Eastern 
Aegean, Ankara University, 1986. 
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elements of the Greek-Turkish conflict within Turkish society that enable further and 
further connections, structural couplings which serve the autopoiesis of the conflict. 
The paradox here is that although Greek and Turkish scientific accounts employ the 
same analytical tools - rational theories - and they study the same issue - the crisis of 
1987 - they draw completely opposed conclusions as regards the causes of the crisis 
and the way the crisis was de-escalated. Nevertheless, they make a claim to 
truthfulness; after all, science is supposed to describe and explain reality. They do not 
ask how it occurs that truth has two sides with one opposed to the other. They cannot 
problematize the introduction of their own distinctions in their analyses that is they 
cannot problematize their own blind spots. 
The re-entry of the crisis to the system of the conflict and thereby the reproduction of 
the conflict is illustrated by the following example. The Minister of Foreign Affairs at 
the time, Carolos Papoulias, considers the management of the crisis by Papandreou as 
an exemplary case of international crisis management to be taught in seminars of 
crisis management. 92 This interpretation of crisis has become a guide for future action 
and a blueprint to understand Greek-Turkish relations. Papoulias himself, present 
President of the interparty Committee of the Parliament for Foreign Affairs interprets 
the fact that there was no other Greek-Turkish crisis after 1987 and during the time 
Papandreou was in office as evidence that his strategic capacities had deterred Turkey 
from trying something new. 93 
92 See interview with Carolos Papoulias, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the newspaper Ta Nea, 
30.10.00. 
" ".. and I want to go back to the testing of [Prime Minister] Simitis [by Turkey] in the Imia crisis. You 
see, I wonder how it occurred that Turkey did not exploit Papandreou's weakness, because of his 
illness, when Papandreou was still in power. Analysts of psychological warfare maintain that when the 
enemy is in a situation of illness you can exploit this event. They did not do that. They did it however 
when Simitis came to power. Which makes me ask why a crisis did not happen before. And I say that 
fear keeps people in their place. Taking into account Papandreou's determination in the crisis of 1987, 
even this thought deterred the Turks. `Papandreou, even if ill, will do the same thing; he will decide for 
conflict with us'. Whereas Simitis was being considered by Turks... [unfinished sentence] and I have to 
say that he is not a man of crisis and he showed that in the Imia crisis. The crisis management in Imia 
was bad. " Interview with Carolos Papoulias, Athens, 13.03.02. 
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2. The Davos Peace Process 
The de-escalation of the crisis through Boutos's accidental intervention `disappointed' 
Papandreou's expectations and enabled the emergence of a new self-description, 
which was reflected in the peace initiative launched in the aftermath of the crisis. This 
initiative has been named after the place the two leaders, Andreas Papandreou and 
Turgut Ozal, met, which was in Davos, Switzerland. This meeting was followed by 
several other meetings among Greek and Turkish officials. Nevertheless, the process 
did not take hold in the Greek and Turkish society. 
Press and international relations literature in both countries have discussed the Davos 
process extensively, suggesting that the cause of its failure was mainly the conflict of 
interests of the two countries and the other side's provocative attitudes. 94 Here it is 
argued that this view is an oversimplification, which does not answer why and how 
the process failed. 
The Davos peace process is an interesting case for comparison with the peace 
processes that developed after the crisis of 1996 and examined in chapters IV and V. 
It will be demonstrated that the interactions among officials provided a field of 
experimentation to society and a test for the new emerging order of co-operation. The 
failure of this process to become crystallized into some structures of a system of co- 
operation was not determined by the governmental actions or decisions. Rather, its 
development was determined by its inability to connect within Greek and Turkish 
societies under the condition of the institutionalized Greek-Turkish conflict. 
2.1. The Experiment 
In the aftermath of the crisis Papandreou and Ozal agreed to make an effort to solve 
the problems between Greece and Turkey. Their first meeting took place in January 
1988 in Davos, on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum. In this meeting the 
two leaders decided not to discuss the thorny issues. "We solved no problems but we 
94 Saha BSlükba$i writes about the Davos and other efforts made in order to improve the Greek- 
Turkish relations: "... although they [Greece, Turkey and the two Cypriot communities] have been 
sincere in their efforts to tackle all or some of the outstanding problems -either through negotiations or 
through international conferences- they have not been able to do so because there are wide divergences 
in their perceptions of their interests". "The Turco-Greek Dispute, Issues Policies and Prospects", in 
Turkish Foreign Policy, New Prospects, ed. by Dodd, C. H., The Eothen Press, p. 28,1992. On the other 
hand Van Coufoudakis put the emphasis on the Turkish attitudes during 1988 and 1989. "Greek 
Political Party Attitudes towards Turkey: 1974-1989", in Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s, Dimitri 
Constas ed., p. 53. 
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agreed to have no war" was the statement made by Papandreou when he was asked by 
The Times to comment on the results of his meeting with the Turkish Prime 
Minister. 95 Furthermore, the two leaders employed existing institutionalized practices 
of conflict resolution. They signed a memorandum, which was designed to pave the 
way for peaceful relations between the states. They agreed to establish a `hotline' 
between Athens and Ankara as a crisis preventive measure. Moreover, they agreed on 
an elaborate plan of confidence-building measures and they decided to set up a joint 
committee at ambassadorial level to define the problem areas, which would "explore 
the possibilities of closing the gap and move towards lasting solutions, the progress of 
which will be reviewed". 96 Other joint committees would discuss the development of 
closer economic and political relations through a series of meetings. Moreover, they 
encouraged businessmen to co-operate and invest in both countries. 
The political and economic committees met twice in 1988 and their sub-committees 
met more often in Athens, Ankara and Istanbul. One month after the meeting in 
Davos in February 1988, the two Foreign Ministers, Carolos Papoulias and Mesut 
Yilmaz met in Athens. The product of this meeting was the signing of a Memorandum 
of Understanding, which made the provision that military exercises would be avoided 
during the summer tourist period. 
The two Prime Ministers met again in March 1988 at the NATO Summit in Brussels 
where they repeated their dedication "to the spirit of Davos". 97 This meeting was 
followed by the first visit by a Turkish Prime Minister after 36 years to Athens on the 
13th of June 1988. During this meeting the committees appointed for discussions 
failed to come to any conclusion. However, the two leaders tried to down play this 
failure in a joint press conference. 
In the last meeting the two political committees had in Istanbul, the then Turkish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mesut Yilmaz, after a discussion he had with Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Yiannis Kapsis and having consulted Prime Minister 
Ozal, proposed to him that the two states sign an agreement on the dispute in the 
Aegean Sea. 98 Nevertheless, neither this proposal found fertile ground to be developed 
's The Times, 01.02.88. 
96 For the Davos communique see "The Week in Review", Greek Embassy Press and Information 
Service, Washington D. C., 1 February 1988, No. 4/88. 
97 Joint press communique, Brussels, 4 March 1988, Yearbook of 1988, ELIAMEP. 
98 Kapsis, Yiannis, The Three Days of March, p. 175 
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nor were the other efforts fruitful. The Davos process did not develop further in the 
second half of 1988. 
2.2. The Paradoxes of the Davos Process 
Mainstream analysis of the Davos process describes the various meetings officials of 
the two states had and their results explaining them through a linear causal analysis. 
Here, it is argued that the failure of the development of the Davos process could not 
be attributed to any premeditated plan designed by the governments of the two states. 
Rather, it will be demonstrated that social patterns of behaviour and institutionalized 
practices constrained the selectivity and connectivity of this peace process as they 
directed social systems' selections towards the system of conflict instead of co- 
operation. Furthermore, as demonstrated in the analysis of peace processes from 1996 
to 1999 here too, the argument is that interactions do not provide solid ground for 
future action but they offer a field of experimentation for modem society. 
The Davos peace process did not find connections to develop in Greek and Turkish 
society. The paradox here is that the very condition for the establishment of this 
process of communication, secrecy, doomed the process to failure. Papandreou kept 
the preparation of the Davos meeting secret not only from the public eye, but even 
from his close associates. His aim was to set aside the `hard-liners' within the Greek 
bureaucracy and within his own party. 99 Ambassador Akiman argues that Papandreou 
had asked him "not to contact him, call him, send letters, or anything. He said he 
would find the way to contact me. Furthermore he asked me to transmit his messages 
to Ozal in person. And he had emphatically told me `Mr. Akiman, do not talk on the 
phone or send coded telegrams to Ankara on this matter, fly and communicate... ̀100 
99 Angelos M. Syrigos, The Status of the Aegean Sea According to International Law, 
SakkoulasBruylant 1998, p. 248-249. 
100 Ambassador Akiman emphasized that Papandreou was very careful regarding his communication 
with Ankara. The following incident makes that clear: "One day I wanted to see Mr. Papandreou and I 
was thinking of ways to see him. It was the Epiphany ceremony on the 6th of January. We were 
supposed to go to the port of Pireas where the ceremony would take place. Mr. Sartzetakis, the 
President of the Republic of Greece, came and all the ambassadors were there too. There, I was 
watching Mr. Papandreou so as to tell him that I had to see him immediately. I was watching him what 
he was doing. At the end of the ceremony he said something to Mr. Sartzetakis, probably he asked 
permission to go and see the diplomats. Then he started shaking hands one by one and when he came to 
shake hands with me it was only 5 seconds we had to shake hands and I told him `I have to see you, 
Sir, today' he said 'come and see me at two' and he went away". Interview with Ambassador Nazmi 
Akiman, Istanbul. That Papandreou followed this tactic in his communication with his Turkish 
counterpart is further confirmed in Kapsis's book. p. 116, as well as in the speech Akiman gave in the 
Center for European Studies in Harvard University, 
http: //www. ksg. harvard. edu/kokkalis/leaders-akiman. htrni. 
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Similarly, Ozal did not explain the Davos process either to his colleagues or to the 
Turkish media and public. 101 Secrecy impeded the intensification and amplification of 
the Davos process. 
Indeed, the undertaking of this initiative by Papandreou was inexplicable and 
surprising for many Greeks. Kapsis writes about it: "It was a big surprise. The 
question remained unanswered: at the aftermath of a big victory, what made 
Papandreou request... negotiations as if he had been defeated? We expected that kind 
of initiative from Ozal". 102 In addition, the tactic of secrecy was observed by other 
social systems. Social systems in order to make sense of what was happening 
employed their own distinctions for the processing of information and the 
continuation of their autopoiesis. The selections the systems of diplomacy, media, 
civil society, the military and the bureaucracy in Greece and Turkey made 
simultaneously while operating in their own autonomous way constrained complexity. 
Nevertheless, they were oriented towards the direction of conflict instead of co- 
operation. 
The institutionalized conflict within the Greek and Turkish society constrained the 
selectivity and connectivity of communication about co-operation. The crisis of 1987 
had reinforced the dynamics that is the connectability of the system of the conflict. 
Greek and Turkish accounts - political, journalistic, and academic - of the crisis were 
all in a jubilant strain. Greeks were celebrating Papandreou's decisiveness and 
strategic thought whereas Turks were convinced that Greece withdrew. The way the 
crisis was perceived to have de-escalated offered further points for connection to 
themes that constituted the conflict. The aftermath of the crisis found Greeks and 
Turks convinced that the use or the threat of power was the effective means to deal 
with the "other side". 
The resignation of Greek senior career diplomats from the diplomatic corps was a 
manifestation of the different interpretation of the events that followed the crisis by 
the system of diplomacy. 103 The Ambassador to the USSR, Mihalis Dountas, the 
Ambassador to Cyprus, Themos Stoforopoulos, and the head of the Greek-Turkish 
section of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Serbos, resigned in 
order to express "their concern about the impact of these initiatives [the Davos 
"' Interview with Yalim Eralp, Istanbul, 04.05.02. 
102 Kapsis, Yiannis, The Three Days of March, p. 111. 
103 See Angelos Syrigos, The Status of the Aegean Sea According to International Law, p. 268 
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process] on the long-term policies of Turkey towards the Hellenic world". 
104 They 
were convinced that the Greek government should follow the policy of deterrence 
instead of engaging in dialogue. After their resignation they engaged in active 
opposition to this new policy of rapprochement. The Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and other diplomats in the Ministry tried hard to redress the legal perspectives 
of the Aegean question, and to narrow the dispute to the delimitation of the 
continental shelf. 105 Kapsis himself admits that even after the meeting of the two 
Prime Ministers in Brussels, he was applying the previous policies "without... 
asking". 106 
The Turkish military opposed this process. 107 Four months after signing the 
memorandum for a moratorium on flights in the Aegean by the two Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, the Turkish military abolished it in practice. Turkish jets started their 
flights again. 108 It was the same memorandum, which made Papoulias the target of 
fierce polemics in Greece, accusing him of treason. 109 
The main national newspapers were critical of Ozal's policy and when the latter went 
to Davos they warned him to follow a tough line on the Aegean continental shelf 
issue. 11° When the Turkish public was asked regarding the prospects for a partial 
withdrawal of the army forces from Cyprus, 45 per cent was absolutely negative. Polls 
conducted in late May indicated that two-thirds of the Greek public did not support 
the rapprochement. Furthermore, another survey a couple of weeks before Ozal's visit 
to Athens indicated that about 30 percent considered his visit a provocation. " The 
different interpretations of the peace process was manifested also in the 
104 ibid., p. 263. 
105 Syrigos, Angelos The Status of the ..., p. 263. 106 Kapsis, Yiannis, The Three Days of March, p. 151. 
107 Mehmet Ali Birand' s account of the Davos Process based on interviews with the Prime Minister 
Turgut Ozal, the Foreign Minister Mesut Yilmaz, the Special Advisor to the Prime Minister, Duna, the 
Ambassador to the EC Ozdem Sanberk, Süleyman Demirel and Ismet Inonu is illuminating as regards 
this aspect. Birand argues that the Davos process was undermined by the constraints "public opinion 
and the rigid subconscious ideas of the ̀ establishment' placed on the implementation of the vision of 
the two prime ministers". See Birand, Mehmet Ali, "Turkey and the Davos Process: Experiences and 
Prospects", in Constas, Dimitri, (ed. ), The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s, pp. 27-39. 
108 Interview with Carolos Papoulias, Athens, 02.07.02. 
109 ibid.. 
1 10 See article written by Mehmet Ali Birand in Milliyet 30 January 1988, also statements by Suleyman 
Demirel and Bülent Ecevit, Hürryet 30 January 1988. 
1' Pridham, Geoffrey, "Linkage Politics Theory and the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement", in Constas, 
Dimitri, (ed. ), The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s, 1992, p. 85. 
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demonstrations of Turkish dissidents and Greek Cypriots in Athens during the days of 
Ozal's visit. 112 
Papandreou's new policy could not reverse the dynamics of conflict that is the 
connectability of communication about the conflict. One of the issues around which 
the polemics of the Davos process centred was the Cyprus issue. Papandreou was 
accused of not discussing the Cyprus problem with Ozal in their first meetings and 
therefore not making this `national issue' the first priority. Ironically, it was 
Papandreou's rhetoric over the years of his administration that raised the expectations 
of the Greek people regarding the Cyprus problem. From the time he came to power, 
one of the two preconditions he had set for the resumption of dialogue with Turkey 
was the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from Cyprus. The other was that Turkey 
should recognize the Greek rights in the Aegean. ' 13 The day after the Davos meeting, 
Papandreou was accused by the opposition and the Greek news media because he did 
not take the opportunity to implement his declared policy. 
Answering these criticisms within the Greek Parliament, the Prime Minister said in a 
laconic way: `Mea culpa'. This became the spearhead of the attack of the polemics 
against Davos. The opponents of the Davos process propagated it as if Papandreou 
himself had admitted a big mistake. However, according to the then foreign minister 
Carolos Papoulias, who had followed the development of this process closely since 
the meeting of the two leaders in Davos, the meaning of these two words was 
completely different. Papandreou actually meant to say that he undertook the 
responsibility for this tactic because he believed that he could not discuss this issue in 
his first meeting with the Turkish leader. 14 
The institutions established through the Davos process did not take hold in Greek and 
Turkish society. Programmes of action and programmes of goals were reversed in the 
stage of their implementation by pre-established social structures like other 
institutionalized practices. An apt illustration of the development of the process 
112 Birand, Mehmet, Ali, "Turkey and the Davos Process: Experiences and Prospects", in Constas, 
Dimitri, p. 35. 
113 This policy fits in with the general framework of Papandreou's rhetoric regarding Greek foreign 
policy developed in the years when he was opposition leader and the first years of his administration. 
During his election campaign in 1981 he had emphasized the need for an independent Greek foreign 
policy vis-a-vis NATO and the EEC. His main argument being that these organizations failed to 
prevent the occupation of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974. However, despite this rhetoric, in practice he 
followed the steps of his predecessors as regards the European orientation of Greece and NATO as 
well. 
114 Interview with the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Carolos Papoulias, Athens, 02.07.02. 
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provides us the example of the decision of the Turkish government to invalidate the 
two illegal secret decrees of 1964 for the seizure of the fortunes of the Greek citizens 
who used to live in Istanbul at that time. "5 This aimed at enabling Greeks to go back 
to Istanbul and claim their properties. Nevertheless, this has not been an easy process. 
In many cases judicial proceedings were involved, which also entailed a time- 
consuming procedure and the interference of political considerations. 116 In some 
cases, the secret decrees were re-activated in practice through judicial decisions based 
on the institutionalized rationale of the decrees. These occurrences were observed by 
various social systems and interpreted as expressions of the designs of the Turkish 
government rather than autonomous operations of the legal system for example. 
Paradoxically enough, in the end, communication about the Davos process within 
Greece and Turkey led to a reinforcement of the system of conflict. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter I examined the crisis of 1987 and the Davos peace process that 
followed in its aftermath. Both emerged and developed through precisely the same 
processes and mechanisms that is morphogenetic evolutionary processes of 
communication. Papandreou's decision to buy shares of the consortium was the 
`butterfly' which enabled chain reactions within a multitude of social and psychic 
systems and increased the complexity of the situation. The emergence and de- 
escalation of the crisis of 1987 led to the Davos peace process. 
The development of the crisis to a new attractor as well as the failure of the Davos 
peace process to develop further were constituted as the unity of the difference of 
"s The two secret decrees were only one out of a number of discriminatory measures taken against the 
Greek minority living in Istanbul during the last century. This specific measure was considered to be a 
part of the Turkish reprisals for the suffering of Turkish-Cypriots in Cyprus. It will suffice to note here 
that at the beginning of the twentieth century more than 100 thousand Greeks were living in Istanbul. 
Towards the end of the century less than three thousand, most of them elderly people, are left there. 
Alexandris, Alexis, "The Greek Minority in Turkey, 1918-1956 and Greco-Turkish Relations", Athens, 
1983. See also on the Capital Tax and the Secret Decrees, Hulya Demir and Ridvan Akar, The Last 
Exiles of Istanbul, ("Istanbul'un Son Sürgtlnleri"), Iletisim, 1994. 
116 An example is the case of [2], the owner of 35 hectares in Yesilkoy. In 1988 she tried to sell her 
property but the Municipality opened a trial against her and the court decided that she could not sell it. 
She lodged an appeal against the decision to a higher court and the latter decided in 1995 that it was not 
within its competence to decide, thus it referred her to the court of the first instance. The latter decided 
in 2001, that it could not recognise her right to sell because this right emanates from hereditary right of 
succession. That decision was based on the grounds that Muslims of a Turkish origin living in Western 
Thrace, Greece, cannot bequeath inheritances to Turks, therefore the Turkish court does not recognise 
the right of a Greek citizen to inherit from a Turkish citizen of a Greek origin. [2] went to the Greek 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ask whether this was true and there she received a certificate which she 
submitted to the court that assures that Turks can inherit from Muslim Greek citizens. 
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themselves and their environment, that is they were both enabled and constrained by 
their environment. Neither a crisis nor a peace process is a self-sufficient entity or a 
unit independent of its environment; put it more succinctly, its environment is not less 
important than the system. Social and psychic systems that formed the environment of 
the crisis of 1987 and the Davos process, Greek and Turkish media, politics, 
bureaucracy and individuals and groups carried out their selections under the 
condition of the institutionalized double contingency of the Greek-Turkish conflict. 
The system of conflict operated as an attractor, which attracted observations that 
confirmed it. The condition of distrust built up over the years before the crisis was an 
important structural constraint to the emerging orders. 
Autocatalytic processes of communication, re-entries of previously established 
semantics back into the society determined the emergence and development of the 
crisis and the failure of the Davos process to be established as a new self-description 
for Greek and Turkish societies. Pre-established patterns of behaviour, social practices 
and interconnected themes provided the necessary connections for the autopoiesis of 
crisis and conflict. They guided social systems' meaning determinations towards the 
direction of crisis and conflict. That process enabled them to reduce infinite 
complexity and continue their autopoiesis. 
This analysis breaks down the assumption of one rationality be it the protection of 
national interests or the rationale of peace. Various social and psychic systems have 
their own distinct rationalities. Furthermore, although they might act rationally 
according to their own "meaning world" that does not mean correspondence to one 
objective reality. Given the infinite complexity of their environment, systems can 
access reality only selectively. Simultaneous selections towards the same direction of 
meaning determination constrain and structure complexity. The selective character of 
the way systems operate illustrates the contingent nature of the crisis as opposed to 
the necessity implied in conventional analysis. 
Social and psychic systems cannot control their environment neither can they control 
the consequences of their actions. The two Prime Ministers were not the protagonists 
of the crisis of 1987. Neither were the protagonists Kapsis, Ambassador Akiman, or 
the Turkish generals and the media. All of them contributed to the emergence of the 
crisis, by "acting" upon their previous determinations of meaning. Yet, they could not 
see the re-entry of their distinctions back to the emerging system of the crisis. The 
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system of crisis was autonomous and independent from the operations of the various 
social systems that contributed to its development. 
Similarly, the development of the Davos peace process was not determined by the will 
or the national interests of the two countries but by the dynamics of communication in 
a functionally differentiated society. The Davos process provided the Greek and the 
Turkish societies with a field of experimentation, a test for the boundaries of existing 
social systems. It gave rise to new themes, and some tentative institutions of co- 
operation. Nevertheless, these structures did not prove successful in forming chains of 
connections and being amplified. 
This analysis places the emphasis on the "social" character of the crisis of 1987 and 
the Davos peace process. The semantics the social and psychic systems employed in 
their determinations of meaning cannot be reduced to a subject. The case of the Davos 
peace process illustrates the social character of peace processes as opposed to 
conventional analysis of the crisis, emphasizes the role of individuals. Although 
Papandreou was one of the most charismatic leaders in Greece's history, admired by 
colleagues and followers and respected by his opponents his policy of co-operation 
was constrained by the existing social structures in Greece that is institutionalized 
practices, patterns of behavior and the system of the conflict. On the other side of the 
Aegean, Turgut Ozal was also a strong leader with a clear vision of Turkey becoming 
part of Europe. Nevertheless, despite their expressed will and efforts the Davos 




This thesis is the first application of Luhmann's modem systems theory to the field of 
conflict resolution and, in particular, to the study of crisis and peace processes. Luhmann's 
theory was employed to examine two Greek-Turkish crises and several peace processes 
such as negotiation, mediation, problem-solving workshops and conferences that aimed to 
improve the communication between the two sides of the Aegean Sea. The thesis 
demonstrated that the theory of social autopoiesis is a fruitful and rich perspective, which 
can enable us to ask new questions and explore aspects of these phenomena that other 
theories have difficulties to deal with. 
Mainstream approaches conceptualize international crisis and peace processes as unique 
and exceptional instances of international relations driven by a particular rationale, that is 
the rationale of political gains for crisis processes and the rationale of peace for peace 
processes. This conceptualization often justifies the separate treatment of these 
phenomena, which further accounts for the fragmented nature of the ensuing analysis. The 
underlying assumption here is that society is hierarchically differentiated, constituted of 
rational actions or decisions made by individuals. 
The results of my empirical research and analysis through Luhmann's theory demonstrated 
that this perspective cannot see, let alone explain, the paradoxes involved in these 
processes. The reason for that is that it cannot go beyond uni-linear causality. To be able 
to explore the dynamics of crisis and peace processes we need to change our way of 
thinking and challenge what we take for granted. Luhmann's theory applied to the study of 
crisis and peace processes led to the examination of these processes from a completely 
different perspective, the improbable probable perspective. This perspective enables us to 
put forth original questions about conflict and peace in modem society. 
From the viewpoint of social autopoiesis the phenomena of crisis and peace processes are 
considered as integral part of the continuous evolution of the Greek and Turkish societies. 
They are neither exceptional instances nor they involve only the two governments. Rather, 
they are being self-reproduced constantly in modem society through recursive processes of 
communication. 
The main conclusions of the thesis can be summarized as follows: 
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1. Conflict Theory 
The main conclusion of this thesis is counterintuitive and subversive: Crisis and peace 
processes are selections made by the whole of modern society in its process of its blind 
evolution which is based on the selection and variation of communication. It was 
demonstrated that these phenomena do not concern only segments of society such as the 
system of politics. They emerge and develop through the complexity of modern society 
and their dynamics is the dynamics of communication about crisis and co-operation to 
get selected and connected within society. 
This approach breaks down important assumptions of the conventional theory of crisis and 
peace processes making a genuine contribution to our understanding of these phenomena. 
The system/environment perspective is a sophisticated tool to explore in depth the 
relationship between crisis and peace processes and their environment, that is society as a 
whole. The conclusion of my research and analysis is that these processes are highly 
complex systems, which emerge as the unity of themselves and their environment. 
This further means that the environment of a crisis or a peace process is not less important 
than the process itself. 
Society here is considered to be functionally and not hierarchically differentiated. 
Furthermore, it is not constituted of idividuals and their interactions as conventional 
analysis argues but of social systems built up of communication. Social systems such as 
politics, media, diplomacy and the military are interdependent and yet autonomous in the 
way they implement their function. Structurally coupled through their normal recursive 
operations, they produce the dynamics of crisis or co-operation. Their aim is neither 
stability nor the fulfillment of some super-ordinate purpose such as peace or the protection 
of national interests; it is simply their self-reproduction: communication must follow 
communication. 
The description of the Greek-Turkish crisis and peace processes through the `butterfly' 
metaphor stresses the emphasis precisely on the system/environment synergy. It is the 
dynamics of the environment that attribute causality every time to the `butterflies'. The 
Figen Akat incident and the earthquake needed the `unintended' coincidental co-operation 
of the environment of the Greek and Turkish societies to produce the `unintended' crisis 
and the ̀ unintended' system of co-operation. 
This thesis argued that crisis and peace processes emerge and develop in the course of 
modern society's continuous self-reproduction. Society is ceaselessly being shaped and re- 
shaped at the level of communication steered by existing structures of expectations each 
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system holds about itself and its environment. Crisis and peace processes, then, emerge 
through morphogenesis that is deviation amplifying mutual causal processes of 
communication. 
The perspective of the social autopoiesis shifts the emphasis from social structures to 
simultaneity and complexity, which enforces selectivity. Various social systems' 
simultaneous selections constrain complexity towards the direction of crisis or co- 
operation and peace. Increased complexity enforces the emergence of nexuses of 
contingent selective occurrences, fast moving cascades of interconnected communications 
which are oriented towards the one or the other direction. The dynamics of these processes 
is found in the ability of communications to connect and to form structural couplings. 
Furthermore, this is possible due to the self-referential nature of `meaning' and its strategy 
of generalization, which grants it autonomy and a high degree of freedom in connecting. 
Peace processes literature has looked for the link to connect the various peace processes 
and the peace processes with their broader environment that is society. Habermas's 
discourse ethics as applied to the study of peace processes seeks this link in the 
communicative rationality and justice. John Burton, Herbert Kelman and others are based 
on the positivist philosophical foundation of human needs and behavioral theories. 
Luhmann's answer is radically different and counterintuitive: neither reason nor justice; 
there is nothing but the structural couplings among social systems that is a-causal 
connections in the process of modem society's autopoiesis. 
Luhmann's different understanding of the complexity and contingency of modem society 
employed here leads to a surprising answer with regard to the on-going discussion in the 
literature of conflict theory, conflict transformation v conflict resolution: there is no 
conflict resolution; perhaps only by accident. The emergence of a crisis or a peace process 
and its development is a matter of chance. Yet, as demonstrated in all of the cases 
examined above, chance does not mean randomness. Rather, it means lack of co- 
ordination. The impossibility of co-ordination among the various autonomous social and 
psychic systems is a condition of modern, functionally differentiated society, which 
determines its every time orientation towards conflict or co-operation. 
The empirical evidence presented here demonstrated that the various self-referential 
systems that contributed to the constitution of the systems of crisis and co-operation did 
not have the same ̀ motives' or the same rationale. They reacted to irritations that they 
selected to observe or some times they selected the same `irritation' to which they 
attributed, however, a different selectivity and connectivity according to their own 
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`meaning worlds'. There was no super-system that organized infinite complexity neither 
was there one particular super-ordinate rationale. The assumption of one rationality breaks 
down to a number of distinct rationales of social systems and their distinctions, which are 
the simplified codes which guide their operations of meaning determination. Then, crisis 
and peace processes emerge through the coincidence of structural couplings. 
The analysis of peace processes through Luhmann's theory challenges the assumptions 
that underly conflict resolution theory to advance the existing theories of conflict 
transformation. Indeed, it offers us the analytical tools to further theorize on the dynamics 
of conflict transformation. Conflict transformation theories emphasize the need of a 
society in conflict itself to address and cope with the conflict. The thesis shed light on this 
aspect making the point that any change in a society in conflict is self-change. 
Furthermore, it argued that this change is not accumulative, result of a rational process; 
therefore, it cannot be planned or engineered. Planning, of course, is part of the operation 
of social systems. Yet, the argument here was that society does not follow the plan of a 
system. Rather, it is the transformational dynamics of communication that can give rise to 
new systemic structures such as language, themes, institutions, programmes of 
actions/goals and persons, possible points of connection that direct communication 
towards co-operation and peace. The discussion in the chapter VI about the emergence of 
latent structures of peace and co-operation, which can be uncovered when a decisive point 
is reached, further illuminates the morphogenetic nature of conflict transformation. 
Recent theories of conflict transformation have hesitantly attempted to move away from 
the mainstream causal analysis, experimenting with the study of self-reflexive processes 
within modem society. Nevertheless, still approaches such as those of Dryzek and Tarja 
Vayrynen's are oriented towards the search of some `shared reality' and `consensus', 
which will be achieved through communication. The problem here is - and this is the 
direction to which, with few exceptions, the majority of conflict transformation theories 
look at - that they equate communication with understanding. The research conducted on 
Greek-Turkish relations through Luhmann's theory challenges this assumption to 
demonstrate that communication sensitizes society to chance. The development of the 
various Greek-Turkish peace initiatives examined above ultimately depended on their 
connectability, whether they were able to link up and form chains of communications. 
This approach emphasizes the impossibility of communication and the increase of 
contingency in modem society. Additionally, it made the point that the fundamental 
problem of society is the self-referential nature of communication. 
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Galtung's TRANSCEND approach is one of the few theories which seek to overcome the 
equation of communication with understanding. Based on his rich experience from many 
conflicts all over the world, Galtung described conflict transformation as a process of 
complexification arguing that a conflict worker should introduce more perspectives, more 
issues and more goals in order to disembed a conflict from its dual restrictive framework. 
The application of Luhmann's theory to peace processes provides a more profound 
understanding of Galtung's complexification process and offers the means to connect it 
with John Vasquez's observation that for the success of peace processes it is important the 
number of institutions supportive of peace in a society. Indeed, the thesis explained that 
the process of connecting the various initiatives is self-referential and every change is self- 
change. The institutionalised aims of the EU and NATO, institutionalised Greek-Turkish 
economic interests, a culture of an active civil society and women's movement were 
points of connection for the co-operation/conflict difference on the side of co-operation. 
Taking the example of PSWs, it was the increase of complexity and more precisely the 
modelling of society's complexity within complexity that speeded up structural couplings 
and enabled the emergence of new social structures. Thus, this thesis argues that 
complexity is not only a problem in the resolution of conflicts but it is also where the 
solutions may lie. 
Conventional analysis of crisis and peace processes evolves around the discussion of 
narrowly defined interactions among decision-makers, assuming a hierarchical 
differentiation of society where leaders have full control of the relations of their state with 
other states and they make decisions on the grounds of a rational processing of 
information. My research and analysis makes the point that interactions, like meetings of 
decision-makers, or meetings among representatives of civil society organizations are 
highly complex social systems which cannot be reduced to its participants. An interaction 
is a cognitive entity on itself constituted of various social systems, social and cultural 
patterns, routines and institutionalized practices. Interactions provide society's constant 
autopoiesis with a field of experimentation rather than a solid foundation for future action. 
Accordingly, interactions are episodes in society's self-reproduction, which can produce 
complexity for its further differentiation. 
The discussion of the re-entry of the two crises back to the Greek-Turkish conflict through 
the mechanisms of writing and printing illustrated again the autopoietic evolution of the 
Greek-Turkish conflict in the Greek and Turkish societies explaining further why modern 
society cannot be described anymore on the level of interactions. The self-reproduction of 
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the crises of 1996 and 1987 continued after their de-escalation through the academic and 
journalistic writings and the political rhetoric. Communication about selected events 
related to the crises was connected beyond the specific locus and time of these events with 
other themes and structures within the Greek and Turkish society towards the direction of 
conflict and thereby reproduced them eventually transforming them to an integral part of 
the conflict. It did not matter whether this communication reflected an objective reality or 
not. All it mattered was the selectivity and connectability of the communication about 
these events. 
The radical shift from action to communication as the constitutive element of these 
processes is an imaginative and fruitful choice, which makes an important contribution to 
theorizing about crisis and peace processes. In the introductory chapter, it was 
demonstrated that mainstream theories of crisis and peace processes, based on a 
hierarchical view of society, focused on actions and decisions, ending to a description of 
isolated aspects of these phenomena. Put it otherwise, although conventional approaches 
do talk about crisis and peace processes they cannot describe and explain the dynamics 
involved in these processes because they remain largely static theories of objects. 
Luhmann's theory is a theory of process, which breaks the illusion of a hierarchical and 
stable society to demonstrate that modem society is a self-organising system, which is in a 
state of dynamic stability based on constant movement, the constant self-reproduction of 
communication that constitutes society. Indeed, using the theory of social autopoiesis, the 
emergence and development of crisis and peace processes were explored as processes of 
constant change, vanishing and becoming. Thus, this perspective signifies the departure 
from the existing theories of crisis and peace processes, which are theories of object, to the 
articulation of a real theory of process. 
The approach to crisis and peace processes developed here through Luhmann's theory is 
holistic. As such it could not ignore the role of the system of science with regard to the 
selection of conflict and peace within modem society. The examination of the process of 
the construction of the analyses of the crises of 1996 and 1987 demonstrated that academic 
discourse can contribute to the reproduction and reinforcement of the structures of a 
protracted conflict. Furthermore, it can contribute to the development and 
institutionalization of conflict resolution practices and thus it can contribute to the 
emergence and development of peace processes. It was discussed, in particular, how 
mainstream theories of crisis and peace processes assign themselves the task of the 
description of an assumed objective reality and they then proceed to prescribe certain 
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solutions to the problems they have defined. This is reflected in their proclaimed goal to 
trace the paths that lead to war and peace and identify specific patterns in these paths. 
These studies, however, are produced through the structures of meaning of social science, 
which is also a function system within society. This system observes society through its 
own pre-established distinctions. For that purpose it employs methods of research and 
schemas of interpretation developed within the system of science. However, just like the 
other social systems, the system of science cannot see the re-entry of its pre-established 
determinations of meaning to society, and thus the consequences of its own operation 
within society. Thus the conclusion here is that the re-entry of theory into modern society 
changes its own object resulting to the paradox where theory is not something different 
from its own object; it becomes its own object! 
This conclusion has further implications with regard to a key question of the praxis of 
conflict resolution namely the problem of direct control and social engineering by means 
of knowledge. The above analysis makes the point that in conditions of high complexity 
control and planning are not possible; neither is prediction possible. Nevertheless, 
although one cannot predict the next crisis because of the nature of society and social 
systems, one can explain the phenomena of unpredictability, dynamics, and `butterflies'. 
One can then explore how the improbable can become probable through deviation 
amplifying mutual causal processes that can be crystallized to some structural form of 
crisis or co-operation. The theory does not produce quick-fix advice to policy makers such 
as the advice provided by the conventional crisis management theories e. g. keep firm 
control on the military or censor the media. As noted at the beginning of this section, it 
requires a different way of thinking which will take into consideration the complexity of 
modern society. 
The methodology of second order observation or the observation of observing systems 
which was adopted here asks sociological researchers to avoid attributing their own 
meaning to events. It seeks to uncover the invisibilities of social systems, their blind spots 
and the paradoxical nature of system formation in modern society. It can explore how 
systems reflect on everything they take for granted as their environment and to which they 
attribute meaning through processes of generalisation and re-specification. The 
epistemology of second order observation enables comparisons instead of immediately 
reducing complexity by attributing itself meaning to actions and events according to its 
own pre-established distinctions. 
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2. Greek-Turkish Relations 
This thesis demonstrated that the Greek-Turkish crises and peace processes are 
paradoxical autopoietic systems. Using the analytical tools Luhmann's theory provides 
us with we explored their constitution through autocatalytic processes of communication 
rather than actions and decisions. Indeed, the empirical evidence presented above 
substantiates the argument that crisis and co-operation in Greek-Turkish relations emerged 
through meaning constitutive processes that involved not only the political system or 
isolated segments of the Greek and Turkish society but society as a whole. Greek and 
Turkish politics, media, diplomacy, the military, science and civil society organizations, 
contributed to the emergence and development of crisis or co-operation through their 
normal operations within society. 
This study led to another conclusion with regard to the evolution of Greek-Turkish 
relations: they develop along the transformational dynamics of bifurcations and 
attractors. This analysis stressed the unpredictability in moments of bifurcation and the 
sensitive dependence on initial conditions or "butterfly effects". In a self-organising 
society an event -like the Figen Akat accident, or the earthquake of 1999- could trigger 
meaning constitutive processes and increase the complexity of the situation and the need 
for its reduction. This moment of infinite complexity is described as bifurcation. An 
attractor is a self-description that has prevailed and has become stable condition through 
networks of recursive observations of observations. Furthermore, after its emergence an 
attractor becomes a distinction, a blueprint, for social systems' selections, which constrain 
infinite complexity. 
The Greek-Turkish conflict itself was defined in this thesis as a powerful attractor that 
reduced complexity and gave rise to the Imia/Kardak crisis and the crisis of 1987. The 
thesis demonstrated that `accidents' triggered nexuses of references activating the 
structures of the meaning of the conflict, which in turn increased the speed of structural 
couplings and eventually structured the complexity towards the escalation of the crisis. It 
was argued that recourse to rational thinking or rational decision-making was not possible 
simply because the leaders of the two countries could not have complete information, they 
could only access the complexity of the situation selectively. 
However, this thesis has also demonstrated how an accident like an earthquake can lead to 
the emergence of a new attractor, a system of Greek-Turkish co-operation. The analysis of 
the phenomenon that followed the earthquake of 1999 demonstrated that morphogenetic 
evolutionary processes of communication were crystallized in social structures of co- 
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operation such as themes, institutions, programmes, and persons. In this case, the system 
of co-operation emerged and it was established as another attractor alternative to conflict. 
Furthermore, after its establishment guided the operations of social systems. 
The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that the emergence and development of crisis 
and conflict on one hand and peace and co-operation on the other cannot be reduced to one 
particular reason or rationale. The crises of 1987 and 1996 did not share the same or 
similar causality; and the same can be said about the peace processes examined in this 
thesis. For example the defence of the national interests of Greece and Turkey was not the 
cause of the two Greek-Turkish crises. Neither was the rationale of peace the cause of the 
peace initiatives undertaken. The above analysis demonstrated that it was multiple rather 
than uni-linear causality, which constituted the crisis and the peace processes examined 
here. The exploration of structural couplings illustrated the self-referential nature of these 
systems. The emergence of the various structural couplings was largely accidental; 
structural couplings were not motivated by the advantages of the couplings themselves. 
The analysis of the paradox of the re-entry of the two crises back into the system of 
conflict, from which they emerged in the first place, further illustrated the autopoiesis of 
the Greek-Turkish conflict within the Greek and Turkish society through structural 
couplings. The two crises re-entered the Greek-Turkish conflict by means of scientific, 
journalistic and political accounts of the crises. These accounts reinforced the structures of 
the meaning of the conflict. Communication about the crisis became independent of the 
living memory of the interactive partners, independent of the interaction itself, detached 
from the temporal point of its appearance and ultimately detached from the events that 
brought it about in the first place. The way the crisis of 1987 or 1996 escalated and de- 
escalated was not important anymore. Journalistic and academic narratives and political 
rhetoric about the Greek-Turkish crises became the crises themselves. These narratives 
structured the complexity, created expectations and institutions, corresponding to the 
expectations which reproduce them further within the Greek and Turkish societies. These 
narratives however, are a self-created reality, part of a continual self-reproduction through 
socialisation and education and the direction of technical automatic processes of social 
systems. The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that in both countries, academics, 
journalists, politicians, and diplomats participate in the creation of the problems they 
address and in a certain way, they have created what they should avoid. 
At the end of a thesis on Greek-Turkish relations one might expect some sort of 
prediction; whether and when another Greek-Turkish crisis will break out or whether the 
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emerged system of co-operation is likely to develop further. According to the above 
analysis what we know for sure is that the development of Greek-Turkish relations is not 
pre-determined; whether crisis or co-operation will prevail depends on `accidents'. That 
means that a negative turn is possible. The evolution of Greek-Turkish relations depends 
on the complexity and contingency of their environment and the connectability of conflict 
or co-operation. 
To give an example here, the process of the European integration has increased the 
complexity of the environment of the Greek-Turkish conflict creating structures such as 
themes, roles and institutions, which guide the operations of social systems towards the 
direction of peace. On the other hand, however, the recent Iraqi crisis and its effects on 
Greek-Turkish relations offer another illustration of the complexity of this environment as 
the complexity of world society. 
During the last months (spring 2003) themes of the Greek-Turkish conflict have re- 
emerged and have again gained the day in the Greek society in particular; the Turkish 
society at that moment was occupied with other issues. The Greek media, politics, civil 
society, focused on - that is they selected to observe - the movement of the Turkish troops 
to the northern border of Turkey with Iraq, interpreting it as the evidence that confirms 
their pre-established image of Turkey as "an unchangeable military regime". They 
willingly ignore another ̀ fact' which is that a small Turkish army was already within the 
Iraqi land and with that they ignore the complexity of this issue. Because the war in Iraq, 
reported by the Turkish media constituted an `irritation' for the Turkish society, which 
increased the complexity. Anti-war demonstrations by masses of islamists after the Friday 
prayer, joined by civil society organizations and intellectuals in a country governed by an 
Islamist party with a European orientation, under the constant pressure of a military which 
seeks to preserve the secular character of the state, its territorial integrity and its power 
through its ties with the USA is a highly complex and unpredictable situation. 
The mobilization of the Turkish troops is only one out of many events, which are 
simplified self-descriptions of highly complex processes going on simultaneously in 
Turkey. The simplified theme of Turkey being a "military regime" makes integral part of 
the "meaning world" of the Greek-Turkish conflict seen from the Greek side. As it was 
demonstrated in the chapter VI under certain conditions this theme has also guided the 
selections of social systems in Greece towards the direction of the crisis as it happened in 
1987. At this juncture, this contingency seems to favour the dynamics of the conflict 
instead of the dynamics of co-operation. To come back to the question posed in this 
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section, if social systems make selections towards the conflict, they reinforce the dynamics 
of conflict and at the same time the system of co-operation atrophies because it cannot find 
points for connection within society. 
3. The Re-entry of this Thesis into Society 
This thesis constitutes a highly complex communicative system itself. Accordingly, just 
like other analyses of crises and peace processes, which have re-entered society through 
the medium of writing and printing, it will re-enter society through the structures of the 
social system of education and in particular its sub-system of universities. These structures 
have pre-determined the processing of a PhD Thesis in the University of Kent at 
Canterbury. As the thesis re-enters society, as something, which is disseminated through 
reading, elements of it can be selected, oversimplified, generalized and re-specified to 
steer further processes of differentiation and autopoiesis within society. These elements 
can be selectively understood and structurally coupled for the autopoiesis of other social 
systems in their connections with existing meaning nexuses. For example, the factual 
evidence my research uncovered with regard to the de-escalation of the crisis of 1987 may 
be connected with the anti-PASOK rhetoric of Nea Dimokratia within Greece. One can 
imagine several other examples where a particular system or subsystem may select 
elements, which may continue its own self-reproduction. 
Nevertheless, the aim of this thesis is to provide an insight into the complexity of Greek- 
Turkish relations. Furthermore, this analysis can serve as an instrument of other and self- 
observation, which may increase our understanding of the nature of modem society. The 
complex architecture of Luhmann's theory enables us to explore the complexity of modem 
society. By increasing internal complexity Luhmann's systems theory increases selectivity 
and enables us to explore the multiple causality involved in crisis and peace processes' 
constitution. 
Finally, I do not claim this thesis is a representation of the reality of Greek-Turkish 
relations. The judgment of the usefulness of the theory rests with the readers and whether 
it offers a better understanding of the complexities of modem society for them. This 
question then will be ultimately answered through the observations of my observations by 
other second order observers. 
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APPENDIX 
The Chronicle of the Crisis of 1996 
26`h of December 1995: the Turkish merchant vessel "Figen Akat" was driven ashore 
in one of the two rocky islets which are located in the Eastern Aegean sea. The Greek 
local authorities offered assistance but the captain of the vessel claimed the islet to be 
part of the Turkish land and therefore suggested that the Turkish authorities ought to 
deal with it. 
271': the Turkish boat was finally towed by a Greek company to the Turkish port of 
Culluk. 
29th: the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Deniz Baykal submitted a memorandum 
to the Greek ambassador Dimitris Nezeritis claiming sovereignty over the islets. The 
main argument was derived from an interpretation of the Treaty of Paris of 1947. It 
was argued, that although the Article 14.1 of the above Convention signed between 
Greece and Turkey, stipulates that the Dodecanese and all the adjacent islets were 
ceded to Greece, meanwhile the islets of Kardak are adjacent to Turkey and not to 
Greece because the distance in the first case is 3.5 nautical miles and 5.5 in the 
second. In addition, it was argued that "the islets of Imia constitute part of Turkish 
territory and that they had been recently registered in the Land Registry of the Turkish 
province of Mugla. 
10th of January: the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied through another 
memorandum, and rejected the Turkish claims. The Greek arguments recalled the 
agreement of 1932 between Turkey and Italy, which demarcated territorial boundaries 
and sovereignty over islets associated with the Dodecanese archipelago. Sovereignty 
over Imia/Kardak was considered to belong to Italy. Subsequently, by the Treaty of 
Paris of 1947, the islets were ceded to Greece with the other Dodecanese islands. 
20`h: an article about the Figen Akat incident appeared in the Greek periodical 
"Empisteutiko Gramma", bringing the matter to the public eye. 
24th: the Greek private television channel Antenna, presented the incident with the 
Figen Akat, as well as the official correspondence between the two states, as evidence 
of a serious threat to Greek sovereignty. 
25th: four inhabitants of Kalymnos (adjacent to Imia/Kardak island), among them the 
mayor of the island, took the initiative to hoist the Greek flag on one of the two islets, 
with Antenna camera crews present. 
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25th: the Minister of the Press and the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
Greece admitted the existence of the issue and tried to play the incident down. 
27th: a group of Turkish journalists, accompanied by a camera crew from the Turkish 
television channel Kanal D, chartered a helicopter and landed on the islet. They 
lowered the Greek flag and hoisted the Turkish flag in front of the Turkish cameras. 
This film was shown on Turkish television the next day. The same footage was shown 
in Greece on Greek television channels. 
27th: the deputy Foreign Minister of Turkey frowned upon this action. 
28th (early in the morning): the Turkish flag was located by a Greek warship, which 
was ordered by the Head of the Greek Forces after communication with the Minister 
of Defence to raise the Greek flag again, and a small contingent of soldiers stayed on 
the island. 
29th (early in the morning): starts the building up of the military presence of both sides 
in the region. 
29th: the Turkish government made an open claim to possess the two islets and the 
Foreign Minister Deniz Baykal gave Ambassador Nezeritis another memorandum. 
The argument was not referring just to the distance of the islets from the other islands 
and the Turkish coasts, but it was based on the non-validity of the procedure of the 
signing of the 1932 Turk-Italian Treaty. 
The same day the Greek Foreign Minister replied on the grounds of the international 
law and both sides increased the presence of their warships in the region. In the 
afternoon of the same day the Greek Prime Minister made a confusing statement -as 
can be seen in retrospect - that "Greece is ready for everything". 
30th (morning): the Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller raised also the tones stating 
on the television: "We do not have to give even a little stone of the land of this 
country... We do not allow the rising of a foreign flag on Turkish land". 
30th: the USA undertook the role of the mediator from early in the afternoon. High 
level officials had direct contacts with Greeks and Turkish decision-makers, Prime 
Ministers, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and the leaders of the armed forces in both 
sides. 
30th (night): the interim Prime Minister Tansu Ciller addressed an ultimatum to the 
Greek government asking for the withdrawal of the land and naval forces, as well as 
the withdrawal of the flag from the Imia/Kardak setting a deadline until 7 o' clock the 
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next morning. The Greek side agreed with the withdrawal of its forces, ships but not 
the flag. 
31st at 2: 00 a. m.: Turkish commandos succeeded in passing through the Greek 
warships and occupied the other one of the two Imia/Kardak islets also hoisting the 
Turkish flag and achieving strategic parity. 
31s`: the negotiations lasted until 4: 00 a. m. The withdrawal of the fleets, the flag and 
the commandos started early in the morning. 
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The Chronicle of the Crisis of 1987 
16`h of February: The Greek Minister of Industry Sakis Peponis stated that the Greek 
state would buy the shares of the multinational consortium Denisson Morris 
Corporation. For that reason he called the companies of the consortium to 
negotiations. 
23`d of February: The President of the Board of Directors of the consortium Mr. 
Parmeli, denied to negotiate. Furthermore, in an interview he gave, he argued that the 
Consortium according to the contract it has signed with the Greek State, was entitled 
to proceed with the drillings east of Thassos, beyond the 6 miles. Furthermore, he 
stated that the company would proceed with that on the 28th of March and asked for 
the intervention of the interested countries -Canada, W. Germany, USA- these 
countries had vested interests in the consortium. 
27th of February: The Ambassadors of the USA, W. Germany, and Canada had talks 
with the Greek Minister of Industry Sakis Peponis. They asked the Greek government 
to cancel its decision to nationalize the shares of the company. 
Ambassador Akiman went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He wanted the Greek 
government to stop the consortium from making research beyond its demarcated 
territorial waters. 
5th of March: emergency meeting in Ankara of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and 
the Minister of Defence, the subject was the developments in the Aegean and the 
drillings out of the Greek territorial waters. 
6th of March: a draft of law about the nationalization of the shares of the consortium 
was proposed in the Greek Parliament. According to the draft, the companies of the 
consortium were to be called to negotiations regarding the conditions of the sale of the 
shares. If 3 months should pass without any sign of interest on the part of the 
companies of the consortium then the Greek government would proceed with the 
application of the Constitution, article 106 &&3,4, which made provision for 
nationalization. 
19`x' of March the Greek Ambassador to Ankara was called to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The Undersecretary of the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs Kamel protested 
about the Greek aircraft and war ships, which were disturbing the Turkish research 
vessel Piri-Reis in the Aegean Sea. Furthermore, a protest was made about the 
statement the Greek Minister of Defence made that "the Aegean Sea is Greek and will 
remain Greek". 
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19th of March in the morning: Piri-Reis left Gokceada and started its trip escorted by 
two warships, "Ak Hisar" and "Adatepe". It came 12 miles of Athos in Halkidiki. 
200' of March in the morning: Ambassador Akiman was called to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The Alternate Minister Yiannis Kapsis and Ambassador Costas 
Zeppos protested Piri-Reis's trip in the Aegean Sea which was considered to create a 
climate of tension and insecurity in Greek public opinion. Finally, it was argued that 
this incident followed a long line of similar incidents, which took place on the 13th 
and 16th of the same month. At that time, Turkish war ships had come just near the 
territorial waters of Limnos, and this was also considered as a clear provocation 
against Greece. 
The Spokesman of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that "the Greek 
government is obliged and for that reason determined to take all the appropriate 
measures and it will have no responsibility for the unexpected consequences a 
deterioration of the situation may have". The Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of Defence 
and the Minister of Industry made statements in an attempt to clarify the intentions of 
Greece. 
22"a of March: 
Greece denied that the consortium was planning to undertake research beyond of the 6 
miles. 
23rd of March 
According to the Greek government Turkish aircraft violated the rules of air traffic. 
24th of March 
A statement was made by the Greek spokesman Yiannis Roumbatis about the 
violations. The Greek representative to NATO protested about the same incidents. 
25th of March 
The Turkish National Security Council was convened. At this meeting, Kaya Erdem 
(the Vice President who was replacing the Prime Minister), Hasan Cemal Guzel, 
(spokesman of the government and Minister of the Presidency), Ministers of Justice 
and Internal Affairs, Sugurlu and Abulut and all the superior military officers were 
present. 
Later in the evening -after the National Security Council meeting- the Ministers' 
Council was also convened and decided to apply the decision taken by the NSC. 
The Turkish Ambassador to the United Nations, Ilter Turkmen sent a letter -dated 23`d 
of March-to the Secretary General of the UN. It was based firstly on the statement 
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made by the president of the consortium Parmeli that the consortium would make 
research beyond the territorial waters of Thassos, and secondly on the Berne Protocol. 
Ozal made moderate statements in London emphasizing the prospects for co- 
operation between the two countries as well as the determination of the Turkish 
government to respond to any attempt on the part of the Greek government to create a 
fait accompli. 
Friday 26th of March 
14: 00-17: 00 Meeting of the Greek National Security Council (Prime Minister, 
Minister of Defence, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Head of the Armed Forces) 
in Kastri, at the Prime Minister's house. Coming out of the meeting they declared that 
"if Turks attempt drillings we will hit". Closure of the American military basis in 
Makri, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Carolos Papoulias went to Sofia to 
discuss the crisis with the neighbouring country. 
Güven Ergedlan, a military officer, general secretary of the NSC, informed domestic 
and foreign press about the decisions taken the day before by the Turkish National 
Security Council. A new meeting of the NSC convened. 
Plus a large Turkish military exercise was taking place during the same days in the 
Aegean Sea. 
Meeting of the Greek Heads of the Armed Forces and later on another meeting with 
the Minister and the Deputy Minister of Defence Haralambopoulos and Kouris 
respectively. 
A meeting of the NATO Ambassadors in Brussels was convened where the crisis was 
discussed. 
The Greek representative in New York informed the President of the Security Council 
about the situation. 
Kapsis called Ambassador Akiman to the MFA and invited the Turkish government to 
agree upon the relegation of the resolution of the dispute about the continental shelf to 
the International Court of The Hague according to the International Conventional and 
Customary law. 
The Turkish newspapers and the Greek press supported the decision of their 
respective governments. 
Piri-Reis left its port for research in the open sea. "If the Greek aircraft disturb it then 
Turkey will immediately react" was the message on the part of the Turkish side. 
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